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INTRODUCTORY 
THE THEORY OF ECONOIviIC DEVELOPMENT 
IN GENERAL PERSPECTIVE 
1. ECONOMIC THEORY AND PRACTICAL POLICY. 
One of the most significant facts of modern life in almost 
all civilised communities is the ever- widening range of state 
action, and as this spreads the more complex become the problems 
of policy formulation and administration. In the selection of 
objectives as well as methods, the statesman needs all the help 
he can get from specialists in every field of human life. And, 
as so many problems of government lie within the scope of 
economics, the economist is increasingly prominent among those 
specialists whose aid is sought. 
The chief incentive to economic studies and the justification 
of specialising in this field, have always been found in the hope 
that they will contribute to the solution of concrete problems. 
The value of economics in the eyes of the public and most students 
of economic science derives from the belief in the practical 
utility of the specialised knowledge of the economist, in the 
relevance of the main body of economic doctrine to policy- making. 
This belief is readily recognisable without questioning. What 
is questionable may, in fact, be the quality of the economist's 
performance and the accuracy of his fact finding. Either or both 
are often the subject of bitter criticism. Yet time and again 
the advice of the economist is sought, because 'practical men' 
in business or in government find themselves helpless when they 
face problems which reach beyond their own experience. This 
advice, however, is still in some measure suspect as being too 
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theoretical or academic, too lacking in practical judgment. 
While anxious to prove the value of his professional skill, the 
economist himself is Billy aware of the limitations of economic 
science, of the gulf between economic theory of all schools and 
the process of policy- making. 
It is important at the outset to survey the limitations of 
economic theory in relation to practical policy, for the attempt 
is worth while if we should seek to reconstruct theory in a more 
useful and realistic form. If it is found that the application 
of theory to the concrete problems of real life requires co- 
operation with other scientists and specialists in other fields, 
then that co- operation should be established and perpetuated. 
These issues are of much interest for the philosophy of science 
or methodology; but they are also of practical importance because 
the practical man is very often confronted with policy problems 
beyond the competence of his unaided common sense. 
2. SELF - IMPOSED LIMITATIONS OF ECONOMIC THEORY. 
The gulf between economic theory and practical policy is 
partly due to the great complexity of the practical problems with 
which policy is concerned and the prevalence of obstacles to the 
use of scientific method. Of all branches of science none is 
devoid of its own external limitations of such a kind. But there 
also exist limitations which economists, conscious of the 
independent status of their science, have imposed upon 
themselves by their definition of the scope and method of 
economics. In the last hundred years the tendency has been to 
draw these self- imposed boundaries closer and closer in an attempt 
to delimit a field within which the findings of economics would 
be as incontestable as those of other recognised natural sciences. 
The political economy of the last two centuries mixed abstract 
reasoning with description of existing conditions, speculation 
about the future and discussion of ethical principles and 
political expediency. In an attempt to achieve positivity, 
objectivity and certainty in theorising, and to win for economics 
a place among the sciences, later writers have shed much of the 
ethical, technological and sociological content of the older 
political economy, and have made much of the distinction between 
the explanation of things as they are and the prescription of how 
they should be. Taking the former task as their province, most 
modern economists deny the competence of their science to 
formulate ends or objectives. Within its own restricted field, 
the positive findings of economics are supposed to form the 
instrumental knowledge that may guide the choice of means to 
achieve a given objective, once that objective has been 
independently established as socially desirable. Only in this 
way, it is sometimes argued, can economics contribute to the 
success of policy. 
A survey of the literature of modern economics, however, 
reveals that exclusion of the normative viewpoint is incomplete. 
In Marshallian and Pigovian 'Welfare Economics', ethical questions 
are openly raised and solutions proposed. Even quite recently 
Little contends that welfare economics as a branch of economic 
science can hardly be a positive study to be based exclusively on 
objective principles. The complications and contradictions which 
Scitovsky has shown to be implicit in the Kaldor -Hicks welfare 
criterion for any economic change has led Little to believe that 
the avoidance of such contradictions can only be effected through 
the introduction of moral premisses and value judgments in order 
(1) 
to arrive at unambiguous welfare conclusions. 
The attempt to establish a positive economic science, however, 
has been, if not wholly successful, at any rate worth while. For 
it has permitted a greater concentration upon the mere explanation 
of price formation and of market operations as well as a clearer 
understanding of causal relationships between economic variables. 
It may be contended, after all, that there has been no scarcity of 
ethical teaching of a general character while there have been many 
fallacious conceptions as to how the economic system does actually 
work. 
Thus if modern economic literature be considered as a guide to 
the subject matter of economic science, we can readily recognise 
two extremes. At one extreme, the abstract theorists, whose 
position and attitude has been defined and defended by Professor 
(1) I.M.D. Little, Critique of Welfare Economics, Oxford, 1950. 
L. Robbins, maintain that economics is in no way connected with 
the explanation of techniques or institutions but takes these, 
along with the wants and the physical and moral resources of the 
society concerned, as the data of economic theory. Given all the 
data, the economic problem, from the standpoint of this school 
of thought, is merely the allocation of available scarce resources 
as between alternative uses according to some principle; and 
economic analysis is just an attempt to discover this principle 
and to exhibit the transactions by which it is made effective. 
This principle is often referred to in economic literature as the 
principle of maximisation, or minimisation, or optimisation of 
some or other economic magnitude, e.g., utility or disutility, 
profit or revenue, cost or output. But the abstract theorists 
would encounter some difficulty in agreeing as to what is to be 
maximised, minimised, or optimised without recourse to ethics, 
technology and sociology. 
At the other extreme, the so- called institutionalists, in an 
attempt to provide a comprehensive picture of economic behaviour 
in general terms, give to techniques and institutions the same 
status as they give to theory. Between these two extremes are 
placed the majority of economists who have found it impossible to 
avoid mixing some description of wants, techniques and institutions 
with logical deduction, formal argument and abstract theory. 
Nevertheless, the attempt is made to demarcate between the pure 
theory of the market and the description of practice. Surveys of 
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human wants, techniques of production, and social institutions 
are becoming more and more the exception in economic literature. 
These matters are increasingly relegated to other allied subjects 
which the appropriate specialists undertake to study and explain, 
while the economic theorist follows up his own speciality. This 
specialisation, no doubt, has facilitated progress in the 
exploration of the problems of market equilibrium under various 
assumed conditions, but the resultant body of economic doctrine 
is inevitably remote from the possibility of practical application. 
To this extent, the gap between theory and policy is of the 
economist's own making. If creation of this gulf was necessary 
for the progress of economic theorising,bridging it is equally 
necessary for the application of theory to policy. 
The abstract theorists, no doubt, have sought to define 
economic theory in such a manner as to exclude the study of 
institutions and techniques. All these variables are grouped 
among the given factors influencing the relative scarcity of 
different economic goods, while economic theory studies only the 
principles by which these scarce goods are allocated between 
alternative uses. Now what is given cannot be at the same time 
the subject of study. The adoption of this definition imposes a 
limitation upon the economist's field of investigation and 
discourages any effort on his part to study scientifically the 
way in which these given factors develop. Since changes in wants, 
techniques and institutions are dominant causes of that complexity 
in economic problems which drives the practical man to seek the 
aid of the economist, such a restricted definition of the scope of 
economic science tends to widen the gap between economic theory 
and practical policy. 
3. EXTERNAL LIMITATIONS UPON ECONOAIC INVESTIGATION. 
The pure theorist can work in his study; he needs neither 
laboratory nor field of work, as long as he confines himself to 
working at the logical implications of a given set of conditions 
relating to the scarcity of available resources. As Wieser argued, 
"we can observe natural phenomena only from the outside but 
ourselves from within." This obviously makes the social sciences 
essentially different from the natural sciences. But if the 
economist takes wants, technology and social institutions as part 
of his subject matter, his material is scattered throughout the 
world. Some of it may reach him in the form of figures, statistics 
and descriptive literature, and may therefore be available for 
investigation within four walls. But there will always be gaps 
and imperfections in the material available to the academic 
investigator, and even to the economic adviser in the service of 
the state. Many of the facts which are necessary for a complete 
picture are not recorded at all; others are recorded but secretly. 
Of those that are not recorded some could be recorded through 
special investigations. No doubt the amount of new factual 
material made available in recent years is substantial at least 
in the more advanced communities in Western Europe and America, 
but the cost is a limiting factor to any such factual research. 
Obstacles of privacy, on the other hand, stand in the way of 
setting down hitherto unrecorded facts, and prevent publication 
of material which particular individuals have already prepared for 
their own purposes. Here, too, the economic investigator is at 
still greater disadvantage as compared with the natural scientist; 
for even apart from the denial of access to facts, the publication 
of which might affect particular interests, there is always the 
danger that personal or class bias will limit the economist's 
interest in certain facts and thereby discourage their 
investigation. This danger will form another limitation upon the 
factual material which is accessible to the most disinterested 
economist. Futhermore, there is the tendency of factual material 
to be out of date as soon as it has been recorded. This deficiency 
in factual knowledge has often been emphasised with reference to 
quantitative studies, for the relevant variables are actually 
subject to frequent changes of varying magnitudes and duration. 
4. THE SYNTHESIS OF SOCIAL SCIENCES. 
If then the tendency among economists has traditionally been 
to attempt to shed ethics, technology and sociology in order to 
concentrate on a narrower range of problems involving the behaviour 
of the 'economic man' in the sense with which students of 
economics are familiar, it may be worth while to consider whether 
a synthesis of social sciences would bring the complex problems 
of human behaviour nearer to a more satisfactory solution. 
Economics is sometimes defined as a science of human motives; 
and by definition it is possible to simplify the economic problem 
by disregarding all motives except the prospect of gain. The 
market structure will measure out wealth to all individuals; each 
in proportion to what has been earned by his efforts or by the use 
of his property. Each will be led to put his efforts and his 
property to the most remunerative use. It is true that such a 
simplification is useful in economic analysis, provided it is 
recognised to be an abstraction. In real life, however, there 
are alongside the motive of gain other motives which are really 
difficult to analyse or measure. A great deal of the daily work 
is done in response not to the incentive of gain, but to the 
deeply ingrained obligations of the family. Analogous to the 
obligations of the family in their detachment from gain are the 
obligations of the individual to the State, and the reciprocal 
obligations of the State to the individual. In civilised 
communities the rational basis of the State is everything; it is 
an instrument of security, and of law and order, and also of the 
promotion of welfare in its various aspects. "The State," says 
Hawtrey, "like the family, is the embodiment of a code of motives. 
Its function is to influence conduct. But it exerts its influence 
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along three discrepant channels. To those who identify 
themselves with it, it is a wider family, claiming allegiance and 
conferring benefits. To those within its jurisdiction it is a 
ruler imposing its will by compulsion and threat of force. 
Finally to all concerned it is a rationally constituted instrument 
of organised action, to be controlled, regulated and directed as 
expediency may indicate, and to be valued and supported in 
proportion to its usefulness.:(1) 
Economics, politics and other fields of social study in fact 
explain different aspects of human conduct and motives. In real 
life, the applied economist, who attempts to solve a concrete 
problem, is bound to transcend the traditional boundaries of the 
economic science; and such an attempt should evidently take him 
far into the realm of sociology; or, at least, he must be 
prepared to draw heavily on the work of the sociologist. In point 
of fact, sociologists have launched their investigation into such 
topics as politics, religion, family, property and other social 
institutions. But whereas economists have hitherto written very 
little about these topics, sociologists, on their part, have 
written very little about the economic aspects of these topics in 
their special field of study. Thus a gap is to be bridged and a 
synthesis of the social sciences achieved. True, the splitting of 
social study into specialised watertight compartments might be of 
great value in the advancement of social sciences. Specialisation 
(1) R. G. Hawtrey, Economic Aspects of Sovereignty, 2nd Edition, London, 
1952, p.32. 
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in the field of scientific study, as a whole, has its own merits 
for diminishing returns might operate here as effectively as in 
the field of industry. Still, of all the social sciences that 
suffered from splitting it was the science of economics which 
suffered most. If we take away from it what history and 
sociology may be taken, we are left over with no more than pure 
abstractions with few assumptions and postulates. This is what 
really took place. Ecopomics has substantially become more and 
more an exercise in logic or, more recently, mathematical logic. 
It may thus be said with some justification that, with such 
development, the science has become of a purely academic interest 
designed for the high intellectuals, but not for the common reader. 
Túow granted that the economist, the technician and the 
sociologist all have much to their credit in their respective 
fields of study, and that each may contribute his share to the 
progress of science and participate in revealing the truths of 
social life, there still remains the problem of synthesis. It 
would be futile for all the specialists to advise severally on 
the various aspects of a problem to the practical man, leaving 
him with the formidable task of effecting a synthesis. In real 
life, we can scarcely find a practical man who might be capable of 
performing this task. In real life, too, this practical man would 
expect to find someone who is capable of giving advice in a useful 
and usable form. Vhere economic issues in a certain problem are 
concerned, the economist himself is the appropriate specialist who 
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should provide the synthesis if he desires that policy should be 
guided by economic knowledge. But what sort of technique should 
the applied economist adopt in the way of providing the synthesis? 
On this interesting issue, Marshall seems to dismiss the contention 
that sociology might be a complement to economic theory. It does 
not exist, he maintains, and the only recourse one may have for 
dealing with social problems as a whole lies in the judgment of 
common sense. G.S. Shone, on the other hand, seems to hold the 
view that other social sciences can help the economist by 
enlarging his knowledge of human institutions and informing his 
judgment in the same way as direct observations and actual 
(1) 
experience do. J.R. Hicks, however, holds a different view. 
In one of his works he recognises that the economist, after 
'running away' with a problem involving extra -economic elements, 
always wants to hand the problem in the end to some sociologist 
or other, if there is a sociologist waiting for him; but very 
often there is not. (2) 
We may agree with Marshall that the economist, who has to 
insert specific data into his formal theory, may seek them by mere 
observation and the exercise of common sense. But the economist's 
reliance on common sense in identifying the specific data, which 
(1) G.S. Shone, Scope and Method of Economics, Economic Journal, 
September, 1938, p.411. 
(2) J.R. Hicks, The Social Sciences, London, 1936, p.135. 
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will constitute the premise of his theory, may sometimes be a 
source of embarrassment. When dealing with a concrete problem 
the economist must go beyond pure theory of the hypothetical type 
"If A, then B ", theory which is neither more or less than a 
tautological exercise in logic. Instead, he must be prepared to 
say: "Since A, then B. If his studies yield no scientific basis 
for the verification or confirmation of the premise A, he should 
confess that he is offering only his personal opinion regarding B, 
even though the technique of economic analysis has assisted the 
formulation of his opinion. 
Indeed the economist who has to advise on policy, however 
confident of his common sense and shrewdness of mind and however 
great his factual knowledge, is still in need of what help he can 
get in ordering the many factors of which account has to be taken 
when he deals with a practical problem. The conceptual scheme of 
economic analysis is believed to be solely an essential guide to 
solving practical problems, for it does not furnish a body of 
settled conclusions immediately applicable to policy. The need for 
a wider theoretical scheme is pretty obvious from the standpoint 
of the economist who is bound to advise on matters not readily 
amenable to economic analysis, and on which his opinion is, for 
the correctness of his judgment, just as crucial as the soundness 
of his economic theory. 
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5. THE FORMAL TREATMENT OF THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPT {MENT. 
Attempts have recently been made to avoid the pitfalls arising 
from reliance on common sense in preference to economic sociology. 
E.H. Walker, for instance, comes along to suggest a theoretical 
scheme considerably wider than that of present economic theory; 
and points out how this new conceptual scheme may be applied to 
the study of concrete problems. 
(1) 
Such a theoretical scheme, he 
states, can best be described as an extention of economic theory 
or as a contribution to economic sociology; but what really 
matters is the question whether it helps to bridge the gap between 
theory and policy. Broadly, it would offer for consideration two 
separate but related contributions: (a) a theory to cover certain 
non -market activities which are vital to economic policy, and which 
may upset forecasting based on a theory which exclusively covers 
the market operations; (b) a theory of economic development 
designed to guide the factual study of changes in such conditions 
as are given by present day economic theory. 
Let us first be clear as to the significance of a formal 
theory of economic development as such. The prediction of the 
course of history is not sought by such a theory, for a conceptual 
scheme is not a body of concrete truth but only a tool for its 
discovery. Because of the complexity of the real world, we need 
the assistance of economic theory to elucidate the changes implicit 
(1) C.f. E.R. Walker, From Economic Theory To Policy. 
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in given concrete conditions. Obviously the forces making for 
changes in such concrete conditions are even more complex than 
those involved in mere adjustments taking place within certain 
given conditions. Like the pure theory of the market, a pure 
theory of economic development would consist of a set of assumptions 
and a logical structure based on them, leading to significant 
conclusions. The only difference between the two theories, 
however, lies in the fact that in the theory of the market the 
assumptions are chosen and the analysis directed in order to yield 
logical conclusions about market behaviour under given conditions, 
whereas in a theory of development the assumptions and analysis 
are intended to yield conclusions as to changes in the conditions 
themselves which constitute the data of modern economic theory. 
Of course, a theory of this type would not by itself provide a 
formal outline of probable future developments; this can only be 
obtained by the application of the formal theory to the observed 
conditions. Thus it would serve the same purpose as that of the 
existing theory in the investigation of a concrete problem; that 
is, the transition from abstract into realistic economics which 
will classify the observed facts according to a significant scheme, 
and reveal what facts must be looked for in a particular instance. 
But while existing economic theory takes its conditions for 
granted and can be realistically applied only to predict the 
future course of events if conditions are assumed to be unalterable, 
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a theory of economic development takes account of changes in 
conditions and can be applied to predict how conditions will 
change in the real world. 
The term 'theory of economic development' is thus taken to 
denote the theoretical study of changes in the data or initial 
conditions of economic theory. But the same term is sometimes 
taken to cover the adjustments of the market to changes in the 
data or conditions of economic theory; hence the distinction 
between static and dynamic analysis in economic discussions. The 
theory of economic development, however, may be couched in a 
comprehensive study, not only of changes in the dependent variables 
or conclusions Which may follow a change in the data, but also of 
changes in the data of economic theory. In this sense the task of 
the development theorist is to construct a theory which might help 
the applied economist to obtain sufficient knowledge of the data, 
i.e., the exogenous factors or external conditions, of economic 
theory in order to permit prediction, even though they are subject 
to change. In other words, the development theorist should seek 
to endogenise in the theoretical scheme what is conventionally 
regarded as unexplainable exogenous factors or conditions. 
Let us, moreover, be clear as to the possibility of a formal 
theory of economic development. In this respect, Robbins' position 
is well known. "It is not possible for us," he says, "to extend 
our generalisations so as to cover changes of the data. We have 
seen in what sense it is possible to conceive of economic dynamics - 
17. 
the analysis of the path through time of a system making adjustments 
consequential upon the existence of given conditions. Can we not 
extend our technique so as to be able to predict changes of these 
given conditions? In short, can we not frame a complete theory of 
economic development ? "(1) Having cast a glance at some of the 
chief categories of data for economic theory, Robbins came to the 
conclusion that none of these data is likely to change primarily, 
or even largely through the processes which contemporary economic 
theory investigates. "In the last analysis," he maintains, "the 
study of Economics, while it shows us a region of economic laws, 
of necessities to which human action is subject, shows us, too, a 
region in which no such necessities operate. This is not to say 
that within that region there is no law, no necessity. Into that 
question we make no enquiry. It is only to say that from its 
point of view at least there are certain things which must be taken 
as ultimate data. "(2) 
This negative attitude of Robbins, however, should not prevent 
the development theorist from exploring more deeply the data of 
economic theory. All it means is that economics assumes certain 
conditions as being given and just explores their implications and 
the necessary adjustments of the market to their impact. It does 
(1) L. Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science, 
lid Edition, London, 1948, p.131. 
(2) Ibid. , p.135. 
1$. 
not therefore explain those data or induced changes in them. 
There may be some explanation, but economic science is not in 
fact seeking to construct a theory covering such explanation, so 
long as this science studies only the implications of its data. 
However, there still remains the problem of where explanation of 
these conditions can be found, if at all. 
At this stage, it is necessary to have a clear idea of what 
are the data, or conditions, of economic theory. Knight provides 
us with the following list designed to cover the data with respect 
to which change or the possibility of change should be the subject 
of theoretical study: the population, numbers and composition; 
the tastes and dispositions of the people; the amounts and kinds 
of productive capacities in existence; the distribution of 
ownership of these productive capacities; geographical distribution 
of people and things; and finally the state of the arts, i.e., the 
whole situation as to science, education, technology, social 
organisation, etc.(l) Once Knight's list of the data or the 
independent variables in the economic structure is pronounced, the 
dependent variables may be reduced to the following: the prices 
of final goods and services, the prices of productive services, 
the allocation of productive resources among enterprises within 
each industry, and finally the distribution of final products 
among the owners of the productive resources.() These variables 
(1) F.H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, p. 147. 
(2) F.H. Knight, The Ethics of Competition, p. 174. 
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are considered to be the results of the operations of the economic 
system, and vary according to the concrete content of the data. 
However, the distinction between data and conclusions is not 
so clear as one may think at first sight. The complete separation 
of conditions from consequences, of data from conclusions, is only 
possible and conceivable if we merely consider the initial 
conditions and the final equilibrium position, regardless of what 
may happen in the intermediate stage between one static equilibrium 
position and another. But the concrete problems with which the 
economist concerns himself arise in a community with a past history. 
The initial conditions, which may lead to equilibrium, always 
include some factors which are themselves the result of previous 
economic processes, in addition to factors which are postulated to 
be exogenous and given. Here we may detect that one channel of 
economic development is inherent in economic theory itself. It is 
only in practice that the distinction between the data and 
conclusions of economic theory appears to be difficult. In theory 
there should be no difficulty in maintaining this distinction, if 
we so desire, for all that is required is an appropriate choice of 
assumptions. The same change may be exogenous to one set of 
assumptions, but endogenous to another. In practice, however, the 
difficulties arise from doubts as to which set of assumptions is 
the more significant for the problem with which the applied 
economist is concerned. 
viethodologically, the treatment of a formal theory of economic 
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development must essentially begin with a consideration of each of 
the foregoing categories of data, and the investigation of the 
extent to which changes in the data appear to be the reflection of 
some economic processes or of other factors outside the economic 
system. Whether such a theory has any bearing on the course of 
economic development in the real world is another problem; this 
can only be settled by testing the theory against the facts. But 
since we start with the whole body of economic theory in the 
background, and then consider the passibility of building a 
development theory upon the existing body of doctrine, it can be 
readily seen that, with the appearance of the same quantities as 
the consequences of one process and the conditions for another, 
economic development has alrèady crept into economic theory. In a 
world with a past history, certain prices are the result of 
preceding given conditions, but meanwhile these very prices 
constitute the data for subsequent economic processes, i.e., the 
same dependent variables in the system of to -da become the 
independent variables in that of to- morrow. 
We may recall, in this connection, the well known Iviarshallian 
long period analysis in respect of which time is allowed for 
changes to work themselves out by influencing later short -run 
adjustments. In fact,arshallian analysis makes allowance not 
only for changes in prices, but also for such changes in the state 
of technology as one consequential on the long -term expansion or 
contraction of the productive unit. 
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Again, dynamic analysis in general whether in terms of 
'period' analysis represented mathematically by difference 
equations, or in terms of 'rate of change' analysis represented 
by differential equations, the adjustment made in one arbitrary 
chosen period help to determine the conditions to which adjustments 
are made in the subsequent period. Business cycles are indeed a 
typical illustration of such a dynamic analysis. The normal type 
of business cycle theory consists of a series of demonstrations of 
the manner in which one 'phase' grows out of the preceding one and 
contains the tendencies which finally brings forth the succeeding 
one, i.e., the past, the present, and the future are temporally 
interrelated; the present being produced by the 'pulls' of the 
past and the 'pushes' of the future. This inter -temporal causal 
relationship between economic variables whose behaviour over time 
is neither spontaneous nor instantaneous, whether this relationship 
is initiated by data changes, or changes in initial conditions, or 
changes in parameters, is in fact the essence of dynamic analysis 
in modern economic theory. (l) 
Having traced the nature of the data and conclusions of 
economic theory, it is then worth while to emphasise the need for 
a formal theory of economic development as defined above. The 
(1) C, f. Paul A. Samuelson, 'The Simple Mathematics of Inane Determination', 
in Income, Etaployment and Public Policy (Essays in Honour of Alvin H. 
Hansen, New York, 191+8), pp, 148-9. 
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economist who advises on practical problems is concerned with the 
prediction of events. If then he bases his prediction upon the 
assumption that the data or conditions of economic activity will 
remain unaltered whilst prices, production and income adjust 
themselves to the initial conditions, these predictions are likely 
to be wrong. The conditions themselves are continually changing; 
partly because some conditions react upon the others directly, as, 
for instance, the geographical distribution of persons reacts upon 
their tastes; partly because the best adjustments some people can 
make to the given conditions is to try to alter them; and partly 
for no reason at all that is apparent to our limited comprehension 
of the world about us. The economist is bound to estimate how 
these conditions are likely to develop in the period under 
consideration; or to adopt somebody else's estimate; and he must 
base his analysis of market or extra -market behaviour on the 
assumption that the data will change according to the estimate. 
When past experience includes changes for which no explanation 
can be offered, the only practical method of predicting future 
change is pure extrapolation. The chief problem encountered in 
this method is the determination of the 'true' past trends. Any 
advance in the technique of observation will improve the chances 
of accurate extrapolation. Some enterprising economists have 
contributed to the art of extrapolation; and others may be led, 
by interest in a concrete problem, to attempt to improve existing 
methods. There is no reason to consider this work to be outside 
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the sphere of the economist, any more than the empirical studies 
which are necessary to verify the assumptions of market theory. 
But when a group of research workers makes a new speciality of the 
determination of past trends and the calculation of extrapolated 
trends, most of us, states Mr. E.R. Walker, will be glad to consult 
the specialist on all cases where pure, but far from simple, 
extrapolation is required. Even when science throws some light on 
the causes of change, it will often be safer to use our scientific 
knowledge to modify the results of pure extrapolation than to 
attempt a forecast based entirely on a causal hypothesis. In most 
economic problems some use of extrapolation is essential, because 
science can give only an incomplete causal analysis of the changes 
observed in the past. But reliance on pure extrapolation alone, 
when our knowledge of the causes of changes suggests that such a 
procedure would give inaccurate results, is out of the question. 
The economist concerned with practical affairs must t ake a lively 
interest in the extension of knowledge regarding the causes of 
development; and, in so far as the causes are to be found within 
the field of economics, it is for economists themselves to discover 
them.(i) 
In this respect, we should refer to Colin Clark's exposition 
of the purpose of economics, and his contention that "economics in 
concerning itself only with those things which can be bought and 
sold for money, remains quite unmoved by the charge that it is 
(1) C. f. E. R. Walker, op. cit. , p. 191 
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neglecting the most important aspects of human life. Economics 
is a wide enough subject already without having to include the 
whole of philosophy, psychology, sociology and human biology in 
addition. Let economists get on with their work ard let the 
students of other social sciences get on with theirs. "(1) 
In view of this attitude of Colin Clark, Mr. E.R. Walker 
seems to provide a convincing answer in the following statement: 
"The economist has worries enough of his own without extending 
his investigation into fields already tilled by other sciences. 
But it is necessary to establish points of liason with these other 
sciences so that their findings can be utilised in the prediction 
of economic development. In particular the economist needs to 
know whether other sciences have determined unambiguously the past 
trend of the conditions of economic activity and whether they have 
discovered the causes of changes in these conditions. If other 
scientists, working in the fields to which these questions are 
appropriate, tend, under the pressure of other interests, to 
neglect or postpone the investigations which might provide answers 
for the economist, he must take the initiative himself and press for 
the recognition of his problems by other sciences. "(2) 
This discussion may thus point the way to a field for research 
rather than providing at once the additional knowledge which is 
suggested as necessary for realistic economics. But it must be 
(l) Colin Clark, The Conditions of Economic Progress, First Edition, London, 
194 0, -p.1. 
(2) E.R. Walker, op. cit., P. 192. 
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pointed out that, beyond a certain point, the cultivation of this 
field, in only general terms, will yield decreasing returns. 
Just as the conditions of economic activity vary from place to 
place and from time to time, so also the rate and direction of 
change, and even its causes, will vary. This is the reason why 
it is so difficult to make any attempt to predict "economic 
evolution" for the world as a whole. But the economist is more 
likely to be asked for advice on limited, local problems, and he 
can therefore manage to go on with his minor field of research. 
And, even though the backwardness of some sciences may leave 
considerable gaps in any attempt to present a synthetic estimate 
of future changes in the data of a particular economic problem, 
is that the capacity to make the most of available 
facts in such estimates should form part of the equipment of the 
economist. This capacity is more likely to be developed by the 
systematic exploration of the problems of economic development and 
by the cultivation of the necessary contacts with other sciences 
than by concentrating on the study of equilibrium theory and 
trusting to common sense for the rest. Moreover, it is necessary 
to pose the general problem involved in the prediction of economic 
development, in order to stimulate the analysis of those economic 
processes which are partly responsible for the data changes. This 
is the specific contribution which the economist might be expected 
to make to the theory of economic development, as distinct from 
the synthetic contributions of various other sciences. 
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If this is the specific contribution of the economist to the 
theory of economic development, he should make his knowledge of the 
economic causes of data changes as full as possible. The results 
of pure extrapolation into past trends have to be corrected in the 
light of scientific knowledge of the causal hypotheses of change. 
This would lead him into the exploitation of those existing 
economic theories which throw light on development, as well as to 
the construction of new ones to fill the gaps in his analytical 
technique. Does this mean, it might be asked, that we should add 
to economic science a special department, like the production, 
exchange and distribution of earlier economists, and the statics 
and dynamics of the most modern? Professor Roll has indeed devoted 
a whole part in a textbook for the discussions of "Problems of 
Change ". About the causes of data changes, he holds that modern 
economics can say little. It may be possible to enunciate general 
laws of change, but it is beyond the competence of the economist 
of to -day to do so; the knowledge of the historian, sociologist and 
philosopher is required as well. However, he admits that the 
economist can make some contribution towards answering enquiries 
into the causes of change, for some of the causes lie within the 
economic system. But there are other causes to be taken into 
account as well.(l) 
It might seem preferable, therefore, to place the problem of 
economic development, in terms of economic causes of data changes, 
(1) E. Roll, Elements of economic Theory, London, 1937, p. 205. 
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among the central problems of economic theory, on an equal footing 
with the adjustment of the market to given data. Then the two 
types of analysis can be elaborated in close relation to each 
other; and in many of the theories of which the establishment of 
equilibrium at present appears to be the climax, the analysis can 
be pushed on into the realm of data changes. 
It then follows that a formal theory of economic development, 
in its narrower sense as defined above, has, as its goal, the 
discovery of those economic processes which contribute to the 
production of data changes. In its broader sense, and in a more 
comprehensive and systematic form, the theory should tackle the 
following questions in respect of each of the data of economic 
theory: (1) the nature and form of the data, (2) the dynamical 
development of the data over time, and investigation of the 
economic causes of changes in these data, if any; (3) the 
investigation of the market or extra -market adjustments necessary 
for the "absorption" of the data changes into the economic system; 
(4) prediction of the future development of the data, to be based 
on extrapolation corrected by the establishment of scientific 
causal hypothesés, if any; (5) control by public Policy of the 
development of the data in question by influencing the course of 
their future development, with the aid of knowledge about the 
data changes. 
Once a theoretical construction, whether in its narrower or 
wider sense, of the development of data has been incorporated into 
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the body of economic theory, we are no more tied to the orthodox 
methodology and the narrow boundaries of the economic science, 
which have long been set by the orthodox school, and which would 
lead us nowhere in terms of realistic economics. Assumptions of 
this school have fundamentally been that of "statically" given 
resources and given conditions. But we live in a dynamic world, 
in a world in which data or conditions of economic theory as well 
as resources as part of the data vary as between different places 
and different periods of time. 
6. THE 'NEW, TREAT1JiENT OF THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. 
Data changes, however, may be for better or for worse, 
depending upon whether changes as such would produce an increase 
or a decrease in real national income and wealth. In other words, 
our primary concern is not so much to build up a formal construction 
of a theory of development for its own sake, as to sort out those 
constellations of data changes which, at certain stages of the 
development of a certain society, would bring forth economic 
progress and material welfare for the society as a whole, and those 
constellations of data changes which, at other stages of development 
would result in economic stagnation or decline, when the economic 
system is bound to adapt itself to such data changes by market or 
extra -market operations. 
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This new treatment of the theory may look different from the 
formal treatment as defined above, at least in form if not in 
essence; but it may contribute more, and in a realistic sense, to 
the understanding of the causes of economic progress and stagnation. 
In solving a minor practical problem, the 'formal' treatment may be 
useful to the applied economist who is equipped with better tools 
of economic theory in which data changes are to be taken into 
account. The 'new' treatment, however, has a much wider scope, 
and a greater and much more important object. Its scope is the 
whole world, for it deals with a major economic problem which is 
common to every country. Its object is the study of the problem 
of how to increase material wealth and maximise economic welfare in 
a dynamic economy, with resources and conditions changing over time. 
Whereas the 'formal' treatment seeks to deal with each and every 
datum and its dynamic development separately, the 'new' treatment 
seeks to study a hypothetical society which presumably passes 
through successive stages of development, and in each stage the 
relevant data, their development and their effects on the level of 
economic activity are collectively tackled and analysed. This 
does not mean that reference has to be made to any particular 
society or any particular historical period. It is a mere 
hypothesis in relation to which four sets of questions may be posed. 
The first question deals with the circumstances under which 
economic progress obtains. Historically, many societies stagnate 
for some time and then suddenly become prosperous. It is then most 
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interesting to investigate the pre- conditions necessary for the 
achievement of such economic prosperity. The second question deals 
with the policies which promote progress. For once economic 
progress emerges, it is equally interesting to investigate the 
mechanism whereby this incipient progress can be assisted to 
develop and perpetuate itself. After a rapid economic progress 
has been achieved, it is then desired to know whether the economic 
system has a momentum of its own, a cumulative pressure moving the 
economy upwards. But once it is assumed that there exists a 
cumulative pressure upwards, by implication there should also exist 
a cumulative pressure downwards. Is decay Inevitable? This is the 
last set of questions which evidently stems from the preceding one. 
But why should there be any attempt to study a theory of 
economic development in this sense? In answering this question, 
it is well to bear in mind the records of history. All down the 
sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, there was a 
certain intellectual atmosphere. Nation states were born, and 
kings were anxious to make their nations strong and powerful. 
This was the Mercantilist Age. From about 1500 right up to Smith's 
day, there had always been the question fWhat are the causes of 
economic progress ?" Yet Adam Smith assumed a negative attitude in 
'Wealth of Nations' by laying great emphasis on the concept of 
economic freedom. The invisible hand would work the miracle and 
the economic system would look after itself. No state interference 
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was needed to stimulate economic prosperity. State interference 
was in fact not only deemed unnecessary but even harmful to the 
progress of the economy. Even if this was not intended by Smith 
to be the answer, it was thought to be so. Once it was accepted, 
the interest in the fundamental question faded away. Since then, 
almost no economist has seriously endeavoured to answer it. 
Generations of students have been trained in the field of economic 
science with its narrow and traditional scope for the last hundred 
years or so, without their attention being drawn to the 
investigation of the question that was seemingly overshadowed by 
Smith's writings. 
But the year 1929 saw the precipitation of a sharp slump and 
a prolonged period of stagnation accompanied by immensely large 
figures of unemployment of a permanent nature. People then began 
to enquire what was wrong with the capitalist system, what were 
the causes of secular stagnation. Besides, Indians, Chinese, 
Egyptians and other peoples in the so called under -developed areas 
began to enquire why their agrarian economies have permanently 
been under -developed, why stagnation has been the normal state. 
The economist is bound to answer these most interesting 
questions. Once they have been satisfactorily answered, it must 
be admitted that there can in fact be a theory of economic 
development to be based on history, sociology and abstraction in 
the realistic sense, i.e., of changing, and not given, conditions. 
It must be admitted that there is a problem and it has to be solved; 
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and the method of approach is analytical, historical and 
dynamical. It is analytical because we seek to discover the 
economic causes of changes in conditions and the market and extra - 
market adjustments necessary for the 'absorption' of the data 
changes. It is dynamical because the changes in the data cannot 
be conceived of as instantaneous in a 'static' sense and a period 
analysis should be involved here. It is historical, not because 
it refers specifically to a certain historical period or periods, 
but because historical facts and observations are invoked, now 
and again, to validate the analytical aspect of this approach. 
"To understand the world in which we live," says J.E. Rees, "it is 
necessary to have some idea of how human society came to be what 
we now find it. Without this knowledge we cannot attach any 
meaning to such things as the present distribution of population, 
the economic activities of different countries, and the institutions 
which bind communities together, for all these are the results of 
the interplay of forces over long periods of time. Whether we 
approve of existing conditions, or whether we find them intolerable, 
we shall achieve little by way of defence or attack unless we know 
something of history. "(l) 
But what of history? Rees again provides the answer. "It is 
sometimes taken to mean what has happened in the past in so far as 
it is known, for only a fraction of what has happened can be 
discovered, because records are lacking, or are imperfect, or are 
(1) T.E. Rees: 'A Survey of Economic Deve1opment,' The Approach to His tory, :p.1. 
33. 
difficult to interpret. History, however, is not merely a 
collection of-details; it is also the arrangement of the facts 
in order to offer some kind of explanation of their meaning. 
Possibly we shall be able to establish some general principles 
which help us to understand the present; but such principles will 
always be subject to modification with fuller knowledge. "(nBut Rees 
advances not only the qualification that our knowledge of history 
is imperfect, but the further qualification that history cannot 
be explained objectively. There is no knowable force, divine, 
cosmic, or physical, he states, which can be proved to be the prime 
cause of what we call history. With our imperfect knowledge we 
can only offer subjective explanations, and these have no final 
authority. The historian can exert himself to discover as precisely 
as possible what actually happened in the past, and he can attempt 
so to relate facts that they give a satisfactory clue to the 
sequence of cause and effect. But the explanation he offers is 
merely his opinion, based on an examination of evidence and always 
relative to his right to have an opinion at all. 
Imperfect knowledge of facts and the subjectivism involved in 
their interpretation are therefore two serious qualifications which 
should make us very chary in our approach to history as a means of 
verifying causal hypotheses based on abstract reasoning. 
So much for the method of the new treatment of the theory of 




of the theory and try to answer the aforementioned questions in 
a summary form. In the writings of economists, there is to be 
found no answer to the first set of questions, i.e., the 
circumstances under which economic progress obtains. Old economists 
were living in an era in which the economic system was operating 
progressively; it is no wonder therefore that they were by no 
means interested in a question of such a kind. It is the 
historian who has shown a tendency toward the investigation of the 
factors underlying the phenomenon of stagnation. Some historians, 
for instance, believe that progress essentially depends upon the 
existence of a creative minority in the human society. By 
tradition, most human societies are conservative and hostile to 
the innovating spirit. It is only when pioneers with power, 
initiative and integrity overcome the society's natural and innate 
opposition to the new ways of doing things, that economic progress 
is likely to emerge. But there must be a particular social pattern 
in which pioneers meet with the least resistance from the 
conservative elements in the society. Some particular social 
shocks can be envisaged as factors which aid the new in destroying 
the old, e.g., wars, plagues, and foreign trade. These factors 
tend to loosen the fetters of the society and weaken its 
resistance to changes which can only be initiated by the creative 
minority. Some historians, however, are inclined to attribute the 
phenomenon of stagnation to the existence of such social 
institutions as the class structure, slavery, caste, religion, 
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family and the theory that each new technology needs a new social 
pattern. Needless to say all these institutions have direct 
bearing on economic progress. Other historians, however, attach 
importance to geographical situation. They hold that man is the 
creature of his environment, necessarily obeying the laws which are 
inherent in material things. He has the illusion of free will; 
but as a matter of fact he is purely an organism operated upon by 
outside forces. There is no more purpose in the life of mankind 
than in that of the animal creation or the physical universe - all 
obey laws because it is inconceivable that they should do otherwise. 
What are these material forces? They are sometimes comprehended in 
the terms "nature" or "climate". All human life, indeed, is 
conditioned by its environment, but it also reacts on its 
environment; 'in some cases the reaction is slight but in others 
it is considerable. It is easy to trace the control exercised by 
environment in primitive societies. Other historians even say that 
such waterways as rivers, lakes and seas are essential to mobility 
and trade in the same way as the inland means of transport are. 
Where there exist such waterways or other means of transport in a 
geographical situation, there will also be a case of economic 
development. Some historians even go so far as to say that a 
favourable situation means greater activity in foreign trade and 
easy access to the foreigners, whose role is no less significant 
in the achievement of any degree of economic progress. To study 
the first question therefore is to study history, geography and 
sociology. 
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The second question deals with the ways or the policies by 
which economic progress is promoted and speeded up. On this issue 
economics has an important part to play. As has been pointed out, 
the question disappeared in the economic literature after Adam 
Smith, perhaps with the exception of J.S. Mill who considered it 
briefly in his 'Principles?. List then came along to scorn the 
writings of Smith in an attempt to substitute state interference 
for laissez -faire in the running of a capitalist system. Marx, 
however, was not interested in the capitalist system, but only 
preached for its overthrow, and thus the Marxians were not 
concerned with economic progress to be achieved in a capitalist 
society but with the uprooting of capitalism itself. Then came the 
"marginal" revolution in economic theory, which carried with it 
the firm belief that since a capitalist system, with perfect 
competition, private enterprise and a pricing mechanism is assumed, 
by marginal analysis, to effect the best allocation of the 
communityts resources, the community would certainly stand to lose 
if any interference with the invisible autonomous mechanism were 
contemplated. Jevons, as one of the leaders of this school, even 
denied that the question seemed to be relevant or important. Thus 
although a tremendous amount of writings on this particular 
question can be traced during the period 1500 -1776, nothing in fact 
was written since then. 
No one, before Malthus, answered the third question whether 
the economic system generates a momentum of its own. The essence 
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of his population theory is that, if population went unchecked, 
it would multiply by leaps and bounds. But there in fact exist 
three checks: misery, vice and moral restraint. Land being given 
as a fixed factor, people will continue to live at the subsistence 
level. If their wages rise above that level, they reproduce 
themselves in such a way that a greater number of people will 
co- operate with the fixed factor, land, in producing the national 
product. It is thus that the wage -level is bound to fall off 
again to the subsistence level. This misery and lowering of the 
living standard will check the growth of the population and help 
keep it in line with other available fixed resources. The theory 
is therefore based on two principles: diminishing marginal 
returns, and the close relationship between the wage -level and the 
size of population. On the assumption that land is a fixed factor, 
the living standard of the masses will never improve, for it will 
always be pegged at the subsistence level according to the fore- 
going relationship. In other words, the Malthusian scheme implies 
no possibility of economic progress so long as the system generates 
a momentum which tends always to push it downwards. This gloomy 
picture affected Ricardo who indeed elaborated on it to a great 
extent. J.S. Mill, in his turn, accepted the answer to the third 
question as given by Malthus and elaborated by Ricardo. Marx did 
not accept the Ricardian doctrine but he did make use of his method 
in propounding the concept of the falling rate of profit. Thus 
Malthus, Ricardo, Mill and Marx, all professed stagnation and 
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implicitly established that the economic system creates within 
itself a cumulative force, which is constantly pulling it downwards 
and hence inevitably putting an end to progress. This orthodox 
gloomy view dominated the minds of the students of economics right 
up to the turn of the century, when the marginal theory dropped 
this view. Afterwards came Marshall to disbelieve the possibility 
of stagnation. Keynes then came to build up a theory of chronic 
unemployment based on his idea of oversaving in a developed 
economy, coupled with a secular fall in investment prospects 
resulting from a continued fall in the marginal efficiency of 
capital. Hansen took the idea of oversaving from Keynes and 
elaborated on it with reference to the American economy, and in so 
doing, was led to propound his four well -known pillars of secular 
stagnation in a "nature" economy. Schumpeter, however, denied this 
idea of secular stagnation; but he also believed that capitalism 
as a system was bound to come to an end because it would bring 
about its own destruction as a result of the new social institutions 
and ideas which had been alien to the system in the past. 
Nevertheless, any other system, in his opinion, would be worse. 
Finally Colin Clark came along to investigate the way in which 
man -power is distributed among primary, secondary and tertiary 
industries. He also collected statistical data related to the rate 
of saving a community tends to undertake, investment outlets and 
the multiplier effects upon the trend of the national income in 
the long -run. In this way he seemed to throw some light upon the 
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question. Since then no writings have been made on the subject. 
Broadly, the third question explores the following topics: the 
impact of progress on institutions and ideas, the laws of capital 
accumulation, the laws of population growth and its effects, the 
inevitable concentration of property, the inevitable urge to war 
and imperialism and the pattern of progress. 
Finally, the fourth question deals with the possibility of 
economic decay. Does the society produce conditions that arrest 
itself? The answer may be that the capitalist system has created 
trade unions which are likely to be opposed to new ideas and new 
productive techniques. This reactionary attitude, on the part of 
some trade unions, may sometimes be inimical to progress. Moreover, 
ideas of democracy and equality have permeated capitalist 
societies, and the proletariat make use of these ideas to demand 
economic equality. This has resulted in the tendency towards more 
and more progressive taxation designed to diminish inequalities of 
income and wealth. But a tax system of such a kind may well eat 
into savings which would otherwise be absorbed into investment 
outlets. Hence there might be a short supply of capital in the 
market and an ultimate diminution of the level of investment as 
a result of a highly progressive fiscal policy. Again, a full 
employment policy, if maintained, might involve a lack in the 
spirit of discipline among workers, with lower productivity and 
wastage of resources as a result. Indeed the fourth question may 
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include such topics as population theories of secular stagnation; 
the exhaustion of the creative spirit; the creation of checks to 
progress, e.g., trade unions, monopolies, barriers to migration, 
tariffs; loss of flexibility; secular stagnation through falling 
propensity to consume; exhaustion by empires and wars; exhaustion 
by growing taxation and national debt; exhaustion by the class 
struggle; and exhaustion of soil and natural resources. The 
fullest elaboration on economic decay is found in Toynbee's 
'History of Civilisation'. In this work, he comes to the 
conclusion that all systems in Western Europe follow the same 
inevitable pattern of stagnation; but as a Christian he leaves 
a way of escape for his fellowmen that they should not lose hope 
and faith in a decent worthy life. 
In chis sense, a hypothetical society as defined above seems 
as if it were bound to revolve in a vicious circle, starting with 
stagnation and ending with the same point from which it has 
started. 
7. SUBJECT ,,ND PLAN OF THE WORK. 
Now that the broad outlines of the method and scope of the 
new treatment of the theory of economic development have been 
defined, it is proposed to delimit the subject of this work. Its 
chief aim is to pursue a detailed and comprehensive study of the 
first two topics covered by the theory, viz: the circumstances 
under which economic progress obtains, and the policies which 
promote progress. The main reason for this partial study of the 
theory is the great interest that has recently been shown by 
national and international agencies in the economic development of 
the so- called backward areas of the world which make up two- thirds 
of the human race. 
But it is perhaps much more instructive to begin with a very 
brief historical survey of such fragments of the theory of 
economic development as can be found in the writings of some of 
the old and modern economists. Apart from its academic interest, 
this historical study of the trend ofeconomic thought, in so far 
as the development theory is concerned, may be useful in throwing 
light on the later discussions of the problems involved in the two 
topics with which this work is primarily concerned. Besides, 
this study in 'itself may prove that the treatment of the theory of 
economic development can then be seen not only as a reaction 
against the modern trends which make economic theory less realistic, 
but also as the continuation of a point of view which has always 
been present in economic thought. 
. PART I 
THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
IN CLASSICAL AND PRE- CLASSICAL POLITICAL ECONCEIIY. 
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CHAPTER 1. 
THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC POLICY 
IN PRE- CLASSICAL THOUGHT. 
1. THE 'ERCANTILISTS. 
The general statement that economic thought tends to reflect 
the economic and social conditions of its time applies equally to 
modern economics and to the economic doctrines of the pre - 
capitalist society of the Middle Ages. Just as modern economic 
doctrines deal with the workings of the market economy, so are the 
economic doctrines of the Schoolmen related to the economic problems 
of medieval economy. Unlike capitalism, the feudal economy was 
fundamentally a 'planned economy'. Production, distribution and 
prices were determined not by the interplay of supply and demand 
but by authoritative control in accordance with generally accepted 
rules and customs. Whereas modern economics searches for causal 
relationships, the medieval thinker was preoccupied with the 
fairness and justice of a particular price. In other words, 
economic issues were considered from the viewpoint of the medieval 
man who was concerned not with the search for new knowledge in 
order to be able to control the forces of nature but with the 
preparation for eternal life. Medieval economic thought was thus 
part of the general stream of medieval thought; it was the by- 
product of the ..religious, ethical and political thinking of its 
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time. In fact economic thought was part of a system of applied 
ethics. In the pre- capitalist society of the Middle Ages therefore 
people were not interested in economic development in itself, but 
only whether the new development was sinful or, more precisely, 
compatible with Christian tradition. Ethics and Economics were 
indeed merged into one whole. 
But whereas the economic theories of the Middle Ages had their 
common roots in Christianity, in Christian ethics and in the 
doctrines of just price, the theories of state economy characteristic 
of the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which are 
usually referred to as mercantilism, reflected the then prevailing 
conceptions of the absolute state. Just as the political units, 
e.g., manors, cities, counties, and regions had to be centralised 
under one administration, so regional economics had to be integrated 
into one unified market system interconnected by trade, division of 
labour and a uniform medium of exchange. 
Mercantilist statesmen and businessmen such as Jean Bodin 
(1530 -1596) and Thomas iviun (1571 -1641) were indeed the first 
writers who thought of economics in terms of political economy 
rather than a part of applied ethics and theology. For the first 
time in the history of economic thought, economic problems were 
seen from the point of view of a unit larger than that of the local 
and self- sufficient manor, the gild, or the city. In fact 
mercantilist writers were the first to realise that political 
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economy had to concern itself with the nature and causes of the 
wealth of nations, to look upon the national state and governments 
as the agents whose main task was to foster national production by 
internal improvements, by the promotion of national industries and 
by the removal of all local barriers. 
But what, in the eyes of the mercantilists, made for a nation's 
wealth and power? During the mercantilist age, the king assumed 
the duty of the defence of the country and the promotion of its 
welfare. Thus the new age of standing armies required permanent 
and regular money resources. Again, new discoveries of silver, the 
influx of which into Europe rapidly revolutionised its commerce and 
finance, constituted one of the finest examples of the quantity 
theory of money in practice. Moreover, this very influx of silver 
over the fields of trade resulted in the transition from a natural 
to a money economy. No wonder, therefore, that wealth as the 
source of a nation's power and strength took the form of money 
or, more precisely, such precious stones as gold and silver and 
which was therefore worthy of all respect, both by the state and by 
the individual. In the pursuit of sources of wealth, the state 
was directed to colonial acquisition, rivalries and even open 
hostilities. The individual, in a similar way, was in pursuit of 
wealth. In a 'natural' economy, it had been sinful to accumulate 
wealth; but in a money economy, accumulation of wealth was looked 
upon with favour. It is, however, the conditions of the time that 
attached new importance to wealth. Centralised states were living 
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in unending rivalries; each was struggling to be strong against 
possible competition; and each was striving to have its rightful 
place under the sun. And, as the individual could then pursue 
wealth shamelessly, so also the state saw in wealth the source of 
strength. This is indeed the kernel of mercantilism. 
When the mercantilists came to look for a test of the strength 
of a country, they found it in its wealth; and above all in that 
portion of wealth which consisted of the precious stones. The 
mercantilists regarded wealth as a stock of something. We now 
regard it as a flow of production, but this is only a recent view. 
The stock of wealth in that age was in the form of gold the 
preoccupation with which was manifest in mercantilist policy. In 
the absence of mines of gold and silver, it was the prime policy 
of the mercantilists to bring about a permanent favourable balance 
of trade, with a view to increasing the supply of gold and silver 
in the country. It was the implication of this policy that the 
country should be industrially developed and that there had to be 
an hierarchy of occupations. Although agriculture could feed the 
population and its expansion by intensive and extensive methods and 
might render certain imports unnecessary, it ,Jas thought to be the 
least important of economic activities. Like all other domestic 
trade and industry, agriculture brought no money into the country, 
and thus on the cruder mercantilist theories it did not increase 
the country's wealth. Manufacturing industry and foreign trade were 
the most important of economic activities. 
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During the reign of Edward III, foreign craftsmen were 
encouraged to-enter the country in order to promote its 
undustrialisation. The clothing trade, for instance, was based 
on the Flemish weavers. Again, under Queen Elizabeth I, foreign 
craftsmen were induced to settle down in the country and set up 
new industries. Foreigners came under a contract whereby a 
monopoly was granted to them for a period of 25 years after which 
time Englishmen would have been taught the technical processes. 
Patent rights were also granted to foreign inventors for the sake 
of encouraging inventing ability, and these rights were later 
extended to Englishmen as well. Acts of Parliament made it quite 
clear that patents could only be granted in respect of new 
inventions and new industries. 
Noreover,'whereas medieval policy was aiming at the 
restriction of exports, the mercantilist point of view was 
diametrically opposite. It was the removal of all restrictions on 
exports of home manufactures that constituted the crux of 
mercantilist policy. Foreign trade was indeed the main object of 
economic policy during the mercantile age, a policy which was 
directed to bring about a permanent favourable balance of trade by 
way of minimising imports and maximising exports. Import 
restrictions could be put into effect by laying down laws against 
luxuries. In this respect, Mun expressed the view that imports 
of wares to be consumed solely by the wealthy class contributed 
nothing to the real welfare of the country. The reduction in 
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imports could be made possible by rendering some of the imported 
goods unnecessary for home consumption; this could be achieved 
by protecting native 'infant' industries, and also by bringing in 
foreign craftsmen who would play an important part in the promotion 
of such industries, or the establishment of new ones in competition 
with, and as substitutes to, imported manufactures. 
The export drive, on the other hand, could only take effect by 
removing all restrictions on exports except for raw materials. If 
the nation took legal steps to ban exports of raw materials, the 
result would be to preserve the essential materials for home 
industry. A striking illustration in England was the establishment 
of wool manufacture, which was primarily aided by the device of 
putting an embargo on exports of raw wool abroad. It is interesting 
to note that such a mercantile policy is still pursued nowadays 
in many countries whenever raw wool is in short supply. The export 
drive could also be assisted by encouraging inventive ability 
through the establishment of legal rights of patents and statutes 
of monopolies. It was a commonplace at the time that technological 
advancement to be brought about by the encouragement of inventive 
ability would put the country concerned technically far ahead of 
other countries in manufacturing business, and thereby in a very 
favourable position in world markets. It is interesting, too, to 
note that, in the Great Britain of to -day, the same argument is 
being put forward as more and more of the economically backward 
countries are being industrialised. The encouragement of large 
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population was also thought at the time to be one of the driving 
forces towards the increase in exports, for it was held that the 
larger the population, the greater the supply of labour; and hence 
under competitive conditions of the market the lower the wage level. 
And, since wages constitute a large part of the production costs, 
especially in those days when mechanisation and industrial 
revolution were still far away in the future, this meant that the 
costs of production of exports would be reduced all round; and 
presumably along with a fairly high elasticity of world demand for 
such manufactures, this would give rise to a big increase in the 
quantum and value of exports which is a fundamental object of 
mercantilism. 
The mercantile age was thus marked by considerable regulations 
and statutes; and mercantilism was a continual state activity in 
the economic field. There was nothing the state might not do and 
nothing it ought not to do, if its activities were designed to 
promote the genera3. well -being. With respect to import restrictions 
and the encouragement of exports, the mechanism was in the form of 
import tariffs so as to keep out foreign goods, and in the form of 
export subsidies so as to promote the sale of domestic goods in 
world markets. The issue of patents and legal monopelies was 
intended to encourage inventive ability and promote the introduction 
of new processes. The purpose of importing foreign skilled labour 
was evidently to establish new industries. Prices and wages were 
fixed by the state as a part of public policy in the interests of 
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production. A whole series of devices were made in order to 
encourage shipping and the Navy, of which the Navigation Acts were 
the most familiar and the prescription of fish days the most 
curious. Besides, many privileged trading companies were created 
to promote commerce. Plantations were founded overseas in order 
to secure supplies of primary products as well as markets for home 
manufactures. Some regulations, furthermore, laid down specifica- 
tions of cloth and other finished products. 
Initially the aim of state interference into the economic life 
of the country was to promote industry and maintain a high standard 
of workmanship, but in some ways this government action proved to 
be a hindrance to industrial development. In France, for instance, 
it caused considerable discontent. In England, on the other hand, 
the system of -apprenticeship was a salient feature of state 
interference in industry, and the regulations thereof were 
originally laid down for the good purpose of increasing the supply 
of labour in certain crafts in order to develop industry. But 
eventually the Statute of Apprenticeship was so abused as to 
constitute a deterrent to new entrants to the crafts, and hence 
create an artificial scarcity of the supply of certain types of 
labour. 
Mercantilist writers hardly attempted to answer the question 
why such an importance as they expressed in their writings was 
attached to stock. They simply took it for granted that an 
increased quantity of money gold tended to inflate prices; but they 
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attempted to explain that increased prices were indeed one way of 
improving the terms of trade. When home prices were pushed up, 
this implied the prospects of selling dearly and buying cheaply; 
otherwise the terms of trade would turn against the home country. 
This view has seemed to be absurd. England would only be richer 
if the terms of trade were moved against her; and even to -day some 
writers express the view that Britain would have been less severely 
hit by the slump of the 19301 s had the terms of trade been moved 
against her. 
(l) Petty recognised that when inventions improved the 
productive efficiency of the country, and thereby production costs 
were lowered, this fact would enable England to undersell other 
countries; but still the terms of trade would have been against 
her. The mercantilists countenanced this view when they maintained 
that, in the interests of the export trade, wages of labour had to 
be lowered. This line of argument is obviously contradictory to 
the other argument in favour of improving the terms of trade. 
However, mercantilist view as regards gold movements was that when 
gold entered the country through a favourable balance of trade, 
this meant a greater supply of money which would in turn bring about 
a reduction in the interest rate. Such a result would stimulate 
production by some mechanism which we call to -day the multiplier 
effect. This analysis is purely Keynesian in essence, or more 
correctly the Keynesian analysis is Mercantilist. 
(1) ILA. Lewis, Economic Survey, 1919 -1939, pp.192 -8. 
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By the end of the seventeenth century, however, Mercantilism 
as a body of doctrines and practices began to fade away and give 
way to others. Gold was losing its importance as a result of the 
recognition of the quantity theory of money. Gold, even though it 
was of higher value relative to other commodities because it was 
scarcer, was no more important for the society than any other 
commodity. In this matter, Petty expressed the view that England 
should actually have just the reasonable amount of money; for if 
she had more than that amount and the extra supply of money was 
put into circulation, prices would be inevitably inflated, whereas 
if she had less than that amount prices would be deflated; neither 
courses were advisable. 
Another reason for the breakdown of Mercantilism was the fact 
that some economists, by the end of the seventeenth century, began 
to distinguish between gold and money, and came to realise that 
they were not the same thing. There emerged a school of such 
writers as John Locke, which maintained that once paper credit 
could do the work of gold, gold would cease to have a prime 
importance as a standard of value and medium of exchange. 
Moreover, the emphasis began to shift from foreign trade to 
the establishment and development of industries for home 
consumption. Writers began to think of value as the product of 
labour; manufacturing industry was important simply because in its 
output were embodied both the product of labour and the value of 
the product.Foreign trade, in other words, was out of the picture. 
. GEÑ 
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Finally, the development of political philosophy, i.e., the 
natural law and the natural, order of the society, had its 
influence on economic thought. When the concept of the 'natural 
order' was to be applied to the economic aspect of human activity, 
this application was equally to result in the parallel concept of 
'laissez- faire' in Economics. Evidently this concept runs counter 
to the mercantilist doctrine of state interference. 
2. THE PHYSIOCRriTS. 
Full reaction to the mercantilist doctrines was taking concrete 
shape by the middle of the eighteenth century on the part of the 
physiocrats. Francois Quesnay was the most notable writer of this 
school of thought; he is rightfully regarded by economic historians 
as the true representative of the whole body of physiocratic theory. 
In his writings there can be distinguished three points of a 
general character. First, economic doctrine, in his view, is 
really only a corollary to something much larger which is perhaps 
the foundation of the whole structure of society. This is to be 
found in his conception of, and distinction between, the natural 
and positive laws. Secondly, the real foundation of the science of 
Political Economy, in the modern sense of the word, can be said to 
be laid by Quesnay, with whom indeed the empirical element 
disappeared. He observes shrewdly that the problem of wealth, the 
conditions of its production and the laws of its distribution are 
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matters to which there can be applied precise scientific reasoning 
for purposes of arriving at generalised truths about economic life. 
Finally, in the eyes of economic historians, Quesnay is regarded as 
the very economist who truly anticipates Adam Smith. 
The search for the natural order leads, on the economic side, 
to the adoration of agriculture by the Physiocrats, in whose eyes 
agricultural countries alone can establish empires, and agriculture 
is itself the sole source of wealth and the only productive industry. 
The physiocratic emphasis on the importance of agriculture as such 
was no doubt the reflection of the needs of France at the time as 
well as a reaction against a phase of Colbertism, the French 
synonym for i /iercantilism, which stressed the importance of 
manufacturing industry. 
The physiocratic school of thought seeks to prove that 
agriculture alone produces the wealth of the country, and unlike 
this activity productive of wealth, all other activities are 'sterile' 
in the sense that in the former there is a 'surplus' whereas the 
latter, e.g., manufacturing industry and commerce, just pay their 
way. More precisely, agriculture is the only industry that not 
only provides for wages and profits accruing to the owners of the 
productive services engaged on the land, but when all expenses 
have been met there still remains something over, a residual 
income, a rent payable to the proprietor. This is, in the eyes 
of the Physiocrats, the real revenue of the nation supporting 
commercial and manufacturing classes. 
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In so far as commerce is concerned, the physiocratic view 
corresponds tö what is an instinctive reaction of the unsophisticated 
mind that mere exchange is in no way an act of production. With 
respect to industry, the physiocratic argument is based on the fact 
that the common value of any commodity is merely the value of the 
original material and the cost of the subsistence of the artisan 
during the production period. The product of the artisan is 
therefore just worth the productive costs involved in the process 
of manufacture, and the artisan merely acquires the right to share 
in the consumption of the wealth produced by the cultivator. In 
this sense, unlike agriculture, there is no 'surplus' in industry. 
A corollary of the physiocratic conception of wealth was that 
something should be done to stimulate and develop agriculture at 
the expense ofother economic activities. On this general view of 
relation between different classes of society, encouragement of 
agriculture became the chief aim of physiocratic economic policy. 
In Quesnay's view, agriculture should be conducted on a large scale, 
and capital should be invested on the land in order to make this 
line of economic activity all the more profitable an employment. 
So, negatively, manufacturing industry was not to be promoted at 
the expense of agriculture; but this did not necessarily mean that 
the former was considered to be almost superfluous and in no way 
useful from the national point of view. All that Quesnay's writings 
really implied was only to lay much more emphasis on agriculture 
than on other occupations from the point of view of the generation 
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of wealth. But Quesnay's contribution did not stop at that. He 
proceeded to advance an analysis of the circular flow of goods and 
money, and the functioning of the economic system as a thole. His 
Tableau Economique was an absolutely new approach to economic 
science at the time. This new approach was not only an analysis 
of the circular flow of goods, but was something approaching the 
breakdown of the older conception of wealth. Quesnay spoke of 
wealth as a 'flows concept rather than as a 'stocks concept, so to 
speak; in other words in terms of national income rather than 
national capital. 
Quesnay's definition of wealth, as consisting of the sum total 
of things necessary for life and in the annual reproduction of such 
things, has led him to the logical conclusion that the quantity of 
money in circulation may decrease or increase without any corres- 
ponding decrease or increase in the things necessary for life. In 
his view, the wealth of a country should not be judged by a 
greater or lesser supply of money that it possesses. Money is 
neither more nor less than sterile riches. Its chief utility 
consists in facilitatinz exchange and effecting purchases and sales 
in the market. It is merely a standard of value, to which prices 
of all other commodities are related, as well as a medium of 
exchange for these commodities. Furthermore, buying and selling 
are but two aspects of one and the same transaction. It then 
. follows that the central idea of Mercantilism - that of a nation 
selling more than it purchases - is not only mistaken but also 
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ridiculous. It can mean nothing but preaching for the 
impoverishment of the country by losing wealth, when it sells 
more than it buys. The excess of sales over purchases is in no 
way compensated for by the accumulation of money gold, for gold 
is not wealth in itself; it is but a sterile commodity giving a 
conventional command over wealth. 
Another characteristic of Quesnay's writings is his advocacy 
of free trade. Commerce, he states, must not be considered as an 
undeclared state of war as between different nations in the sphere 
of business relations. On the contrary, it is only in the interest 
of a nation to leave trade entirely freed from any restrictions or 
control by the state in such a way that the forces of competition 
in the foreign market may secure for the nation the highest 
possible price' for its exports and the lowest possible price for 
its imports . However, it would be a gross error if this were 
taken to mean that the physiocrats' advocacy of free trade attached 
particular importance to foreign trade. On the contrary, foreign 
trade, like domestic trade, was for the physiocrats essentially an 
'unproductive' occupation; and this ran counter to mercantilist 
doctrine. But when Quesnay was preaching for a free trade policy 
he was evidently speaking with the voice of Adam Smith. 
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CHAPTER 2. 
THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC POLICY 
IN CLASSICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
1. ADAM SMITH. 
Adam Smith (1723 -1790), the Great Scotch Philosopher, shared 
with the Physiocrats and with other representatives of eighteenth 
century thought the belief in a natural order. This belief was 
founded on ideas which were partly moral and religious and partly 
philosophical. This attitude of Smith has led him to such an 
optimistic view of a world as would imply an invisible hand, whose 
secret intervention in the social activity of man in his pursuit 
of gain, would miraculously harmonise self -interest with public 
interest. 
Smith's conception of wealth was entirely different from both 
the Mercantilists and the Physiocrats. Broadly, the Mercantilists 
had attributed the increase of the wealth of nations to a favourable 
balance of trade bringing forth an accumulation of money gold and 
silver, the sole source of wealth and of power in their opinion. 
The Physiocrats, for their part, had contended that wealth sprang 
solely from the pursuit of agricultural industry, whose surplus 
value, the real revenue to the nation, was indeed its read wealth; 
and by implication that all other occupations were 'unproductive' 
in this sense. Smith refuted these fallacies and emphasised that 
the annual labour of every nation was the fund which orginally 
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supplied it with all the necessities and conveniences of life 
which it consumed. The source of all wealth, in his view, was 
thus to be found in labour; and an increase of wealth was to 
depend on the skill, dexterity and judgment with which labour was 
supplied, i.e., on the productivity of labour in modern terminology. 
Taking this view as a starting -point in his analysis, Smith 
places the principle of the division of labour in the forefront 
as the cardinal fact of economic life. In his exposition of this 
principle, he points out that wealth depends on the productivity 
of labour. Division of labour increases this productivity, permits 
specialisation in the process of production, and through itthe use 
and development of elaborate machinery. But he proceeds to 
emphasise that division of labour is limited by the extent of the 
market; and, as a corollary, all barriers to trade must be broken 
down. He advocates colonisation and regards colonies as a source 
of the supply of necessary raw materials as well as an extension 
of the home market. 
Moreover, Smith follows in the steps of the physiocrats and 
brings in his writings the evil legacy of the distinction between 
'productive' and 'unproductive' labour. But with Smith the two 
words have then definite meanings. Productive labour, according 
to Smith, is that which adds value to the raw materials to be 
worked upon; whereas unproductive labour is that type of labour 
which, however useful it may be, ends in no increase in value. 
In his language, the labour of the manufacturer fixes and realises 
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itself in some particular object or vendible commodity which lasts 
for some time at least after the labour is past; therefore such 
labour has been productive. On the other hand, the services of a 
menial servant generally perish in the very instant of their 
performance. Thus the Smithian test of productive labour is that 
labour should realise itself in a vendible commodity or result in 
a higher vendibility. On this view of productivity of labour is 
based the charge of materialism which the German idealist school 
puts forward against Smith. In this sense of materialism, his view 
of wealth is that it only embraces those things that can be and 
are brought to the market, and subsequently that an increase of 
wealth takes place only whenever there is an increase in such things 
as command exchange values. 
But would , it not seem to be that Smith confuses production 
and productive power? The above deals with the negative side of 
his book. What, then, is his positive statement? The wealth of 
a nation depends on two entirely different things: first, the ratio 
that 'productive' labour bears to 'unproductive' labour in the 
society concerned; secondly, the productivity of the 'productive' 
labour in that society. On the second issue, enough has already 
been said. On the first issue, however, Smith admits that some 
types of the so- called 'unproductive' labour are useful and 
indispensable to society, e.g., university teaching. But the 
majority of this type of labour, he maintains, is nothing but a 
waste of resources, for 'productive' labour produces wages as well 
60. 
as profits, whereas 'unproductive' labour produces wages only. 
This argument, however, is not impressive, for the simple reason 
that the former type of labour is combined with capital in order 
to produce the final product, the manufactured article, whereas 
the second type is working on its own without the assistance of 
capital in order to produce the service. 
This distinction was firmly established from that time until 
the end of the nineteenth century, which marked the emergence of 
the neoclassical school of thought based on marginalism. The 
leaders of this school then laughed at the idea and demolished it. 
The marginalists have asserted that no distinction exists between 
goods and services in the circle of exchange so long as both types 
of commodities command utility to consumers. Nevertheless, might 
it not sometimes seem, in the light, not of abstract reasoning, 
but of historical and factual evidence, that there is a grain of 
.truth in the Smithian distinction between the two types of labour? 
Colin Clark provides the answer to this question by stating that 
one of the reasons for the backwardness of under -developed countries 
is that domestic and menial service constitute a high proportion of 
the labour force in those countries. A concrete example exists in 
the case of Jamaica. While the population there has doubled itself, 
it seems that almost the same number of workers are engaged on the 
farms, and the surplus population has been driven to domestic 
service. This implies that a large part of the working population 
is engaged in occupations where no real production obtains in the 
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sense that the total output of the country would not significantly 
be reduced if-the domestic service were prohibited or diminished. 
This surplus could.have been absorbed in manufacturing industry 
had there been enough capital formation to work with. 
Another point characteristic of Adam Smith is his emphasis on 
parsimony as the real basis of the accumulation not only of private 
wealth but also of the wealth of nations. In his view, capital 
accumulation should be attributed to parsimony rather than to 
industry. This proposition goes along the traditional lines of 
encouraging the Saving Movement - by declaring that every spendthrift 
is a public enemy and every saver is a public benefactor. Thus 
Smith seems to urge people all the time to save their earnings 
rather than to spend them unwisely as, for instance, on domestic 
service, and to attach great importance to the conversion of 
'unproductive' labour into 'productive' labour by way of saving 
and investment. But Smith seems not to go far afield and 
investigate what are the stimulants to savings. Would it be 
nation -wide political propaganda, or forced savings by fiscal 
measures or even tax reliefs on useful investment projects or 
otherwise? Smith fails to refer to any saving policy as such; he 
simply tells us that if people save a part of their earnings and 
if there are investment outlets to absorb these domestic savings, 
the national income and the level of employment will always be on 
the upgrade. 
62. 
A further point characteristic of Adam Smith is his emphasis 
on consumptioh. "Consumption," he says, 11is the sole end and 
purpose of all production, and the interest of the producer ought 
to be attended to only so far as it is necessary for promoting 
that of the consumer.T'(l) By consumption is to be understood not 
only the consumption of private individuals, the benefit of which 
is limited to themselves, but also the consumption of government 
services the benefit of which is in no way discriminate. By 
consumption is also to be understood not only consumption now but 
also consumption in future. It has sometimes been made a reproach 
in the Classical tradition that, in making consumption the end of 
economic activity, Adam Smith and his followers ignored the necessity 
for creating productive power. But the distinction between 
productive and unproductive consumption well recognised in Smith's 
writings and the importance he attached to accumulation were in 
fact designed to reinforce the emphasis on productive power. 
Once it has been established that consumption is the end of 
economic activity, it was then the specific contribution of Smith 
and other classical economists that, for the achievement of this 
end, they recommended the so- called System of Economic Freedom. 
Given a certain framework of law and order and certain necessary 
public services, the object of economic activity was conceived to 
be best attained by a system of spontaneous co- operation. As 
consumers, the citizens should be free to purchase what they best 
(1) Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations (Cannan's edition), Vol. ii, p. 159. 
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satisfy their fancy. As producers, as workers or as owners or 
organisers of the factors of production, they should be free to use 
their labour force or their property in such wise as would 
maximise the reward they receive in money or satisfaction. It is 
this impersonal mechanism of the exchange market that would bring 
it about that the interests of the citizens as a whole are 
harmonised. The individual who intends only his own gain is led 
by an invisible hand to promote an end which is no part of his 
intention. It then follows that it should be the chief aim of 
policy that where obstacles to this spontaneous co- operation exist, 
they should be swept away. It was in this spirit that, in the 
world of practice, Adam Smith and his followers addressed themselves 
to agitation against the main forms of these obstacles: against 
the privileges of regulated companies and corporations, against 
the law of apprenticeship, against restrictions on movement and 
against restraints on importation. 
It was in this spirit, too, that,in the fourth book of his 
Wealth of Nations, Smith bitterly criticised the mercantilist 
doctrines. It was here indeed that the full argument for a free 
trade policy was developed. Smith conceived of gold and silver not 
only as commodities devoid of all superior qualities, but also as 
commodities genuinely subordinate to other commodities. If 
therefore foreign trade is not pursued for the ultimate end of the 
acquisition of gold and silver, what will then be the gains to the 
country from extending its commercial activities to the outside 
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world? Smith answers this question by reference to two distinct 
gains. Foreign trade carries out the surplus produce of the 
country; this is one benefit. The other is that it brings back 
other commodities for which there is a home demand but no home 
supply, or at least a deficient one. For Smith, foreign trade is 
nothing but an extension of domestic trade; and it brings in its 
train an extension of the division of labour, an increase in 
specialisation and a multiplicity of exchanges. Related to Smith's 
free trade argument is his denial of the 'infant' industry argument. 
For him, the premature development of 'infant' industries, which 
fail to thrive but for state protection, would bring forth a 
reduction in the level of saving, employment and national income. 
This argument, however, seems to be somewhat obscure and difficult 
to grasp. 
It is noteworthy, in this respect, that Adam Smith never 
conceived the system of economic freedom as arising in vacuo or 
functioning in a political system so simple and so minimal as to be 
restricted to the functions of the night watchman. There must be an 
adequate framework of law and order for this system. According to 
Smith, the state has three functions, "first, the duty of protecting 
the society from the violence and invasion of other independent 
societies; secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as possible, 
every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of 
every other member of it; and, thirdly, the duty of erecting and 
maintining certain public works and certain public institutions, 
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which it can never be for the interest of any individual, or small 
number of individuals, to erect and maintain; because the profit 
could never repay the expense to any individual or small number of 
individuals, though it may frequently do much more than repay it 
to a great society. "(1) 
It is interesting to compare this formulation of the functions 
of the state with the formulation which is found in Keynes' pamphlet, 
'The End of Laissez -Faire'. "The most important agenda of the 
state ", says Keynes, "relate not to those activities Which private 
individuals are already fulfilling, but to those functions which 
fall outside the sphere of the individual, to those decisions which 
are made by no one if the State does not make them. The important 
thing for government is not to do things which individuals are 
doing already; and to do them a little better or a little worse; 
but to do those things which at present are not done at all. "(2) 
This formal similarity in fact indicates the essential continuity 
of thought in the tradition of economic liberalism concerning the 
positive nature of the co- operation between the state and the 
individual. But it should not be considered that the content of 
Smith's agenda was limited to the provision of such public utilities 
as roads, canals and harbours, utilities which embraced the whole 
sphere of activities affording indiscriminate benefit. Smith made 
the most powerful plea for popular education and indicated that, had 
(i) Adam Smith, op. c it. , Vol.'', pp. i 814. -5. 
(2) J.M. Keynes, The End of Laissez -Faire, pp.1+6 -1+7. 
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he known of any available technique, he would have favoured health 
legislation. 
( l) 
Such is Adam Smith's contribution to the theory of economic 
policy. Say, Rae and List, however, represent the well- defined 
lines of criticism of his work. According to Say, "Smith has taken 
infinite pains to explain how it happens that civilised communities 
enjoy so great an abundance of products, in comparison with nations 
less polished, and in spite of the swarm of idlers and unproductive 
labourers, that is to be met with in society. He has traced the 
source of that abundance to the division of labour; and it cannot 
be doubted, that the productive power of industry is wonderfully 
enhanced by that division; but this circumstance alone is not 
sufficient to explain a phenomenon that will no longer surprise, if 
we consider the power of the natural agents that industry and 
civilisation set at work for an advantage." 
From this error, Smith has drawn the false conclusion that 
all values produced represent pre- exerted human labour or industry, 
either recent or remote; or, in other words, that wealth is 
nothing more than labour accumulated; from which position he infers 
a second consequence equally erroneous, viz. that labour is the sole 
measure of wealth or of value produced.' 
'This system is obviously in direct opposition to that of the 
Economists of the eighteenth century, who on the contrary, maintained 
(1) C.f. Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol.II, p.272. 
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that labour produces no value without consuming an equivalent; 
that, consequently, it leaves no surplus, no net produce; and that 
nothing but the earth produces gratuitous value, - therefore 
nothing else can yield net produce Now facts demonstrate 
that values produced are referable to the agency and concurrence 
of industry, of capital, and of' natural agents, whereof the chief, 
though by no means the only one, is land capable of cultivation; 
and that no other but these three sources can produce value, or add 
to human wealth." 
(1) 
Rae, on the other hand, shows how fundamental to Smith's 
thinking is the notion of an identity between individual and 
national wealth, and that he connects his analysis with public 
policy. Rae in fact puts forward Smith's case as follows: "The 
axiom which he, brings forward, that the capital of a society is the 
same with that of all individuals who compose it, being granted, it 
follows that to increase the capitals of all the individuals in a 
society is to increase the general capital of the society. It 
seems, therefore, also to follow that as every man is best judge of 
his own business and of the modes in which his own capital may be 
augmented, so to prevent him from adopting these modes is to obstruct 
him in his efforts to increase his own capital, and to check the 
increase of general capital; and hence, that, as all laws for the 
regulation of commerce are in fact means by which the legislator 
(1) Jean Baptiste Say, A Treatise on Political Economy, Book I, Chapter 44 
'Of The Natural Agents That Assist in The Production of Wealth, and 
Speciality of Land.' 
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prevents individuals conducting their business as they themselves 
would deem bést, they must operate prejudicially on the increase 
of individual and so of general wealth. "(l) 
Rae rejects the whole scheme. It is not true, he says, that 
social and individual interests are identical; nor that the causes 
that give rise to wealth are the same in the two cases. An 
individual may gain wealth by way of gambling and tricky bargaining; 
and factual evidence shows that self -interest does not always lead 
to increased national wealth. Moreover, while it is generally true 
that an individual can find employment', and so obtain an income 
from which he can save, in the case of a nation the materials on 
which the national industry may be employed are to be provided, 
and often are or may be wanting. Individuals generally increase 
their capital -by obtaining a larger portion of the common stock. 
One grows rich, while another grows poor; but While this being so, 
the national capital itself may remain but little changed. In 
other words, as individuals generally grow rich by acquiring a 
larger and larger portion of wealth already in existence, nations 
do so by the production of wealth that did not previously exist. 
The two processes differ in the fact that the one is an acquisition 
of wealth, whereas the other is a creation of it. 
It is then a consequence of his views as to the distinction 
between individual and national capital that aae assigns to 
(1) John Rae, The Sociological Theory of Capital, p. 380. 
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invention a place of primary importance in his scheme of things; 
and his work is substantially a study of the place of invention 
in social development. He argues that the creation of wealth is 
largely dependent upon inventions; and national wealth, as 
distinct from individual wealth, can only be increased through the 
aid of the inventive faculty. Thus the power of inventions plays 
a leading part in his thought; and in this sense he is anticipating 
J.A. Schumpeter, whose theory of economic development is essentially 
based on the emergence of innovations. Moreover, the fact that 
private accumulation rests very largely, according to Rae, on mere 
acquisition rather than creation of wealth implies further that 
there is in no way any natural identity between national and 
individual interests. In harmony with this idea, Rae rejects a 
strong tendency of the Classical school by holding that there is 
no presumption against state interference, and that the legislator 
may, by means of a small expenditure, effect an increase in the 
productive powers of the community. It is this tendency in Rae's 
work towards the extension of the scope of state interference for 
the sake of public good that economic historians usually speak of 
Rae as the anticipator of the German economist, Friedrich List. 
Rae also criticises Smith's treatment of division of labour, 
holding that it springs from invention rather than the reverse, and 
hence is effect rather than cause of increased productivity. 
although there seems to be an element of truth in Rae's emphasis 
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on inventions rather than on division of labour, in reality the two 
are interrelated, each being now cause and effect. 
However, a more deliberate line of attack was made by List on 
the Classical school; it was the neglect of the national element 
in Political Economy. Adam Smith and his followers had extended 
their investigations to the whole world. In List's opinion, 
Political Economy ought to have reference to the life of a nation. 
Individuals are not only producers and consumers, they are also 
citizens of states and members of nations; and, moreover, the 
productive power of all individuals is largely determined by the 
social and political circumstances of the nation. The function of 
Political Economy, then, is to accomplish the economic development 
of the nation.(1) 
It follows, therefore, that any attempt to keep economics free 
from politics is mistaken, and that the doctrine of laissez -faire 
is a sheer fallacy. "The necessity for the intervention of 
legislative power and administration," says List, "is everywhere 
more apparent the further the economy of the nation is developed.tt(2) 
Laissez -faire is a maxim which sounds no less agreeable to robbers, 
cheats and thieves than to the merchant.(3) It is not the function 
of the statesman to do nothing. "A statesman will know, and must 
know .... how the productive powers of a whole nation can be 
awakened, increased, and protected, and how, on the other hand, 
(1), Friedrich List, The National System of Political Economy (translated by 
Samson S. Lloyd, 1904) . 
( 2 ) 'bid, p. 139,. 
(3) Ibid, p. 208. 
71. 
they are weakened, laid to sleep, or utterly destroyed. "t(l) 
How, then, is the task of the statesman to be accomplished? 
The answer brings us to what is perhaps the central point in List's 
doctrine. Smith emphasised the advantages of division of labour 
as applied to any individual trade, e.g., pin- making; but he had 
no perception of the division of labour as applied to a whole 
nation, in which case the principle of the division of labour would 
mean the symmetrical development of all the nation's productive 
powers. "The popular school," said List, "inasmuch as it does not 
duly consider the nature of the powers of production, and does not 
take into account the conditions of nations in their aggregate, 
disregards especially the importance of developing, in an equal 
ratio, agriculture, manufactures and commerce, political power and 
internal wealth, and disregards especially the value of a manu- 
facturing power belonging especially to the nation and fully 
developed in all its branches. "(2) 
This is the text on which List preaches for the encouragement 
of manufactures. He constantly stresses the point that agriculture, 
trade and other economic activities flourish only when manufacturing 
industries have reached a high stage of development. A nation which 
is predominantly agricultural lacks the most essential division of 
operations among its inhabitants, and may not acquire even an 
infinitesimal part of the material wealth of the perfect nation. 
1) Ibid., 284. 
2 Ibid., p. 114. 
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A nation which carries on agriculture alone is like a crippled 
individual, for in such a nation there would prevail dullness of 
mind, awkwardness of body, obstinate adherence to old nations, 
customs, methods and processes, want of culture, of prosperity, 
and of liberty. It is indeed only under the influence of 
manufactures that agriculture itself is to be fully developed and 
raised to a skilled industry. 
Against this background of theory based upon the concept of a 
political and national economy, List indicates the functions of 
the State. In broad terms, it is crucial to promote the productive 
powers of the nation, and in the case which List had particularly 
in mind, from the purely agricultural state to the state combining 
agriculture and manufactures. In his complete statement, there are 
five stages of development through which a nation has to pass, and 
these he describes under the names of original barbarism, pastoral 
condition, agricultural condition, agricultural manufacturing 
condition, and agricultural manufacturing commercial condition. 
The primary weapon whereby a nation may progress from a lower to a 
higher stage of development is protection in one form or another; 
but the common view that List is a strong supporter of Protection 
is as mistaken as giving the impression that Adam Smith was an 
uncompromising free -trader. List, it is true, lays emphasis on 
protection, because he is primarily concerned with the stage at 
which, in his view, protection is most appropriate. But, in a 
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complete statement of his theoretical exposition, List is properly 
to be described as being neither a protectionist nor a free trader. 
Neither policy is for him an end in itself; each is merely a 
means, and the appropriate policy will depend on the needs of each 
case. In the earlier stages, nations will adopt Free Trade with 
more advanced nations as a means of raising themselves from a 
state of barbarism, and of making advances in agriculture; in the 
next they will promote the growth of manufactures, fisheries, 
navigation and foreign trade by means of commercial restrictions; 
and in the last, when they have reached the highest degree of 
wealth and power, they will revert to the principle of Free Trade 
in order to preserve their agriculturalists, manufacturers and 
merchants from indolence. 
It will be observed, therefore, that, for List, Protection is 
but a transitional phase from one stage of economic development to 
another. In this respect, he appears to be overwhelmed with a 
nationalistic spirit preaching for the doctrine that 'Germany must 
care for Germany and Russia for Russia.' Yet, elsewhere, he appears 
to be looking into the future when the union of all nations will 
have become a reality. Protection, according to List, is indeed 
the most efficient means of furthering such a union, and hence 
true freedom of trade, when all nations will have reached the 
highest stages of economic development. 
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2. JOHN STUART LULL. 
Although J.S. i,_ill (1806 -1873) added little to economic 
theory, his formulation and exposition of the doctrines of his 
predecessors, together with applications and illustrations, was 
such that his famous work represented the most intelligible 
transition from classical political economy to neo- classical 
economics. 
(i) 
Mill distinguishes national or social wealth from individual 
wealth, and defines it as all useful or agreeable things which 
possess exchangeable value." He adds that the essential qualities 
of wealth are a material nature and susceptibility to accumulation. 
He attacks mercantilist ideas, explores the various economic stages 
of society as he sees them, and investigates the great inequalities 
in wealth among different nations, attributing those inequalities, 
partly to the laws of production which are natural and not arbitrary, 
and partly to the laws of distribution which are largely influenced 
by human institutions and hence are in fact arbitrary. 
In iJiill's opinion, the whole question of private property, as 
a social institution, is at bottom one of utility. If any other 
system could be shown to minister to the happiness of society as a 
whole better than the system of private property, this system 
should no doubt be adopted. But which system carries with it a 
greater amount of total net happiness? The answer to this question 
(1) John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy. 
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is the solution of the problem; and it should imply the 
consideration of historical experience, all motives which 
influence men under different social systems, and all effects of 
society on the individual and of the individual on society. 
The right of property, which one enjoys in the fruits of 
one's labour, exists only by support of the authority of society, 
and this support can be withdrawn. Now if the right of property 
in that which one has created is of this nature, how much more 
dependent must be the right of property in land, which nature, not 
man, created? Here private property is justifiable only if 
landlords make those improvements which would benefit society. 
The state should invariably reserve and exercise the right to 
interfere when the public good demands it. The fact that land is 
limited both in quantity and quality gives the state this right, 
which it ought to have in case of all monopolies. In fact Mill 
here recommends various measures to encourage improvements on land, 
small holdings, and the cultivation of waste land. He even goes 
further in the formulation of his economic policy to express the 
view that it might be advisable for the state itself to own land 
and lease it to co- operative agricultural associations, or in small 
portions to individual peasants. 
It is sometimes believed that Mill would prefer Communism to 
an unimproved state of our present capitalist system. But the 
choice does not lie between Communism and the continuance of our 
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present state without improvement. According to Mill, the first 
measure to be introduced is universal education. The workers lack 
the means and the will to provide for the education of their class. 
The state must care for the schools, and the education should be 
thoroughly practical in its nature, aiming at developing sound 
common sense, good judgment and an understanding of surrounding 
circumstances. Moreover, a participation in political affairs is 
considered by Mill to be an important and necessary means of 
educating the people. Every adult should have the right of 
suffrage, under the sole condition of demonstrating that he has 
improved the advantages of education offered him. Taking an 
active part in politics is the first condition to accustom the 
mind to more extended interests and views than those which are only 
personal. It 'is, indeed, the first step taken outside of 
individual and family selfishness. 
Such is the way Mill looks at the society, in which the human 
race can live happily together and maximise their well being and 
welfare. His policy for social and political reform is impressive 
and ingenious. He proposes such measures as universal education, 
universal suffrage and emancipation of women. He recommends the 
promotion of agriculture by all means, e.g., the re- organisation 
of the productive units, security of tenancy by lessees, the 
tillage of all waste land, and the creation of a class of small 
proprietors by handing over the public land to industrious people. 
In a nutshell, Mill's real contribution to economic policy seems to 
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lie in his enlightening discussion of the ways in which the legal 
framework can be so formulated as to govern economic activity in 
the best interests of society. And, above all, 4ill states with 
clarity and ingenuity that the property rights should not have 
come into being but for the protection of society, and as a 
corollary these rights should be subject to the authority of the 
state in seeing to it that the property in land is administered 
in the best interests of society as a whole. 
Along this line of thought, therefore, we may see in ìill's 
writings all the signs of a moderate socialism, the principles of 
which can be said to be accepted by public opinion in almost all 
capitalist societies at different stages of development. Besides, 
his attitude to Communism becomes pretty clear in the last edition 
of his 'Principles', in which he declares that whatever economic 
system actually achieves the high ideals of a happy society and a 
utopian state of things is justifiably acceptable to all. As to 
Communism, in particular, he sets out two requirements for its 
adoption. The first is that a Communist regime should carry with 
it the achievement of high ideals of maximisation of social welfare 
in the utiliterian sense; but this test is highly impractical, 
requiring a great deal of historical evidence and concrete facts. 
The second is that, under a Communist regime, there should be a 
huge fund of moral and intellectual abilities at the top to 
administer with efficiency a huge totaliterian state. But this 
requirement, too, is almost impossible of fulfilment. Human nature 
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is susceptible to abuse, to lust for power and corruption; and 
it is no wonder that, under a totaletarian state, the natural 
rights of man as a free citizen are entirely frustrated. This 
political aspect is evidently no less important than the economic 
aspect of Communism. It is then much more advisable to try to 
improve and re- organise our capitalist society from above in such a 
way as to get rid of its evils of inequalities, monopolies, crises 
and poverty rather than to run the risk of putting the destiny of 
human society and all its noble elements and social values under 
the dictatorship of a handful of men, whose despotism may be 
enlightened or completely disastrous to our race. To the unbiassed 
critic, this seems to be the genuine interpretation of Mill's 
opinion on the 'Social Question'. Such an interpretation is 
essentially a ' challenge to the allegations sometimes made that 
i'iill is much more of a Marxian than a Ricardian. 
Nevertheless, the improvement and the re- organisation of our 
capitalist society would necessarily imply that there should be a 
certain authority charged with the task of bringing such a social 
reform into effect. Evidently it is not the individual citizens 
separately but collectively, who can perform this task: it is the 
State pure and simple. Does not this mean that, by implication, 
Mill abandons the Smithian doctrine of laissez -faire based on the 
physiocratic beliefs in the natural laws, rights and liberties of 
man in his social conduct? Does not this mean that Mill favours 
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that the State should transcend its traditional functions as a 
watchdog, keeping order and justice in an atmosphere of pure 
individualism? 
In fact, Lill remained an individualist, and even his 
socialism is moulded in individualistic ideas. The reforms which 
are dear to his heart, the extension of peasant proprietorship 
and the fusion of labour and capital in a system of co- partnership, 
are essentially of an individualistic character. 'When he speaks 
of legislation that favours equality of fortunes, he openly 
qualifies his proposed reform by adding: "so far as is consistent 
with the just claim of the individual to the fruits, whether great 
or small, of his or her own industry.'t 
1) 
He looks with disfavour 
upon progressive taxation as a socialist proposal on the ground 
that "to tax the larger incomes at a higher percentage than the 
smaller, is to lay a tax on industry and economy; to impose a 
penalty on people for having worked harder and saved more than 
their neighbours."(2) In the chapter on Bequest and Inheritance, 
he is obsessed with the individualistic idea that bequest, as one 
of the sacred rights of property, must not be frustrated; and he 
reveals a tendency to favour a system which would "restrict, not 
what anyone might bequeath, but what anyone should be permitted to 
acquire, by bequest or inheritance."(3) According to gill, 
government interference should be limited by a general right of 
(1) Ibid., Book IV, Chap. 6, Sec. 2. 
(2) Ibid., Book V, Chap. 2, Sec. 3. 
(3) Ibid., Book II, Chap. 2, Sec. 4+. 
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citizens to their individuality, in so far as such a right is not 
injurious to óthers. Like his classical predecessors, Mill holds 
that the individual has both a greater knowledge of his own 
feelings and circumstances, and more interest in his own well -being, 
than anyone else. Individual initiative is therefore desirable 
except when it harms other individuals or impedes their efforts 
to better their position. Individuality, a rich diversity of 
human development, is the source of all progress. In his essay on 
Liberty, iill also shows the dangers of bureaucracy, how it 
substitutes routine for progressiveness, and how it rushes into 
ill- advised formulation of policy so long as it is not sufficiently 
subject to criticism. 
dill, however, allows a great place for government action. If 
utility is the' only test, and if the greatest happiness for the 
greatest number is thereby to be preserved, then government action 
is obviously inevitable. Specifically, he would permit state 
interference in cases in which it is required by the interests of 
consumers who are unable to help themselves, for here the 
competition of the market does not apply. State interference is 
also permissible in the interest of the incompetent, of those 
under a personal contract in perpetuity, and of those who have but 
an indirect control over their property, e.g., investors in joint 
stock companies. There is also room for public activity in cases 
where people are acting for others and are not properly guided by 
self -interest as in the administration of charity, or of public 
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utilities, or in the conduct of scientific research. In such 
cases, Mill is substantially in conformity with Adam Smith, with 
the exception that the former as a Classical liberal reveals a 
tendency in his work towards the extension of the economic functions 
of the State for the sake of public good. 
That distinguishes the Classical liberal outlook, as is 
exemplified in Mill's work, from the authoritarian system is not a 
denial of the necessity for state action on the one side and an 
affirmation on the other, but rather a different view of what kind 
of action is desirable. The authoritarian has to issue from the 
centre, or at least from agencies directly controlled from the 
centre. In contrast to this authoritarian attitude, the Classical 
liberal does not say that the centre should do nothing. But he 
believes that the attempt to plan from the centre is liable to 
break down and that no such plan can be a substitute for truly 
decentralised initiative. The state, he proposes, shall prescribe 
what individuals shall not do, if they are not to get in each 
other's way, while the citizens shall be left free to do anything 
which is not so forbidden. To the one is assigned the task of 
establishing formal rules, to the other responsibility for the 




IN CLASSICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY. 
1. ThOivAS ROBERT i'IALTHUS. 
Malthus (1776 -l834) marks indeed a new development in the 
approach to economic science at the end of the eighteenth century. 
He attacks the Mercantilist idea that the growth of population is 
beneficial and socially desirable so long as savings increase. 
He also attacks thè view that savings, when increased, must 
necessarily add to the national wealth. In Smithian economics 
the society will be economically progressive if both the stock of 
capital and population increase in appropriate proportions. 
Malthus, however comes along to introduce a third factor into this 
conception of the dynamic development of the economy, viz. the 
available stock of arable land. This trinity of factors is 
obviously logical in the production and the increase of wealth, for 
as J.B. Say emphasises, values produced are attributable to the 
agency and concurrence of labour, of capital, and of natural agents, 
and nothing but these three sources can produce value or add to 
national wealth. 
But Malthus differs from other economists in his approach to 
the laws of economic progress. In his view these laws would 
inevitably imply a disproportionate rate of increase in population 
and capital and a continual dearth of land of superior fertility, 
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with the inevitable result that population would outstrip the 
means of subsistence. Malthus had to fight the socialists of 
his day, notably Godwin, who believed in the demand for 
egaliterian principles, and in the fact that all the social evils 
would spring solely from the establishment of bad social institutions. 
Malthus objected to this attitude of Godwin, and stated emphatically 
that social evils must be attributed not so much to bad social 
institutions as to the natural law embodying the phenomenon of 
population. 
Malthus starts his analysis of this law by making two 
postulates upon which to build his population theory: first, that 
food is necessary to the existence of man; secondly, that the 
passion between the sexes is necessary, and will remain nearly in 
its present state. Then Malthus goes on to state that these two 
laws ever since we have had any knowledge of mankind, appear to 
have been fixed laws of our nature; and, as we have not hitherto 
seen any alterations in them, we have no right to conclude that 
they will ever cease to be what they are now, without an immediate 
act of power in ;that Being who first arranged the system of the 
Universe.(1) 
These two postulates, being granted, the power of population 
is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth to produce 
subsistence for man. Population, when unchecked, increases in a 
geometrical ratio, whilst subsistence only increases in an 
(1) T.R. Malthus, An Essay on The Principle of Population, 1798, Book I, 
Chap. I., 'Outline of The Principal Argument of The Essay.' 
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arithmetical ratio, and by the very law of our nature which makes 
food necessarÿ to the life of man, the effects of these two 
unequal powers must be equal. This implies a strong and 
constantly operating check on population, arising from the 
difficulty of subsistence. 
The ultimate check to population, states Malthus, appears to 
be a want of food, arising necessarily from the different ratios 
according to which population and food increase. But this ultimate 
check is never the immediate check, except in cases of actual 
famine. The immediate check may be stated to consist in all those 
customs, and all those diseases, which seem to be generated by a 
scarcity of the means of subsistence; and all those causes, 
independent of this scarcity, whether of a moral or physical 
nature, which tend prematurely to weaken and destroy the human 
frame. 
i althus classifies these checks to population, which keep 
down the number to the level of the means of subsistence, under 
two general heads: the preventive and the positive checks. The 
sum of all these checks - vice, misery and moral restraint - 
taken together, forms the immediate check to population; and, in 
every country where the whole of the procreative power cannot be 
called into action, the preventive and the positive checks must 
vary inversely with each other. In countries either naturally 
unhealthy, or subject to a great mortality, from whatever cause it 
may arise, the preventive check will prevail very little. In those 
$5. 
countries, on the contrary, which are naturally healthy, and 
where the preventive check is found to prevail with considerable 
force, the positive check will prevail very little, or the 
mortality be very small. 
iialthus then resorts to factual evidence, after he has 
propounded his population theory, and finds that in every country 
some of these checks are in constant operation. However, there 
are few societies in which there is not a constant tendency in the 
population to increases beyond the means of subsistence. This 
tendency subjects the lower classes of society to distress and 
prevents any great permanent betterment of their condition. Its 
effect, in Malthus's view, is to be brought about in the following 
way. Starting from a situation in which the means of subsistence 
in any society are just equivalent to the easy support of its 
inhabitants, the constant urge towards greater population increases 
the number of people before the means of subsistence are increased. 
Thus the poor must live much worse, and many of them be reduced to 
severe distress. The number of labourers will exceed the amount 
of labour demanded in the market; hence the price of labour must 
tend to fall, whereas the price of food must simultaneously tend 
to rise. The labourer therefore must do more work to earn the 
same as he did before. During this period of distress, the 
discouragement to marriage and the difficulty of rearing a family 
are so great that the progress of population is retarded. In the 
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meantime, the cheapness and abundance of labour encourage the 
agriculturists to employ more labour on the land, to bring fresh 
soil under the plough, to adopt intensive methods of agriculture 
to the already cultivated land, until eventually the means of 
subsistence become in the sa:iie proportion to the population as in 
the initial situation. The new situation of the labourer, being 
then again tolerably comfortable, the restraints to population are 
in some degree loosened, and, after a short period, the same 
retrograde and progressive movements, with respect to happiness, 
are repeated. This Aalthusian reasoning, relating changes in the 
size of population to the level of the real wages of labourers, 
demonstrates the futility of bettering the conditions of the lower 
classes through any attempted increase in their wages. r; 
pessimistic view as such would cast suspicion upon the possibility 
of restoring the happiness and felicity of the human race in the 
present state of society. 
ivialthus then proceeds to point out that the oscillation implied 
in his thesis, viz. the alternate retrograde and progressive 
movements with respect to happiness, will probably not be obvious 
to common view; and it may be difficult even for the most attentive 
observer to calculate its periods. One reason why this oscillation 
is concealed from common view is the difference between the 
nominal and the real price of labour. It very rarely happens, he 
says, that the nominal price of labour universally falls; it 
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frequently remains the same while the nominal price of provisions 
has been gradüally rising. This, indeed, will generally be the 
case if the increase of manufactures and commerce be sufficient 
to employ the new labourers that are thrown into the market, and 
to prevent the increased supply from lowering the money- price. 
But an increased number of labourers, receiving the same money- wages, 
will necessarily, by their competition, increase the money -price 
of corn. This is in fact a real fall in the price of labour; and 
during this period, the conditions of the lower classes of the 
community must be gradually growing worse. But the farmers and 
capitalists are growing rich from the real cheapness of labour. 
Their increasing capitals enable them to employ a greater number of 
men; and, as the population probably suffers some check from the 
greater difficulty of supporting a family, the demand for labour, 
after a certain period, becomes great in proportion tothe supply, 
and its price of course rises, if left to find its natural level. 
Thus the wages of labour, and consequently the condition of the 
lower classes of society, have progressive and retrograde movements, 
though the price of labour might never nominally fall. 
Malthus then shifts his discussion from pure abstract theory 
and the exposition of its implications in respect of any society, 
to policy prescription. On that score, Malthus looks with horror 
at the increase of misery which must necessarily follow the attempts 
to encourage marriage and population growth. He stresses the fact 
that, among the lower classes of society, where the point is of 
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utmost importance, the poor laws afford a direct, constant and 
systematic encouragement to marriage, by removing from each 
individual that heavy responsibility, which he would incur by the 
laws of nature, for bringing beings into the world Wa ich he could 
not support. Aalthus thus sees the root cause of poverty not in 
the establishment of property institutions which would give rise 
to greater inequalities of earnings between the higher and lower 
classes, but solely in the natural forces, constantly latent in the 
human race as a specie of the animal kingdom, which drive man to 
reproduce himself in a much greater proportion than the means of 
subsistence allow. He sees, too, that the only way to improve the 
lot of the lower classes is not to raise real wages of the working 
people, for this is only a temporary improvement which would 
eventually give way to the initial situation of distress and 
poverty, but solely to adopt preventive checks to population growth, 
and thus by withholding the supply of labour raise its price for 
an indefinite period. This mode of diminishing poverty is perfectly 
clear in theory and invariably confirmed by the analogy of every 
other commodity 'which is brought to the exchange market. 
In this manner, Aalthus becomes the first economist to 
investigate whether the economic system develops its own laws of 
motion, whether economic progress generates a momentum. 'Moreover, 
the Nalthusian views on the theory of population were a complete 
reversal of what was held in the preceding two centuries, especially 
by the Mercantilists. They went even further than this. For Petty 
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held that an increase in population was socially desirable on the 
grounds that it went hand in hand with increasing returns. Smith, 
too, maintained that.an increase in population really meant ampler 
scope for the application of the principle of division of labour; 
hence it implied increasing returns. But Ricardo accepted Malthus's 
theory and inferred that wages in the long run were to be fixed at 
the subsistence level because changes in population in the manner 
which 4lthus described in his Essay would unavoidably keep wages 
at that level. Ricardo then took this conclusion as a premise 
upon which to build up his dynamic theory of falling rates of 
profit and increasing rents. 
However, it is well to pause here and consider John Stuart 
Mill's position in respect of the Malthusian thesis, for Mill gives 
a larger place to the principle of population than any other 
economist of his day. He accepts the thesis and agrees with 
Malthus in his conception of the preventive and positive checks to 
population. But he goes farther than Malthus did in the advocacy 
of preventive checks. This fact is partly to be explained by his 
strong feeling that women were abused under the existing system. 
He dwells particularly upon the sin of calling human beings into 
the world without having the means to support them. He wishes to 
strengthen the feeling of responsibility in parents, and to spread 
among the people an understanding of the consequences of over - 
population. "Poverty, like most social evils," says fill, "exists 
because men follow their brute instincts,without due consideration. 
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But society is possible precisely because man is not necessarily 
a brute." 
A little further on, he makes use of this strong language: 
"Little improvement can be expected in morality, until the 
producing of large families is regarded with the same feelings as 
drunkenness or any other physical excess. But while the 
aristocracy and clergy are foremost to set the example of this 
kind of incontinence, what can be expected from the poor? One 
would imagine that children rained down on married people direct 
from heaven; that it was really, as the common phrases have it, 
God's will and not their own, which decided the number of their 
offspring." 
It is then obvious that Mill favours .legislation which must 
not weaken the feeling of responsibility in begetting children, 
but must strengthen it. It is in this sense that he explains the 
ground of his objection to a legal minimum of wages. It would 
remove all the barriers which now oppose overpopulation, until 
finally the human race would be so overabundant that it would lead 
to disastrous consequences to the state of society. Among the 
lower, as among the higher, classes, the concept of a proper 
standard of life would be formed and the increase of population 
would thereby be limited. Besides, if public opinion were once 
far enough advanced to allow it, legislation could make it a legal 
offence for one to beget children without having the means to 
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support them. But Mill thinks that such a law would be 
unnecessary, if only women were emancipated so that they should 
not depend for their living upon the exercise of a single physical 
function. Becoming more independent, they would not submit to 
the burden of large families. In this sense, Mill preaches for 
birth control and moral restraint before and after marriage in 
order to stave off distress and poverty. 
But if iialthus's theory was received with the.utmost respect, 
and met with widespread acceptance by such leading writers in 
classical economics as Ricardo and J.S. :dill, one may wonder whether, 
in the light of historical evidence during the period between 1798, 
the date of the publication of his Essay, and then, his theory has 
been testified to be true or not. 
The first criticism of Malthus' theory is to be levelled 
against the reliability of his postulates. He considered that the 
chief evidence for the geometrical increase in population was the 
experience of North America where the usual checks to population 
had not been operating, so that the postulate might be regarded as 
based on extrapolation from population trends in that part of the 
world. His second postulate, the arithmetic increase of means of 
subsistence was also a case of simple extrapolation on the basis of 
past trends in Great Britain. It was therefore in flagrant 
contradiction to past trends in North America and, perhaps, 
conflicted with the opinions of agricultural experts. However, 
the concrete conclusions of the theory stood or fell by the 
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reliability of the method of extrapolation. Exponents of Aalthus 
attempted to- support the results of. simple extrapolation by an 
appeal to contemporary theories of agriculture. The principle of 
diminishing returns from agriculture became the principle prop to 
the assumption that food production could not expand so rapidly as 
population would, if unchecked. In its 'static' form, this 
principle suggested that additional food production could be 
obtained only by the extension of agriculture on inferior soils or 
the intensified cultivation of land already utilised. In either 
case, production would not increase proportionately to the number 
of workers engaged. Taking a 'dynamic' view, however, it was 
necessary to consider the possibility of technical improvements 
enabling increased production to be obtained from any given piece 
of land or providing access to 'new' land superior to that already 
under cultivation. Even simple extrapolation from the past progress 
of agricultural science gave results inconsistent with the 'dynamic' 
principle of diminishing returns. Attempts to retain the principle 
often took the form of assertions that future improvements could 
not be expected on the same scale as in the past. 
The second criticism is levelled against Aalthus's assertion 
of the way in which social and economic forces affect the 
reproduction rates. He states that in most countries, among the 
lower classes of people, there appears to be something like a 
standard of wretchedness, a point below which they will not 
continue to marry and propagate their species. This standard varies 
93. 
from one country to another, and is formed by various concurring 
circumstances of soil, climate, government, degree of knowledge, 
civilisation, etc. The principal circumstances which contribute 
to lowering it are despotism and ignorance; and those which 
contribute to raising it are liberty, security of property, the 
spread of knowledge and a taste for the conveniences and comforts 
of life. 
(l) 
There seems to be nothing wrong with this exposition of the 
effect of social forces on population changes. What is really 
subject to much criticism is the contention that, once such a 
standard of wretchedness is set in the society, economic forces 
affect population in such manner that both the population change 
and the change in real earnings of the working class would go in 
the same direction; both upwards or both downwards. For the 
history of the last two centuries suggests that where resources 
are adequate, production can increase more rapidly than population, 
so that the standar& of living may rise even though population is 
growing rapidly. And, where this happens, the combination of a 
rising standard of living and of the new modes of life associated 
with economic development, causes the birth rate to fall, until it 
reaches the point at which the population may for a while be stable, 
or may even fall. This empirical evidence evidently runs counter 
to what Malthus proposes in his theory; for at certain stages of 
(1) T.R. Malthus, op. cit. , 2nd Édition, London, 1803, p.557. 
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economic development, a rising level of real wages and a rising 
living standard are realistically concomitant with a falling birth 
rate, not a rising birth rate as is implied in Malthus's theory. 
It is tempting, however, to defend the validity of 4althus's 
theory by investigating, at the same time, both the economic and 
social forces which influence the development of population. In 
its 'static' form, therefore, the theory suggests that a raising 
of the level of real wages of labour above the standard of 
wretchedness, which is already defined and established by social 
values, tends to push up the natural increase in population; 
similarly, any lowering of that level below the conventional 
standard tends to slow down the natural increase. In its 'dynamic' 
view, the theory would take account not only of the economic 
forces, which 'constantly play the same part in any perk d of time, 
but also of changes in social values and forces which take place 
over time. These changes dynamically tend to raise up the standard 
of wretchedness in the Malthusian sense, and thereby more than 
counterbalance the effects of economic forces. 
But Aalthus does not stop at the point of tracing the causes 
which practically keen down the population of a country to the 
level of its actual supplies, but goes on to investigate the 
causes which chiefly influence these supplies or call forth the 
powers of production into the shape of increasing wealth. Such an 
interesting issue is raised and elaborately discussed in his 
'Principles'. 
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"Many writers ", says ilalthus, "have been of opinion that an 
increase of population is the sole stimulus necessary to the 
increase of wealth, because population, being the great source 
of consumption, must, in their opinion, necessarily keep up the 
demand for an increase of produce, which will naturally be 
followed by a continued increase of supply." 
That a permanent increase of population is a powerful and 
necessary element of increasing demand, will be most readily 
allowed; but that the increase of population alone, or, more 
properly speaking, the pressure of population hard against the 
limits of subsistence, does not furnish an effective stimulus to 
the continued increase of wealth, is not only evident in theory, 
but is confirmed by universal experience. If want alone, or the 
desire of the labouring classes to possess the necessaries and 
conveniences of life, were a sufficient stimulus to productibn, 
there is no state in Europe, or in the world, which would have 
found any other practical limits to its wealth than its power to 
produce; and the earth would probably before this period have 
contained, at the very least, ten times as many inhabitants as 
are supported on its surface at present. "(1) 
It is obvious, in theory, that an increase of population, 
when an additional quantity of labour is not demanded, will soon 
be checked by want of employment, and will not furnish the required 
(1) T.R. Malthus, Principles of Political Economy, 1820, 'On The Immediate 
Causes of The Progress of Wealth'. 
stimulus to an increase of wealth proportioned to the power of 
production. 'If any doubts, p1althus emphasises, should remain 
with respect to the theory on the subject, they will surely be 
dissipated by a reference to experience. Evidently the only 
way by which one can appraise the practical effect of population 
alone as a stimulus to wealth, is to refer to those countries 
where, from the excess of population above the means of subsistence, 
the stimulus of want is greatest. If in these countries, which 
still have great powers of production, the progress of wealth is 
very slow, we have certainly all the evidente which experience 
can possibly give us, that population alone cannot create an 
effective demand for wealth. 
£althus then turns to discuss the possibility of saving from 
revenue to add to capital, considered as a stimulus to the increase 
of wealth. No permanent and continued increase of wealth can 
take place without a continued increase of capital accumulation. 
But, meanwhile, he is inclined to enquire what is the state of 
things which generally disposes a nation to accumulate; and 
further, what is the state of things which tends to make that 
accumulation the most effective, and lead to a further and 
continued increase of capital and wealth. 
First, he holds that commodities should not only be compared 
and exchanged with each other, as if they were so many mathematical 
figures, but must be referred to the numbers and wants of consumers. 
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He disagrees, in this connection, with Say and Ricardo who both 
hold that although there may easily be a glut of particular 
commodities, there cannot possibly be a glut of commodities in 
general. Production being thus the sole source of demand, an 
excess in the supply of one article merely proves a deficiency in 
the supply of some other, and a general excess is impossible. 
Malthus challenges this proposition by reference to the fact that 
if we compare commodities, as we certainly ought to do, with the 
numbers and wants of consumers, then a great increase of produce 
with comparatively stationary numbers and with wants diminished 
by parsimony, must necessarily occasion a great fall of value 
estimated in labour, so that the same produce, though it might 
have cost the same quantity of labour as before, would no longer 
command the same quantity, and both the power of accumulation and 
the motive to accumulate would be strongly checked. 
Further, a healthy taste for luxuries - a taste which will 
properly stimulate industry - is one of the things which generally 
disposes a nation to accumulate. But the history of human society 
shows that the development of this taste for luxuries is culturally 
of slow growth, and that it is a most important error to take for 
granted that mankind will readily produce and consume, and will 
never prefer indolence to luxuries and the rewards of industry. 
Finally, Malthus imposes the condition that the conversion 
of revenue into capital should be kept within the appropriate 
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limits. If the conversion of revenue into capital is pushed 
beyond a certain point, it must throw the working classes out of 
employment as a result of diminution in effective demand. Hence 
the adoption of parsimonious habits, in too great a degree, may 
be accompanied by the most distressing effects at the outset as 
well as by a permanently marked depression of wealth and population. 
The Malthus- Ricardo controversy over the saving problem emerged 
out of the conditions of the time. There were import duties on 
corn, and these raised a debatable issue between the industrialists, 
on the one hand, and the landowners on the other. Ricardo was 
the champion of the repeal of Corn Laws. He believed, rightly 
or wrongly, that the landowners' were usually lazy and apathetic, 
and they often spent their incomes on things which were in no way 
productive. 'By contrast, the capitalists were energetic and 
thrifty, and their increased incomes were saved and invested. 
Dialthus, however, refuted this argument. He was in favour of 
the Corn Laws. He accepted the view that landowners are usually 
the consumers while the capitalists are the savers; but he doubted 
very much that the national income would increase as a result of 
increased savings. 
In Malthus' opinion, savings are invested in fixed capital 
for furthering the production of consumable goods. Thus an 
increase in savings would ultimately bring forth an increase of 
the output of final products. After all, consumption in the 
Classical tradition is the ultimate end of all economic activities. 
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But it would only be possible for the producers of final 
products to dispose of the increased output in the commodity 
markets if, and only if, there was a corresponding increase in 
effective demand. The crux of the problem is therefore the 
creation and maintenance of this effectual demand. If the 
demand is there, the capital will be forthcoming. But the 
contrary is not always true. If the capital is there, the 
demand will not necessarily be forthcoming. Foster the 
demand, and the capital will look after itself. Should not 
this I althusian line of thought be regarded as the prototype of 
what is technically known as the acceleration principle in 
modern economic analysis? 
In real life, !Malthus goes on, we may find countries 
abounding in natural resources, with open land with high 
fertility. Nevertheless, the peoples of those countries 
actually live in abject poverty and enjoy but a low standard 
of living. Malthus explains this backwardness by reference to 
the fact that those peoples are actually indolent and apathetic, 
that their conventional habits and mode of life are such that 
they are contented with bare necessities, and their standard of 
wretchedness, so to speak, is so low that effective demand is 
correspondingly low. If effective demand in those countries 
were pushed up, production of goods would be buoyant, and 
savings and investment requirements would automatically be met. 
Malthus then procéeds to discuss ways and means of fostering 
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demand. First, he commends the expansion of internal and 
external markets. In regard to home markets, he argues, the 
best way to effect their expansion is to ensure an adequate 
number of 'unproductive' consumers, e.g., landowners, civil 
servants, domestic servants. For that reason, he is against the 
aggregation of land into large units. If these units were 
disintegrated, there would be more and more landowners who 
constitute a major part of the demand for the produce of industry. 
In view of this, an increased number of landowners, through a 
change in the legal framework, would produce a greater demand, 
a larger amount of consumption, and a higher level of employment 
and a larger national income. 
On the same line of argument, Malthus is in favour of the 
National Debt- which performs a useful function in fostering 
effective demand. If a tax is levied on production in order 
to finance the debt service, and the tax proceeds then transferred 
to the bondholders who, in Maith us's view, are largely the 
'unproductive' consumers, this would increase effective demand. 
If the National Debt were suddenly abolished, this would bring 
forth a great deal of unemployment, resulting from the slackening 
of demand. From 'productive' to 'unproductive' labour was the 
slogan in the days of Malthus for maintaining a high level of 
employment. In our times, the cry is for a transfer from the 
rich to the poor with a view to increasing the purchasing power 
in the hands of consumers as one measure of maintaining full 
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employment. In other words, Malthus was in favour of 
transferring income from capitalists to consuming landowners 
in order to increase effective demand; and this is contrasted 
with the Ricardian advocacy of transferring income from land- 
owners to capitalists for the sake of increasing saving and 
investment. 
Jean Baptiste Say represents the well defined line of 
criticism of Malthus's work. In his 'Treatise', he argues 
that the belief held by so able an economist as Malthus, that 
there may be a glut in the market and a general over -production, 
is entirely erroneous. 
(1) 
There can be no such thing, Say 
observes, for selling is at the same time buying, and in 
producing, men are creating a demand for other things. Say's 
idea appears to be more or less a development over the physio- 
cratic teaching that, in buying and selling, goods exchange for 
goods. For his argument is essentially based upon the assumption 
that exchange is "barter ", but the use of money introduces lags 
and complications which make so simple an analysis too unreal to 
be generally applicable. Money performs but a momentary function 
in any act of double exchange; and when the transaction is finally 
closed, it will always be found, that one kind of produce has been 
exchanged for another. 
According to Say, a product is no sooner created than it, 
from that instant, affords a market for other products to the 
(i) J.B. Say, A Treatise On Political Economy, Book I, Chap.15, 
'Of the Vent or Demand. for Product'. 
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full extent of its own value. When the producer has put the 
finishing hand to his product, he is most anxious to sell it 
immediately, lest its value should vanish in his hands. Nor is 
he less anxious to dispose of the money he may get for it; for 
the value of money is also perishable. But the only way of 
getting rid of money is in the purchase of some product or other. 
Thus the mere circumstance of the creation of one product 
immediately opens a demand for other products. 
But Say goes further in his analytical exposition by 
explaining that the glut of a particular commodity arises from 
the fact that it may outstrip the total demand for it in one of 
two ways: either because it has been produced in excessive 
abundance, or because the produce of other commodities has fallen 
short. It is because the production of some commodities has 
declined, that other commodities are superabundant. Say observes, 
moreover, that precisely at the same time that one commodity makes 
a loss, another commodity is making excessive profit. And, 
since profits must operate as a powerful stimulus to production, 
there must be some violent means, or some extraordinary cause, 
a political or natural convulsion, or the avarice or ignorance of 
authority, to perpetuate this scarcity on the one hand, and 
consequent glut on the other. No sooner is the cause of this 
political disease removed, than the means of production feel a 
natural impulse towards the vacant channels, the replenishment 
of which restores activity to all the others. 
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Says s analysis on the above lines has led hire to deduce the 
following four fundámental conclusions: (a) In every community, 
the more numerous are the producers, and the more various their 
production, the more prompt, numerous, and extensive are the vents 
for these productions; (b) Each individual is interested in the 
general prosperity of all others, and that the success of one 
branch of industry promotes that of all the others. The division 
of nations into agricultural, manufacturing and commercial is 
idle enough; for the success of a nation in agriculture is a 
stimulus to its manufacturing and commercial prosperity, and the 
flourishing condition of its manufacture and commerce reflects 
a benefit upon its agriculture; (c) There is no injury to the 
industry and production to buy and import commodities 
from abroad, for nothing can be bought from foreign producers, 
except with domestic products which find a vent in world markets; 
(d) The encouragement of mere consumption is no benefit to 
commerce, for the difficulty lies in supplying the means, not in 
stimulating the desire for consumption. Production alone 
furnishes those means; and it is thus the aim of good government 
to stimulate production, of bad government to encourage consumption. 
According to some authors, there is perhaps in all this 
nothing very original. Professor Gray, for instance, remarks 
that the essence of the doctrine can be found in :2,,,uesnay's 
Dialogue du Commerce; nor are the conclusions drawn by Say 
from the TTLoi des Debouches" different from those to be found 
in Smith or nuesnay. 
(1) 
But even if Say was not Original in 
11) Professor Sir Alexander Gray Thg Development of Economic Doctrine, An Introductory Survey, n0.269-270. 
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propounding his famous law that supply creates its own demand, 
his illustrious and elegant exposition of that law justifiably 
gained for him a famous name in his days. 
It was almost a century after its enunciation that Say's 
law was shown to be frustrated. Say's views on the subject 
coincide with those of Ricardo who represents the classical 
tradition that adequacy of effectual demand and full employment 
of resources normally obtain, except for temporary disequilibrium 
in the exchange market as a result of institutional forces. 
Malthus's position, however, is entirely different; but apart 
from his criticism of Say's work along the lines which are 
based on abstract reasoning alone, the facts of history themselves 
condemn Say's theory. The phenomenon that stands out in the 
history of the capitalist market economy during the last fifty 
years, is the persistence of cyclical economic instability. It 
is fully effected in the general trend of contemporary economic 
thought, and a number of business cycle theories have been 
expounded in order to explain its persistence in capitalist 
societies. The recurrence and increasing severity of unemployment, 
particularly in the 1930's, produced in fact a keener pre- 
occupation with the analysis of business cycles and a new trend 
of economic thought that has been associated with the name of 
J.M. Keynes. This new development in economic theory constitutes 
a break in the continuity in the classical tradition as exemplified 
in Say's law of adequacy of effective demand. 
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2. DAVID RICARDO. 
It was with economic maladjustments caused by the 
beginning of the Industrial Revolution and the Napoleonic 
Wars that political economy turned more and more towards 
problems of distribution. Whereas Adam Smith was still 
preoccupied with problems of production, Malthus with problems 
of population, Ricardo (1772 -1$23) and his followers regarded 
the exploration of the laws regulating the distribution of the 
national product amongst the owners of productive resources 
as the main theme of political economy. 
(1) 
Nevertheless, what is really relevant here is not the 
exploration of the laws governing the distribution of the 
national product but the Ricardian dynamic approach to the 
scheme of distribution, an approach which is substantially 
based on the Ricardian rent theory and the Malthusian theory 
of population. But capital as well as population are the two 
fundamental factors in dynamic analysis, whose introduction into 
the Ricardian scheme is necessary to draw a clear picture of 
the dynamic development of the economy. An increase of 
capital will tend to increase the demand for labour in the longer 
run. Wages will therefore tend to increase; and, as a result, 
the checks to population, in the Aalthusian sense, will be 
weakened and the numbers increased. Every increase in 
(1) David Ricardo, Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. 
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population is supposed to drive cultivation out into inferior 
land, thus raising the rent on the better land which was already 
under cultivation. On inferior soils an additional amount of 
labour will be required to produce a given quantity of food, and 
the price of foodstuffs is therefore increased. Money wages 
rise subsequently, for wages must cover the subsistence of the 
worker. Thus when two of the three shares into which the 
produce is divided increase in money terms, the share going to 
the agricultural entrepreneurs in the form of profit must at the 
same time decrease. In real terms, wages remain constant, 
whereas with rents increasing profits must decrease. According 
to Ricardo, whenever money wages are increased, profits, with 
which interest is lumped, must be reduced correspondingly; 
nothing can affect profits but a rise in money wages. There 
seems to be no place in the Ricardian scheme for the 'economy' 
of high wages, or the possibility of changes in the productivity 
of labour. In the Ricardian scheme, wages and profits are 
diametrically opposed; the fall in the one means a rise in the 
other. In the long run, whereas rents and money wages will 
rise, profits will always tend to fall relatively and absolutely; 
and when they do they will gradually become too low to support 
the capitalists. In consequence, accumulation will eventually 
come to a stop and secular stagnation will be the inevitable 
outcome. 
It then follows that, instead of the old harmony of individual 
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interests which Adam Smith elaborated and emphasised in his 
work, we find at the heart of the economic system, according to 
Ricardo as well as Malthus, antagonisms and inevitable conflict 
of interests. Ricardo's dynamic scheme of distribution implies 
a constant clash between the interests of the landlords on the one 
hand, and those of the consumers and manufacturers on the other. 
It also implies a permanent clash of interests between the workers 
and the employers, a clash which is in no way reconcilable. 
For if one party gains, the other party will necessarily lose. 
Once again the Smithian optimism has been transmuted into down- 
right pessimism. 
In a sense, however, Ricardo was not a Ricardian, for he 
was always inclined to consider other economists' views. He 
differed with, Malthus in matters of economic policy; the Malthus - 
Ricardo controversy over the saving problem is an interesting case 
in point. Unlike Malthus, Ricardo rejected the idea that there 
could be any deficiency in demand. J.B. Say, as has been pointed 
out, held a similar view which was vigorously expressed in his 
famous law that supply creates its own demand. 
Nevertheless, concern about deficiency in effective demand 
is readily recognisable in the chapter devoted to capital in 
Ricardo's 'Principles', for he points out, in that part of his 
work, how the introduction of machinery into productive processes 
might act as a deterrent to employment. His argument is not 
unambiguous, and it is based on the distinction between fixed and 
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circulating capital. Fixed capital, he argues, employs fewer 
men than circulating capital; hence if capital resources are 
transferred from the latter to the former, this transfer must 
occasion a reduction in the level of employment. This is the 
inevitable outcome, he maintains, if the total amount of fixed 
and circulating capital remains unaltered. But if the total 
amount of capital is constantly tending to increase, the transfer 
will not matter much, as it is in this case that the increase in 
mechanisation will tend to reduce costs and prices. The 
reduction in prices implies that the consuming capacity of the 
capitalists is increased; they are thus enabled to save more 
and invest more on capital equipment. The answer to the 
Ricardian argument may be that, although the transfer of resources 
from circulating to fixed capital will tend to reduce the level 
of employment, this is not the most important element in the 
situation. Fixed capital comes out of new savings, which in 
turn should create employment not only in the sense of the number 
of operatives who will be employed with this type of capital in 
producing final products, but also in the sense of the number of 
operatives who must be engaged in producing it. In other words, 
less additional employment, but not necessarily a fall in the 
level of employment would be the ultimate result. Moreover, 
even if this Ricardian argument were accepted, it should 
necessarily imply that savings, which have always been considered 
as one of the engines of economic progress, would then be 
condemned on that score. 
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Ricardo was attacked from different quarters. His 
value theory was demolished by the utiliterians. The 
Malthusian theory of population, which he recognised and intro- 
duced into his scheme, was accepted by most people, but not all 
of them. Carey, for instance, argues that it is by no means 
true that increased population involves the diminution of wage 
rates until they are reduced to the subsistence level, and 
population increase checked through misery, vice and moral 
restraint. On the contrary, an increase in population gives 
rise to increasing returns, and this means increased production 
and increased wealth of nations. Rae, too, attacks Ricardo 
on the grounds that, in his theory, he neglects the significance 
of inventions to economic progress. 
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CHAPTER 4. 
THE CLASSICAL AND PRE -CLASSICAL THEORIES 
IN RELATION TO THE UNDER- DEVELOPED ECONOMY. 
We are now in a position to sum up the classical and pre - 
classical economic thought in so far as the theory of economic 
development is concerned. 
The Mercantilists were the first to realise that political 
economy had to concern itself with the nature and causes of the 
wealth of nations. They regarded wealth as a 'stock' of something; 
and it was in the form of gold and silver, the main source of a 
nation's wealth and strength. In the absence of mines of gold 
and silver, it was therefore their prime policy to foster and 
develop manufacturing industries and bring about a permanent 
favourable balance of trade by means of minimising imports and 
maximising exports of manufactures. It was thus on the cruder 
mercantilist theories that manufacturing industry and foreign trade 
were the most important of all economic activities, for they could 
alone increase the country's wealth. The reduction in imports 
could be made possible by rendering some of the imported goods 
unnecessary for home consumption by way of protecting native 
'infant' industries as well as bringing in foreign craftsmen who 
would play an important part in the process of industrialisation. 
Maximisation of exports, on the other hand, could be achieved by 
removing all restrictions on exports, except for raw materials, and 
by encouraging inventive ability through the establishment of 
legal rights of patents and statutes of monopoly. 
The Physiocrats, however, sought to prove that agriculture 
alone produced the wealth of the nation; and unlike this activity 
productive of wealth, all other activities are 'sterile' in the 
sense that in the former there is a 'surplus' whereas the latter 
just pay their way. A corollary of this physiocratic view, that 
agriculture was the sole source of wealth and the real revenue 
to the nation as a whole, encouragement of agriculture became the 
chief aim of physiocratic policy. Indeed Quesnay, as the true 
representative of the physiocratic school, laid much more emphasis 
on agriculture than on other occupations from the point of view 
of the generation of wealth. He spoke of wealth as a 'flow' 
concept rather than a 'stock' concept; and defined it as consisting 
of the sum total of things necessary for life and in the annual 
reproduction of such things. On this general view, the wealth of 
a country should not be judged by a greater or lesser supply of 
money in its possession; for money is but a sterile riches. He 
was also preaching for a free trade policy, and in this respect he 
was evidently speaking with the voice of Adam Smith. 
Whereas the Mercantilists attributed the increase of wealth of 
nations to a favourable balance of trade and a concomitant 
accumulation of money gold and silver, and the Physiocrats contended 
that wealth would spring solely from the pursuit of agriculture, 
whose surplus value is indeed its real wealth, Smith came along to 
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refute these conceptions of wealth, and argued that the source 
of all wealth was to be found in labour, and that an increase of 
wealth would be dependent on its productivity. Division of 
labour would increase this productivity, permit specialisation in 
processes of production, and through it the use and development 
of elaborate machinery. He then proceeded to point out that 
division of labour would be limited by the extent of the market; 
and as a corollary all barriers to trade must be broken. He 
advocated colonisation, and regarded colonies as a source of the 
supply of necessary raw materials as well as an extension of the 
home market. Moreover, he brought in his writings the evil 
legacy of the physiocratic distinction between 'productive' and 
'unproductive' labour; but with him the two words had then 
definite meanings. In his view, 'productive' labour is that 
which adds value to the raw materials to be worked upon, whereas 
'unproductive' labour is that type of labour which, however useful 
it may be, ends in no increase in value. Smith also laid emphasis 
on parsimony as the real basis of accumulation not only of private 
wealth, but also of the wealth of nations. He postulated that 
consumption was the sole end and purpose of all economic activities; 
and for the achievement of this end, he recommended the so- called 
System of Economic Freedom. Given a certain framework of law and 
order and certain public services, the object of economic activity 
was conceived to be best attained by a system of spontaneous co- 
operation. He was thus in favour of free trade; and for him 
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foreign trade was nothing but an extension of domestic trades it 
would bring in its train an extension of the division of labour, 
an increase in specialisation and a multiplicity of exchanges. 
It was in this spirit that he denied the 'infant' industry 
argument. 
J.S. Mill, for his part, distinguished national wealth from 
individual wealth, and defined it, as consisting of all useful or 
agreeable things which possessed exchangeable value. His 
conception of wealth as such has led him to maintain that its 
essential qualities were a material nature and susceptibility to 
accumulation. He investigated the great inequalities of wealth 
among different nations, and he attributed them partly to the 
natural laws of production, and partly to the arbitrary laws of 
distribution. He visualised a policy for social and political 
reform. He proposed such measures as universal education, 
universal suffrage and emancipation of women and recommended the 
promotion of agriculture by various means. Mill's real contribution 
seems to lie in his discussion of the ways in which the legal 
framework can be so formulated as to govern economic activity in 
the best interests of society. Above all, he stated with clarity 
and ingenuity that the property rights should not have come into 
being but for the protection of society, and as a corollary these 
rights should be subject to the authority of the state in seeing 
to it that property, the property in land in particular, is 
administered in the interests of the community as a whole. Along 
this line of thought we may thus see in Mill's writings all the 
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signs of a moderate socialism, rooted in individualistic ideas. 
It was largely due to the influence of the Essay on 
Population by Thomas Robert Malthus that many economists of the 
nineteenth century were led to the pessimistic conclusions which 
soon earned Political Economy the name of the 'dismal science'. 
For the main thesis of the Essay was the discovery of the so- called 
immutable laws of economic development, viz. a disproportionate 
development of population and capital along with a steadily 
increasing dearth of land of superior fertility. Malthus was 
indeed the first economist to investigate whether the economic 
system develops its own laws of motion. He conceived that the 
root cause of poverty was overpopulation; and his reasoning 
related changes in the size of population to the level of real 
wages in such a manner that real wages would always be pegged at 
the subsistence level. It was in this sense that he pointed out 
the futility of improving the conditions of lower classes except 
through efforts to check population growth besides increasing the 
quantity of provisions. Malthus used his literary skill to plead 
for the 'preventive' checks to the natural increase in population. 
These checks, which are the least inconvenient to the human race, 
he considered necessary to supplant the dictates of Nature in 
disposing of redundant population. However, he seemed to restrict 
himself to moral restraint only in the sense of deferred marriages. 
But even late marriages may bring forth devastating torrents of 
children to such an extent that the redundant population would 
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increase and what he called the positive checks of vice and misery 
would reduce humanity to the most horrible state. Thus when it 
comes to such a practical proposition, Malthus' advice seems to 
be entirely ineffective. Unlike Malthus, J.S. Mill preached for 
birth control and moral restraint before and after marriage. 
Finally, Malthus in his 'Principles' put great emphasis on 
fostering and maintaining effective demand rather than on the 
encouragement of saving and investment; and here he dissented 
from Ricardo and J.B. Say who both denied that there could be any 
deficiency of effective demand. In compliance with his own views, 
Malthus was in favour of the expansion of home and foreign markets, 
and held that the home market could be extended by increasing the 
number of the 'unproductive' classes, the consuming landlords and 
civil servants. On that basis, he favoured any measure which 
entailed the transfer of income from capitalists to consuming 
landowners, or which increased the number of landowners at home, 
in order to increase effective demand, whereas Ricardo advocated 
the transfer of income from landowners to capitalists in order to 
increase saving and investment. Thus it was only natural that 
Malthus was against the aggregation of land into large units, and 
was in favour of the National Debt which, in his view, would 
perform a useful function in fostering demand. Malthus's 
reflections on the saving problem has indeed earned him the 
reputation of being the Classical economist who, in some respects, 
anticipated Keynes. 
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Ricardo, for his part, accepted Malthus' theory of 
population and inferred that wages in the long run were to be 
fixed at the subsistence level because changes in population in 
the manner which Malthus described in his Essay would unavoidably 
keep wages at that level. Ricardo then took this conclusion as 
a premise upon which to build his dynamic theory of falling rate 
of profit and increasing rents. The long run decline in the 
rate of profit would gradually become too sharp to support the 
capitalists; hence accumulation would eventually come to a stop 
and secular stagnation would be the inevitable result. 
Such was, broadly, the contribution of the Classical 
Economists to the theory of economic development. With Adam Smith, 
Malthus, Ricardo and John Stuart Mill, the structure of Classical 
Political Economy was, in a sense, complete. On the broader issues, 
they undoubtedly held certain principles in common: they 
subscribed to the central thesis of the Wealth of Nations against 
Mercantilism; they believed in property, free enterprise and 
economic freedom; they accepted the main drift of the Essay on 
Population; and the individualistic spirit was notably dominant 
in their writings. Alt::ough they varied greatly in political 
outlook, they shared a common interest in economic development 
and social betterment. For good or for bad these men and their 
ideas are historically important. They exercised a profound 
influence on public opinion in their days, and were responsible, 
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directly or indirectly, for many far reaching legislative and 
administrative changes. It is difficult to understand the 
evolution of Western civilisation without some understanding of 
Classical Political Economy. It is also difficult to tackle 
the so many problems involved in the economic development of 
backward areas without some reference to the broader theory of 
policy, based on Smith, Malthus, Ricardo, Mill and Say. 
Against each of the various aspects of the classical body of 
thought, however, reaction was inevitable. In the next generation, 
critics of the excessive individualism of the classical school 
denied the assumptions on which Laissez -Faire is based, so that 
some writers began to advocate Protection while others revealed a 
tendency towards a more optimistic view of the universe. Rae 
and Sismondi were led to reject Laissez -faire and to insist that 
extensive duties rest on the State, List and Müller represented 
the reaction to nationalism and protection; Carey and Bastiat 
the reaction to optimisim, while the continuation of the classical 
school may be exemplified by Say, Senior and Cairnes. 
Say criticised the Smithian proposition that all values 
produced represent pre- exerted human labour or industry, either 
recent or remote, and that wealth is nothing more than accumulated 
labour. In his view, values produced are referable to the agency 
and concurrence of industry, of capital, and of natural agents; 
and no other but these three sources can produce value or add to 
human wealth. In Rae's scheme, on the other hand, individual and 
social wealth are in no way identical: the one is acquisition of 
wealth whereas the other is a creation of it. On this general 
view, Rae assigned to invention a place of prime importance in 
his scheme; and his work is essentially a study of the place of 
invention in social development. List, for his part, preached 
for the encouragement of manufactures, and in his work he stressed 
the point that all other economic activities would flourish only 
when manufacturing industries would have reached a high stage of 
development. It is therefore in List's view that the chief 
function of the State is to promote the productive powers of the 
nation; and when a nation has to pass from the purely 
agricultural state to the state combining agriculture and 
manufactures, the primary weapon is protection in one form or 
another. But neither a protectionist nor a free trade policy is 
for him an end in itself; each is merely a means and the 
appropriate policy will depend on the needs of each case. 
This is an all- inclusive view of the classical and pre - 
classical theories of economic policy in general. It is only 
natural, at this stage, that one is tempted to think of the extent 
to which these theories are related to the under -developed economy. 
This relation can best be understood if the attempt is made to 
dispense with the purely historical and academic parts of the 
classical and pre- classical economists' theories and concentrate 
on those parts which will directly pertain to the study of the 
under -developed economy, and which will crop up in the later stages 
of this study in their proper context. 
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Let us consider first the mercantilist policy of bringing 
about a permanent favourable balance of trade. In its broadest 
context, neo- mercantilism is in some respects pertinent to the 
study of the economics of 'development'. The ability to have 
large exports and to obtain favourable terms for them is of great 
importance for all under -developed countries. If the proceeds 
of exports are substantial and stable, these countries may be able 
to satisfy their needs of imports of capital goods for development 
largely out of these proceeds and thus to keep down the volume of 
foreign savings. 
Again the physiocratic concept that agriculture is the sole 
source of wealth is held to be a sheer fallacy in the light of 
modern economic analysis. In a sense, however, this concept is 
directly relevant to the under -developed economy. In such an 
economy, agriculture is by no means the sole source of wealth, but 
it is, and will remain, its main source. Economic improvement 
may call for greater industrialisation as a natural growth, but 
the most promising field for rapid economic development lies in 
agriculture. There are no inherent advantages of manufacturing 
over agriculture, or of agriculture over manufacturing. The 
arbitrary dogmas of the inherent inferiority of one type of 
industry over another will result in the squandering of resources 
and the disappointment of the great masses of population looking 
forward to be relieved of their abject poverty. On the grounds 
of historical experience, let us consider what happened in the 
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original home of industrial development, in England in the 
eighteenth century. Industrial revolution would not have been 
possible without the agricultural revolution that preceded it. 
The latter was based mainly on the introduction of the turnip. 
The lowly turnip made possible a change in crop rotation which did 
not require much capital, but which brought about a tremendous 
rise in agricultural productivity. As a result, more food could 
be grown with much less labour, and the surplus labour was released 
for capital formation. The growth of industry would not have 
been possible without the revolution that took place in 
agricultural methods and techniques. 
The emphasis throughout this part is evidently the 
contribution that theory can offer to policy - making in the 
economic field if it is reasonably good theory. The English 
classical school met the test of relevance very well. It kept in 
close touch with the matters which the lay public regarded as 
urgent and important, and it directed its analysis towards those 
problems rather than towards artificial problems of its own 
manufacture. "The relevance of the procedures of the English 
classical school, however, was relevance for their own time and 
country, and therefore not necessarily for other times and for 
other countries. There are certain respects in which it has 
become clear, for instance, that the assumptions, the models, 
they worked with are not appropriate, or at least are not 
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acceptable, for their own country in our times and for economically 
less advanced countries at any time. "(1) 
The English classical school, with the sole outstanding 
exception of Malthus, neglected the short -run phases of economic 
process and economic policy, and especially cyclical instabilities 
of employment and income. The growth of the political importance 
of under- developed countries has rendered unacceptable the 
classical economics which conducts its analysis chiefly in static 
terms and overwhelmingly in the light of the conditions and the 
concerns of the industrially most advanced, the socially most 
stable, and the economically most prosperous countries. Even the 
more recent developments in economic and social structure, and in 
political organisation, make the classical doctrine if left 
unaltered obsolete, and calls for its adaptation to the new 
circumstances if not for its outright re,e ction. The decline of 
effective competition and of price -flexibility, the growth of 
central planning on a national scale, the establishment of new 
international institutions, all operate to create a setting for 
international economics differing significantly from the nineteenth 
century setting out of which the classical theory of trade was 
evolved.(2 ) 
(1) Jacob Viner, International Trade And Economic Development, Oxford, 
1953, pp. 1+-5. 
(2) Ibid., pp. 12 -13. 
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In under -developed areas and in circles in the advanced 
countries which are specially concerning themselves with the 
problems of development, there is to-day a large and growing body 
of doctrine which presents specific challenges to the classical 
school. However, the writer wishes to stress the fact that there 
are certain other respects in which the relevance of the classical 
doctrine to the under -developed economy becomes pretty clear. 
The classical school operated on the assumption that men acted 
rationally, that the major economic objective of rational men 
which required national policy decisions for its fulfilment was 
the promotion of economic prosperity, and that the major means of 
attaining that goal was economic liberalism at home and free trade 
in international commerce. To -day there is in government 
activities an inherent irrational bias toward autarky. Foreign 
trade nevertheless survives, and survives to a surprising degree, 
in spite of the obstacles placed in its way. In part, it 
survives because the strength in human nature of the basic 
economic objectives, the search for better commodities at lower 
costs, for different commodities, for better markets, is great 
enough to break through in some degree the tightest of restraints 
on trade. 
Besides, it is not without significance to the under -developed 
economy that Adam Smith expounded his theory of wealth, that 
labour is the source of all wealth and that division of labour 
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increases productivity but is limited by the extent of both the 
internal and external markets. In most under -developed countries, 
there are many instances of the way in which the small size of the 
market discourages, or even prohibits, the profitable application 
of modern capital equipment and the establishment of large -scale 
industries. In other words, Smith's specific contribution lies 
in the fact that he provides the key to the solution of the 
fundamental problem of capital formation on its demand side in the 
under -developed economy. 
The opportunities open to an under -developed country in the 
foreign trade field are certain to be a vital factor in determining 
the rate at which it can make economic progress. No country 
except the U.S.A. has attained a high level of per capita income 
which has not maintained a high ratio of imports to total national 
product, and no country except Russia can, in this respect, follow 
the example of the United States without courting perpetual poverty. 
But the high degree of self -sufficiency of the United States was 
mainly due to its continental character, its richness and variety of 
natural resources as well as the technical skills of its people 
which enabled her to achieve economic prosperity in spite of its 
deliberate national policy of high tariff protection and its low 
ratio of foreign to domestic trade.OA 
If from the mercantilists and physiocrats one gets the idea of 
the relative importance of different types of economic activity, 
(i) Ibid. pp. 116. 
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from Smith the concept of free trade and extension of the market, 
from John Stuart Mill one can also get the idea of social and 
political reform. As has been pointed out already, Mill's theory 
of economic policy is essentially based on universal education, 
universal suffrage, emancipation of women, security of tenancy, 
tillage of waste land, promotion of agriculture, and the creation 
of a class of small proprietors. What else in the classical 
doctrine can be found to be more pertinent to the study of the 
under -developed economy? In such an economy, the 'quality' of 
the working population is indeed of great importance. Labour 
productivity depends upon historical and cultural factors, upon 
the quality of health, nutrition, and education, and the quality 
of the leadership provided by government and the ruling class. 
The first requirements for high labour productivity under modern 
conditions are that the masses of the population shall be literate, 
healthy, politically minded, and sufficiently well fed to be 
strong and energetic. If this were achieved all else necessary 
for rapid economic development would come readily and easily of 
itself. Whenever this has not been achieved, it is not necessary 
to look for other factors to explain pervasive poverty and slow 
economic growth. 
As for Malthus, he was deeply concerned about the difficulty 
of raising the masses of the English poor from their level of 
desperate poverty, because of their tendency, as he believed, to 
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absorb any increase in productivity in an increase in their 
numbers instead of using it to raise their standard of living. 
The fundamental assumption of Malthusianism in the strict sense 
is the uniform power of increase in population, subject to the 
preventive checks, i.e., a potential uniform birth rate. But 
one of the most pronounced features of population statistics is 
the steady decline in the birth rate in many well- developed 
countries, and in some of these countries the fear is of de- 
population. In most under -developed countries, however, a serious 
obstacle to the attainment of economic prosperity, in the sense 
of a high level of per capita income, is associated with a rapid 
rate of increase of population. In those countries, population 
increase can offset, perhaps more than offset, the contribution 
to economic prosperity which all other factors can make. Matever 
the opportunities for economic development created by technical 
progress, by the discovery of new natural resources, by economic 
aid from abroad, they can have as their main consequence an increase 
in the number of children who survive to a short and wretched 
adulthood. 
What is most discouraging is that there are no easy and 
certain remedies for the overpopulation problem, that the remedy, 
birth control, which to most social scientists appears to be the 
only promising one requires a fairly high level of education and 
of income to be widely available and effective. As Viner has 
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pointed out, it is a paradox of the population problem in 
under -developed countries that on the grounds of historical 
experience and of theoretical analysis the attainment of high 
levels of per capita income and of education appear to be almost 
essential pre- requisites of a cure of the problem and that the 
excessive rate of increase of population is itself the most 
important barrier to the establishment of these pre -requisites. 
Here once more, the curse of the poor is their poverty; and here 
again the Malthusian bogey hovers over all poor countries.(1) 
(1) Ibid., pp. 118 -119 and 101 -102. 
PART II 
MORE RECENT TRENDS 
IN THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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CHAPTER 5. 
ECONOMIC DESTINY IN 
THE M RXIAN SCHEME 
Classical political economy was attacked from two sides. 
One attack came from the historical school, which refused to 
consider the capitalist market economy as a natural order, and 
which refuted such major classical doctrines as the wage fund 
theory, the law of rent and profits and the doctrine of 
population by reference to 'facts' in terms of statistical data. 
Thus by the middle of the nineteenth century a different subject 
came into being, and economic historians set up the historical 
school in Germany and England. This school assumed a different 
approach to economics, for it denied altogether the usefulness of 
abstract reasoning. The study of history, in the opinion of this 
school, was essentially the only way to understand and explain 
economic phenomena with clarity and certainty, so that the school 
concerned itself with making historical studies in order to 
arrive at economic laws absolutely based on historical facts. In 
so doing, the school moved out of the field of abstraction, the 
deductive method of scientific research. 
Classical political economy was also attacked by Marxism, 
which criticised capitalism as a system of exploitation, monopoly 
and periodical crises ultimately doomed and destined to be 
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replaced by a system of collectivist planning. Like classical 
economics, Marxism undertook the analysis of the operation of the 
capitalist market economy. Like Ricardo, Marx used the method 
of abstraction and approached reality only in a series of 
'successive approximations'. The labour theory of value, which 
forms the cornerstone of the Marxian system, was not peculiar to 
Marx. With the exception of J.B. Say, every leading political 
economist since Sir William Petty had taken for granted that 
labour is the measure of value. But in spite of this identity 
of method and central doctrine between Marxism and Classical 
Economics, Karl Marx arrived at conclusions diametrically opposed 
to those of the classical school. Instead of harmony of interests, 
Marx demonstrated the existence of exploitation, the urge to 
accumulation, the inevitable concentration of property, and the 
inevitable conflict and struggle between labour and capital. 
Instead of automatic equilibrium between consumption and production 
and the economic development of the capitalist society, Marx 
prophecied recurrent crises and ultimate breakdown of the 
capitalist order. 
Before Karl Marx became a political economist he had been a 
political scientist and a historian. From the outset he regarded 
the capitalist order as a historical category which would give way 
to new forms of economic organisation in accordance with the 
changes in the economic structure of society. This general world 
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outlook induced Marx to search for, and arrive at, the 
revolutionary conclusions which emerged in the Communist 
Manifesto (1$48), and which found their most systematic 
demonstration in the three volumes of Das Kapital. Unlike most 
classical economists, Marx never hesitated to carry out the 
labour theory of value to its logical conclusion. What neither 
Smith nor Ricardo would admit, Marx states in an explicit way. 
It is that the price of labour falls short of the labourer's 
contribution, in terms of value, to the total product. Upon 
this theory of surplus value is based the whole series of 
conclusions which together make up the Marxian scheme. 
Marx started as a man of vision. He views that historically 
human society constantly enters into successive stages of evolution 
and development, that capitalism as a social organisation sprang 
from feudalism and should in time give way to socialism. In the 
Marxian view, capitalism is a process by which the proletariat 
were separated from land and have henceforward become workers, 
thus ending a status of serfdom. As a man of vision he also 
distinguishes in a capitalist society, two conflicting classes: 
bourgeoisie and proletariat. This class war, he urges, is bound 
to handicap economic progress. In any given society, the strivings 
of some of the members conflict with the strivings of others. 
History discloses to us a struggle among peoples and societies, 
and also within each nation and each society. These contradictions 
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in social life manifest in addition an alternation between 
periods of revolution and reaction, peace and war, stagnation 
and rapid progress or decline. Nothing but the study of the 
totality of the strivings of all members of a given society, or 
group of societies, can lead to the scientific definition of the 
result of these strivings. The conflict of strivings arises 
from differences in the situation and modes of life of the classes 
into which society is divided. 
The history of all human society, past and present, wrote 
Marx in the Communist Manifesto, has been the history of class 
struggles. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, baron and 
serf, guild- burgess and journeyman - in a word, oppressor and 
oppressed - stood in sharp opposition each to the other. They 
carried on perpetual warfare, sometimes masked, sometimes open and 
acknowledged, a warfare that invariably ended either in a 
revolutionary change in the whole structure of society or else 
in the common ruin of the contending classes. Modern bourgeois 
society, rising out of the ruins of feudal society, did not make 
an end of class antagonisms. It merely set up new classes in 
place of the old, new conditions of oppression, new embodiments 
of struggle. Our own age, the bourgeois age, is distinguished by 
the simplification of class antagonisms. More and more, society 
is splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great and 
directly contraposed classes: bourgeoisie and proletariat. Among 
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all the classes that confront the bourgeoisie to -day, the 
proletariat alone is really revolutionary. Other classes decay 
and perish with the rise of large -scale industry, but the 
proletariat is the most characteristic product of that industry. 
The lower middle class - small manufacturers, small traders, 
handicraftsmen, peasant proprietors - one and all fight the 
bourgeoisie in the hope of safe guarding their existence as 
sections of the middle class. They are, therefore, not 
revolutionary, but conservative. Nay, more, they are reactionary, 
for they are trying to make the wheels of history turn backwards. 
If they ever become revolutionary, it is only because they are 
afraid of slipping down into the ranks of the proletariat. They 
are not defending their present interests, but their future 
interests, they are foresaking their own standpoint in order to 
adopt that of the proletariat. 
Although Marx started as a man of vision, he became an 
analytical economist throughout the next forty years, after he had 
published his Communist Manifesto. He tried in fact to set out a 
logical system in support of his visionary ideas. In this respect, 
he has independent views which are entirely his own, particularly 
in regard to the value theory. Throughout his work, the concept 
of the surplus value is basic to his scheme, and his attempt to 
associate the construction and use of machinery with mass 
unemployment is readily manifest. In this matter, Marx is more 
Ricardian than Ricardo himself. In other fields of enquiry, 
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however, he is no more a Ricardian. He completely refutes the 
Ricardian as well as the Malthusian theories of secular 
stagnation. He visualises that a capitalist society will not be 
secularly stagnating, but will inevitably collapse, and on its 
ruins will be firmly established a 'progressive' socialist society. 
On the path to this ultimate development of economic organisation, 
he envisages five successive stages viz., falling rate of profit, 
capital accumulation, commercial crises, increasing misery of the 
proletariat, and finally the breakdown of the capitalist system 
when the expropriators become expropriated. 
1. FALLING RATE OF PROFIT. 
It is the ultimate aim of Marx's work to reveal the economic 
law of motion of modern capitalist bourgeois society, and the 
content of his economic teaching is the study of the production 
relationships in a given, historically determinate society, in 
their genesis, their development, and their decay. In capitalist 
society the dominant feature is the production of commodities, and 
Marx's analysis therefore begins with an analysis of a commodity. 
First, a commodity is something that satisfies a human need; 
secondly, it is something that is exchanged for something else. 
Exchange value, or simply value, presents itself first of all as 
the ratio in which certain units of one commodity are exchanged 
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for certain units of another. What is common in these various 
commodities, which are constantly weighed one against another in 
a definite system of social relationships, is that they are 
products of labour. In exchanging products, people equate with 
one another, most diverse kinds of labour. The production of 
commodities, Marx observes, is a system of social relationships 
in which different producers produce various products (the social 
division of labour), and in which all these products are equated 
with one another in exchange. In consequence, the element common 
to all commodities is not concrete labour in a definite branch of 
production, not labour of one particular kind, but abstract human 
labour in general. All the labour power of a given society, 
represented in the sum total of values of all commodities is one 
and the same human labour power. Thus each particular commodity 
represents only a certain part of 'socially necessary' labour time. 
The magnitude of the value is determined by the amount of socially 
necessary labour, or by the labour time that is socially requisite 
for the production of the given commodity. "Exchanging labour 
products of different kinds one for another, they equate the values 
of the exchanged products; and in doing so they equate the 
different kinds of labour expended in production, treating them as 
homogeneous human labour. They do not know that they are doing 
this, but they do it." Value can only be understood when it is 
considered from the point of view of a system of social production 
relationships in one particular historical type of society; and, 
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moreover, of relationships which present themselves in a mass 
form, the phenomenon of exchange repeating itself millions upon 
millions of times. "As values, all commodities are only definite 
quantities of congealed labour time." 
Marx then goes on to discuss the history of the development 
of exchange and commodity production, beginning with isolated and 
casual acts of exchange, passing on to the universal form of value, 
in which a number of different commodities are exchanged for one 
and the same particular commodity, and ending with the money form 
of value, when gold becomes this particular commodity, the universal 
equivalent. "Being the highest product of the development of 
exchange and of commodity production, money masks the racial 
character of individual labour, and hides the social tie between 
the various producers who come together in the market." 
At a particular stage in the development of commodity 
production, money becomes transformed into capital. The formula 
of commodity circulation is C.M.C. (Commodity -Money -Commodity), 
i.e., the sale of one commodity for the purpose of buying another. 
But the general formula of capital, on the contrary, is M.C.M. 
(Money-Commodity-Money), i.e., purchase for the purpose of selling 
at a profit. The designation 'surplus value' is given by Marx to 
the increase over the original value of money which is put into 
circulation. Because of this 'growth' of money in capitalist 
society, money is transformed into 'capital', as a special, 
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historically defined, social relationship of production. Surplus 
value cannot -arise out of the circulation of commodities, for this 
represents nothing more than the exchange of equivalents. Surplus 
value cannot arise out of an increase in prices, for mutual losses 
and gains of buyers and sellers would cancel out; and what is 
really significant is not what happens to individuals separately, 
but with a mass or average or social phenomenon. There is a 
commodity, Marx urges, the actual process of whose use is at the 
same time the process of the creation of value. Such a commodity 
is nothing more or less than human labour power. Its use is 
labour, and labour creates value. The owner of money buys labour 
power at its value, which is determined, like the value of every 
commodity, by the 'socially 
for its production. In other words, the value of labour power 
is the cost of the maintenance of the labourer and his family. 
When the owner of money buys that labour power, he is then entitled 
to use it by setting it to work for the whole day, i.e., over and 
above the 'necessary' labour time. It then follows that, in the 
course of the 'necessary' labour time, the labourer produces 
sufficient to pay back the cost of maintaining himself and his 
family; but in the course of 'surplus' labour time, he produces 
in addition a 'surplus' product or a 'surplus' value for which the 
capitalist does not pay him. It is thus in capital that there 
should be distinguished two parts in so far as the process of 
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production is concerned: constant capital and variable capital. 
Constant capital is that part which is expended for the means of 
production, e.g., machinery, tools, raw materials and the like, 
and the value of that part is all at once or piece -meal transferred, 
unchanged, to the finished product; whereas variable capital is 
expended for labour power, and the value of that part is not 
constant, but grows in the labour process and hence creates surplus 
value. In the assessment of the degree of exploitation of labour 
power by capital, Marx compares the surplus value, not with the 
whole capital but only with the variable part of it. 
Having pointed out the origin of surplus value, Marx adds that 
there are two historical pre- requisites to the genesis of capital. 
There should be an accumulation of a considerable sum of money in 
the hands of individuals living under conditions in which there is 
a comparatively high development of commodity production. There 
should also be the existence of workers who are 'free' in a double 
sense of the term: from any constraint or restriction in respect 
of the sale of their labour power, and free from any bondage to the 
soil or to the means of production in general, i.e., of property- 
less workers who cannot maintain their existence except by the 
sale of their labour power. 
In the third volume of capital, Marx proceeds to show the 
reason why that average rate of profit has a tendency to fall. The 
starting -point in his analysis is the division of surplus value into 
profit, interest and ground -rent. Profit is the ratio between the 
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surplus value and all the capital invested in an undertaking. 
Capital with á 'thigh organic composition ", i.e., with a 
preponderance of constant capital over variable capital to an 
extent above the social average, yields a below- average rate of 
profit. Capital with a "low organic composition" yields an 
above -average rate of profit. Competition among the capitalists, 
who are free to transfer their capital from one branch of 
production to another, reduces the rate of profit in both cases to 
the average. The sum total of the values of all commodities in a 
given society coincides with the sum total of the prices of all the 
commodities. But in separate enterprises, and in separate 
branches of production, as a result of competition, commodities 
are sold, not in accordance with their values, but in accordance 
with the 'prices of production', which are equal to the expended 
capital, plus the average profit. 
Marx then proceeds to investigate the three fundamental 
historical stages of the process whereby capitalism has increased 
the productivity of labour: simple co- operation, division of 
labour and manufacture, machinery and large -scale industry. An 
increase in the productivity of labour means a more rapid growth 
of constant capital in comparison with variable capital. In so 
far as surplus value is a function of variable capital alone, it 
is then manifest that the rate of profit - that is, the ratio of 
surplus value to the whole capital, and not its variable part alone 
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has a tendency to fall. Symbolically if 
C stands for Constant Capital; and 
V rr " Variable Capital; and 
S rr rr Surplus Value; 
then, according to Marxian analysis, 
S V° the degree of exploitation of labour; and 
S - the average rate of profit 
CtV (C4V being the whole capital expended) 
Now, if it is assumed that all the time constant capital is 
accumulating and thereby accelerating the replacement of workers by 
S 
machinery, and that the degree of exploitation V is constant all 
the time on the grounds that when V decreases, S which is a 
function of V will correspondingly decrease, then it is obvious 
S 
that C +V will fall off accordingly. In other words, the average 
rate of profit will, in the long run, have a tendency to decline so 
long as capital accumulation is taking place over time. But it 
must be noted here that Marx is dogmatic about the constancy of the 
S 
degree of exploitation V. True, it is a logical deduction that 
when V decreases, S which is assumed to be a function of V must 
also decrease in the meantime. But there seems to be no reason why 
both S and V should decrease to the same extent. Unless this 
dogma were removed, the l' arxian concept of falling rate of profit 
would seem to be utterly unfounded. 
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2. THE ACCUMULATION OF CAPITAL. 
By capital accumulation Marx means the transformation of a 
portion of surplus value into capital, and the application of this 
portion to additional production, instead of using it to supply 
the personal needs or to gratify the whims of capitalists. This 
portion of surplus value is in fact divided into 'means of 
production' plus variable capital. In the Marxi an scheme, the 
more rapid growth of constant capital as compared with variable 
capital is immensely important in the process of development of 
capitalism as well as in the transformation of capitalism into 
socialism. 
From accumulation of capital upon a capitalist foundation, 
Marx distinguishes the so- called 'primitive accumulation': the 
forcible severance of the labourer from the means of production, 
the driving of the peasants off the land, the stealing of the 
communal lands, the system of colonies and national debts, of 
protective tariffs and the like. 'Primitive accumulation', he 
states, creates, at one pole, the 'free' proletariat; at the 
other, the owner of money, the capitalist. 
In his second volume of Capital, Marx attempts to analyse the 
reproduction of social capital, taken as a whole. Here, too, he 
deals, not with an individual phenomenon, but with a mass phenomenon; 
not with a fractional part of the economy, but with the economy 
as a whole. In this part of his work, Marx divides the whole of 
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social production into two major parts: production of the means of 
production, änd production of articles for final consumption. 
Further, he makes a detailed examination of the circulation of all 
social capital taken as a whole both when it is reproduced in its 
previous proportions and when accumulation takes place. 
The upshot of Marxian analysis is that society will eventually 
be divided into two main classes: capitalists and proletariat as 
a result of the constant growth of monopolies and the centralisation 
of capital. Moreover, Marx brings the financial aspects of the 
matter into the fore and contends that financial empires are not to 
be necessarily based on technical economies. The effect of this 
tendency towards financial empires is that petty capitalists are 
finally destroyed and driven out into the army of the proletariat. 
In this way, the number of the capitalists becomes smaller and 
smaller, whereas the number of the proletariat bigger and bigger. 
This increased division of society into capitalists and proletariat 
is considered by Marx to be the principal cause of the breakdown 
of the capitalist system. He stresses that, in a social structure 
of such a type, crises will be growing always worse; and the 
recurrent shocks to the economy through the periodical occurrence 
of more and more acute crises will bring forth the downfall of 
capitalism as a historic development of society. Evidently the 
picture is in no way clear without an explanation of the root 
causes of crises in the Marxian sense. 
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3. THE PERIODICAL OCCURRENCE OF ACUTE CRISES. 
In the Marxian scheme, the real cause of these crises has 
always been the accumulation of capital. When a level of full 
employment obtains, demand for labour will be buoyant and real 
wages of labour will be rising. This rise in real wages will 
leave over to the capitalists a lesser amount of surplus value, a 
fact which implies that the average rate of profit should tend to 
fall off so much that the capitalists will be inclined to refrain 
from embarking upon further accumulation. Thus surplus value 
ceases to be transformed into 'means of production' plus variable 
capital as a result of the decline in the average rate of profit; 
hence labourers will be thrown out of work. This state of 
involuntary unemployment will bring real wages down to the 
subsistence level as a result of the fierce competition for 
employment among labourers. A crisis therefore sets in, bringing 
in its train a state of unemployment, overproduction and misery 
among the working classes. But the diminution in real wages will 
entail a rising average rate of profit, and this rise will act as 
an economic force, on the part of the capitalists, towards 
resuming capital accumulation. In this way, the process is 
repeated over and over again, and crises occur periodically in 
capitalist societies. 
It is interesting to note that Marx is the first economist who 
conceives of the economic system as being bound to move in that sort 
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of cycle with almost regular periodicity, and not in an ad hoc way. 
Marx, too, recognises that wages are to be kept at the subsistence 
level, but not on a Malthusian basis, i.e., not in terms of 
population movements. He denounces the treatment of men as being 
beasts or a high specie of the animal kingdom with natural 
sexuality. Malthusian theory of population might be a long -run 
theory. But Marx, in his nine -year cycle needed some theory to 
explain the reason why wages are kept at the subsistence level in 
the shorter run; he found this explanation in his doctrine of 
crises of overproduction. Wages are thus to be kept down to the 
level of subsistence as a result of the constantly increasing use 
of machinery, which gives rise to an ever -expanding level of 
unemployment and an ever -increasing army of labour. 
4. INCREASING MISERY OF PROLETARIAT. 
In the Marxian scheme, misery is connected with exploitation 
of labour in agricultural and non -agricultural industries alike, 
and increasing misery is connected with the increasing use of 
machinery as a result of technological advancement. 
In this respect, Marx places special emphasis on the evolution 
of capitalism in agriculture by reference to the history of the 
ground -rent. His analysis shows how rent paid in labour services 
is transformed into rent paid in produce or in kind; then into 
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monetary rent, and finally into capitalist rent, when the place of 
the peasant has been taken by the agricultural entrepreneur, 
cultivating the soil with the help of wage labour. This is 
indeed of special importance in its bearing on backward countries. 
The expropriation of part of the country folk, and the hunting 
of them off the land, does not merely 'set free' the workers for 
the uses of industrial capital, together with their means of 
subsistence and the materials of their labour; in addition it 
creates the home market. (Capital, Vol. I). 
The impoverishment and the ruin of the agricultural population 
lead, in their turn, to the formation of a reserve army of labour 
for capital. In every capitalist country, part of the rural 
population is continually on the move, in course of transference 
to join the urban proletariat, the manufacturing proletariat. This 
source of a relative surplus population is, therefore, continually 
flowing. The agricultural labourer, therefore, has his wages kept 
down to the minimum, and always has one foot in the swamp of 
pauperism. (Capital, Vol. I). 
The peasant's private ownership of the land he tills 
constitutes the basis of small -scale production and causes the 
latter to flourish and attain its classical form. But such petty 
production is only compatible with a narrow and primitive type of 
production, with a narrow and primitive framework of society. 
Under capitalism, the exploitation of the peasant "differs from the 
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exploitation of the industrial proletariat only in point of form. 
The exploiter "is the same: Capital. The individual capitalists 
exploit the individual peasants through mortgages and usury, and 
the capitalist class exploits the peasant class through state 
taxation ". Peasant agriculture, the smallholding system, is 
merely an expedient whereby the capitalist is enabled to extract 
profit, interest and rent from the land, while leaving the peasant 
proprietor to pay himself his own wages as best he may. As a rule, 
the peasant hands over to the capitalist society, i.e., the 
capitalist class, part of the wages of his own labour, sinking 
"down to the level of the Irish tenant - all this on the pretext of 
being the owner of private property". Peasant proprietorship, 
the smallholding system, which is the normal form of petty 
production, degenerates, withers, and perishes under capitalism. 
In agriculture as in industry, therefore, capitalism improves the 
productive process only at the price of the martyrdom of the 
producers ". 
The dispersion of the rural workers over large areas, states 
Marx, breaks down their powers of resistance at the very time when 
concentration is increasing the powers of the urban operatives in 
this respect. In modern agriculture, as in urban industry, the 
increased productivity and the greater mobility of labour are 
purchased at the cost of devastating labour power and making it a 
prey to disease. Moreover, every advance in capitalist agriculture 
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is an advance in the art, not only of robbing the worker, but also 
of robbing the soil, Capitalist production, therefore, is only 
able to develop the technique and the combination of the social 
process of production by simultaneously undermining the foundations 
of all wealth - the land and the workers. (Capital, Vol. I). 
But Marx points a one -sided picture of a capitalist society. 
He might be impressed by the conditions of his day when capitalism 
as a social organisation had not as yet taken a definite shape. 
If, on one side of the labour market under capitalism, the owners 
of capital have exercised monopolistic powers and made collusive 
arrangements with the result that agricultural and urban labour 
power have immensely been exploited and impoverished, it is equally 
true that, at later stages of the evolution of capitalism, and on 
the other side of the labour market, the owners of labour power 
have exercised the same monopolistic tendencies and collective 
bargaining strength through trade unionism to the exclusion of the 
idea of exploitation in whole or at least in part. As historical 
evidence bears out, labour movements in this direction have made it 
clear that the interests of the labourers and their employers, the 
monopolistic capitalists, sometimes coincide; that, with monopoly, 
the monopolist is perhaps the friend, and not the foe, of the 
labourer. 
Turning to the fundamental issue, that the increasing misery 
of proletariat is the offspring of the increasing use of machinery 
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and large -scale industry, here as elsewhere Marx slips into a gross 
error. He contends that as wages go up, when trade is thriving, 
employers usually look for economies in production costs by 
substituting machinery for labour in the performance of particular 
jobs. In other words, higher wages would be an impetus for the 
employers to encourage inventive ability and progress in technology, 
to rely more and more on inanimate powers of production over which 
they have complete control rather than on the labour powers of 
production, over which their control is comparatively small. This 
is what is sometimes technically called the economy of high wages, 
i.e., dearer labour combined with elaborate machinery to bring 
about the diminution in production costs. The substitution of 
machinery for labour, or what Marx calls the increasing 
mechanisation of industry, will carry with it the reduction of 
wages to the lowest level, the overabundance of labour along with 
an ever -decreasing demand for it, and hence an ever- increasing 
level of unemployment with all the symptoms of proletariat misery 
and destitution. It is thus readily seen that Marx builds up this 
logical sequence of events on the fundamental assumption that 
machinery is all the time a perfect substitute for labour, that 
labour can be dispensed with indefinitely. But herein lies a 
logical error in his scheme. In its modern and refined form, the 
theory of production presupposes that the substitutability of the 
factors of production, is merely to be effective at the margin. 
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But even at the margin, it can hardly be admitted that labour can 
be dispensed with altogether. The newly constructed machinery 
which is to replace labour power at the margin of production is 
virtually the embodiment of the dearer labour meanwhile. Marx 
appears to slip into the same error, as did Ricardo before him, 
when the latter discussed the transformation of circulating 
capital into fixed capital and its adverse effect on the level of 
employment on the grounds that fixed capital employs less labour 
than circulating capital.(1) It has been pointed out already, in 
this connection, that the real effect is not less employment, but 
less additional employment, that one should consider not only the 
use of fixed capital, but also its construction and the amount of 
labour required for both purposes. 
5. BREAKDOWN OF CAPITALISM. 
The final issue of Marxian well -known sequence of events is 
the breakdown of capitalism. According to Marx, two things could 
bring this about: the self -generated and automatic collapse of 
the system; or the political struggle of the proletariat in the 
way of overthrowing the system. All that this means is a 'wait - 
and- take -over' policy; otherwise 'work- for -the- overthrow'. This 
has evidently an important political implication. Marx in fact 
(1) C.f. Part I, Chapter 3, p. 108. 
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mentions both ideas; but neither of them with much elaboration. 
When Marx talks of the collapse of the system as a result of 
the periodical occurrence of more and more acute crises, he means, 
but in a narrower sense, that economic progress comes to an end 
on account of the social structure itself. Social structures are 
usually associated with the state of technology; the latter only 
flourishes in those social structures which are appropriate to it. 
The history of mankind and of man's social activities abounds with 
many striking examples. 
Three thousand years before the Christian era, Egypt was 
progressing in technology, and along the Nile Valley there were all 
the signs of advancement and of a great civilisation: the invention 
of agricultural methods, the irrigation system, building and the 
like. But this progress came to an end, as the society was 
'static', i.e., not responsive to changes in technology which 
needed a corresponding change in the social structure. But why 
did the ancient Egyptian society fail to adapt itself to changing 
conditions of production? Lilley tries to answer this question by 
reference to the 'copper' age as distinct from the 'iron' age.(l) 
Sometime between 4000 and 3000 B.C., copper was discovered in the 
valley; but 1000 years earlier, iron had also been discovered. 
Iron had been a 'democratic' material, so to speak, for it had been 
(1) Samuel Lilley, 'Men, Machines And. History', A Short History of Tools And 
Machines In Relation To Social Progress, London, 1948. 
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plentiful and within the reach of the masses. But whereas the 
iron age had -been a democratic one, this was not true of copper; 
for this metal at the time was relatively scarce and it was only 
in the possession of the very few wealthy people. In this way, 
the discovery of copper actually revolutionised the ancient 
Egyptian society, and thus there emerged a new social structure 
in which a few people came to dominate all the rest. In 3000 
B.C., therefore, when-this happened all further progress came to 
an end, simply because the interests of the leaders of the society, 
who were put at the top of the social ladder by virtue of their 
pecuniary position, were not in favour of further economic progress. 
So long as the technology embodied in copper prevailed, their 
economic and political privileges remained invulnerable. Another 
instance from the records of ancient Egyptian history is the story 
of the wheeled- carts. These wheels were said to have been known 
in the neighbouring territories one thousand years before they were 
practically introduced into Egypt. This introduction was delayed 
ten centuries simply because the masters of the Valley were not 
interested in wheels; in fact they built the pyramids without 
wheels. 
In the same way, the decline of Rome and Greece was associated 
with the growth of the slave economy. This new method of 
production, new technology, put an end to technical progress in 
100 B.C., again for the same reason. If the society were thriving 
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under a slave economy, and the masters of Rome and Greece were 
enriched by it and interested in its continuation, there would be 
no place for technical progress under such circumstances, as there 
was no driving force to stimulate technology neither by the 
Masters nor, of course, by their slaves. 
The examples given will make it clear that this stagnation of 
technique was not caused by a lack of problems to be solved, or 
lack of obvious deficiencies to be rectified. Some of the problems 
might have been too difficult at that particular stage of progress, 
but simple improvements vere by no means beyond the capabilities of 
men's minds at that time. Some deeper explanation must be sought. 
The most probable explanation lies in the nature of the social 
system which dominated the advanced part of the world in this 
period of stagnation. The appearance of class- divided society was 
necessary for the development of man's technical equipment beyond 
a certain stage. But this social structure did not ensure 
uninterrupted progress; at times it retarded technical progress 
for long periods. How did this come about? 
When the great social changes were complete and the class - 
divisions fixed and hardened, the societies of this period were 
divided, broadly speaking, into two classes. The great mass of 
the people, belonging to the oppressed classes of peasants, slaves 
and serfs, did all the productive work of the community, but 
received in return only the bare necessities of life. The small 
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ruling class of priests, nobles and kings did no productive work, 
but lived luXUriously on the products of the work of others. The 
labouring classes were familiar with the techniques already in 
existence, and they had the practical experience from which it 
would have been possible to learn how they could be improved. But 
they had no incentive to make improvements, since any resulting 
increase of production would be taken from them and used merely to 
increase the well -being of their masters. Nor, worked to the 
utmost night and day, did they have the leisure required for 
invention. The ruling class, on the other hand, saw the world 
only from the point of view of consumers. Ignorant of the actual 
methods of production, they could not usually be aware of technical 
deficiencies, nor had they practical knowledge to effect 
improvements.. They were familiar with the art of exploitation of 
government, of extracting the last available grain of corn from the 
peasant, and in these arts they produced many improvements. But 
they were incapable of advancing the technical methods of society. 
Thus, with one class possessing the requisite knowledge and 
experience, but lacking incentive and leisure, and the other class 
lacking the knowledge and experience, there was no means by which 
technical progress could be achieved. (l) 
If now that is the sense for which the social structure may be 
conceived by the Marxists, how does it fit in with capitalism when 
(i) Ibid., pp. 17-18. 
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the system breaks down? Marx's answer lies in the proposition 
that crises will be getting worse and worse until these periodical 
shocks to the economy will ultimately burst it asunder and sound 
the knell of capitalism. But why will the crises be getting worse? 
In Marxian economics, there is no answer. Moreover, in Marxian 
analysis, the crisis is due to the fact that wages would push down 
profits in the shorter run; hence the capitalists would refrain 
from further accumulation of capital. In Marxian analysis, 
however, there will also be an ever -increasing use of machinery in 
the longer run. Now if we fuse together the shorter and the 
longer run propositions in the Marxian scheme of things, the 
contradiction will be readily seen. For if there will be an ever - 
increasing use of machinery and thereby an ever -increasing reserve 
army of labour, wages, by implication, will tend to be pushed down 
to the subsistence level all the time. As a corollary, there will 
be no danger of crises in the Marxian sense, i.e., higher wages 
pushing down profits in the shorter run. Marx does not really 
support his vision by sound economic analysis. Here and there 
one can easily find flaws in his arguments. Marx's followers 
were aware of the weakness of his theory of falling rate of profit 
in an attempt to explain the phenomenon of recurrent crises. In 
Marx, however, there were occasional hints at the concept of under - 
consumption, but he seemed reluctant to attach much importance to 
it. True Marxists therefore decided the under -consumption theory. 
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And, since Keynes has formulated his famous theory of chronic 
stagnation on the basis of ' oversaving' or 'under-consumption', 
Marxism and Keynesianism are sometimes believed to be following 
the same line of thought. ,'That Keynes has written is sometimes 
believed to be true Marxism. 
But if the capitalist system would not eventually collapse, 
then the duty of the communist party would be to work earnestly for 
its overthrow. In point of fact, most communists attach much 
more importance to the overthrow of the system than to its eventual 
collapse. When the proletariat become more and more disciplined, 
united and organised under intelligent leadership, they will no 
longer tolerate the division of society into two conflicting classes: 
capitalists and proletariat. The ultimate end will therefore be 
a revolution to be directed in such a way that the expropriators 
become expropriated. In other words, the ultimate end will be the 
socialisation of all means of production. This seems to be an 
odd line of argument, which is by no means in consonance with the 
history of sociological development. Even in Marxian theory of 
history, society is developed and advanced by virtue of the efforts 
of the creative minority, the enlightened leaders at the top, not 
by ill- conceived emotions and irresponsibleaction by the masses. 
In his interpretation of the history of human society, Marx indeed 
admits that capitalist society was created by the new capitalists, 
formerly the feudal lords, who had the strength, cleverness and 
initiative to make use of new technology and achieve a rapid 
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development of the economy. If a new society were created by the 
rebellious poor, it would inevitably be foredoomed to failure; 
such a society, none the less, would be incompatible with the 
Marxian views on the theory of human society. If ever these 
rebellious poor create a society, they will never create a 
beautiful Utopian society; instead they will merely create chaos. 
It then follows that the overthrow of the capitalist system can 
hardly be squared with other parts of Marxism. 
Besides, it is not genuinely a rebellion of the proletariat 
themselves, but of the Communist Party, pure and simple, in the 
sense that the Party takes advantage of any opportunity to create 
rebellion or take over somebody else's rebellion. Peasants may 
rebel and then the Communist Party steps into the political arena 
and takes over; the same is true of other sections of the community. 
The Party can only take over power by virtue of other people's 
rebellions. But the Communist Party is not a class in itself, for 
it is not a class in the Marxian sense. It is thus hardly 
conceivable to get from Marxist analysis to Marxist vision of 
creating a classless society. 
However, since the days of Marx and Engels, other groups of 
Socialists have emerged. They have not been 'revolutionary' in 
the Iiarxian sense, but 'evolutionary' in the sense of being more 
inclined to await developments. They have revealed a tendency 
towards the refutation of both the materialistic interpretation of 
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history and the theory of 'surplus value'; but they have accepted 
the doctrines of class struggle, internationalism, and the 
socialisation of the instruments of production by reliance upon 
universal suffrage and the processes of democracy. The Fabians, 
on the other hand, reject Marx and draw upon J.S. Mill and Henry 
George. They are essentially idealists, and stand for gradual 
reform. Their chief reliance has been upon education, and their 
most generally accepted aim has been the government appropriation 
of 'unearned income', both from land and from capital. Meanwhile, 
Syndicalism as a socialist movement came into being about 1$75 in 
France. While the Syndicalists are extremely radical, they are 
non -Marxian; and their beliefs are more influenced by Proudhon's 
anarchism. They have a different idea of the part to be played by 
the State. While accepting the doctrine of class struggle, they 
aim at the abolition of the political state, and the substitution 
of a condition of self -government by the workers, who are to be 
organised in non -political 'industrial' unions. 
The influence of Socialism upon economic thought has been 
very marked indeed. The so- called 'scientific' socialism has 
emphasised the idea that social institutions are of historical 
growth and relative to environment. Socialists have also given 
greater strength to such tendency as there has been among 
economists to take the social point of view, as they have 
persistently stressed that modern methods of production involve 
a great deal of co- operation, and that the product is to that 
extent a social product. Moreover, socialistic criticism has led 
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to a greater interest in the question of distributive justice and 
a closer analysis of the economic functions of the state. The 
discussion of this topic has rendered possible a more accurate 
separation of those activities which are most profitably entrusted 
to the State, from those which are, all things considered, carried 
on most efficiently by private enterprise. A saner individualism 
has been the ultimate outcome, while at the same time people have 
become no longer alarmed when the State takes over some branch of 
industry, which the principles of economics and politics show that 




THE CLASH BETWEEN SECURITY AND MATERIAL PROGRESS. 
During the second half of the nineteenth century, there had 
been a systematic attempt to reinterpret the whole matter of value 
and distribution in terms of subjective utility, thus breaking 
away from the Classical School who based their value theory on 
cost, and particularly labour cost. The great names in this 
process of reinterpretation of economic science are Jevons, Menger, 
Walras, Bohm -Bawerk, MArshall, iiicksell and Wicksteed. The common 
denominator of the New School was a decided return to abstract 
reasoning and a tendency towards a subjective study of the problems 
of production and distribution. The School attempted to explain 
economic and social phenomena as the result of individual behaviour. 
The market economy was considered as consisting of a large number 
of individual economies, each seeking to maximise its 'utility', 
and each finding itself in perfect competition with the others. 
This abstract conception of a perfect market economy consisting of 
a great number of competing consumers and competing entrepreneurs 
became the intellectual model of the New School. It would be a 
mistake to believe that this ideal type of market economy was so 
far removed from reality than as it appears to -day. The economy 
of 1$50 -1$70, when most of the ideas of the School were formulated, 
was an economy of small -scale producers and peasants with neither 
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cartels nor trade unions and with a minimum of interference in the 
form of tariffs or social legislation. 
Of the neoclassical economists, Thünen (1703 -1$50) was the 
first to develop the concept of marginal productivity which has 
remained till to -day the predominant concept and technique of 
analysis in neoclassical distribution theory, of course, along with 
some constraints and serious qualifications. A. Marshall (1842 - 
1924) came along to outline the central idea of his celebrated 
work, Principles of Economics (1$90) in an Essay on Mr. IIill's Value 
Theory (1876), by stating that it is not utility alone, but utility 
and costs, that determine value, and thct value is determined at 
the equilibrium point of supply and demand. It is in this way that 
Marshall was able to preserve a good deal of the classical value 
analysis for the purposes of the new subjective school. But a 
more decisive break with the classical doctrine of value came with 
the reinterpretation of costs as opportunity costs by such Austrian 
economists as Böhm- Bawerk and Wieser, and their contemporary Knut 
Wicksell. Wicksell's famous work,'Lectures on Political Economy,' 
fused the main teachings of Walras and the early Austrians with 
great ingenuity, giving to the philosophical insight of Menger and 
his followers the superior precision and elegance of the 
mathematical formulation. Wicksteed's contribution to economic 
science,''he Common Sense of Political Economy (1910),''has pointed 
out that, with Wicksteed as well as Uicksell, it is utility and 
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utility alone which serves as the central concept of a unified 
interpretation of the economic universe. Indeed the classical 
interpretation of the market economy in terms of the social facts 
of costs is replaced completely by an analysis in terms of the 
subjective concept of marginal utility. 
Thus the Marginal School, and afterwards its derivative, the 
Mathematical School, both have largely shifted the emphasis from 
objectivism to subjectivism based upon particular postulates, from 
macro -economics to micro -economics, from the explanation of the 
behaviour of the national economy as one integral whole to that 
of the individual economic units within the economy. 
Such is the scheme of economics which the Marginal School has 
impressed upon the minds of the students of economic science. 
Even some of the ablest economists, until quite recently, have been 
impressed by the magic of the marginal calculus, indulged almost 
exclusively in abstract reasoning, and confined the scope of their 
study to mere explanation of economic behaviour from the individual, 
rather than from the national, point of view. The more recent 
elaborations and complications of the marginal concept, which some 
of the modern theorists have attempted to formulate, might then be 
reduced to a mere intellectual exercise. This is perhaps most 
interesting to the academic student, but it leads nowhere in 
solving the economic problems of the real world. If the work of 
the theorists is nothing more or less than a logical exercise, which 
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has in fact little bearing upon reality, then what is the use of 
economic theóry in such an absolutely abstract form? 
Fortunately, greater minds have never lost sight of a scheme 
of economic dynamics, and the tendency has recently been towards 
the analysis of the national income, its elements of growth, and 
a long run theory of development. With this new trend in 
economic thinking are associated the names of Harrod, Samuelson, 
Clark, Schumpeter, Fisher, Hilton, Keynes and Hansen. It is 
therefore the task of this and the following chapters to survey 
briefly some of the more recent trends in the theory of economic 
development, at least to find out what continuity of economic 
thought there may exist between Old and New Economics, i.e., before 
and after the establishment of the marginal utility school. 
1. ECONOMIC PROGRESS AND SOCIAL SECURITY. 
Professor Fisher's work, 'Economic Progress And Social 
Security', contains some material which is necessary to the 
theory of economic development, although it is primarily concerned 
with the adaptation of economic life to changing conditions rather 
than with the explanation of these changes. (1) 
Fisher starts his analysis of the economic problem involved in 
material progress with the classification of economic activities 
into three types: primary including agriculture and mining, 
(`1) Allan G.B, Fisher, Economic Progress And. Social Security, London, 1945. 
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secondary including manufacturing processes in all its forms, and 
tertiary including a wide range of economic activities which are 
primarily devoted to the production of services. In every 
progressive economy, there has been a steady shift of employment 
and investment from the essential 'primary' activities, to 
secondary activities of all kinds and, to a still greater extent, 
into tertiary production. And, shifts of employment towards 
secondary and tertiary production are the inescapable reflection 
of economic progress. If we do not have the one, we cannot have 
the other. Any attempt to prevent these shifts of employment is 
in the meantime an attempt to prevent improvements in the level of 
the average real income. 
Fisher then proceeds to investigate the desirability of 
economic progress. He remarks that material progress seems to be 
distasteful to some people who contend that it is in no way 
consistent with the cultivation of higher social values. True 
material progress is no guarantee of cultural progress, but the 
latter will be seldom carried very far unless the community 
possesses adequate resources which material progress alone makes 
possible. More significant, however, is a variant form of the 
argument which maintains, not that economic progress is a base 
materialist notion, the pursuit of which leads people astray from 
the cultivation of higher cultural values, but rather that it is 
not something which the ordinary man really wants. It is 
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security that really interests and excites him. Some people even 
go so far as to argue that in case there should arise a clash 
between security and material progress, security must be maintained 
even if it involves the sacrifice or the postponement of progress. 
But before throwing ourselves on the side of those who ask for 
security, and nothing but security, care must be taken that the 
real meaning of the term is properly understood. 
By security is really meant one of two alternatives: either 
getting back to one's old employment when one is embarrassed by a 
temporary loss of it in the economic framework; or, alternatively, 
taking up a different type of employment. These two alternatives 
in fact correspond to two divergent interpretations of security and 
two equally divergent security policies. It is therefore essential 
to distinguish between stability for the economy as a whole, with 
individuals from time to time changing their places in it, and 
stability of each individual in the economic structure in the sense 
of ensuring precisely the same place as he has occupied before. 
These two distinct interpretations of security carry with them two 
distinct policy approaches to the problem of insecurity. The 
former policy is consistent with the achievement of both material 
progress and security, whereas the latter policy, if universally 
adopted, would make progress quite unattainable and security in 
the end highly improbable. 
The ordinary man usually thinks of economic security in terms 
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of obtaining a job, the kind of job he will be expected to do, and 
the rate at which it will be paid. Securing any kind of work is 
certainly not a matter of indifference. Work is important not 
only as a means .. "of ensuring an income; it also affects the 
individual's sense of self -respect, and not every kind of work will 
satisfy this test. Work must be recognised as being useful. 
Digging holes and filling them up again will not do. Many people, 
moreover, have a quite natural prejudice in favour either of work 
to which they are already accustomed, or at least some kind of 
work which is not too widely different. Many disappointments 
which attended efforts at 'work creation' during the depression 
were the result of that prejudice. 
It is indeed beyond dispute that material progress and 
widespread unemployment have sometimes been found side by side. 
How far is this association inevitable? How are we to get economic 
security without stagnation and decline? Is this problem insoluble? 
Fisher answers these questions by stating that, if we want security, 
our efforts for that purpose must, in the modern world, be 
frustrated unless at the same time we strive for progress. 
Similarly, though for different reasons, our efforts to achieve 
progress may be frustrated unless at the same time we provide at 
least a greater measure of security. The failure to satisfy the 
desire for security, which is now commonly felt, would encourage a 
stubborn resistance to changes without which progress can hardly be 
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achieved. This statement brings us back to the two conflicting 
interpretations of security or stability. On one interpretation, 
the individual is secure if he is left undisturbed or restored to 
the possession of his previous job. On another, stability is 
characteristic of a constantly developing economy, in which changes 
in individual employment are considered as being the normal course 
of economic development, though associated as far as possible with 
arrangements to ensure that customary incomes will not be 
unnecessarily disturbed. The second is the correct one, and 
policy should be based upon it rather than upon keeping one's 
customary job and maintaining one's income intact. 
Fisher then goes to analyse the dynamics of a progressive 
economy. He recognises that, in the future as well as in the past, 
the great practical economic problem is the efficient organisation 
of appropriate transfers of productive resources. The immediate 
causes for structural readjustments are often varied and numerous, 
but in the last, analysis they may be resolved into changes in 
productive techniques and changes in consumers' tastes. It is 
difficult, Fisher admits, to predict in detail the nature of the 
new goods and services which a community with a rising income - 
standards will wish to purchase, but observations of the 
expenditure habits of people who are already wealthy, aided by 
general reasoning, would enable us to make some safe 
generalisations about what is likely to occur when poor 
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communities find that they can spend more than they have been in 
the habit of spending in the past. From this emerges the thesis 
that progress implies a continual transfer of labour and other 
resources from 'primary' to 'secondary, industries and, in really 
prosperous countries, to 'tertiary' industries. So long as the 
objective conditions for material progress are present, there will 
always be a tendency for the relative importance of primary 
products to diminish and the relative importance of tertiary 
industry to increase. 
Fisher then proceeds to discuss the mechanism by which the 
reallocation of productive resources is effected in the market 
economy as a result of the adoption of a new productive technique 
a change in consumers' tastes. Let us first assume an 
improvement in the productive technique and consider the primary 
effects of such a change upon the economy. Goods or services can 
be placed upon the market which give better value to their purchasers: 
because either their price is lower or their quality higher. 
However, there are also secondary effects upon the economy as a 
whole; and they depend first upon the character of demand for the 
cheaper product, i.e., whether the demand for it is sufficiently 
elastic or is relatively inelastic. 
When the demand for the cheaper product is sufficiently elastic, 
i.e., when consumers are induced by the diminution in price to 
increase their purchases on a sufficiently large scale, the change 
may not necessitate any ejection of labour from the industry affected. 
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This kind of change requires only some rearrangement of resources 
in the industry concerned, and there will be involved no problems 
of unemployment or insecurity arising directly from technical 
change. But the position is different if the impact of the change 
falls first upon those industries for whose products demand is 
relatively inelastic. In this case, the 'elective' power upon 
labour then gets to work first, and there will arise the problem 
of generating a corresponding 'attractive' power in other fields 
of employment with the least possible delay. Consumers of goods 
with an inelastic demand will be very pleased when they observe 
that the price of these goods has fallen, and may even buy more of 
them. However, they are now able to purchase all they want of 
these things with a smaller expenditure of money, and they usually 
prefer to spend on other items part of the free money placed at 
their disposal so that they will not maintain at the old level the 
demand for labour in the industries affected by technical change. 
The producer may therefore discover that his services are no 
longer required in the old field. He must then find out some 
other field, which in principle should be in an industry in which 
the consumer, who has now some free money to spend, will demand 
some extra goods. In the field of agriculture, for instance, 
where the demand for essential foodstuffs is relatively inelastic, 
problems of displaced labour created by such technical 
improvements are of course very familiar. 
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Nevertheless, the essential character of the insecurity 
problem is bound to be involved in both cases. Even if all 
technical changes happen to be imposed upon industries for whose 
products the demand is sufficiently elastic, there is still the 
problem of displaced labour, and there are still some people who 
find that their services in the old field are no longer wanted 
as a result of changes for which they have no responsibility and 
over which they can exert but little control. But even though 
such people still present a problem, the prospects for fixing them 
up in a new place in the productive structure will be more 
promising, if the industries, upon which the first impact of the 
technical change has fallen, are rapidly expanding. It is 
therefore of practical importance whether the 'attractive' or 
'ejective' power gets to work first. 
If this were all that Fisher's work implies, though important 
in itself, it would hardly fall within the scope of study of the 
theory of economic development. His assumption that technical 
improvements will constantly be forthcoming is essentially based 
on extrapolation from observed past trends. His analysis so far 
is nothing more or less than exploring the implications of 
constant technical improvements in terms of the re- allocation of 
productive resources as between different lines of production; but 
such an analysis can only be reduced to an exercise in market theory. 
Nevertheless, Fisher's principal contribution to the theory of 
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economic development lies rather in his detailed study of the 
resistances Which the transfer of resources encounters, and in 
his observations that, when these resistances are markedly 
effective, market adjustments are not completed and available 
technical improvements fail to be appropriated and utilised. 
Resistances may take many forms, but broadly they can be classified 
into passive resistances and active resistances. 
Passive resistances usually take the form of a refusal to 
move to places of higher remuneration. This phenomenon is a 
common feature in the discussion of problems of 'factor mobility' 
and largely responsible for the high level of unemployment in the 
so- called 'Depressed Areas' in Great Britain during the inter -war 
period, so much that Sir t.-illiam Beveridge and others advanced the 
proposition of moving capital to labour into those areas rather than 
moving labour from those areas into capital elsewhere. In fact, 
economists have found this concept of passive resistance essential 
to explain the persistent inequalities in remuneration or in 
employment opportunities. Resistance, however, may be active, 
through political activities and other channels outside the market. 
An analysis of the conditions which bring forth an active 
resistance of this type implies an analysis of the strength of the 
motive of security and the various institutional and other factors, 
which may determine the form which resistance takes. But it is 
worthy of note here that neither material progress is the only 
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menace to the security of particular groups, nor is security the 
only motive to economic operations outside the market. 
Inventions in the Schumpeterian sense are treated as 
economically irrelevant until they are given practical application 
as a 'new combination' of resources.(1) It can thus be observed 
that Fisher's analysis reveals incidentally an important factor 
among those which_ determine when inventions will become 
economically relevant. For material progress, in Fisher's 
analysis, requires the transfer of labour and capital from such 
industries as the advance of technical knowledge has made more 
efficient into other, and in many instances, new industries. 
Resistances to transfer of resources not only cause over- 
production and depression in the former industries but also 
prevent the emergence of new ones. 
Fisher cites, as an illustration of active resistances, the 
reactions to technical improvements which are often revealed by 
monopolistic elements. He believes, rightly or wrongly, that the 
distinction between goods with elastic and inelastic demand has 
some significance here, not so much because the prudent monopolist 
is always tending to keep this factor in mind when he determines 
his pricing policy, but because the effect of monopolistic 
tendencies must be in the direction of maintaining output at a 
lower level than would be attained under free competition. 
fil) Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Theory Of Economic Development. 
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In some instances, an expansion of output may go so far as 
to entail the employment of a larger volume of resources than 
before in the industries affected by the change in productive 
techniques. But in this case the 'attractive' power of the 
impact of technical improvement will be significantly weakened 
by monopolistic influences. In some other instances, however, 
the output of the monopolistic industries affected by the change 
in productive techniques may reach such a high level that the 
'attractive' power of the impact of technical progress will be 
strengthened, and not weakened, by monopolistic influences. Some 
recent reports on the supply of certain monopolistic industries 
have revealed that there have been no signs of restriction of 
capacity in post -war years; but on the contrary improved 
efficiency as a result of the exchange of technical information 
on the basis of a "system of regulated competition" has resulted 
in a steady and progressive fall in real costs of production and 
in an expansion of output.(1) It seems that the attitude of the 
managerial class has virtually changed. Immediate profits are 
now of less concern than continuity and stability. That is a 
natural consequence of the managerial revolution through which the 
business world is now passing. 
(1) C. f. The Monopolies And Restrictive Practices Commission: 
Report on the Supply of Cast Iron Rainwater Goods, London 1951, 
Sec. 139, p. 39. 
Report on the Supply of Electric Lamps, L orrion, 1951, Sec. 233, pp. 83-84. 
Report on the Supply of Insulated Electric Wires and Cables, London, 1952, 
Chapter 16, p. 76 seq. 
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More specifically, Fisher conceives of five barriers to 
progress. 
(1) 
First come the moral and cultural standards as 
contrasted with the materialist standards, as well as the 
conservative attitude of preserving the cherished ways of life. 
Besides, material progress threatens loss to important groups, 
who accordingly take such measures as may be effective to protect 
themselves, thus reinforcing any other forces which may be 
generating instability and creating additional risks of insecurity 
both for others and often for themselves as well. Two groups are 
likely to exert such an obstructive influence. The first group 
comprise those who are already operating in fields the expansion 
of which would harmonise with the trend towards material progress; 
but the members of this group will naturally dislike inconvenient 
competition which may bring their incomes below the customary level. 
Thus they tend to obstruct the flow of competing capital into their 
industry and limit entry of new competitors by various devices. 
A striking example is the case of professional men in the field 
of tertiary production. The second group comprise those who may 
find the demand for their products falling off as technical change 
facilitates the cheap production of other things with a highly 
elastic demand. Expansion of this kind of demand inevitably means 
a decline in the demand for other products, directly or indirectly 
competitive with them; and the risk of loss may induce the 
(i) Allan G.B. Fisher, Economic Progress And Social Security, London, 1945, 
Chapter VII, pp. 74 -92. 
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capitalists concerned to attempt to check this inconvenient trend. 
But even if-structural adjustments might be made without friction, 
the course of material progress must inevitably change the 
relative positions of groups of people occupying different places 
in the income scale. These changes may seem very inconvenient, 
and require some re- ordering of the customary mode of life of the 
wealthier class, e.g., the shortage of domestic service due to 
progress. Finally the extension of luxuries and amenities of 
life to the poorer members of the community will tend to increase 
the congestion at the middle of the social ladder where the great 
middle class is already congregated; in other words, the nearer 
will the rich and the poor approach this middle point. Perhaps 
the poor will still feel that they are at the bottom while those at 
the top will feel that they have been deprived of something which 
does not appear to have benefited anyone. The whole idea of 
progress may therefore be frustrated. 
In the light of the above analysis, Fisher comes to the 
conclusion that, if these serious obstacles which stand in the way 
of material progress were not removed, and hence the necessary 
transfers of resources were not made, not only would the average 
level of income fail to rise as improvements in efficiency of 
production would warrant, but the failure to make such transfers 
would also mean the loss of the individual or group security which 
is usually the object of resistance to structural readjustments. 
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2. ARE TRADE UNIONS OBSTRUCTIVE ? 
The obstructiveness of trade unions is a topic which seems to 
be more or less related to Fisher's thesis that there may exist a 
clash between security and material progress. For trade unions, 
it is alleged, impose obsolete restrictions upon flexibility of 
industry in order to secure their position towards their employers 
in respect of the rates of pay and conditions of work. 
In his discussion of barriers to progress, Fisher has seemed 
to focus his attention only upon the passive resistances on the 
part of workers and the active resistances on the part of employers, 
to the structural adjustments necessary for the assimilation of 
technical improvements. In other words, he has neglected the 
active resistances alleged to be made on the part of trade unions 
as representatives of different sections of labour. In a sense, 
therefore, the work edited by John Hilton and others may be 
(1) 
considered as a complement to Fisher's. 
The purpose of this work is to find a satisfactory answer to 
the question embodied in its title by means of empirical 
observations and investigations with reference to some main groups 
of industries where trade union practices are deemed to be largely 
effective. Specifically, it is alleged that restrictive practices 
laid down by trade unions have been largely detrimental to the 
progress of the economy, and that trade unions have failed to 
(1) Are Trade Unions Obstructive? An Impartial Enquiry, London, 1935, 
edited by John Hilton, J.J. Mallon, Sam Mayor, B.S. Rowntree, 
Sir Arthur Salter and Frank D. Stuart. 
174. 
observe the changes which have radically affected the whole 
structure of industry throughout the world, or to recognise their 
responsibilities in the field of industrial relations of capital 
and labour. But the story is not as simple as that. On the 
other side, it is alleged with equal sincerity that barriers to 
progress, if any, come from the coercive and warlike practices of 
the employers themselves. They have failed to realise the 
aspirations, abilities and outlook of people who work for them and 
see the structure of industry from below. They have never learned 
to regard their employees' organisations as anything but weapons 
of offence directed against themselves. They have been as bad as 
the Trade Union leaders. They lack the vision either to recognise 
the portents of social and economic change or to admit workers to 
any share in the real control of industry. In respect of these 
as well as the previous charges, no body of information was 
available to support either of them. The work edited by Hilton 
and others provides this body of information. It is indeed an 
analysis of the main alleged obstructive practices on the part of 
trade unions, viz., wages policy, barriers to the introduction of 
new techniques based on elaborate and labour- saving machinery, 
arbitrary restrictions on apprenticeship, the restrictive policy of 
demarcation, and finally the 'go -slow' policy. 
To begin with, trade union restrictions is a vague term, 
purporting to imply any stipulation a trade union may make in respect 
175. 
of the terms and conditions on which its members will sell their 
labour. Employers have had widely divergent views as to what 
constitutes a trade union restriction. Some of them, however, 
have considered the refusal of unions to agree to a reduction of 
wages as the most grievous of all restrictions. But in answering 
the question of whether resistance to wage reductions has really 
to fall within the category of 'restrictions' or not, one has 
further to make the distinction between the general level of 
wages and particular cases of wages far above that level. As 
regards the general level of wages, the authors' position is to 
defend and advance the share of labour in the national product. 
In their view, this is the cardinal object of trade union movement. 
Otherwise, unions have to be damned from the start. True, the 
maintenance of over -high wages imposed by unions may be a 
principal cause of the persistence of trade depression and 
unemployment; if so, then trade union wages policy is the chief 
villain of the piece. But it is equally true that the levelling 
down of wages would intensify the trade depression; if so, then 
trade union wages policy is a laudable thing. The authors' 
discussion of this issue has led them to the conclusion that trade 
union policy of standing out for the highest general level of wages 
and working conditions that can be obtained without general hurt is 
not a trade union restriction. (1) 
(1) Ibid., p. 312. 
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As regards particular rates, which appear to be exceptionally 
high, they are justifiable by trade unions concerned on the grounds 
that the wages in question form so small a part of the total cost 
of the article that the employer and the public need not bother 
much about their abnormal level, that work, like other things, is 
worth what it can be made to fetch, and good organisation can make 
it fetch much more than it otherwise would. But wage -rates so far 
above the general level tend, on the one hand, to choke down the 
demand for whatever article it is that requires such labour, and, 
on the other, to bring many minds on the employers! side to bear on 
methods of production which would side -step the wage- profiteers. 
It is not easy, moredver, to point out that these exceptionally 
high rates are invariably enforced at the expense of other wages, 
but there is a general presumption that this is so, and in 
particular cases it is certainly so. On these two lines of 
argument, the authors conclude that the trade union movement would 
do well to look with disfavour on exceptionally high rates of pay. 
But much more general in the evidence are the complaints of 
obstruction and extortion in the matter of overtime, night work 
and Sunday work. All employers, the authors say, take it for 
granted that extra payment is called for; but their grievance 
relates, not to the principle of extra payment, but to what they 
regard as exploitation and abuse. They refer to instances in 
which trade unionism tries to ban all working of overtime, or 
(1 
(1) Ibid., p. 313. 
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insists on its being limited to few hours a week, or allows it to 
be worked only on payment of what the employers regard as 
exorbitant rates. As regards both the limits and the rates, they 
complain of the rigid adherence to the letter of the law and of 
little give- and -take on the part of unions. Besides, employers 
in the export sector of industry stress the disadvantages under 
which they suffer as against their foreign competitors who either 
pay no increased rate for overtime work or pay that rate but on a 
much lower scale. Trade unions' reply to these allegations is 
that overtime is an evil which must be avoided; and the employer 
who cannot so organise his work as to render it unnecessary must 
pay a deterrent penalty in the form of high overtime rates. 
Overtime is an evil because if it is systematic it cuts into a 
man's rightful leisure and subjects him to much strain, whereas if 
it is spasmodic it breaks without warning into the man's leisure 
and upsets his social arrangements and his home life. In either 
case, therefore, it is the worker's legitimate right to be so 
highly paid as to compensate him for these great inconveniences 
and strains. Moreover, overtime runs counter to the principle 
of spreading the available work among the greatest possible number 
of workers, especially in times of depression. On broad issue, 
the authors seem to side with the trade unions' point of view. 
The working week, as is laid down in collective agreements, is in 
their view quite long enough; and no employer is right in asking his 
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employees to work beyond the standard hours, except in cases of 
real emergency which could not have been foreseen in advance. 
(1) 
The authors finally dwell on the obstruction imposed by trade 
unions on piece work, and refer to the complaints in some 
industries, e.g., building, wood- working, printing and docks, of 
the refusal of certain unions to allow their members to work under 
any form of payment by results. Employers in the industries 
concerned regard this practice as one of the most harmful of all 
restrictions, which accounts for a great deal of suffering and 
inefficiency in their branch of industry. Piece work versus day 
work is a controversial topic in business organisation already 
explored and well- documented. But it should only be noted here 
that there is no clear trade union doctrine on that subject, nor 
is there a uniformity in trade union attitude. For it has been 
observed that payment by results is the traditional and accepted 
system in such industries as coal, iron and steel, cotton, wool 
and several other industries. Still in some such industries as 
engineering and shipbuilding, some types of work are being done 
on the basis of piece rate while other types on day rate. 
Needless to say, the pros and cons of piece work versus day work 
vary not only from industry to industry, but from occupation to 
occupation, and even almost from job to job. The classical 
grounds for resisting piece work are well -known and scarcely need 
any further comment: deterioration of craftsmanship, inducement to 
(1 ) Tbid. , p. 316. 
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bad feelings and jealousy as between fellow- workers, destruction of 
the team spirit, scamping, encouragement of overwork to the point 
of exhaustion, inducement to subsequent rate -cutting, and finally 
the creation of friction and bad atmosphere all -round in the 
workshop. Everyone of these objections is found fully expressed 
in the evidence. The kind of work for which payment by results 
is resisted is almost always craft work. But much of the work, 
which was formerly done in a craft fashion, has, for many decades, 
been going over to mass -production; and, in mass repetition work, 
these considerations are no longer of account. In this 
transitional phase, the job goes to a different type and grade of 
worker. Craftsmen are thus thrown out of work, and no craft union 
is in a position to prevent such a change. 
(1) 
As regards the obstruction imposed upon the introduction of 
machinery, the evidence collected by the authors discloses how 
much of the tension, which is being felt in industry, stems from 
the attempts made by craft unions to lay down what must happen to 
their members, when a job previously done by a craftsman with hand 
tools begins to be done on a machine or with the aid of mechanical 
appliances. The conflict covers three general questions: Who 
shall work the machines or appliances? How many men are required 
for their operations? net rates shall be paid to the operatives? 
In some instances, the union in question claims that the work shall 
be done on the machine by the class of men who did it by hand. The 
(i) Ibid. , pp. 318-319. 
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employer concerned sometimes agrees to such a stipulation. At 
other times -he refuses to accept it on the plea that the new 
machine has dispensed with the need for the skill of the craftsman. 
What he really wants is an operative skill; he thus prefers to 
train his operative labour from the raw and proposes to pay no 
craft wage for an operative work. Trade unions, however, have an 
opposite view. They argue that the craftsman from whom work is 
being taken has a prior claim and a moral right to work the machine, 
that no one knows the feel of the material and the quality of the 
product so well as he does, and that it will pay the employer to 
make use of the craftsman at the craft rate rather than the operative 
at a lower rate. They also argue that, even if it costs the 
employer a little more, he is getting a much greater output from 
the machine and should not look forward to make a further profit 
by employing cheaper labour on it. In the authors' view, craft 
unions can put forward their own terms; their members can threaten 
to w alk out if these terms are not accepted or they can stay in and 
make trouble right and left; but they cannot hope to win a lasting 
victory. 
Machinery, the authors say,has for long time past been putting 
workers out of employment. Can one expect sweet reason from men 
who wait the next stroke of the axe? If with the new -appliances 
the work previously done can be done with one -third of the labour, 
then, even supposing the employer agrees to use skilled men on the 
new process, two- thirds are going to lose their jobs. Their real 
aim is to deter him from bringing in the new plant. Who expects 
the skilled man to stand still while the machine that is to 
dispense with the need for his skill is to be installed? He has 
invested his life in the trade and everything he has is at stake. 
Text -book proofs that labour- saving machinery do not destroy 
employment mean nothing to him. He knows that mates have lost 
their jobs to machinery and he may lose his. Of course he will 
try to put a spoke in the new wheels. His terms are not those of 
a gangster, but of a die -hard; he will not see his skill cheapened 
without some effort to stop it. The semi -skilled man and the 
general labourer are in much the same boat. Indeed, aspects of 
the 'machine' question have caused as much bitterness in the cotton 
industry as in any other; 
tradition to overcome. 
and in cotton there is no strong craft 
In printing trade, on the other hand, it 
has proved possible to reach a high degree of mechanisation and at 
the same time to preserve and even to strengthen the skilled crafts. 
No doubt, the semi -skilled or unskilled man is in rather a stronger 
position in that he has less to lose and can more easily move over 
into any new employment that the labour -saving machinery can creat 
The craft unions are bearing the brunt of the attack at the moment 
but workmen of all grades are threatened by the introduction of 
machines and appliances whose immediate result will be the 
discharging of staff. They know that they are between the devil 
e. 
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of losing their jobs and the deep sea of their employer losing his 
orders. Their best policy, as they see it, is to cheat the devil 
and risk the drowning. Is it the best policy? We doubt it. If 
the trade union movement as a mole thinks that, at a time like 
this, further improvement in technique and apparatus of production 
should be taboo, let it say so and persuade the nation to make it 
law. Or let it persuade the nation to the principle pronounced 
by a spokesman of the dock industry, that machinery which displaces 
labour should be taxed for the benefit of those whom it displaces. 
Or let it make a case for the patriarchal view, also put forward 
in the docks evidence, that an industry which has once included a 
man among its personnel should be therefore responsible for his 
maintenan_de, work or no work. These are rational and honest 
proposals which could command respect, if not ready support. But 
the policy of professing welcome to devices which will make 
production more efficient, and at the same time, obliquely doing 
everything to crab them, is doomed, it seems to us, not merely to 
fail, but to handicap organised labour in making the best for 
itself of the new conditions. The strategy is bad and the tactics 
are worse. Labour's better course is to co- operate whole- 
heartedly in increasing the efficiency of industry, wherever 
possible taking the lead; to nurse craft skill in its transition 
from one kind of craftsmanship to another; to use their weight with 
employers to ensure that all transitions are made with the maximum 
possible consideration for workers; to clear out of the way any 
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impediments to the meeting of' new demands for industrial products 
wherever they may: arise and in whatever form. (1) 
Turning to the no less serious question of' restrictions 
imposed by craft unions in the matter of apprenticeship, it may be 
reasoned that they should contrive restrictions in the supply of 
their members so that, by creating an artificial scarcity of the 
supply of the labour concerned, they are enabled to keep its price 
at a fancy level. In very few instances, however, has the evidence 
revealed clear cases of the price of a particular type of labour 
being raised by a deliberate limitation of its supply. The older 
method of keeping prices at a fancy level by restricting supplies 
is rapidly giving place to the provision of ample supplies at 
fixed prices. Trade union practice is in line with that of the 
rest of the community. In the professions, for instance, there 
exist resistances to the lowering of fees and salaries but no 
deliberate limitation of training for the professions. This does 
not mean that there are no restrictions on apprenticeship and other 
forms of entry, which lead to shortage in the supply of particular 
types of labour. There are some instances of restrictions and 
shortages, but they do not constitute important elements in any 
monopoly power the unions concerned may exercise. 
One of the other complaints of employers is demarcation 
difficulties in the sense that each craft union defines the range 
of the work which 'belongs' to its members. ?hen the boundary 
(i) Ibid., pp. 322-23. 
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line of the province of each union is demarcated and no one who is 
not a member of the craft must do any of the jobs or operations 
within that boundary, this demarcation, it is alleged by employers, 
will not only cause friction, delay and loss while unions squabble 
among themselves, but it must occasion the use of successive 
workers belonging to different crafts for the performance of a 
small job, which anyone of them could do from the beginning up to 
the end. Fortunately, demarcation troubles are not so serious as 
they used to be; and some of the remaining restrictions are 
designed to ensure good and responsible workmanship through 
training and experience. This is the justification of the craft 
unions for the insistence on each job being done by the right man. 
But the argument seems to be strong in the case where a high quality 
of work is all -important; but it could scarcely apply where a 
work of a less vital nature, as, for instance repair work, is being 
done. In this case, friction, delays and avoidable costs are 
usually involved; and here there should be some ruling for the 
relaxation of craft rigidities on any such work. 
Evidence also refers to some extracts from actual trade union 
rules under which fines are imposed for finishing a piece of work 
too soon, but it is uncertain how far these rules are genuinely 
effective. The unions concerned return these charges with counter- 
charges, that deficient outputs are largely due to faults and 
failures for which the management alone is responsible. "Slack 
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masters ", say the authors, "make slack men, and it needs no trade 
union villainy to account for men putting very little into their 
part of the joint business of production when the employer sets 
the example. An employer should know just what is a fair day's 
work from each and every man; if he does not, he can neither 
praise, blame nor judge aright. His intelligence section is at 
fault and he had better get it mended But that does not 
exonerate the trade "union that gives the wink and the nod to 
slacking."(1) No union, the authors go on, can afford to play 
about with ca canny. Those employers do best, who recognise the 
great part the workpeople can play in making a good organisation 
work at a good speed and to a good purpose. Several of the trade 
union spokesmen express the wish that employers would more 
generally seek the collaboration of their workers in matters of 
workshop control and organisation. 
To conclude, it might be asked what, on the evidence, trade 
union restrictions as a whole amount to in the industrial order. 
The general summing -up of the results of the enquiry reveals the 
fact that the obstructions to industrial efficiency and 
improvements set up by trade unions are not so serious as is 
commonly alleged or taken for granted. Moreover, it is clear, as 
the evidence bears out, that restrictive practices imposed by trade 
unions are in fact fewer than they were, and of less importance. 
In a number of industries, employers have referred to conditions 
(1) Ibid., p. 332. 
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prevailing in the past, and have admitted that relatively their 
own grounds-for complaint are small. Both trade unions and 
employers have learnt through experience, and there is a great 
deal more reasonableness than there used to be in the past decades. 
It is well to bear in mind that the main factor holding back 
industrial efficiency are much more human than mechanical. 
Management and workers in their own and the general interest are 
equally concerned with that problem. There are few who do not 
realise that it can be solved, and maximum efficiency achieved, 
only if management and workers unite in a harmonious group, looking 
at the problem common to both from the same angle. 
The elements of the problem jointly facing management and 
labour can be simply stated. Means must be found and al plied to 
enable both men and machinery to be employed in the most 
economical manner and in such a way that the reward to all is both 
increased and assured. This is indeed a practical problem to 
which must be brought the qualities of good sense and good faith. 
At the same time, it must be recognised that, in the past, 
this has often been dangerous ground on which to tread. The 
memories of trade -union leaders stretch back to old times and 
rooted in their minds is the fear that acceptance of new techniques 
may bring unemployment to their members. Scarcely less happy are 
the recollections of what sometimes resulted from wage systems which 
related earning to effort. On such basis restrictive practices 
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have been established and defended. Management, on the other 
hand, have often been deterred from capital investment in new 
equipment by the fear that any resultant economies would be 
reduced or nullified by the conditions the trade unions would 
attach to its use. Memories of the past and realities of the 
present place difficult obstacles in the path to progress. The 
vital question for all concerned is whether they can be overcome 
and whether there is- the will to overcome them. The abandonment 
of restrictive practices is a hard doctrine for trade -union 
leaders, which they cannot be expected to adopt without far - 
reaching measures against the results they fear. Management, on 
their side, have the duty to establish the conditions of confidence 
without which is impossible. 
If these problems have defied solution in the past, it is 
natural to ask whether there are any special reasons why they can 
be successfully overcome to -day. There are many. The first is 
to be found in the position of the trade unions themselves. Labour 
has now reached a new high status in the country's economy. That 
new status carries with it not only greater power but greater 
responsibility. So far, the unions have not fully awakened to 
their new position, but many are ready to move forward from their 
negative and defensive position to make the positive contribution 
they alone can do. 
Conditions are favourable in another respect. Unemployment, 
in the sense in which it was known in the past, has been put behind, 
perhaps for many years to come. The removal of this fear, which 
has haunted industrial relations in the past, provides the 
opportunity for management and labour to recognise frankly that 
their interests are common interests and can best be served by 
co- operation and not by conflict. At the same time, the attitude 
of management towards labour has significantly changed. In his 
.search for efficiency, the manager of to -day regards not only the 
skill but the contentment of all for whose employment he is 
responsible as essential if technical efficiency is to reach its 
highest level. 
These changes are real, and just as real is the change of 
atmosphere. To -day there appears to be a powerful desire that a 
new approach in a new spirit shall be made to these human problems 
of industry. But a new spirit in industry, by itself, is not 
enough: it must be translated into action over the whole field of 
industry. How, then, is the matter to be brought to the point of 
action? It is that if leaders of industry, both in management and 
in the unions, were publicly to declare their willingness to attempt 
a new approach, action could swiftly follow. 
For the past ten years the Trades Union Congress and the 
Government have been urging the need for increased production, and 
to some extent this appeal has met with reasonable success. In 
spite of shortages of materials, the increase of production has been 
maintained, but many leaders of industry believe that it can be 
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greatly extended if both sides of industry are prepared to 
eliminate ekisting restrictive practices. 
The reports of the production teams which have crossed the 
Atlantic from Britain to study productivity in America all prove 
beyond any doubt that modern methods of production and scientific 
management, with the almost universal acceptance of incentive 
payment schemes, have made possible constant increases in real wages 
and have extended, ráther than limited, the influence and scope of 
the American trade unions. Arising out of the report of the team 
of British trade union officials who visited the United States in 
1949 to investigate the operations of the American trade unions as 
they affect industrial production, the General Council of the Trades 
Union Conress recommended that unions should: (a) interest 
themselves actively in modern production and management techniques 
to improve industrial efficiency; (b) employ staffs qualified to 
advise and assist on production problems, and establish where 
appropriate their own production departments; (c) provide for their 
members generous education and training facilities. 
This represents a revolution in trade union thinking. But 
while the British trade unions have no desire to apply American 
methods of production in their entirety to British industries, the 
trade union movement is insisting on the need for increased 
(1) 
production by means of modernisation and re- equipment. 
Ti) C.P. Ministry Of Labour And National Service Centenary Lectures, The Worker 
in Industry, London, 1952. 
Allan Flanders, Trade Unions, 1952, Chapter VI; 
New Fabian Essays, edited by R.H.S. Crossman, London, 1952, Trade Unions 
In A Full Employment Economy, pp. 113 -160. 
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Here, then, is a simple, positive and constructive approach 
which can be accepted and followed by all as one national team to 
produce the best results in industry. Once the purpose of industry 
is defined as the provision of the goods and services that the 
community requires with the minimum use of real resources, then the 
first part of this definition gives a practical and social meaning 
to industrial activity of every kind; the second implies the 
objective of high and increasing efficiency based on an over- 
growing stream of technical and administrative knowledge. 
In building an effective philosophy based on the above 
definition, the question arises, what are the essential parts of 
the industrial organisation? The answer is that there are three 
sides of industry, each having a definite function and interest 
in its working and results. These are: (1) the labourers of all 
grades who work in industry; (2) the management, which has the 
responsibility for organising the whole activity; (3) the 
Government which assumes the dual responsibility of taking over 
the managerial function in nationalised industries and of serving 
the interests of the consumers of the goods and services provided 
by industry as a whole. Each and every side of industry must play 
its effective part if successful results are to be achieved. 
This new 
. approach to the industrial problem, based as it is 
on the co- operation between labour, management, and Government, 
shows a way to the future development of under- developed countries. 
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To -day the first indications of a trade union movement in those 
countries are largely insignificant and the associations of labour 
are often formed on religious and recreational rather than 
occupational grounds, but growing industrialisation will naturally 
be associated with a parallel growth of trade union movements. 
However, the first need is for the leaders of industry, both in 
management and in -the unions, as well as for the governments 
concerned, to declare their willingness to attempt a new approach 
in a new spirit to those human problems of industry, and to state 
in explicit terms what is the true aim and purpose of a trade union 
movement. Its aim and purpose must be in all circumstances to 
safeguard and improve the working and living standards of its 
members; but it cannot be pursued in isolation from the general 
and permanent interests of the community. 
In such countries, the urgent need for the transmission and 
appropriation of up -to -date and efficient production methods and 
techniques in the whole field of industry is well recognised. 
That is not well recognised, or perhaps entirely overlooked, is 
the fact that the human and psychological factors in industry are 
no less important than the technical aspects. For both, the main 
responsibility must rest on management, which has not only to 
ensure the use of the best techniques of applied science, but must 
also provide the leadership vital to any healthy organisation. 
Management must see to it that the workers are satisfied, not only 
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with the remuneration they receive, but with their general 
treatment and opportunities for development, if they are to find 
the happiness in their work that is necessary to enable them to 
live a full and useful life. 
In under -developed countries, too many still think that the 
introduction of new methods and techniques is something from which 
the managerial class has the sole rights to benefit. In other words, 
labour will in no way share in reaping the fruits of increased 
productivity, for management will secure to itself the major part 
of any increase in the yields of industry. Thus the fundamental 
problem is how to stimulate the interest of the worker in 
increased productivity and in the prosperity of the firm which 
employs him in such a way that he can see and appreciate the 
personal advantage to hint. Incentive payments, while in 
themselves essential to higher productivity, are not enough to 
develop in his mind the idea of the close association of interest 
between his job and management. Indeed, it is in the wider 
recognition of that community of interest that the kernel of the 
matter lies. Class struggle is out of date, and believers in it 
on both sides should recognise this. In under -developed countries, 
the wider recognition of the community of interest is, indeed, a 
vital factor in industrial relations which the trade unions alone 
can supply by modifying the climate of thought of the rank -and- 
file workers. With the growing power and strength that the unions 
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may possess, and the influence they may yield in national life, 
surely there will be a general acceptance of the idea that 
industry is a joint enterprise dependent on the efforts of both 
management and labour, and that any differences can be reconciled 
by discussion and negotiation against the background of common 
interest. 
The future development of under -developed countries will be 
at stake if management and labour take up positions of permanent 
hostility in an atmosphere in which every difference of opinion 
becomes a battle to be fought rather than a problem to be solved. 
In those countries, management and labour should in no way be 
obsessed by the long- standing practices, old- fashioned traditions, 
or outworn doctrines which have haunted industrial relations in 
the nineteenth -century development of western economies. In 
under -developed countries, these conditions did not exist in their 
past history and should not exist in their future development. If 
technical and industrial resources have to be used to the full, 
a new approach as defined above must be required on the part of 
employers and unions, an approach in which high productivity 
occupies a central place in their habit of thought and behaviour. 
This is a basic but simple philosophy for industry which all can 
accept as being logical, social and progressive in its implications. 
In its acceptance, there would be a firm foundation for united 
action in industry and for the release of the individual and 
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collective efforts which the economic situation in any under- 
developed country genuinely demands. 
Granted that there must be a new approach in a new spirit, 
why is co- operation lacking? ?':hat is hindering this new spirit 
from finding expression at the actual point of industrial production 
in so many under -developed countries? It is what happens there 
that really matters. Active co- operation is indeed very rare. It 
is not that the workshop relations are bad. They are not. In 
many concerns they are peaceful and friendly. But active co- 
operation is something much more than a mere absence of strife. 
It involves a conscious concern for the increase of productivity 
and for the prosperity of the undertaking; but such concern is 
rarely forthcoming. 
So once again what is it that is preventing that new spirit 
from getting through? That are the rocks that are impeding the 
channel. First and foremost is the fact that in many under- 
developed countries the government has assumed a peculiar attitude 
towards labour by seeking to suppress, on false pretences, the 
growth of free and independent trade unions. So long as this 
attitude governs state action in the sphere of industrial relations, 
so long will the way be barred to the modification of the climate 
of thought of the rank- and -file workers, which trade unions alone 
can achieve. 
-There is one real answer to any shortcomings on the 
government side. It is that, in many instances, the ruling class 
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in the Eastern community has its interests vested, directly or 
indirectly, in industry; and more often than not the ruling class 
and the managerial class are more or less identical. In other 
words, there are practically two, and not three, sides of industry 
in the under -developed economy. Thus the attitude of the ruling 
class has always been conditioned by these vested interests. 
Rooted in its consci ousness is the fear that the unrestricted 
growth of labour movements may bring disastrous consequences which 
would threaten its very existence in the social frame. The rulers 
of many under -developed societies seem to be obsessed by the idea 
that labourers are the proletariat in the Marxian sense, and that, 
if they w ere free to organise themselves in strong and unified 
labour associations and take an active part in the social 
development of the society, they would sooner or later throw 
themselves on the side of communism, again in the i,arxian sense. 
This is one explanation of the peculiar attitude of the 
government on its political side. Another explanation on the 
economic side is that, if trade unions were freely and 
independently organised, then their chief purpose must be to 
improve the working and living standards of their members. This 
again would come into conflict with the interests of the 
capitalist, ruling class in two ways. First, the employers' 
attitude has always been conditioned by the desire to get cheap 
labour; but if strong and well- organised trade unions came into 
being and exercised a strong bargaining power in the labour market, 
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the employers' position in industry would be menaced by frequent 
demands for -an increase in wages. Secondly, when the existing 
extremes of wealth are a crying injustice in the Eastern societies, 
trade union activity will rightly concentrate on its unfair and 
uneven distribution and on the struggle for larger shares of 
existing wealth by a redistribution of income. 
Workers' organisations should in no way be subject to the 
direct or indirect intervention of the government. It is a 
fundamental truth that trade unions must be free and independent 
organisations in all circumstances in order to pursue their 
independent policy as the true representatives of the working 
people. The experience of the T''est have taught that truth far 
and wide. Trade unions in the Eastern societies rightly demand 
a high degree of freedom and independence so that they can freely 
take the initiative in tackling problems concerning the well- being 
of their members. But in taking this defensive position there is 
no reason why they should not in the meantime move forward to make 
the positive contribution they alone can do in promoting economic 
efficiency and industrial health, based on a whole- hearted co- 




IN THE NEW ECONOMICS 
The foregoing discussion of the works of Fisher, Hilton 
and others contains some material which is necessary to the 
theory of economic development in the sense that it is concerned 
with the adaptation of economic life to changing conditions 
rather than with the explanation of these changes and their 
effect on economic life. 
It is now time to discuss in one theoretical scheme 
certain changes of some conditions, viz., propensities of the 
people, population, geographical distribution of people and 
things and state of technology, and to investigate the effect 
of these changes on the level of economic activity in a well - 
developed economy. 
Is there not a tendency, it might be asked, in a progressive 
economy for saving to outrun investment opportunities, with the 
inevitable result of more years of slump than of high employment, 
of long -lived depressions and brief recoveries? Such a view, 
pessimistic as it is, is often called 'secular stagnation', and 
is associated with the name of Professor Alvin H. Hansen. (1) 
According to him, dynamic investment is the mainspring of economic 
fluctuations. As investment shifts to high gear, the total 
demand is high and jobs are plentiful. When the capricious 
fil) C.f. Alvin H. Hansen, Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles. 
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factors making for investment happen to be unfavourable for a 
long time, the economic system may go through decades of high 
unemployment. In respect of this proposition, almost all 
economists would agree with Hansen. But a number of them would 
not, when he goes on to state in his stagnation thesis that there 
are a number of long run factors in the American economy which 
lead to a situation whereby investment will be a lagging factor 
relative to saving. 
Hansen's reasoning is based on the concept of 'maturity' of 
the American economy. The frontier is gone, the rate of 
population growth is declining, and technology gives less room 
for revolutionary inventions comparable in impact to the railroad, 
electric power, or the automobile in earlier times. The weaken- 
ing of these dynamic factors leaves the economy with a dearth of 
opportunities for private investment, which is increasingly 
confined to mere replacement of existing capital assets upon 
retirement. This replacement and such limited expansion as 
remains, can be financed largely from depreciation accruals and 
the retained earnings of business 8.ndertakings, hence absorb 
little or no personal savings. Meanwhile, these savings, un- 
affected by the dearth of investment opportunities, pile up as 
idle funds for which there is no outlet in new physical capital. 
This accumulation of savings gives rise to a downward spiral of 
income and production. The dearth of investment opportunities, 
which is the main feature of the 'mature' economy, precipitates 
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over -saving, and marks the beginning of a long period of secular 
stagnation and recurrent crises from which there will be no 
escape, except through government action. The government can 
only solve the problem either by expanding public investment or 
by taxing out of existence the excess savings which poison the 
economy. In a nutshell, the mature economy can survive only by 
reliance upon state action. 
"One curious aspect of this theory ", says George Terborgh, 
is its development primarily in United States. Although it has 
drawn from the writings of Keynes most of its basic ideas on 
saving and investment, the peculiar doctrines of economic maturity 
have been elaborated in the United States under the leadership of 
Dr. A.H. Hansen. It is not too misleading to call it an American 
theory. If this theory were merely a matter of academic contro- 
versy, we should be content to leave it without exposition, 
confident that history would in time discredit it; but it has 
emerged into the arena of public propaganda and practical 
politics. It threatens through its impact on mass opinion and 
public policy to influence the history not only of ideas, but of 
social and economic institutions. A defeatist philosophy, if 
widely believed can so affect the economy that it helps to 
produce the very conditions it assumes. Ideas are social forces. t"(1) 
Hansen' s stagnation thesis is principally based on four 
components. It starts with an interpretation of the general 
(1) George Terborgh, The Bogey of Economic Maturity, published by the 
Màchinery and Allied Products Institute, U. S.A. 
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relationship between saving and investment, as being the two 
economic magnitudes that determine the level of the national 
income. This interpretation serves as an analytical frame- 
work or premise for the whole discussion. Three conditions 
are then held to constitute economic maturity in the sense of 
bringing forth the dearth of investment opportunities, viz., 
the decline in population growth, passing of the frontier, and 
the dearth of great new capital consuming industries. Two 
other elements in the theory are taken, by mistake, to be the 
cause of economic maturity, whereas, properly speaking, they 
should be considered as its effects, viz., the increasing 
relative importance of replacement in capital formation and of 
depreciation accruals as a source of financing capital. 
(a) ON THE SAVING SIDE 
The income stream flows daily to anyone who participates 
in the productive process, which includes the production of 
commodities and services of every kind and description. The 
size of this income stream depends upon the volume of purchases 
currently made; and these are of two major kinds: purchases 
of consumers' goods and services, and purchases of capital goods, 
e.g., industrial plant and machinery, public utility and rail- 
road equipment, commercial and residential buildings. The 
volume of these two expenditure streams determines-the size of 
the income stream. But the expenditure stream, which is mainly 
responsible for the rise and fall of the total income stream, 
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is that which is made on capital equipment and plant extension; 
when investment is made on a large scale, the total income is 
raised to a high level. 
A part of the total incóme stream, which is received or 
realised out of the processes of the previous period of 
production, will be spent on consumablesand services, and will 
automatically become the source of a new income stream. But 
the part that is saved may or may not find its way back into the 
income stream, and this will depend upon whether or not these 
savings are used, either by the saver himself or by a borrower, 
for the purchase of capital goods. 
If the saver does not himself use the funds, Hansen goes 
on, or if he fails to find a borrower who will use them to 
purchase capital goods, the income stream will dry up and 
unemployment will prevail in the capital goods industries. It 
is very essential that the part of the current flow of income 
which is not spent on consumables, i.e., that part which is 
saved, will be spent either directly by the saver himself or 
indirectly through a borrower on new plant and equipment of some 
kind or another. If the amount which is saved is large, as is 
usually the case at a high income level, it is necessary that 
equally large investment outlets be available for these savings. 
In every boom period, the flow of savings is spent on capital 
goods, and frequently these funds are increased by additional 
sums created out of an expansion of bank credit. In a depression 
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expenditures on capital goods deteriorate; savers are reluctant 
themselves to purchase such goods with their savings, or unable 
to find borrowers to do so. In consequence, the income stream 
dries up. Besides, the stream of expenditure on consumption 
declines as a result of the fall of employment in capital goods 
industries; and so the income stream shrinks still further. 
It then follows that a society geared to a high level of 
capital -goods production is likely to experience violent 
fluctuation in income and employment. A high - savings economy 
will remain a highly dynamic economy, so long as it is able to 
experience great bursts of capital outlays on plant and equipment 
from time to time. Such an economy is then rapidly expanding 
and progressive in spite of its being unstable. But if it fails 
to find adequate investment outlets in plant and equipment for 
its new savings and for its depreciation allowances, it will lose 
its dynamic quality and become a depressed and stagnant economy, 
with a large volume of chronic unemployment. The high- savings 
economy can escape a fall in income and employment only through 
the continuous development of new outlets-for capital expenditures. 
Terborgh, however, believes that the stagnation thesis is 
a bogey without sound factual or theoretical basis. Prior to 
1929, the time of the Great Depression, there was little or no 
evidence of senility in the American economy. And, as one 
swallow does not make a summer, so to borrow the expression,one 
depression, even as great as the Great Depression, cannot 
establish a presumption towards stagnation. On the specific 
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topic of income analysis along saving and investment lines, 
Terborgh also believes that the analysis taken by itself is 
essentially neutral and establishes no presumption in favour of 
stagnation. Stagnation or no stagnation will realistically 
depend on the relationship which exists between the potentialities 
of investment outlets on the one hand, and the magnitude of 
savings on the other. If the former falls short of the latter, 
stagnation will be the inevitable outcome. 
If now the theory is in itself neutral, why then is Hansen 
a stagnationist? The answer is explicit in his views as to the 
future of saving. He believes that people tend to divide their 
extra income between consumption and saving. The creative 
genius of scientists and engineers can be expected to increase 
full employment real incomes at a rapid rate, and it is likely 
that real wages and productivity will continue to grow even faster 
than in the past. Assuming that people's tastes and standards 
of consumption remain unaltered, this rapid increase in real income 
will probably mean an even greater proportionate increase in saving. 
What is wrong in Hansen's concept of the long run development of a 
mature economy? It is the fact that his assumption of the 
constancy of consumption standards does not conform to reality. 
Fortunately, consumption standards do not remain constant. 
People's needs and desires are constantly expanding, because of 
new products invented, because of advertising, and because of 
social custom and imitation. As Paul A. Samuelson has pointed out, 
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throughout all America's history the donsumption- income 
schedule has been shifting upwards; the propensity -to -save 
schedule has been shifting downwards. There are now pretty 
good statistical records going back more than half a century. 
These records show, rather than an increase in the ratio of 
saving to income, a remarkable constancy of the proportion which 
the American people have saved out of past full - employment 
incomes. There is no reason, Samuelson remarks, why the same 
should not continue to be true in the years ahead. If rising 
living standards keep pace with rising productivity, then the 
percentage of personal saving that has to be offset by investment 
need not get worse, especially if progressive tax and expenditure 
help to maintain a high consumption ecanomy.(1) 
(b) ON THE INVESTMENT SIDE . 
In the past, the principal determinants of investment have 
been such dynamic elements as rapid population growth, discovery 
and settlement of new territory, and technological innovation. 
But these dynamic elements, Hansen maintains, are lacking in the 
American economy of to -day: population growth is on the decline, 
the geographical frontier is no longer being pushed out, and 
technological innovation often takes the form of inventions that 
require smaller, rather than a greater, volume of investment. 
Each of these three pillars of Hansen's stagnation thesis will 
be critically examined in what follows. 
RT-Paul A. Samuelson, Economics, An Introductory Analysis, Second Edition, 
pp. 401+ -5. 
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I. DECLINE IN POPULATION GROWTH. 
It is not difficult, says Hensen, to see that a country 
experiencing a rapid increase of population requires a great 
capital outlay in order to provide housing, transporation and 
all facilities necessary for modern methods of living. The rate 
of population growth must play an important part in determining 
the composition, of the flow of final goods. A rapidly growing 
population will demand a much larger per capita volume of new 
residential building construction than will a stationary 
population, whereas a stationary population, with its larger 
proportion of old people, may perhaps demand more personal 
services. The composition of consumer demand will have an 
important influence on the quantity of capital required. The 
demand for housing calls for large capital outlays while the 
demand for personal services can be met without making large 
investment expenditures. It is,_ therefore, not unlikely that a 
shift from a rapidly growing population to a stationary or 
declining one may so change the composition of the final flow of 
consumers' goods that the ratio of capital to output, as a whole, 
will decline. 
In the past, population growth and territorial expansion 
opened vast outlets for extensive investment of capital. In the 
past, the Americans enjoyed opportunities for both extensive and 
intensive investment. Now extensive expansion is largely over, 
and there re rains only the possibility of intensive expansion. 
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But both types have proceeded together, each reinforcing the 
other. Technological developments characterised the nineteenth 
century expansion, but population growth and penetration into 
new territory, in turn, played an important part in widening of 
markets, minimising the risks of technical progress and promoting 
the development of mass production techniques. In other words, 
extensive expansion has speeded up intensive expansion. 
Hansen believes, in this connection, that the growth of 
population in the last half of the nineteenth century was 
responsible for about 40 per cent of the total volume of capital 
formation in Western Europe and 60 per cent of it in United 
States. If this estimate is approximately correct, then an 
important outlet for investment has been closed as a result of the 
rapid decline in population growth. 
Terborgh's criticism here is both factual and theoretical. 
It is factual in the sense that, if economic stagnation is 
associated with low rates of population growth, there should be 
some evidence of this association, by comparing the rates of 
economic expansion in various countries with their respective 
rates of increase in population. Countries with low rates of 
population growth should be expected to have less dynamic economies 
than those with high rates. There are, in fact, indices of 
industrial production for a number of countries, beginning in 
1$$0, and in addition indices of real income, beginning in 1911, 
for the detection of any significant correlation between economic 
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and demographic growth rates. This statistical test, however, 
has shown that there is no evidence whatsoever that countries 
with high rates of population growth have had, in general, any 
more rapid rise in their per capita production than others with 
slow population growth. 
Terborgh's criticism is also theoretical when he refers to 
population growth in the abstract, as related to saving, on the 
one hand, and investment, on the other. On the first issue he 
states that, because a substantial fraction of all saving is 
motivated by investment in particular capital goods, that fraction 
vanishes when the need to purchase such goods eeases. If there- 
fore a decline of population growth leads to a relative reduction 
of capital formation, this is accompanied by a partially com- 
pensatory reduction in saving. Furthermore, the change in the 
age distribution of the population should imply an increase in 
the number of retired people relative to the number of workers. 
This demographic change, however, would represent an increase in 
the number of those who are dissaving relative to the number of 
those who are saving. In consequence, a large fraction of the 
total saving of the community is absorbed in financing dissaving, 
leaving a reduced proportion to be absorbed in capital formation. 
In other words, a declining population growth tends to reduce 
both the volume of saving as a whole and the proportion of this 
reduced volume which is available for capital formation. These 
effects are considered by Terborgh to provide a partial explanation 
of the historical fact that the decline in demographic growth 
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rates has not been accompanied by the unfavourable consequences 
which are visualised by the stagnationists. 
On the second issue, i.e. population growth relative to 
investments, Terborgh contrasts two opposing theories. First, 
a growing population, according to Hansen's theory, will give 
rise to both intensive and extensive investment, whereas a stable 
size of population will only stimulate the intensive type in the 
sense of providing an increase in the quota of capital goods per 
head. It is for this reason that investment opportunities will 
be more in the former than in the latter case. Secondly, 
before over - saving doctrines became popular, it was commonly 
believed that an economy which had to devote a substantial portion 
of its investment to supplying the annual increment of population 
would advance in per capita productivity and living standards more 
slowly than an economy which could devote its entire investment to 
maintaining and expanding its stock of capital goods per capita. 
The savings abeorbed in meeting the demands of the increment of 
population were thought to be diverted, in part at least, from 
the task of promoting the average level of real income and standard 
of living. ii.C. Mitchell, for instance, has treated the 
declining rate of population growth primarily as an opportunity 
for more rapid improvement in economic welfare. Stagnationists 
have reversed this argument. Intensive investment, i.e. the 
investment that goes to expand the stock of capital goods per 
capita, is not, in their view, competitive with extensive investment, 
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i.e., the investment that is needed to equip the increment of 
population" with capital goods. On the contrary, they maintain 
that the intensive depends largely on the extensive type of 
investment in order to complete the absorption of savings and 
hence prevent economic stagnation. 
Hansen may be right in generalising that, as far as 
investment prospects are concerned, population growth tends to 
generate investment' opportunities that are lacking in its 
absence, and that an economy with a rapidly increasing population 
should have, ceteris paribus, a higher rate of capital formation 
than one which has reached demographic maturity. The annual 
increment of population must be supplied with its proportionate 
quota of capital goods, whereas the existing population already 
so equipped requires investment only to replace the current 
consumption of such goods; this is apart from the possible 
increase in per capita stock resulting from technical progress 
in both cases. But even though population growth provides an 
important quantitative source for investment, that in itself 
does not prove that investment would fail to go elsewhere if 
there were no population growth. Terborgh' s final conclusion 
is that there appears to be no significant correlation whatever, 
positive (stagnation theory) or negative (other theory) , between 
the rate of economic progress and 'the rate of population growth. 
But this final conclusion must be qualified if account is taken 
of the size of the available resources in the community concerned* 
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The correlation between the rate of economic progress and the rate 
of population growth may indeed be positive or negative; or, in 
other words, intensive and extensive types of investment may be 
complementary or competitive, depending upon whether the available 
resources in the country are adequate or not, relative to the size 
of the existing population. If the resources are inadequate, the 
price of population growth is costly, for the average living 
standard will tend to remain constant or even deteriorate, and in 
this case intensive and extensive investments will be competitive. 
If the resources are relatively adequate, the average standard of 
living will tend to rise, and here both types of investment will 
be complementary. 
2. PASSING OF THE FRONTIER. 
Throughout the nineteenth century, growth of population 
coincided with the settlement and exploitation of new territories 
all the world over, especially the United States of America. The 
development of those virgin areas called for heavy capital 
investment and provided a special non -recurring outlet for savings. 
With the passing of the American frontier by the turn of the 
century, the foreign capital that had poured into America to 
finance its economic development then turned to other geographical 
areas, e.g., Canada, Latin America, Africa and Asia, whilst the 
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U.S.A. herself gradually became a capital- exporting country, 
depending on foreign investment outlets for the absorption of a 
significant part of her savings. The mature economy theorists, 
however, believe that the future prospects of foreign investment 
outlets in outside frontiers will most probably not amount to much. 
They even go so far as to state that the inability of the Americans 
to compensate for the passing of their own frontier by large and 
continued capital éxports for the economic development of frontiers 
elsewhere will greatly aggravate the American problem of finding 
sufficient investment opportunities. 
But if the passing of the Western frontier, Terborgh argues, 
had created a dearth of investment opportunities, we should have 
heard about it long since. But there is no evidence that it did 
so. The first three decades following the disappearance of the 
frontier showed a slightly higher ratio of capital formation to the 
national product than the last three decades of the nineteenth 
century when the frontier was expanding. There is no historical 
evidence, therefore, that the completion of the first wave of 
western settlement impaired the functioning of the American economy, 
or that United States suffered from the passing of the frontier. 
Terborgh, moreover, proceeds to clear up a misconception which 
is related to the significance of frontier development for saving 
and investment. The frontier development, he admits, clearly 
required railroads, highways, public utilities, houses, commercial 
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buildings, etc., but perhaps it is less clear that this investment 
was, from the viewpoint of its immediate effects, largely at the 
expense of capital formation in older areas from which pioneers 
migrated. In Terborgh's own words: "The settlement of the 
American frontier occurred during a period of population growth 
so rapid that the western movement merely drained off a part of 
the overflow without depopulating these areas. A migrant into 
the virgin territory therefore reduced by one the increment in the 
area he left. Had he stayed, he would have given rise to capital 
formation required in the home area to equip an increment of one 
worker with housing, consumers' capital and productive facilities. 
This is an important point. In a community of shrinking 
population, new workers entering the labour force can be supplied 
with productive facilities by taking over the existing facilities 
released by death or withdrawal of old workers, while new families 
can be housed in dwellings released by dissolution or withdrawal 
of old families. In a growing community, on the other hand, only 
a part of the new workers and families can be so supplied, the 
'excess' of new workers over withdrawals and of new households 
over those dissolved require additional capital formation. Because 
migrants from other parts of this country to the frontier would 
almost invariably have constituted an increment to the population 
of their regions of origin had they remained, the question of the 
immediate effect of their migration on national capital formation 
is a question of whether the per capita stock of man -made capital 
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goods with which they were equipped on the frontier exceeded the 
per capita stock of such goods in older areas. For most of the 
period of western settlement, this question must be answered in 
the negative. The frontier was as a rule relatively poor, and 
though developing more actively in the creation of transport 
facilities, e.g., roads and railways, it invested less in other 
productive facilities, in housing and in consumers' capital than 
was invested in equipping a like increase of population for the 
east." 
3. DEARTH OF GREAT NEW INDUSTRIES. 
Finally, it has been stated by the stagnationists that the 
decline in population growth and the passing of the frontier 
combine to render the advancement of technology of much greater 
importance in maintaining investment opportunities. But, 
unfortunately, they believe that here, too, the situation is 
unfavourable. Such great new capital- consuming industries as the 
railroad, the electric lines or the automobile, which stimulated 
investments so considerably in the past, have long since come to 
an end, and no industry of such magnitude is yet in sight. It 
has also been stated by the stagnationists that there has lately 
developed a tendency for new inventions to be capital- saving, 
and not capital -consuming, so much so that investment requirements 
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as a whole have ceased to increase, relative to output. This 
tendency, they state, is characteristic of technological maturity. 
"Considering the economy as a whole," says Hansen, "there is no 
good evidence that the advance of technique has resulted in recent 
decades in any deepening of capital. Apparently once the machine 
technique has been developed in any field, further mechanisation 
is likely to result in an increase in output at least proportional 
to, and often in excess of, the net additions to real capital. 
Though the deepening process is all the while going on in certain 
areas, elsewhere capital- saving inventions are reducing the ratio 
of capital to output." 
With reference to technical innovations in general, and great 
new industries in particular, Terborgh sees no reason why it should 
be assumed that these are merely things of the past. Innovations 
as such, making for intensive expansion, can be expected to 
continue with unabated vigour and potentialities. Hansen's 
argument, as Terborgh sees it, is simply that such industries come 
along irregularly, that their timing is a matter of accident, and 
that one of them may exhaust its impetus before the next one 
arrives, leaving the economy in a state of profound stagnation. 
In Hansen's opinion, therefore, the Americans were in such a state 
of affairs during the thirties and still are. It is important to 
note, however, that although this supposed gap between great new 
industries happens to be synchronous with the Americans' approach 
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to economic maturity, this temporal conjunction is purely 
fortuitous. 
In addition, Terborgh points out that investment opportunities 
may be found not only in the initial innovation, but also in the 
subsequent improvements in it as well as in the replacement 
investment. The ability of a new machine to displace existing 
methods, depends not only on the extent and character of the 
original innovation., but also on the vigour of the flow of 
secondary innovations in the form of improvements. The railroad 
of to -day, for instance, represents an accumulation of thousands 
of separate innovations, most of them individually minor, but the 
cumulative effect of which has transformed the industry into its 
present advanced state. The same is true of motor vehicles, 
electric power, or telephone industries. These become great 
industries, not simply by virtue of the original invention, but 
because of long sequence of supplementary improvements increasing 
the value of the basic innovation and lowering its costs to users. 
These improvements took place not only in the basic line, but also 
in related lines. In the case of the automobile, for instance, 
there can be found improvements in motor vehicle manufacturing as 
well as in rubber, in petroleum technology, and in highway 
construction. Indeed, parallel improvements in allied fields 
are often a pre -condition of advance in the main field itself. 
But while capital. formation as a whole derives its expansion 
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chiefly from the growth of investment in innovations in the 
dynamic stage, it should not be assumed that such a growth 
represents entirely a 'net' gain. The invention of wireless or 
the multiple- message cable all economise on the considerable 
amount of investment required in capital installations. The 
development of motor transport in the 1920's minimised the need 
for more railroads and huge related capital equipment. Atomic 
energy may minimise the need in many parts of the world for 
costly hydro electric projects. Science gives and tañes as far 
as investment is concerned. On balance, however, general 
innovations certainly create more capital formation than they 
obviate or prevent, and an increase in the rate of innovation is 
automatically an increase in investment outlets for the absorption 
of savings. 
This sort of analysis has led Terborgh to put forward his 
final proposition that, since neither innovation in general, nor 
the rise of 'great new industries' in particular, is held to be 
affected by economic maturity, we are dealing indeed with a 
factor accidental from the standpoint of the theory of maturity. 
There is no evidence, he stresses, that the great industries so 
often cited by stagnationists have had a combined influence on 
investment any more dynamic than has the aggregate of lesser 
innovations. This is significant, for as technology advances, 
there is a tendency toward an increasing multiplicity and diversity 
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of innovations and a diminished probability of single inventions 
as outstanding and as revolutionary in impact as the more 
conspicuous examples of earlier times.(1) 
(i) Ibid. , pp. 89-96. 
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CHAPTER 5. 
THE MODERN THEORY 
IN RELATION TO THE UNDER -DEVELOPED ECONOMY. 
It is now time to recapitulate what fields of study have been 
pursued so far. These studies have begun with a preliminary 
discussion of the meaning, scope and object of the new treatment 
of the theory of economic development. Its scope is the whole 
world, for it deals with a major economic problem which is common 
to every country, and its object is the study of the problem of 
how to increase material wealth, maximise economic welfare and 
raise the average living standards in a dynamic economy with 
resources and conditions changing all the time. In other words, 
it is the study of the causes of economic progress and stagnation 
in the dynamic sense. This new treatment of the theory conceives of 
a hypothetical society which is supposed to pass through successive 
stages of development; and in each stage the relevant data, their 
development and their effects on the level of economic activity are 
collectively tackled and analysed. It is thus a mere hypothesis 
in relation to which the following four sets of questions have been 
posed: Under what circumstances does economic progress emerge? 
What policies promote progress? Does progress generate a 
momentum? Is decay inevitable? 
Broadly, the first part of this work has dealt with the 
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classical and pre- classical economists' views as to the causes of 
material progress, or specifically the policies which are designed 
to increase the country's wealth. It has been pointed out that, 
whereas the prime policy of the mercantilists was to foster and 
develop manufacturing industries and bring about a permanent 
favourable balance of trade, the encouragement of agriculture 
became the chief aim of physiocratic policy. Unlike the 
mercantilists or the physiocrats, Adam Smith saw in labour the 
source of all wealth, and argued that an increase in wealth would 
be dependent on the productivity of labour. Division of labour 
increases this productivity, but it is limited by the extent of the 
market. Smith was therefore a free trader, as for him foreign 
trade was nothing but an extension of domestic trade. J.S. Mill, 
for his part, visualised a policy for social and political reform, 
recommended the promotion of agriculture by all means, and conceived 
of a legal framework that could be so formulated as to govern 
economic activities in the best interests of the society. But 
with Malthus the root cause of poverty was overpopulation. Hence 
his main policy was to check the natural increase in population, 
but he restricted himself to moral restraint only in the sense of 
deferred marriages. Unlike Malthus, however, J.S. Mill preached 
for birth control and moral restraint before and after marriage. 
Accordingly, the classical and pre-classical economists concerned 
themselves with such policies as were related to the relative 
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importance of different types of economic activity, the 
productivity of labour and size of the market, the legal framework, 
and the problem of overpopulation. Such topics will crop up 
later on in dealing with the economic development of under- 
developed countries. 
However, it was with Malthus that the first attempt was made 
to investigate whether the economic system develops its own laws 
of motion, and his reasoning related changes in the size of 
population to changes in the level of real wages in such manner 
that real wages would in the long run be pegged at the subsistence 
level. It is in this sense that Malthus inserted the concept of 
secular stagnation into his population thesis. Ricardo then took 
this conclusion as a premise upon which to build his dynamic theory 
of falling rate of profit, the gradual decline of which would 
become too sharp to support the capitalists. In consequence, 
accumulation would eventually come to a stop, and secular 
stagnation would be the inevitable result. Although Malthus and 
Ricardo differed in their views as to the causes of secular 
stagnation, this concept in itself seems to dominate their writings. 
But whereas the first part of this work has been mainly 
concerned with the causes of economic progress, the second part has 
been primarily considering the causes of secular stagnation as dealt 
With in the writings of Marx and other modern economists. This more 
recent trend in economic thought, it will be readily observed, is 
221. 
not novel. In a sense, it is a continuation of a drift of 
thinking in the classical tradition. Nevertheless, I.arx 
completely refutes the Ricardian as well as the Ralthusian theories 
of secular stagnation. He visualises that a capitalist society 
will not only be secularly stagnating, but will eventually collapse, 
and on its ruins will be set up a socialist society. On the path 
to this ultimate development of economic organisation, he envisages 
his well -known successive stages of development, leading in the 
end to the breakdown of capitalism when the expropriators become 
expropriated. But when Marx talks of the breakdown of the system, 
he means that economic progress comes to an end on account of the 
social structure itself, i.e., crises will be getting worse and 
worse until the periodical shocks to the social framework will 
ultimately burst it asunder and sound the knell of capitalism. 
Fisher's contribution to the theory of economic development 
lies in his detailed study of the barriers to progress, i.e., the 
passive resistances on the part of workers and the active 
resistances on the part of employers to the transfer of resources 
as the result of the assimilation of available technical improvement 
Fisher's analysis has led him to the conclusion that, if these 
serious obstacles which stand in the way of material progress were 
not removed, and hence the necessary transfers of resources were 
not made, not only would the average level of income fail to rise 
as improvements in efficiency of production would warrant, but the 
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failure to make such transfers would also mean the loss of the 
individual or group security which is usually the object of the 
resistances to structural readjustments. John Hilton and other 
authors supplement Fisher's work by investigating the active 
resistances which are alleged to be made on the part of trade 
unions as representatives of different sections of labour. The 
results of,the impartial enquiry made by these authors have shown 
that the obstructións to industrial efficiency set up by the 
working class are not so serious as is commonly alleged, that 
restrictive practices imposed by trade unions are indeed fewer 
than they were and of less importance. 
Finally, Hansen comes along to point out that in a progressive 
economy there is a tendency for saving to outrun investment outlets. 
His stagnation thesis is principally based on four components. It 
starts with an interpretation of the general relationship between 
saving and investment as being the determinants of the level of 
the national income. Three conditions are then held to constitute 
economic maturity in the sense of bringing forth the dearth of 
investment outlets: the decline in population growth, passing of 
the frontier and the dearth of great new capital -consuming 
industries. I,ieanwhile, savings pile up as idle funds for which 
there is no outlet in new physical capital. Excessive savings 
coupled with a dearth of investment opportunities mark the 
beginning of secular stagnation and recurrent crises from which 
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there will be no escape except through expanding public 
investment or taxing out of existence the excessive savings 
which poison the economy. According to a new school of fiscal 
theorists, fiscal policy, in such a period of secular stagnation, 
must be expansionary much if not most of the time. Over the 
business cycle es a whole, the budget might not be in balance, 
because the lean years would outnumber the good years. As 
national income grows, so too might the public debt. All this 
is still debatable, and many eminent economists are still opposed 
to any policy of continuous deficits. 
1. TEE 1,IEA.NING OF STAGNATION IN MATURE AND I MATURE ECONOMIES. 
Now if this is the contribution of the modern economists to 
the theory of economic development in so far as the economic causes 
of stagnation are concerned, what fragments in their contribution 
may well be considered as pertaining to the study of the under- 
developed economy? Before any attempt can be made in this respect, 
it is worth while to clear up a common misunderstanding as to the 
meaning of 'stagnation' in a 'mature' economy which is industrially 
well advanced and in an 'immature' economy which is predominantly 
agricultural and comparatively much less advanced. In the case of 
the mature economy, it is not the growth of the productive 
potentialities that is believed likely to be stagnant. The secular 
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stagnationists believe that productivity and production may grow 
incessantly,: :doubling at every generation. The only thing that 
they think is likely to stagnate, if nothing is done about it, 
is the ability to keep everybody employed so as to realise full 
potentialities. To put the matter differently, although the 
.aggregate national income and per capita income tend to be 
secularly increasing, the level of the full -employment national 
income schedule will most of the time be higher than the level of 
the actual national income schedule. The discrepancy between the 
levels of the two schedules, i.e., the potential and the actual, 
would then represent stagnation, or chronic unemployment, of some 
of the productive resources in the mature economy as a result of 
the unfavourable disequilibria between saving and investment in 
the ex ante .sense. In point of fact, the last few years following 
the end of hostilities have proved to be quite the reverse of any 
gloomy expectations concerning the stagnation of a mature economy. 
In the economics of under -development, stagnation has a 
really different meaning. An immature economy is that in which 
both the aggregate national income and the income per head in 
real terms show a secular tendency towards stability at relatively 
low levels or sometimes a decline. This secular tendency would 
imply no prospects of improvements in the level of living, or 
even a decline in it, even though productive potentialities 
might not be lacking in such an economy. In other words, 
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the under -developed or immature economy may have good potential 
prospects for using more capital, or more labour, or more available 
natural resources, or all of these, to support its present 
population on a high level of living, or, if its per capita income 
level is already fairly high, to support a larger population on a 
not lower level of living. This statement of economic immaturity 
would readily provide us with a sort of definition of the under- 
developed economy, which seems most appropriate in putting the 
primary emphasis on per capita levels of living and on the issue 
of poverty and prosperity;. Even some economists like Viner prefer 
this definition on the grounds that it leaves room for secondary 
emphasis on quantit -- of population. (l) On the basis of this 
definition, a country may be under -developed whether it is densely 
or sparsely populated. The ba sic criterion then becomes whether 
the country has good potential prospects of raising per capita 
incomes, or of maintaining an existing fairly high level of per 
capita income for an increased population. 
It may be thought useful to consider the case of the under- 
developed economy for the sake of comparison with the well - 
developed economy. The two have one thing in common. In both 
cases, productive potentialities are not realised, in the full sense; 
in both cases stagnation is associated with the idleness of a lesser 
or a greater part of available resources, whether it be labour, 
11) Jacob Viner, International Trade And Boonanic Devel opinent, Oxford, 
1952, p. 98. 
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capital, or natural resources. In the one case, however, 
stagnation is paradoxically progressive in the, sense that it is 
associated with rising national incomes and per capita incomes; 
in the other, stagnation is associated with almost stationary, or 
perhaps declining, per capita incomes at comparatively low levels. 
In the one case, the level of living shows a tendency towards a 
secular rise in spite of the predominance of secular stagnation, 
whereas in the other case the level of living is almost always 
constant or even deteriorating. In the one case, chronic 
unemployment is 'open' and industrial, whereas in the other case 
it is usually 'disguised' and rural. 
2. STAGNATION THESIS FROM THE VIE'sPOINT OF 
THE UNDER -DEVELOPED ECONOMY. 
If the stagnation thesis has perhaps left behind it a gloomy 
atmosphere and disappointment in the future prospects of the 
Western economy, it should have left an opposite impression of the 
future prospects of the under -developed economy. As has been 
pointed out, this thesis is based on the general relationship 
between saving and investment in the mature economy, as being the 
determinants of the level of the national income, and on the 
concept of chronic over - saving unaffected by the dearth of 
investment outlets. Such poor prospects of investment 
opportunities are believed by the stagnationists to be conditioned 
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by the decline in population growth, passing of the frontier and 
the dearth of great new inventions. 
It is well to bear in mind, in this connection, thE.t by far 
the major problem of capital formation on its supply side in the 
under -developed economy is the paucity of capital resources which 
is largely due to the very low incomes of the masses of the people. 
On the saving side of the stagnation thesis, therefore, there is 
no possibility that savings will poison the under-developed economy. 
On the contrary, any increase in savings by way of saving incentives 
on a voluntary or a compulsory basis may convert a capital -poor 
into a capital -rich country. 
The next point to notice is that, on the investment side of 
the stagnation thesis, there are again no signs of decline in the 
rate of population growth, but on the contrary there is a steady 
increase. Following the stagnation theory, a growing population 
will give rise to both the extensive and intensive types of 
investment in the under -developed economy; but this is of course 
on the assumption that the available resources in the economy are 
adequate relative to the size of the existing population. Besides, 
there is no fear of the passing of the frontier in the sense in 
which Hansen has defined in his thesis, since the settlement and 
exploitation of new territories in the Eastern under- developed 
economies have by no means been completed. There is still a 
great scope for the development of spacious virgin areas in Africa, 
Latin America and Asia, and this will call for heavy capital 
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investment. Finally, the more backward a country is in its 
techniques of production, the greater is the field for 
technological progress. A country with the most modern 
processes can advance farther only by new inventions and 
discoveries. A country which is backward technologically can 
make great advances merely by borrowing from the already existing 
stock of knowledge. All of these factors are favourable indices 
to show that, by reversing the arguments of the stagnationists, 
there can be economic progress rather than permanent stagnation 
or retrogression in the under -developed economy.. 
3. BARRIERS TO PROGRESS IN CONNECTION ITH 
THE UNDER -DEVELOPED ECONOL Y. 
Furthermore, Fisher's and Hilton's works, which contain 
evidence of the existence of some barriers to progress in a well - 
developed economy can scarcely be of any relevance to the under- 
developed economy. Whereas the desire for a decent standard of 
living and a certain degree of security is the common aspiration 
of all workers in the broad sense of the word, the statutory 
regulation of conditions of work has been regarded as the most 
certain method of achieving this aim in an under -developed economy. 
In India, for instance, labour legislation has been the substance 
of the protection enjoyed by labour. The Payment of Wages Act 
seeks only to ensure the regular payment of wages and to prevent 
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the exploitation of the wage earner by arbitrary deductions; it 
does little to help the worker with no bargaining power to secure 
a living wage. This gap has recently been filled by the Minimum 
Wages Act, l948, which may rightly be described as a new landmark 
in Indian labour legislation. (1) 
Parallel with the social progress which may be expected to 
result from statutory action, the workers themselves in an under- 
developed economy may have another means of striving for greater 
freedom and an improved status. This means is association, of 
which the most effective form is association in trade unions. But 
trade unionism in the western sense of the term is a recent 
feature of the industrial life in many under -developed countries. 
The right to organise trade unions has recently been recognised 
in many such countries. In China, for instance, the workers' 
right of association has largely been extended in recent years. (2) 
The legal status of the trade unions in Iran is governed by the 
Labour Act of 1949, which lays down that wage earners employed in 
the same undertaking may form a trade union, and that unions for 
the same trade may form a federation. (3) In India, the Trade 
Unions (Amendment) Act of 1947, provided for the compulsory 
(1) International Labour Review, A Decade of Labour Legislation In India, 
1949, p. 506, seq. 
(2) International Labour Review, The Labour Policy of the Chinese Government 
and Its Reaction on Industry and Labour, by Professor Ta Chen, Vol. LIX, 
No. 1, January 1949. 
(3) International Labour Review, The Trade Union Movement in Iran, 1951, 
pp. 180 -181. 
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recognition by employers of representative trade unions by order 
of a labour court. (1) 
As a rule, the existing trade unions in most of the under- 
developed countries are not yet well enough organised to be of 
much service to their members. Broadly, their main activities are 
more or less cultural and recreational. The inability of most of 
them to discharge their duties properly demonstrates the 
ineffectiveness of-this agency in promoting the general well -being 
of the working classes. 
If these conditions have prevailed in most under -developed 
countries, it is natural to ask whether there are any special 
reasons why trade unions in those countries have failed to improve 
the status of the working classes. The first is to be found in 
the fact that trade unionism, in theory and in practice, is a 
foreign concept which few labour leaders and workers understand 
and appreciate. The activities in which many unions engage are 
but a superficial imitation of their western counterpart. About 
the true nature and functions of the leading unions in the western 
world, little is in fact known. 
Conditions are unfavourable in another resi,ect; for, in many 
instances, trade unions have been subject from the outset to 
political influences. The direct or indirect intervention of the 
public authorities concerned, aiming at keeping the Yorkers' 
(0) International Labour Review, Trade Union Legislation In India, 949, 
p. 510. 
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organisation free from foreign influences, is bound to hamper the 
free and effective development of trade unionism in the Eastern 
world. 
Besides, the success of a trade union movement largely depends 
on the spread of education, the acquisition of experience in trade 
union work, the feeling of solidarity among workers and the real 
understanding of the idea of industrial democracy. These elements 
are not yet strong- enough to bring about a vigorous labour movement 
of the western type. 
This being granted, there is not the least fear of obstructive- 
ness on the part of trade unions in most under -developed economies. 
The defensive fortress of restrictive practices in the sense in 
which they are known in the West has not yet been established. 
That condition does not obtain to -day and is far ahead in the 
future. Trade union movement in the East has no inherited skill, 
experience and capacity that are needed to strengthen its 
bargaininL power and to struggle for larger shares of existing 
wealth. If in Fisher's and Hilton's sense, there may be some 
barriers to progress in the West, there are none in the East. If 
there have been all the symptoms of secular stagnation in the East, 
there must be some causes other than those embodied in stagnation 
theories which are only referable to a Les-tern advanced economy. 
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THE MARXI aid SCHEME IN RELATION TO 
THE UNDER -DEVELOPED ECONOMY. 
So far we have been discussing the contribution of the 
stagnationists to the theory of economic development from the 
standpoint of the under- developed economy. This is one point of 
view. Let us come to the other point of view which is based on 
the Marxian approach. In his scheme of things, Marx relates 
misery to the exploitation of labour in agricultural and non- 
agricultural countries alike. Marx indeed lays much emphasis 
on the evolution of capitalism in agriculture, showing how monetary 
rent is converted into capitalist rent when the place of the 
peasant has been taken by the agricultural entrepreneur, cultivating 
the soil with the help of wage labour. Such a primitive 
accumulation, as he calls it, 'sets free' the workers for the uses 
of industrial capital. The impoverishment and the ruin of the 
agricultural population lead in their turn to the formation of a 
reserve army of labour for capital, and the rural proletariat join 
the urban proletariat in their misery and pauperism. 
Even the small peasant proprietor who escapes the continual 
move from the farm to the factory is also exploited by the 
capitalist. This sort of exploitation, as Marx believed, differs 
from the exploitation of the industrial proletariat only in point 
of form. The individual capitalists exploit the individual 
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peasants through mortgages and usury, and the capitalist class 
exploits the peasant class through heavy taxation. The capitalist 
is enabled to extract profit, interest and rent from the land while 
leaving the peasant proprietor to pay himself his own wages, and 
as a rule he hands over to the capitalist class part of the wages 
of his own labour. 
Even the tenant farmers, the cultivators of the soil, are 
exploited by a landlord class which contrives to secure to itself 
the major part of any increase in agricultural yields without 
performing any useful social function. In the Marxian scheme 
therefore the cultivator of the soil, whether he be a wage 
labourer, or a small peasant proprietor,. or a tenant, is 
exploited and the exploiter is the same: capital. 
This dim picture of misery and exploitation is largely true 
of many under -developed countries. Land reform, abolishing the 
landlord class, and the creation of an effective machinery for 
relieving the small peasants of private excessive debts and 
mortgages would be the first step necessary for releasing the 
productive energies of the people. If private enterprise in the 
field of agriculture is to yield its best results, the private 
initiator must secure the fruits of his own labour If 
agricultural progress is to be achieved, there must be no 
exploitation by the capitalist landowner or the money- lender in the 
Marxian sense. (1) 
(1) C.f. Measures For The Economic Development Of i .. er- eve ope 
United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, New York, May 1951, 
Sections 56 -57, p. 21. 
oun ries, 
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Such is the contribution to the theory of economic 
development in the Old and New Economics. Very broadly, it touches 
upon the second, third and fourth sets of questions in the new 
treatment of the theory as defined above. 7Jhereas the first part 
has been dealing with -the policies which promote progress in an 
already developing economy in the classical sense, the second pert 
has been dealing.with secular stagnation in a well- developed 
economy in the modern sense. With this body of economic thinking 
in the background, it is then proposed to proceed with the main 
theme of this work; the circumstances under .which economic 
progress obtains, and policies which promote progress. 
But when considering, conditions of economic progress it is 
essential to have some knowledge of the history, geography and 
sociology, which is relevant to the question. It is therefore 
well in order to begin with a preliminary discussion of the 
historical evolution of simple communities. 
PART III. 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH 
ECONOMIC PROGRESS OBTAINS. 
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CHAPTER 9 
EVOLUTION OF SIMPLE COMi4UNITIES 
1. THE EARLY SETTLEMENT 
Since all human societies must rest on an economic basis, 
geographical factors necessarily play an important part. The 
environment always prescribes the conditions under which men can 
earn their living. Under the impact of their environment, men 
have to co- operate with one another in ways which determine the 
form the community will take. Differences in environment, indeed, 
explain the diversity of human types better than any other 
hypothesis. 
In simple societies the interplay of "Place -Work- Folk" is 
obvious enough. Given an environment so restricted that there 
is practically no choice as to means of livelihood we get a 
society which must adjust itself to "Nature ". The most elementary 
forms of human society are found where life is supported without 
settlement on, or cultivation of, the soil. To live man has to 
wander; and, consequently, he makes no permanent impression on 
his surroundings. As an illustration, consider the vast grass- 
lands of Central Asia. The climate is characterised by a period 
of snow, followed by a short damp season suitable for the natural 
growth of grass. Other vegetation has no opportunity for 
developing, and whatever economy is established must rest on the 
basis of grass. The conditions are so strict that man must 
accept them; he is powerless to modify them. So he depends 
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on the grass- eating animals for his food, clothing, and shelter. 
He solved the problem by forming an alliance with the horse; this 
enabled him to round up and domesticate the cow. 
Thus a simple community came into being, and its manner of 
life was strictly controlled. It had to move with the cattle as 
the grass was eaten. There was no appropriation of land, for 
when it was grazed it had no value. There was no accumulation 
of belongings beyond bare necessities and ornaments for the 
person, because they would be burdensome to People who were 
constantly moving. There were no specialised trades, because 
each adult male had to be able to turn his hand to any task. 
The group was an extended family, recognising the bond of kinship, 
and paying allegiance to the head or patriarch. It had to be 
large enough to tend its cattle, and yet not so large that the 
area of its temporary settlements was overstocked. When it 
reached a certain size it tended to split up. On the steppe the 
nomad adopted the pastoral life because he had the horse to help 
him. It was otherwise on the American prairie, where the horse 
was unknown until introduced by the Europeans; so that the 
Indians were hunters of buffaloes. Instead of the large 
patriarchal group, there was the hunting clan, in which the 
energetic young men had the advantage over the elders. The clan 
was unstable and did not provide a basis for a permanent social 
organisation. 
The people of the grasslands, whether they are in the pastoral 
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or hunting stage, must be considered fortunate as compared with 
those who have to contend against the extremes of cold and heat. 
Human life should successfully withstand the rigours of the 
northern winter and here circumstances impose the severest of 
conditions. The climate limits the food supply, both vegetable 
and animal. The reindeer may be domesticated, but to supply its 
frugal diet it is necessary to keep moving. The parts played by 
horse and cow on the steppe have to be taken by the reindeer which 
is not particularly efficient in either role. `while the horse 
can endure a considerable range of temperature, and has again and 
again brought the nomads into contact with settled communities, 
the reindeer cannot penetrate the forest belt. So the people are 
virtually confined to the north. While they are nomads, they 
cannot be purely pastoral nomads. To secure sufficient food it 
is necessary to resort to hunting and fishing. These activities 
tend to break up human society into small groups, each of which 
endeavours to supply its own needs. All their energies are 
directed to solving the problem of bare subsistence. Still, 
their fate may be considered happy compared with that of the 
peoples of the tropical forest. In the basins of the Amazon 
and Orinoco there is a vast extent of forest broken only by rivers. 
The area is subject to torrential rains at definite periods of the 
year. Excessive rainfall promotes the luxuriance of forest 
growth, but it is fatal to grass. In the primeval forest the 
animal life is mostly hostile to man. If he is to live, he must 
be a hunter on a small scale, lurking in the thicket and pouncing 
upon such animals or birds as he can eat. Foresight is not 
demanded; for food for each day must be obtained on the day. 
In that climate he cannot make accumulations. The search for 
food is therefore a constant preoccupation. He often suffers 
hunger and sometimes practises cannibalism. All movements are 
difficult and dangerous, but permanent settlement is out of the 
question. He hasS no means of transport except the primitive 
canoe and picking his way through the undergrowth. In these 
circumstances human society is almost completely disintegrated. 
All the human types of society so far mentioned have at 
the best been waging a rather unequal fight. The people of the 
steppe have been the most fortunate, for through their reliance 
on the horse, they have been able to establish a permanent 
community on a patriarchal basis. But even they are subject to 
the imperious commands of Nature. They are doomed to wander, as 
are all people who live on the spontaneous products of the soil 
and the yield of the chase. Given the environment, progress is 
impossible, for these peoples must always remain what they have 
become, since they were caught in the web of circumstance. The 
essential distinction between these simple societies and the more 
complicated societies which have developed under more favourable 
conditions is that the one is nomad and the other is settled. 
To settle it is necessary to be able to cultivate the soil. 
External conditions no longer completely dominate the life of man. 
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He learns to modify them by his exertions and to provide for the 
future through his foresight. He becomes less dependent on 
Nature but more dependent on his fellows. The social organisation 
which arises is much more a matter of human will and design, for 
it rests on the relations between men who perform different functions 
in an increasingly complex society. Variety of employment offers 
opportunity for various aptitudes; there is no longer a level 
uniformity, but grades, classes and trades. 
It is some eight or ten thousand years since one branch of 
the human race discovered the possibility and advantage of 
settlement. Geography determined the scene of man's earliest 
successes. Egypt is the creation of the Nile; without it the 
tract would be desert. But the great river, flooding with 
remarkable regularity, deposited rich alluvial soil in which it 
was possible to grow cereals in great quantities. The corn of 
Egypt could maintain a large population, provided advantage was 
taken of the annual inundation. So men settled, arranged their 
fields, and developed an irrigation system. They learnt to work 
in stone, and their skill in pottery, metal- working and building 
industries was remarkable. A great civilisation was evolved, 
and a settled government, with control of the whole area, was 
established. The ruling classes enjoyed a life of great luxury. 
No doubt public order and increasing wealth were associated with 
a condition of slavery for the mass of the people. So difficult 
is it for society to exploit the advantage of a favoured region 
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without placing an undue burden on the actual cultivators of 
the soil and other manual workers. Similar circumstances 
provided the basis for the successive empires which sprang up 
in the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates. Here again, the 
rivers brought down alluvial soil, which when properly treated 
was remarkably fertile. Settlement led to the development of 
the crafts and the promotion of commerce. By desert routes, 
the valleys of the-Nile and of the Tigris and Euphrates were 
brought into contact. These routes in due course developed 
sea extensions which played a great part in the growth of 
Mediterranean civilisation. The commercial greatness of Venice 
to the end of the Iviiddle Ages was based on trade which came by 
these ancient routes from the East. 
From these few illustrations we can gather some conception 
of the part played by environment in the growth of human societies. 
"Place -Work -Folk" is a formula which provides a means of inter- 
preting the significance of any group. Place gives the environ- 
ment, Work indicates what men can make of the environment, and 
Folk reveals how the environment has fashioned its inhabitants.(1) 
2. THE SLAVE ECONOMY. 
The shores of the iviediterranean Sea witnessed the development 
of the successive civilisations which have moulded the thou »' ht 
and defined the outlook of the West. Here the external con- 
ditions offered favourable opportunities for the settlement of, 
(i) C.f. J.E. Rees, A Survey of Economic Development, p.11,-. 
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and the intercourse between, organised groups. There was a 
considerable degree of unity, because, when once men had mastered 
the navigation of the great inland sea, they had an easy means of 
intercommunication. The river valleys of the sea board were 
similar in general character, and colonists who left one place 
for another were able to reproduce communities on the model of 
their old homes. The natural products of the Mediterranean 
region are alike, and immigrants found that the soil was suitable 
for the extension of cultivation. The environment of the typical 
settlement may be resolved into three elements: the valley in 
which agriculture could be established; the port which could be 
made the basis of commerce; and the hills of the hinterland where 
pastoral life was maintained. The settlements mingled these 
three ingredients in different proportions. The valley life of 
these Mediterranean people probably represents traditions brought 
by settlers from the eastern banks of the Black Sea, where 
communities had early discovered the possibilities of cultivating 
the soil. So they were acquainted with a variety of trees, 
fruits and cereals. Naturally they would establish settled 
villages which would by degrees become fortified cities, for the 
cultivation of the soil demands concentration, and to defend its 
yield from marauding hill peoples defence is necessary. So city 
life became the chief characteristic of Mediterranean civilisation; 
it came to be conceived as the environment in which man reached his 
true stature. Instead of the family grouping of pastoral people 
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or the temporary alliance of hunters, there emerged an organisation, 
public and permanent, within which the individual had fuller 
opportunities for realising his capabilities. The older sanctions 
of force or custom gave place to the idea of law; a growing sense 
of public justice ensured to each full member of the community 
freedom to follow any lawful enterprise. Phoenicians, Greeks, 
and Romans were -all city- dwellers. Their history is one of the 
confederation and rivalry of city - etates. To their intense city 
life is due the development of architecture, art, literature, 
philosophical speculation, and legal conceptions. 
The Phoenicians were predominantly traders. On the coast 
of Syria they founded the old -world ports of Tyre and Sidon, 
where they were in touch with the empires of the Nile and of the 
Tigris and Euphrates valleys. They were active in opening up 
trade routes by sea, and establishing centres where they bought 
and sold goods. They ventured to the shores of the Western 
Mediterranean, and even to the mysterious ocean beyond, bartering 
articles which appealed to the natives for the metals and other 
raw materials they required. Of their settlements in the West 
the most famous was Carthage which after the fall of Tyre (572 B.C.) 
became their chief city. They traded in weapons wrought in 
copper and bronze and in ornaments of gold and silver; they knew 
the arts of spinning, weaving and dyeing. But the strength of 1 
the Phoenician cities, i.e. commercial prosperity, was also their 
weakness. They neglected the agricultural basis. With 
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settlements far from one another and regarded primarily as 
markets, the Phoenicians could not solve the problem of stability. 
How to avoid revolution was a question which occupied the 
attention of the political thinkers of the Greek city- states. 
The presumption of Plato and Aristotle was in favour of a more or 
less self- sufficient state. This could only be attained by 
giving particular attention to agriculture. 
In Greece, the early settlers had passed from the pastoral 
to the agricultural stage. At the dawn of history there are 
revealed communities cultivating the soil, and on this agricultural 
basis they built up a variety of crafts. Gradually the separate 
communities, divided from one another by the intervening hills, 
began to establish relations by sea. The villages had become 
urban centres before the beginning of historical record. They 
were ordered groups, dependent on the arts of peace in a world 
where violence was still rampant. The men of the hills were 
mainly engaged in cattle- rearing and had not forsaken their nomad 
habits; but they were quite prepared to make raids on the valleys 
and an aggressive military character prevailed among them. Sparta 
was an armed camp in which the ruling minority maintained control 
over a large subject population. In Athens commerce had naturally 
developed, for Attica was a peninsula with easy access to Asia 
Minor by sea. Its citizens enjoyed greater liberty, but its 
government was less stable than that of Sparta. 
The interesting question is what kind of economic relations 
existed between the different elements in these settled 
communities. Land was obviously limited in extent and 
appropriated for special cultivation; but it was not held 
in common. There was a large proportion of landless men who 
in some condition of slavery or serfdom did the agricultural 
work for a small number of rich landed proprietors. Whether 
the agricultural workers were conquered peoples or had been 
reduced to dependence by the burden of taxation or debt, the 
fact remains that settled cultivation of the land involved a 
hardening of social relations and the definite emergence of 
classes. Discontent sometimes threatened the stability of 
the city -state, and relief was sought either in emigration or 
in revolution in favour of the oppressed. In the crafts, and 
even in commerce itself, the same distinction between the full 
citizen and those who had fewer privileges was maintained. There 
was a tendency to relegate labour and trade to slaves and freemen. 
The intelligence of the Greeks was not applied to mechanical 
invention; and, apart from the development of the use of money, 
they played very little part in the elaboration of commercial 
methods. Apparently, when the city -states were at the zenith 
of their power, there was a considerable amount of trade, but it 
did not notably react on industry. It is possible to exaggerate 
the consequences of the institution of slavery; but no doubt its 
existence created an atmosphere unfavourable to the growth of the 
ideas which we regard as essential for the full economic 
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development of a community. What the Greek city -state made 
of its environment, then, was dependent on a number of factors, 
of which the most important was the conflict of different types. 
Successive waves of invaders imposed their will by conquest on 
the people they found in possession. It was not a question of 
a homogeneous people trying to find a solution to the problem 
(1) 
of settlement in a region not hitherto appropriated. 
In Rome also there was a blending of types. Situated in a 
more or less characteristic Mediterranean valley, the site of 
Rome invited settlers from the North side of the Tiber, and from 
the South as well as from the sea. The legends of Ancient Rome 
point to a mingling of different types: Etruscans, Latins and 
Sabines. They all became settled agriculturalists. The geograph- 
ical situation was not suitable for the growth of commerce. It 
was by military power that Rome established its control over Italy, 
Greece, and ultimately the whole Mediterranean seaboard. The 
extension of the Roman Empire facilitated the spread of the ideas 
which had their origin in the city- states. A certain uniformity 
was thus given to Western Europe which it has never entirely lost. 
The weakness of this imposing structure was economic. Rome itself 
in the days of its splendour based its prosperity on the tribute 
which it exacted from its provinces. It never distinguished 
between plunder and commerce. For a great city, it was singularly 
unproductive, and had no firm foundation. Industry remained in 
(1) p.16. 
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the hands of small craftsmen, and mechanical invention made no 
progress. The wealthy accumulated capital, but there was no 
proper credit organisation by means of which it could find a 
variety of outlets. Capital was usually applied to agriculture, 
mines and forests. It was often invested in foreign trade, but 
practically not at all in industry. 
Generally speaking, therefore, the Roman Empire did not 
achieve economic integration. Most trade was local. The articles 
that entered into wider commerce were luxuries demanded by the 
rich. Supplies of corn were obtained as tribute, i.e. without 
sending other goods in exchange for it. The crafts were often 
practised by the unfree, or by foreigners, and practically always 
on a small scale. But the extractive industries, metal- mining, 
quarrying, and particularly the cultivation of certain crops, did 
lead to capitalist enterprise. In the two centuries before the 
Christian era the growth of great slave plantations (latifundia) 
attracted much attention. The plantation often extended to 
thousands of acres. They offered opportunities for the investment 
of capital and were generally owned by those who had acquired 
riches in the exploitation of the provinces. How far this 
movement involved the decay of smallholding is not clear. That 
the conditions of employment were often most oppressive is 
demonstrated by the revolts of the slaves, the best known of which 
is that of Spartacus in 73 -71 E.C. The facts that public land 
could be easily acquired and that the wars made slaves abundant 
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probably account for the establishment of the great slave 
plantations. In the long run the system was found unsatisfactory. 
From the economic standpoint, Columella, who wrote a treatise on 
agriculture about the middle of' the first century of our era, 
recognised that slave labour was costly because it was wasteful. 
From the sociological point of view, "when rates of change are very 
discontinuous, it may well happen that one sector of the society 
cannot be meaningfúlly integrated into the social life of the 
community at all - so that, as far as that sector is concerned, 
society as whole no longer exists. The most extreme case of 
failure to achieve a balanced rate of change is that of slavery. 
It illustrates in its most terrible form the deliberate 
disintegration of established patterns of social and human values 
in order to pursue an immediate objective. Slavery not only 
detaches men and women by force from an established pattern of 
social relationships but, by using them as chattels for the ends 
of others, denies them both the opportunity to reconstruct a new 
society for themselves, and the right to become an integrated 
meaningful part of the society of their masters. In a society 
based on slavery the uneasy and unstable rule of force takes the 
place of that social harmony necessary for the full development 
of each part of the disrupted whole." OA 
(1) Prof. S. Herbert Frankel, The :commit Impact -On Under -Developed 
Societies, Essays on International Investment and Social Change, 
Oxford, 1953, p. 21+ -25. 
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Nevertheless, large estates survived, and they were let out 
to free tenants. But freedom had not won a final victory. As 
the Empire entered into its decline, the free tenants fell into a 
condition of serfdom. They were bound to the soil, and the 
burdens of their payments increased. The causes of this reduction 
in status were manifold. Men surrendered their freedom to these 
who would relieve them from the burden of taxes or would protect 
them in times of growing disorder. They would engage to make 
payments in kind, i.e. agricultural produce, or to work for their 
protectors for so many days a week. So the Mediterranean 
civilisation which had achieved so much failed to secure permanent 
freedom for the masses. 
In the year 622 A.D. the Moslem religion was born in Western 
Arabia, and a tiny Moslem state was set up. Within a century 
the armies of this infant state conquered the whole of Western 
Asia, North Lfrica, the Nile Valley, and even Spain in Southern 
Europe. Upon the conquered peoples they imposed their religion, 
language and culture. 
Some sociological aspects of Islamic society, however, are 
so significant in themselves as to deserve a separate appraisal. 
Among these are such questions as the special nature of such a 
society, its attitude towards slavery, and the influence of 
religious traditions on the economic qualification of the society. 
A study of the foundations of Islamic society cannot ignore the 
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various meanings of the term "Islam ", which may equally well 
signify a religion, a community, a State idea, or an entire 
congregation of Moslem peoples. The term, however, can be 
understood as signifying not only a system of religious elements 
or religious and political doctrines but, above all, that 
civilisation which, starting from Hither Asia, has created in the 
countries within its sphere a common culture and philosophy of 
life based on a uniform creed and a framework of ideas, political, 
social and State, derived therefrom. All these elements taken 
collectively, and in their vast spatial extent and spiritual 
power, constitute the substance of Islamic society stretching over 
lands and seas and based on a tradition embracing all spheres of 
life. 
In the first centuries of Islam its teachings did not 
influence the state of society in the countries brought within its 
fold. The population of Arabia, apart from the urban settlements, 
was made up of a number of warlike tribes and groups held together 
by loose ties. These tribes were indifferent to religious ideas. 
Their social structure was determined by the clan as a unit. The 
patriarchal way of living among the Beduin tribes revolved, as in 
all primitive communities, round the family or clan. The 
individual is conscious of himself as a member of a certain family 
or clan, behind which background his separate ego and its claims 
and feeling completely recede. The spiritual world of the clan 
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member was conditioned by the concepts and forms which, by virtue 
of old tradition, regulated the life of the tribal society and its 
relations with the outside world. The individual was hemmed in 
both his mental and emotional world; his world of ideas was that 
of his group. The collective ideas of the clan were accepted by 
the individual member unquestionably as his own; his views were 
those of the clan to which he belonged. In the old tribal 
groupings are revealed a natural development in which the 
individual is automatically incorporated and is allowed to function 
solely as a part of such society. As in all primitive societies, 
the individual claims no status as such, but regards himself as a 
member of the society. He feels safe and secure so long as he is 
under the legal protection of his family, clan or tribe. Under the 
conditions of life in the desert and steppe, and in view of the 
absence of the legal apparatus of more developed civilised 
societies, this tribal protection could alone guarantee the 
security of the social organisation. It was with the forces of 
this integration and identification of the individual with the 
tribe and its self -imposed system of values that the new teachings 
of Islam had to contend. 
Furthermore, the postulate of equality contained in the 
Islamic doctrine from the time of its original preaching at first 
found no acceptance in the Islamic society. Nobility of descent 
was a valuable asset in the social life of the Arab tribes. The 
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cult of their ancestry, pride in a long chain of noble forbears, 
was firmly 'ingrained in their consciousness; and as late as the 
fourteenth century this spirit of ancestral glorification prevailed 
among the tribes. In fact, no one could become head of a tribe 
who could not boast of a long and noble descent. For this - 
reason the efforts of Mohammed, himself neither of high parentage 
nor a member of.a particularly distinguished profession, were 
first directed to-the establishment of a new society of equals. 
Rank in this new society was to be determined not by aristocratic 
descent but by faith. The antagonism of the old tribal nobility 
to Mohammed's proclamations was due in no small measure to the 
revolutionary break they entailed with Beduin social tradition, 
with its fund of time -honoured notions on the status of the 
individual and the family and the importance of descent for society. 
The dispute over the essential postulate of Moslem social teaching 
was not settled even in the centuries after Mohammed, although in 
the newly- forming society of Islam the Prophet's doctrine of 
equality asserted itself more and more as time went on. Up to 
the present time the demand for equality and the suppression of 
the old tradition of descent has not been realised in the sense 
desired in spite of its advocacy by the Prophet. Kinship with the 
Prophet, in fact even the slight degree of relationship deriving 
from the accident of belonging to his tribe, came to be regarded 
as the touchstone of true nobility. Thus whereas the revolutionary 
abolition of the old ideology of nobility of birth, although 
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accepted in principle, found little practical response in the 
Moslem world, the idea of a community of all true believers 
everywhere gained a firm hold. The Islamic doctrine, like the 
ideology of every religious mission, envisages the liberation of 
the individual from his isolated position and his union with his 
fellow- believers in one great community where he is offered the 
deep satisfaction of equal status by virtue of belief alone, and 
not through "external" values such as descent, material possessions 
and so forth. All followers of Islam possess equal rights and 
duties in this community to which one may be admitted regardless 
of sex, class, office or possessions; they feel themselves to be 
a great brotherhood of believers. Even the Khalif himself, the 
Prophet's representative, was occupying his high position of 
authority over whole countries and continents solely by virtue of 
his faith and the confidence of his followers. ( 1 
) 
A further element which came to possess great social 
importance in Islamic society was the slaves. Slavery had 
flourished throughout the whole of Arabi(,, both in the towns and 
among the Beduin tribes. The importance of the slaves for the 
Arab society of that period was so great that Mohammed did not 
demand the abolition of slavery. The slave trade was an extremely 
remunerative branch of commerce and remained so right up to the 
nineteenth century. The social structure of Oriental countries, 
Ti) C.f. Alfred Bonne, State ana Economics In The Middle East, London 1948 
p. 327. 
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particularly the management of the household, was extensively 
based on slave labour so much that, though the abolition of 
slavery became the watchward of the European powers a hundred 
years ago, the custom has continued to flourish in the Arab and 
African countries practically up to the present day. 
In the eyes of Islam the position of slaves is not so 
degrading as it might appear to the European observer. Apart from 
the fact that the Koran itself ordains that slaves be treated 
humanely, their acceptance of Islam in a society in which the 
brotherhood of all believers should play an essential part likewise 
guaranteed them a more dignified position, although the actual fact 
of servitude, the legal status of slaves, was not abolished. Thus 
the inner sense of equality and their claim to religious brotherhood 
provided the Moslem slaves in many cases with opportunities to rise 
in the social ladder and even brought them: to the very highest 
positions in the State. In point of fact, a great number of 
slaves during the period when Islam was spreading exercised the 
highest of political authority and even formed ruling dynasties, 
among which were the royal house of Delhi and the dynasty of the 
Mamelukes. This very position of the slave, his lack of relations 
and isolation from influences rendered him particularly fit for the 
execution of the plans of his master. This fact often resulted 
in the more talented of the slaves acquiring a position of intimacy 
With the rulers and finally themselves attaining; to important 
positions in the State. 
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But equally the legal status of the slaves has, according to 
Islamic theory, 'always been extremely limited. Islam took over 
the pre -Islamic practice of declaring property in the form of slaves 
to be acquirable by purchase, donation, inheritance or capture. 
In early Islamic times the possibilities of acquiring slaves by 
capture applied only in respect of unbelievers, while it was 
likewise contrary to the law to sell believers for one reason or 
another into slavery. Thus the patriarchal structure of Arab 
society led in practice to the complete admittance of the slave 
into the household or_ family community just as the advocated humane 
treatment of slaves was general. The law is on the whole stricter 
in this respect than the practice. According to the la- slaves 
are expressly treated as 'movable goods' and may-be freely bought 
and sold, exchanged, given in security or hired out. As regards 
their physical needs they possess the same rights as domestic 
animals, i.e., the right to board and lodging, an appropriate 
measure of work and, in particular, an interval of rest during the 
summer holidays. Slaves may not own property, and everything they 
acquire reverts to their masters. A slave, therefore, may not 
engage in any independent trade but only act as his master's 
representative. Marriage is allowed only with the consent of the 
slave's owner. 
The sociological importance of the slaves is reflected in 
their political function as bodyguards to the great Emirs, and their 
suitability as high ranking state officials, and secondly in their 
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emergence as independent tribes. Undoubtedly the fate of Emir 
families Was often entirely dependent on the existence and 
intervention of the slave bodyguard. Their suitability for this 
calling arose from the fact that they were in practice uninterested 
in the family disputes of the tribes and were an absolutely 
reliable and efficient tool in the hands of their masters. 
Moreover, the rise of individuals as strong personalities from the 
rank of the slaves can be explained by the fact that they were 
readily entrusted with important functions which it was not desired 
to hand over to directly interested freemen. The freeing of 
former slaves and their formation into tribes with their own chief, 
herds, and land is likewise an important feature in the general 
picture of Islamic society. 
The fundamentals of early Moslem society may thus be summarily 
restated. The family or the clan, as the case may be, is the 
nucleus of Moslem society as established on a patriarchal basis. 
All members of Moslem society are co- equal, and the management of 
the social groups in the community is governed by democratic 
principles. Women have equal rights with men, with the exception 
of certain legal disadvantages in respect of property and 
inheritance. Slavery is tolerated in practice, and though 
emphasis is laid on the equality of the slaves as human beings, 
such an institution is well recognised as legitimate in Islamic 
theory. 
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3. THE PRIFaTIVE PEASANT ECONOMY. 
The first impression that one receives on coming into contact 
with the rural life and forms of agrarian society in -Middle Eastern 
countries, near and far alike, is one of broad external similarity 
or even uniformity. Even though pronounced differences may exist 
side by side within each single community, according to the nature 
of its soil and--water supply, the aridity of the climate, with its 
long rainless summer and the need for artificial irrigation in 
rainless areas, has produced similar conditions of vegetable life 
and of production over wide zones of the Orient. 
To these natural factors in stationary agriculture should be 
added a number of other factors of social, political and legal 
nature which have also tended towards uniformity e.g. the n'ioslem 
code and philosophy of life, Islamic legal institutions, and the 
effects of the feudal social order. In addition, there was the 
Ottoman regime which for centuries had grouped those areas together, 
imposing upon them both its rulers and its political and 
administrative institutions. Furthermore, the links of language, 
intensified by the religious factor, brought the peoples of these 
lands closer to each other. All these factors have tended to 
create, in spite of the' differences that exist, a social structure 
permeated by many similar elements. 
Nevertheless, a general uniformity in the stratification and 
development of such agrarian societies is in no way complete. 
Account must he taken of the social divergences which do exist 
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between farmers and townsfolk, landowners and tenants, settled 
population and nomad elements. More important as a factor of 
deviation are the differences which result from the prevailing 
systems of agriculture conditioned by Nature. 
For anyone with a sense of history visiting the lands of the 
Middle Last for the first time, the impression of an arrested 
development, of. gap in the course of historical progress, or 
indeed of a retrograde movement, is the essence of an experience 
which has been bound up with the word'Orient'. As a matter of 
fact, impressions of this kind would apply to almost all Oriental 
countries. In the centre of the Oriental town, the stately 
buildings, constructed in a spurious Oriental style, may convey a 
certain bigness of conception. But in the immediate neighbourhood 
of noble edifices, one would notewith surprise the very low state 
of housing and building conditions with a correspondingly inferior 
standard of living. In the countryside, the forms of settlement, 
established many centuries ago throughout most parts of the Orient, 
show no appreciable difference from those of to -day, just as 
agricultural techniques have undergone no important change. The 
thousand -year old Eastern nail -plough still leaves its trail across 
the fields; still can the ox be seen turning the old water scoop - 
wheel. The farmer is everywhere living a life of almost 
unsurpassable frugality based on exploitation both of the soil and 
of human exertion. It is a way of life which can only be 
interpreted through the extreme traditionalism which lias indeed 
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invested the agriculture of the Orient with its own specific stamp. j 
Besides in the E.C.A.F.E. region, agrarian societies reveal 
almost the same picture conveyed to us by the constitution of 
economic society in the Middle East. They show more or less the 
same basic characteristics as are peculiar to the Oriental countries 
in general: a stationary- agriculture along with a rapidly growing 
population pressing heavily on the means of subsistence; a low 
hygienic and educational level which manifests itself in high 
mortality, widespread disease and low literacy rates; a paucity 
of known mineral resources; a marked concentration on agriculture; 
a great shortage of capital; and a lack of technological 
advancement. All these characteristics result in very low 
productivity and low levels of income, the social consequences of 
which areaggravated by the very uneven distribution of wealth and 
income. 
are even told by the anthropologists that there do exist 
in the remote places of Africa and Asia some primitive communities 
which are almost out of contact with the outside world. These 
communities have scarcely been touched by gestern civilisation and 
have led the most primitive of human life and enjoyed but the most 
humble of human culture. Many are peasant systems, much more 
backward and immature than those obtaining in the Middle East, with 
money used for a limited range of transactions, a very simple 
technology with hardly any machinery, and methods of enterprise, 
co- operation, credit and income widely divergent from those in a 
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Western economy. Others of these peasant systems are truly 
primitive, with no monetary medium at all to facilitate econdmic 
activity in the spheres of production, distribution and exchange. 
Those types of society are taken to differ so fundamentally from 
'European Culture as to merit the term 'primitive'. 
Thus over the wide zone of the Orient, almost all peasant 
systems, from the most primitive to the relatively more advanced, 
are basically characterised by stagnant agriculture and the most 
deplorable of social conditions. The question now arises, what 




THE AGENTS OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS. 
Principles of economic theory may be conceived as universally 
applicable to both a primitive and an advanced economy. But the 
social and moral design embracing economic relations and activities 
in the former is widely divergent from that in the latter type. In 
all types of soci ëty, however, social ends and values, the legal, 
religious and political framework have bearing on the economic 
organisation. Any social relationship, any aspect of human life, 
can be shown to have its economic impact. It is only by studying 
these social relationships that one can properly understand the 
way in which an economic system does in fact work. It is only 
against a background of knowledge about the social framework in a 
peasant society that a study of the causes of stagnation and progress 
can best be pursued. 
In the pursuit of such a socio- economic study, however, 
reference should first be made to a serious qualification. 
Historians have often declined to consider the possibility of 
building up a theory of economic development. They have assumed 
this attitude on the grounds that it can hardly be possible to 
prove the validity of such a theory in a historical way. The 
difficulty involved in making use of history scientifically lies 
in the fact that it is not sufficient to pick out one or two 
historical events in order to prove the validity of the theory, but 
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it is necessary to go further afield and prove the validity of the 
theory throughout the history of mankind in different places and at 
different times. This attitude, however, should not deter us from 
investigating, as far as possible, the tacit assumption that the 
record of history is a record of stagnation, that stagnation is 
the normal state, even though it is interrupted by fits of economic 
progress. 
To begin with, the ruling class in a society is in fact 
responsible for keeping things stagnant. Only the very primitive 
societies are based on a purely egaliterian basis. Most of these 
societies are based on the minority's ownership of land, capital, 
or even slaves. By ruling class is here meant the aristocracy of 
a society who have the exclusive right to rule and govern. Religion 
as an institution is very often tied up with the ruling leisure 
class, supporting it and the status quo. This is all the more 
important from the standpoint of those who rule and govern for 
control over religion means control over the minds of the people. 
But an interesting question here presents itself: Why is the 
ruling class inimical to progress? 
Where innovations create wealth but in the meantime destroy it 
by frustrating existing investments, it is therefore always in the 
interest of some people to resist these innovations. But if they 
create more wealth for some members, then the class as a whole may 
not resist them. Innovations which frustrate the wealth of all 
members of the class, are only those that can meet, and are bound 
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to meet, resistance all -round. Consider, for example, the rise 
of industry in Medieval Europe alongside the expansion of trade and 
the growth of towns. Towns attracted the serfs who were tied to 
the land under the manorial system. As it was impossible to build 
up an industrial capitalist system without attracting away labour 
from feudal lands, it was only natural that the feudal lords should 
have resisted that change. As it was incompatible with the growth 
of the new capitalist system, feudalism was bound to be abolished 
in spite of the resistance of the feudal lords. 
The ruling class in the Roman Empire, based as it was on 
serfdom or slavery, on the entire exploitation of human labour, had 
also no interest in labour -saving innovations so long as it had 
the slaves as part of its property. It was also with the Greeks 
(600 -300 B.C.) that slavery as an institution became the cornerstone 
of the economic organisation. The ruling class was thus bound up 
with the then existing techniques of production. Any changes in 
techniques, which might be detrimental to the interests of the 
class as a whole, were bound to meet with consistent resistance all 
round. 
1. THE THEORY OF THE CREATIVE flINORITY. 
Who are then the agents of economic progress? This question 
should bring us to the theory of the creative minority. New 
progress is but the product of new men outside the circle of the 
ruling class. They seize new opportunities and resist the 
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opposition of the dominating members of that class. For instance, 
the rise of trade and the growth of towns in the Middle Ages was 
the work of runaway serfs and minor members of the society. The 
same proposition is true of nineteenth -century Japan. In 186$, 
a revolution in the form of government came about with the result 
that the old ruling class was ousted from power, and a new class 
arose setting up a new society of its own. Thus the Meiji era 
began and with it "the career of P:=odern Japan after the 
disintegration of the old regime. .After the Restoration in 1868 
the control of the central government rested, under the Emperor, 
in the hands of those vigorous leaders who led the revolt against 
Tokugawa. Rapid changes in the technical equipment and the 
economic organisation of society were achieved as the result of the 
deliberate policy of the new ruling class. To quote Allen: 
11Yet if Japanese society was moved by ancient traditions, in 
the middle of the nineteenth century it was in a condition which 
made it receptive of stimulus from the 'Jest. T Moreover, if it was 
constituted so as to be capable of providing the country with a 
ruling class that possessed prestige and self-confidence, that 
class was not rigidly demarcated from the rest of the population, 
nor was it conservative in its outlook. fen of talent found 
opportunities to enter it, and many of its members were themselves 
avid for change in the ordering of their country's affairs. The 
mass of the people were docile in the presence of acknowledged 
authority, and in every class there was a capacity for co- operation 
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and organised effort which was in part the product of a long 
experience of a group action in the family, the clan, and the guild. 
This society, while it often threw up men of strong personality and 
will, yet usually contrived to ensure that their activities were 
subordinated to the interests of the group or the nation as a 
whole ." 
(1) "
Similarly,. in the history of medieval England, the Tudor 
kings, Henry 7th and Henry 8th were pursuing a policy of backing 
up the upstarts in the English society, new men who were but the 
spurs to its progress. We are told, too, by historians that the 
Ottomans so suddenly emerged in history at the beginning of the 
fourteenth century, so suddenly established the Ottoman Empire 
which so extended far and wide, in fact as far as Hungary, that 
they were governing peoples the majority of whom were non- 
Mohammedans. How did such a great Empire come into being? In 
1360, slaves and Christian boys, it is stated by historians, were 
stolen and went through rigid education and training for public 
administration and government of the different parts of the Empire. 
New blood was therefore injected into Turkish society; new men of 
a different race and of an originally different religion became, in 
fact, the real governors of the Moslem and non- IIoslem territories 
under the Ottoman rule. British imperialism, however, put itself 
behind the princes in the colonies; it was a system of indirect 
(i) G. C. Allen, A Short Economic His tory of Modern Japan, 19+5, p. 156. 
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rule behind tribal chiefs. It looks very odd that British 
imperialism should be of such a type. By contrast, French 
imperialism is said to win over new men who were brought up within 
the French pattern and were then made the ruling class in the 
different territories of the Empire. 
T E ROLE OF THE FOREIGPTE.R. 
Usually a very influential factor, bringing forth a change in 
the social structure, in the social ends and values,is provided 
by the emergence of the foreigner in the under -developed society. 
The Chinese, the Indians, the Japanese and the Egyptians, all alike, 
have witnessed that economic progress can be initiated and enhanced 
through the influence of the foreigner who brings with him new 
ideas as well as new opportunities for trade and civilisation. 
And, once a country is opened up for foreign trade, opportunities 
for specialisation and wealth are subsequently created. 
In Malthus's view the foreigner even develops new tastes and 
enhances the demand of the people in less advanced communities for 
new things hitherto unknown to them. The people's desire to work 
harder in order to satisfy themselves witn these new demands is 
held to be brought about at the instigation of the foreigner. In 
í'.i111 s view, the economic advantages of commerce are surpassed in 
importance by those of its effects which are intellectual and moral. 
A great value is placed on the idea of putting human beings in 
contact with persons dissimilar to themselves, and with modes of 
thought and action unlike those with which they are familiar. 
Commerce is the principal source of this contact, and commercial 
adventurérsfrom more advanced countries have generally been the 
first civilisers of barbarians. Commerce is the purpose. of by 
far the greater:, part of the communication which takes _:lace between 
civilised nations and such communities, and has thus always been 
one of the primary sources of progress. There can hardly be any 
nation which does not heed to borrow from others, not merely 
particular arts or practices, but essential points of character in 
which its own type is inferior. 
(1) 
Historical evidence of some countries in Europe, Asia and 
Africa show pretty clearly that, whenever the foreigner emerges 
in a society, he carries with him a new agency of economic progress. 
This is quite obvious in the case of China. Up to the middle of 1 
the sixteenth century this country was ahead in innovations and 
standards; but then towards the middle of the seventeenth century 
the Chinese turned against the foreigners, breeding an all round 
anti -foreign feeling. The Chinese Emperor himself embarked upon 
a policy of persecuting the Catholics and compelled the Russian and 
European merchants to confine their activities to one port, Canton. 
This fanatical nationalism slowed down the wheels of progress, and 
finally stagnation set in to the detriment of the interests of the 
(i) J.S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy, 7th Edition, 1871, Book III, 
Exchange, Chapter XVII On International Trade. 
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country itself. The Chinese turned inwards, severed relations 
with the foreigners, and through their own unwise action stifled 
the progress of their economy. 
It is perhaps more pertinent to this historical study to draw 
attention to Medieval Spain as another case in point. This 
country, appeared in Medieval Europe as one that had the gold and 
riches of the world, supplied from the newly- discovered mines in 
its colonies. Nevertheless, Spain as a great Empire afterwards 
passed from the scene and faded away in history. It is only 
natural that most people should then give a high place to the 
inquisition in the downfall of that Empire. As soon as the jews 
and other foreign elements were expelled from Spain, this 
historical event should have forbidden any future prospects of 
Spanish economic development. 
The story of Japan is entirely different, for this country 
did welcome the foreigners and accept Western influence. After 
the disintegration of the old regime and the Restoration in 1868, 
Japan gave at that time little promise of her future development, 
save in the determined way in which her leaders faced their 
difficulties. As Allen has pointed out, some foreigners in Japan 
contemplated with complacency the mediocrity of achievement which 
the future promised, and emphasised that Japan would never become a 
wealthy industrial country. The Japanese were known to be a 
happy race, and being content with little were not likely to 
achieve much. The love of indolence and pleasure of the people 
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themselves should have been a deterrent to economic progress. 
True, in 1$67 the Japanese economy was not only backward, when 
compared with that of the chief Western nations, but the 
foundation for a new era of expansion seemed to be ill prepared. 
In the space of some sixty years, however, Japan had been 
transformed into a modern industrial state, equipped with all 
resources of applied science and technology and capable of 
producing efficiently most types of manufactured products. She 
had established adequate systems of finance and communications. 
Her mercantile marine was the third greatest in the world. Her 
overseast trade was large and was still growing rapidly; in its 
composition it was in most respects typical of that of a modern 
industrial state. In the nineteen- thirties Japan was conducting 
with success large -scale undertakings beyond her shores, and she 
was becoming an important investor in overseast enterprise. She 
possessed an efficient bureaucracy and a skilful and experienced 
class of entrepreneurs, technicians and managers. Her workers 
rivalled in skill those of far older industrial countries. Since 
the beginning of the Meiji era her population had doubled itself 
but meanwhile the standard of living of her people had risen. 
Political changes had accompanied the economic expansion. Japan 
had made herself into a great military and naval power, and since 
1894 she had pursued with success a policy of imperialist 
expansion on the continent of Asia. 
Japan's economic development may be attributed to such factors 
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as the sense of national unity being as it was the product of her 
geographical position, of linguistic uniformity and of her long 
history; the centralised form of government; the progressiveness 
of the new rulers who were not demarcated from the rest of the 
population; government aid to industry for strategic reasons and 
national power;. technical inheritance; and the large foreign 
demand for new silk owing to the great expansion of the American 
market. None the less important, however, was the role of the 
foreigner in the economic expansion of that country. (1 
In promoting Japan's economic life, the role of the foreigner 
was not confined to technical assistance and the transmission and 
appropriation of western production techniques. T:7estern influence 
brought about along with the foreigner made itself felt in other 
directions. The latter decades of the nineteenth century 
witnessed the rise in Japan of new industries and new forms of 
organisation rather than the persistence of the old. These 
innovations were in part the result of a government policy of 
creating foreign -style industries such as wereoonsidered necessary 
for national power, but they were in part the result of the 
appearance of new wants among the Japanese public being as they 
were the reflection of "estern influence. 
It then follows that, in order to set in motion a process of 
economic development, there should emerge two types of men who are 
(1) C.f. C.C. Allen, op.cit., p. 151+. 
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indeed the agents of progress: new men at home forming the new 
ruling class, and new men from abroad carrying with them new ideas 
and techniques. With these two types of men, the social structure 
is bound to undergo substantial changes in favour of progress and 
expansion of economic life. 
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CHAPTER 11. 
THL STATE AND THE RULING CLASS. 
Having considered the important part to be played by new men 
at home and foreigners from abroad in the process of economic 
development, it is now time to enquire into what it is that 
activates economic stagnation into economic progress. Social 
institutions, as, for instance, the state, the ruling class, 
religion and the family, may be inimical to progress; if that is 
so, the remedy is of course nothing short of their overthrow. New 
men outside the circle of the old ruling class should get together 
to bring this about and establish new social institutions which 
would be much more favourable to progress. 
But these new men must first of all ascend to political 
power in order to achieve such a fundamental social reform. This 
being granted, it is well in order to proceed with a socio- economic 
study of the concept of the state and other social institutions 
which may sometimes place difficult obstacles in the way of 
economic development in most under -developed societies. 
1. THE CONCEPT CF THE STATE. 
As far as the state as a social institution is concerned, 
the crucial point is indeed the extent to which it is organised. 
In this respect, history suggests that it is almost inconceivable 
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to overthrow the existing social regime if the State is strong 
and highly centralised. This was indeed the case with the 
Russian State during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
While economic progress was proceeding vigorously and rapidly 
throughout Europe during that period, the Russian State was 
meanwhile so strong and highly organised that it was able to 
suppress any progressive elements hostile to the existing form 
of government. If, on the contrary, the political framework 
in the community is weak and corrupt, with feudalism dominant 
and local authorities powerful, it is more likely to be amenable 
to progress. For such a political structure can be easily 
destroyed by the creative minority. The new political upheaval 
in Egypt is a recent and striking case in point. 
Assuming now that a new political structure has been 
established, ousting from power the old ruling class of priests, or 
landlords, or capitalists, what is now required under the new 
regime? Again what is really required is a strong national state. 
Historical evidence goes a long way to substantiate this 
proposition. Never in its history did China achieve a strong, 
highly organised state; hence it was scarcely possible to create 
progress in such a political structure. Brazil, too, has shown so 
little economic progress throughout the last century, in spite of 
the fact that she had adequate natural resources comparable to 
those of many advanced countries. The main reason for this 
relative under -development seems to be that her geographical 
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situation has hindered the creation of a powerful national state. 
Again there is a striking contrast historically between the 
achievements in the economic sphere of England and Germany. 
England became highly organised and centralised from the fifteenth 
century onwards, and within this political framework there has 
since been created an atmosphere favourable to progress; economic 
expansion was all the more vigorous and rapid on all fronts. The 
fact that Germany "was disintegrated explains the paradox of the 
rel«tively under- developed German economy as late as the nineteenth 
century, even though productive resources were by no means 
inadequate. -:'hen at long last the country was unified under the 
leadership of Eismark, conditions then became favourable to 
economic progress. 
Thus -a major pre- requisite of economic development in under- 
developed societies is an evolution in the form of government. 
This would only mean the overthrow of the old ruling class that is 
inimical to progress, and the establishment of a new progressive 
class that should have one end in view: the achievement and 
maintenance! of national unity and integrity as well as the 
initiation and promotion of economic development. 
a conclusion obviously demonstrates the extent to which 
the concept of the ruling class is all the more significant for any 
systematic study of the causes of stagnation or progress in the 
under -developed society. It is worth while therefore to push our 
analysis one step further and discuss with more clarity and 
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exactitude when a ruling class as such is conducive or not 
conducive to progress. 
2. THE CONCEPT OF THE RULING CLASS. 
It may safely be said that the forces making for readjustment 
of institutions; are, in the last analysis, almost entirely of an 
economic nature. The group is made up of individuals and the 
group's life is the life of the individuals, and the group's 
accepted scheme of life is the consencus of views held by them as 
to what is right, good, expedient and beautiful in the way of 
human life. In the alteration of conditions of life that conies 
of the changed method of dealing with environment, the outcome is 
not an equal change in the facility of life throughout the group. 
The altered conditions may increase the facility of life for the 
group as a whole; but usually the redistribution results in a 
decrease of facility or fullness of life for some members. For 
instance, advances in technical methods or changes in population 
or industrial organisation, will require some members to change their 
habits of life 'if they are to enter with facility into the altered 
industrial methods, and in so doing they will be unable to live up 
to the received notions as to what are the right and beautiful ways 
of life. 
Anyone who is required to change his habits of life will feel 
the discrepancy between the methods of life required of him by the 
275. 
newly arisen exigencies and the traditional scheme of life to which 
he is accustomed. It is the individuals placed in this position 
who have the incentive to reconstruct the received scheme of life 
and are most readily persuaded to accept new standards. It is 
through the need to win the means of livelihood that men are placed 
in such a position. The pressure exerted by the environment upon 
the group, making for the readjustment of its scheme of life, 
impinges upon the members of the group in the form of pecuniary 
exigencies. The forces are therefore chiefly economic, i.e. these 
forces take the form of pecuniary pressure. 
The ruling leisure class, however, is sheltered from the stress 
of these economic pressures and exigencies of struggle for means of 
subsistence; or at least they are less exacting for this class 
than for any other. As a result of this privileged position, it 
is expected to find the leisure class one of the least responsive to 
demands which a new situation makes for the further readjustment 
of institutions. (1) 
That the ruling leisure class is the conservative class in 
Eastern comiunities is a truth which can be recognised on the 
following grounds. First, the exigencies of the general economic 
situation do not directly impinge upon the members of that class. 
They are not required, under the penalty of forfeiture, to change 
(i) C.f. Thorstein Veblen, The Theory Of The Leisure Class, An Economic Study 
of Institutions, Chapter VIII, pp. 188 -211. 
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their habits of life and their theoretical views of the external 
world to suit the demands of an altered industrial technique, 
since they are not in the full sense an organic part of the 
industrial community. These exigencies, therefore, do not 
produce, in the members of this class, that degree of uneasiness 
with the existing order which alone can lead any body to give up 
views and methods of life already habitual to them:. The office of 
the leisure class in the social evolution of Oriental societies is 
to retard the movement and conserve what is obsolescent. 
Moreover, conservatism, as being an upper class characteristic, 
has acquired a certain honorific value. The fact that the usages, 
actions and views of this class acquire the character of a 
prescriptive canon of conduct for the rest of the community gives 
added weight and power to the conservative influence of that class. 
It makes it incumbent on all reputable people to follow their lead, 
so that by virtue of its high position the wealthy class comes to 
exert a retarding influence upon the social development far in 
excess of that which the simple numerical strength of the class 
would assign it. The prescriptive example acts to stiffen 
resistance of all other classes against innovation and to fix 
men's affections towards the good institutions handed down from 
earlier generations. 
But the leisure class has also a material interest in leaving 
things as they are, i.e. in preserving the status quo. Under 
the circumstances prevailing at any given time, this class is in a 
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privileged position and any departure from the existing order may 
be expected to work to the detriment of the class rather than the 
reverse. This interested motive comes in to supplement the strong 
instinctive bias of that class, and so to render it more conservative 
than it otherwise would be. 
Nevertheless, the arguments in favour of the ruling class are 
no less impressive. It is sometimes argued that if a society were 
created on an entirely egaliterian basis all its members would be 
so poor and so preoccupied with their means of subsistence that they 
could hardly have enough leisure time to be devoted to social 
progress. If, however, the society keeps a minority who, by 
virtue of their social standing, will have enough leisure time to 
devote themselves to government, art, scholarship, sport, music 
and all other kindred activities, it actually is preserving a 
valuable asset in terms of human ingenuity, skill and statesmanship. 
Civilisation can hardly be maintained and good government achieved 
but for the upkeep of the energies and potentialities of the 
members of the leisure class. No progress can be expected unless 
there is a small ruling class who alone can preserve the dignity, 
values, traditions and all items of civilisation in the society. 
Thus every society must have a ruling class, a small number of non - 
wage earners, unproductive workers who rule and govern and live, 
not on the fruits of their own labour, but on the produce of the 
rest of the society. 
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Furthermore, there may be a grain of truth in the view so often 
expressed by the spokesmen of the conservative elements, that, 
without consistent resistance to innovation on the part of the 
conservative leisure class, social innovation and experiment would 
hurry the community into untenable and intolerable situations, the 
only possible result of which would be discontent and disastrous 
reaction. "What is is right" is the conservative view opposed to 
the more liberal view that "what is, is wrong". However, it is 
not that the institutions of to -day are wholly wrong for the 
purpose of life of to -day, but they are always, and in the nature 
of things, wrong to some extent. The institution of a leisure 
class, by force of class interest and instinct and by prescriptive 
example, makes for the perpetuation of the existing maladjustment 
of institutions, and even favours a reversion to somewhat more 
archaic scheme of life. 
It remains true, however, that institutions change and 
develop as time goes on. There is a cumulative growth of 
customs and habits of thought, a selective adaptation of conventions 
and methods of life. Something therefore should be said of 
the office of the leisure class in guiding this growth as well 
as in retarding it, but only in regard to those institutions 
that are primarily of an economic character. The economic 
structure can be said to be composed of two main categories 
of institutions: institutions of acquisition and institutions 
of production. The latter category is not often recognised as 
institutions, for they do not concern the ruling class, and therefore 
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are seldom the subject of legislation or deliberate convention. 
When they do receive attention, they are commonly approached from 
the business side. The relation of the leisure class, is held 
to be a pecuniary one which manifests itself in adopting pecuniary 
institutions, giving it the best effect for the acquisition of 
private gain. This relationship explains the consistent trend 
in the leisure class guidance of institutional growth, answering 
to pecuniary ends and shaping the leisure class economic life. 
Its effects are seen in those enactments and conventions that make 
for security of property, enforcement of contract, facility of 
pecuniary transactions and vested interests, as, for instance, 
changes affecting limited liability, banking and currency, 
trusts and pools etc. 
"The community's institutional furniture of this kind" says 
Veblen "is of immediate consequence only to the propertied class, 
and in proportion as they are propertied; that is to say, in 
proportion as they are to be ranked with the leisure class. But 
indirectly these conventions of business life are of the gravest 
consequence for the industrial process and for the life of the 
community. And in guiding the institutional growth in.this respect, 
the pecuniary classes, therefore, serve a purpose of the most 
serious importance to the community, not only in the conservation 
of the accepted social scheme, but also in shaping the industrial 
process proper. "( 1) 
) Ibid. , p. 210. 
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But even if. the ruling leisure class as an institution is 
justifiably established in the society, a further issue may still 
arise. In what way are the members of this class maintained and 
recruited? The ruling class could be maintained either out of 
taxation, as was the case in Russia, or by endowments as in the 
feudal states.- Members of the class can be recruited afresh in 
each generation by test, or can be recruited by hereditary 
principles. But if the former practice were adopted, what test 
would be applied? There seems practically no test to apply. 
Besides, the members of the class cannot be recruited every 
generation, for it takes at least two generations to do the 
training for the job, to make a gentleman capable of assuming the 
office of government. We .are then left with the other alternative, 
i.e. recrü.itment by hereditary principles, but this should 
eventually lead to decay. Probably in the second, and most 
certainly in the third and fourth generations, the legacy of 
civilisation and material progress is handed over to the weak 
inheritors, and all that was built up in previous periods fall to 
pieces. The fact that the hereditary system is a weak one is well 
recognised and acted upon in the real world. Turkey, for instance, 
built up a vast empire which lasted for almost three centuries by 
recruiting afresh each generation new members of the ruling class 
from Christian boys who were brought up to be the rulers of the 
Empire. When the system was eroded by the Sultan, allowing the 
Janissaries to marry and bring up their own children, this source 
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of fresh recruitment dried up and resort was had to the hereditary 
principle. But most societies disintegrate when this principle 
dominates their life, and this is precisely what Turkey had 
experienced when the Empire went into decay. 
Hereditary principles therefore have to be abolished if a 
society is to be built up anew. Rapid progress can only be 
achieved in 'open' societies, so to speak, in societies which have 
both vertical and horizontal mobility, and whose members regardless 
of caste, creed, or colour can rise from the bottom to the top of 
the social ladder. Problems arise when members of the ruling class 
establish a social system which may deny to enterprisers the 
resources they need for organising new units of production. Thus 
it may not be possible to recruit labour because it is tied to the 
soil by law, or because caste restrictions prevent labour from 
moving to new occupations. Or land may be concentrated in the 
hands of a small number of persons who are unwilling, often for 
reasons of political prestige, to sell it to persons outside their 
group. Or the banking system may discriminate against borrowers 
of a particular race or creed. In other words, horizontal mobility 
of resources is, like vertical social mobility, a pre- condition of 
economic progress. But both types of mobility, although socially 
desirable, are probably retarded by the deliberate action of the 
ruling leisure class. 
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CHAPTER 12. 
RELIGION AND ECONOMICS 
1. ECONMIC 'ETHICS IN CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY 
Thomas Acquinas was said to have taken infinite pains and 
ingenuity in an attempt to weld the teachings of the Bible and 
of Aristotle into a harmonious body of thought. One result of 
his attempt was the celebrated classification of laws into eternal, 
natural, human and divine. The first is the controlling plan of 
the universe as conceived by God; that part of it which can be 
grasped by man and which enables him to distinguish good and evil 
is natural law; while human or customary law consists of the 
enactment of earthly powers. Divine law is that part of the 
eternal law revealed in the holy writings. Human or customary 
law should be based upon natural law. It falls into two parts: 
civil law (Roman) and Canon law (Church) . Canon law was co- 
ordinated and given a systematic form about the middle of the 
twelfth century. It was drawn from a mass of ecclesiastical 
legislation and decision, thus containing elements of Christian 
doctrine, Aristotelian philosophy, and Roman law; and it 
expressed the judgment of orthodox churchmen concerning human 
relations, and so contained economic ideas. 
The tendency of scholasticism was on the whole opposed both 
to individualism and to the emphasis of the human personality as 
the basis for economic decisions. It tended to subordinate the 
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individual to the institution and to consider man as subject 
to "natural" laws. Thus, on the one hand, it tended to limit 
that reference to individual choices which was to become the 
basis of economic science; while, on the other, it kept alive 
and emphasised the concept of social uniformities and the 
dominance of abstract "laws" which later contributed to the idea 
of that science. But scholasticism was neither Christianity nor 
the Church, but only part of each with an admixture of the 
philosophy of Aristotle. It was the system of thought which 
came to be dominant during medieval times; it cannot be called 
a science, for it did not seek to explain phenomena so much as 
to apply certain absolute rules of conduct to existing conditions. 
It was only the scholarship of the Middle Ages. 
Apart from the Roman component, Christianity and the Church 
may be considered next as perhaps the chief factors in determining 
medieval thought. It should be borne in mind, however, that 
Christianity as a religion is quite distinct from the various 
institutions or churches which profess it. The following are 
the principles of Christian doctrine which have any direct 
economic significance. Christianity taùght a brotherhood 
extending beyond community or nation, embracing all classes and 
races. In accordance with this spirit, the Church taught the 
natural equality of rights among men. On that score, slavery 
was condemned, wholly or in part, the least radical teaching 
being that slaves should be freed when Christianised. Closely 
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connected with the doctrine of brotherhood and equal rights 
was the idea of a natural community of property; originally, 
and according to the law of nature, men owned all goods in common. 
Besides, one of Christianity's teachings was that concerning the 
dignity of labour; another was the virtue of charity and alms- 
giving. Finally Christianity was a force for purifying and 
perpetuating the family and the family life. 
These principles of Christianity were considerably modified 
or given a special meaning in their practical application by the 
Church. To mention but an instance or two: the "naturals' law 
of equality was admitted to be modified on grounds of expediency 
so as to permit inequality both in property and in status. The 
idea of brotherhood was reconciled with inequality in wealth by 
teaching that charity is a duty, and by preaching that the rich 
should regard themselves as trustees for their brother men. At 
the same time, it must be noted that charity was too commonly 
regarded as an end, as a pious thing, rather than as a means for 
benefiting society or the poor. So, too, with manual labour: 
it was regarded rather as a form of discipline for the attainment 
of salvation than as a means of producing wealth. Pride was not 
to be taken in the craft, and the main interest was not to be in 
the product. As a rule, the general economic environment was 
not favourable to the complete advancement from slavery, and the 
Church made room for it on grounds of expediency. Serfdom could 
scarcely have disappeared in towns by the tenth century, while in 
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agriculture serfdom lingered on into the nineteenth century. 
Still, there was the tendency towards freedom. 
Prior to the thirteenth century, the Church fathers concerned 
themselves but little about economic matters. On the one hand, 
a very simple independent domestic economy prevailed; on the 
other, purely religious ideas were in control. Consequently, one 
finds little but moral dissertations concerning the evils of 
luxury and the like. Among the most noteworthy economic ideas 
were those concerning the desirability of wealth, values, and the 
relative merits of different forms of industry. In these there 
is little new. Agriculture was praised; manufacture did not 
displease God; but trade could not be pleasing to the Deity. 
Material wealth was dangerous to spiritual welfare, though it 
was permissible to the laity if used for the good of their fellow 
men. As to value, the recognition of labour was preparing the 
way for a cost theory based on the labour element. The general 
notion appears to have been that value is absolute and independent 
of price. Accordingly, exchanges were looked upon as just or 
unjust in proportion to the equality of the absolute values, and 
usury was forbidden to churchmen on the grounds that in the taking 
of interest a greater value would be exacted than that given, 
which would result in injustice to the borrower.(1) 
But as early as the eleventh century there were some 
indications of social progress. Vüith the growth of monasteries, 
(0) C. f. L.H. Haney, History of Economic Thought, p.95. 
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towns, handicraft, and commerce, and the increasing use of money, 
new phenomena were presented; while in the twelfth century the 
first Latin translation of Aristotle's Politics found its way into 
Western Europe. This fact marks a new epoch in medieval thought. 
Theses on the subject have drawn attention to the clash 
between religion and economic development. Medieval religion 
rejects the idea of gain in commerce, finance, and industry. A 
capitalist system requires a free market for capital, but medieval 
theologians showed much concern over the question of gain and 
usury. Orthodox churchmen used the term 'usury' to cover what we 
designate as interest; and, in a broad sense, to include any 
excess over and above the 'just' price. At first (325 A.D.) usury 
was forbidden to the clergy only, but before the close of the 
twelfth century the prohibition was extended to the laity. As 
late as 1311 it was declared absolutely illegal. The broad simple 
ground for this action was the belief that to take interest for 
a loan of money was like charging more than the just price. 
However, the development of industry and exchange brought forth 
a gradual modification of the doctrine of usury or value of money. 
Acquinas and his brother scholastics recognised that where, for 
example, a loss was incurred by a loan, or a profit was missed, a 
corresponding sum might be demanded of the borrower. A buyer on 
credit was not prohibited from paying more than the cash price. 
Discounts were allowed on bills of exchange, and money combined 
with labour in partnership was called productive. Jews and 
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Lombards, being damned anyway, were permitted to take usury. 
And, in the fifteenth century, banking houses were associated 
with financial operations, and thus it became difficult for the 
Church to frown upon interest on bank deposits. 
(1) 
The medieval idea of usury could not have long existed in a 
money economy. The social organisation, with which the biblical 
writers, Aristotle and the schoolmen alike were associated, was 
non - capitalist and largely self -sufficient. They were not 
exchange economies, and the political counterpart of this industrial 
condition was a predominance of clan or family feeling, a feeling 
which appears in the gild and even in the medieval municipality. 
This explains to a large extent the general condemnation of interest - 
taking.Loans at interest generally involve a rather abstract or 
impersonal relation between the parties, such as became common with 
the establishment of a money economy. Even to -day, the purely 
business relation is apt to become unsatisfactory when existing 
among relatives or persons belonging to the same social organisation, 
and the condemnation of usury was natural when most of a man's 
dealings were with such persons. 
If, in England the Reformation was a revolution, it was a 
revolution which left almost intact both the lower ranges of 
ecclesiastical organisation and the traditional scheme of social 
thought. Where questions of social ethics were concerned, the 
religious thought of the age was not less conservative than its 
(1) C.f. Henri Pirenne, Economic And. Social History of Medieval Europe, 
Chapter IV, Sec. IV, Credit And The Traffic In Money, pp.118 -11.1. 
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ecclesiastical organisation. Both in their view of religion as 
embracing all sides of life, and in their theory of the particular 
social obligations which religion involved, the most representative 
thinkers of the Church of England had no intention of breaking 
with traditional doctrines. By the sixteenth century, the law 
of 'nature' had been invoked by medieval thinkers as a moral 
restraint upon economic self -interest; by the seventeenth century 
a significant revolution in thought had taken place. ?Nature' 
had come to mean, not divine ordinance, but human appetites, and 
natural rights were invoked by the individualism of the age as a 
reason why self -interest should be given free play. Prompted by 
these intellectual changes, the policy towards interest -taking 
began to be reversed, and by the middle of the sixteenth century 
the law prohibiting all interest was repealed in England, and the 
exaction of interest ceased to be a criminal offence, provided 
that the rate did not exceed a certain moderate percentage. It 
was therefore established that the law should not impose on 
business a utopian morality. The sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries saw the expansion of finance and international trade, and 
the need arose for the reconsideration of the religious doctrine 
which had tried to moralise economic relations, by treating every 
transaction as a case of personal conduct, involving personal 
responsibility. The following is an illustrious quotation from 
R.H. Tawney on the economic side of religion: 
"In an age of impersonal finance, world markets and a 
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capitalist organisation of industry, its traditional social 
doctrines had no specific terms to offer; and were merely 
repeated when, in order to be effective, they should have been 
thought out again from the beginning and reformulated in new and 
living terms. It had endeavoured to protect the peasant and the 
craftsman against the oppression of the money- lender and the 
monopolist. Faced with the problems of a wage - earning proletariat, 
it could do no more than repeat with meaningless reiteration its 
traditional lore as to the duties of master to servant and servant 
to master. It had insisted that all men were brothers. But it 
did not point out that, as a result of the new economic imperialism 
which was beginning to develop in the seventeenth century, the 
brethren of the .English merchant were the Africans whom he kidnapped 
for slavery in America, or the American Indians whom he stripped 
of their lands, or the Indian craftsman from whom he bought muslins 
and silks at starvation prices. Religion had not yet learned to 
console itself, faced with the practical difficulty of applying 
its moral principles, by clasping the comfortable formula that, in 
the transactions of economic life, no moral principles exist. But, 
for the problems involved in the association of men for economic 
purposes on the grand scale which was to be increasingly the rule 
in the future, the social doctrines advanced from the pulpit 
offered, in their traditional fonrr, little guidance. Their 
practical ineffectiveness prepared the way for them theoretical 
abandonment.tT(l) 
0) R.H. Tawney, Religion And The Rise of Capitalism, Lonion, p.184. 
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This defect was fundamental. It made itself felt in 
countries where there was no Reformation, no Puritan movement, no 
common law jealous of its rights and eager to prune ecclesiastical 
pretensions. But in England there were all three, and from the 
beginning of the last quarter of the sixteenth century ecclesiastical 
authorities who attempted to enforce traditional morality had to 
reckon with a temper which denied their right to exercise any 
jurisdiction at all, above all any jurisdiction interfering with 
economic matters. Then came the Long Parliament, the fierce 
denunciations in both Houses of the interference of the clergy in 
civil affairs, and the legislation abolishing the Court of High 
Commission, depriving the ordinary ecclesiastical courts of penal 
jurisdiction. The change had begun before the Civil War and was 
completed with the Restoration. 
2. ECONOMIC ETHICS IN ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY 
But Islam,as well as medieval Christianity, has revolted 
against interest -taking. Whereas the West under the pressure of 
economic expansion has come to justify the taking of interest, 
and in fact distinguishes in practice between common usury and the 
results of productive investment of capital, Islam still carries 
the moral law openly through into the commercial sphere. The 
condemnation of the Koran of "the devourer of usury" is regarded 
in many Moslem circles as being as valid to -day as it was 1300 
years ago. The word used in the Koran for interest or usury is 
'riba' meaning increase in anything or the additional amount 
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which a debtor pays to a creditor. According to -Moslem jurists, 
tribal is the extortion of wealth without legal or lawful con- 
sideration; and the taker of 'ribat, its giver, the scriber of 
the deed, and the witness to it, have been pronounced by the 
Prophet to be alike cursed in their sin. 
It should be borne in mind, however, that Islam does not 
forbid the giving of credit in general. The essence of its 
objection to the taking of interest is that the creditor receives 
an increment onhis loan and that this increment is a fixed periodic 
sum. If, on the other hand, one puts one's money into a business 
as a partner and takes a profit by sharing in the risks of under- 
taking this is legitimate in Islamic theory. For here the 
increment on one's money is uncertain, and it is the reward for 
uncertainty- bearing. According to a Moslem scholar, "the 
creditor's deriving a profit from every investment in business 
is uncertain whereas this additional amount (riba) from the debtor 
to the creditor is certain".(1) 
True, the medieval churchmen and the Moslem jurists built on 
different religious foundations. But the same basic social and 
economic conditions apply in both the medieval Christian and 
modern Islamic societies. Both societies have an essentially 
peasant basis to their social structure and trade rather than 
industry as their major outlet for economic enterprise. What 
Tawney says of the medieval West, that the doctrine of interest 
(i) G.A.I. Qureshi, Islam And The Rate of Interest, Lahore, 1945, p.52. 
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received its character in an age in which most loans were not 
part of a credit system but an exceptional expedient, seems to 
apply in large measure to the contemporary East as well. The 
prohibition of interest, then, is not just the result of an 
arbitrary moral attitude about the use of money. It is linked 
with a type of society in which the use of money in certain ways 
is apt to result in clearly perceptible personal hardship, and in 
the drying up of that fount of compassion which should remain 
fresh in every human being. 
In Modern Islam, as in medieval Christendom, these doctrines 
have not passed without either challenge or evasion. The 
Christian story is well- known. In Islam there are two parallel 
movements, both responsive to the economic situation, but in 
different ways. One is that of plain side - stepping of the 
Prophet's injunctions. The writer knows of cases where lenders 
of money secretly received a fixed increment on their loans. Or, 
in order to be able to defend it before the courts, if necessary, 
they lent a smaller sum than was written down for repayment on 
the document agreed to by the borrower. The courts, which 
disallow any case brought where there was a bargain for payment of 
interest, would have no evidence that less than the agreed sum 
for repayment had in fact been handed over. On the other hand, 
Moslem modernists argue for a more refined interpretation of 
the Prophet's views; some defend the taking of interest on 
the grounds that what the Prophet really disallowed was 'usury' 
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and not the moderate rates of interest. This view is refuted 
by the more orthodox jurists who argue that, even though usury 
is commonly regarded as an exorbitant rate of interest, ideas 
as to exorbitance vary greatly at different times; hence there 
is no essential difference between the two concepts. Another 
view is that simple interest is allowed, but not compound interest. 
But this view again is regarded by most r <îoslem jurists as very 
specious. Some modern Moslems of the educated class regard even 
ordinary interest on bank deposits, as illegitimate for them. 
Although many Moslems do in fact accept the addition of interest 
to their bank deposits, this is regarded by orthodox jurists as 
a "personal weakness" analogous to that of not saying one's 
prayers regularly at the prescribed times. A strictly orthodox 
view of the role of banks in an Islamic State is that they pay no 
interest to depositors and charge no interest to their clients. 
In other words, they should treat all deposits as Western banks 
treat current accounts, and depositors should use them only for 
security and not for profit. 
The prohibition on tribe.' was also extended by the Prophet 
to such transactions of exchange whereby quantities of gold, silver, 
wheat, barley, dates, and salt are exchanged for more or less of 
the same kind of commodity. Trade in general is encouraged, but 
this prohibition puts a bar on concealed interest- taking and direct 
dealing in futures. But here again there is a difference of 
opinion among the learned men of Islam. Some wish to extend this 
294. 
prohibition in modern times to all commodities. Others, 
holding to the letter of the law, argue that one may not reason 
by analogy, and that it is only the six commodities specifically 
mentioned by the Prophet which are so affected. 
A sophisticated view of the orthodox Moslem position has 
recently been expressed by Mr. G.A.I. Qureshi, a Moslem scholar 
and an academic economist, in a published work entitled 'Islam 
and the Rate of Interest'. His thesis is that many of the ills 
of the capitalist society are mainly due to interest and that 
Islam has indeed made a contribution to the solution of world ills 
by the definite prohibition of interest. He quotes Western 
historical precedents in support of his contention. Aristotle's 
comparison of money to a barren hen which laid no eggs is cited, 
likewise the medieval objections to interest. To him, as perhaps 
to others, the age of faith has given place to the age of science, 
but not necessarily to that of reason. He defends his orthodox 
view by arguing that festern economists are not agreed on the 
nature and theory of ihterest, that Keynes and others have regarded 
the rate of interest as a highly conventional phenomenon, that 
the rate of interest in Western countries is progressively becoming 
lower. It is thus theoretically possible and practically by 
no means out of the question that the minimum rate of interest 
may be a zero rate. His final conclusion is that what Islam has 
forbidden on religious grounds should be abandoned on economic 
grounds. The certainty, regular accumulation, and lack of 
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expenditure of effort characteristic of interest -taking militate 
socially and economically against it. To him, as to most 
Moslems, the proper method of using capital is the partnership 
system,tin which capital co- operates with labour, and gets a 
profit on the joint result. This profit in turn should be 
allocated in an agreed proportion of the joint product, and not 
as fixed percentage of the principal sum invested. This is the 
Moslem profit -sharing enterprise. Islam has thus not 
illegalised all transactions which produce income without labour. 
In fact, in addition to the profits of co- partnership, it allows 
rent from houses and agricultural land. What it objects to is a 
situation where only one party bears sacrifice or risk and the 
other re.nains immune or practically so. 
However, the clash between religion and economic development 
is not only confined to the religious ban on the use of certain 
forms of capital. Religion as an institution is sometimes held 
to be a deterrent to economic development in some other ways. 
It may discourage the experimentation of science by prescribing 
the way,- in which things should be done in the economic field. 
In the extreme cases, this can be observed in primitive societies 
where the method of cultivation of the soil is dictated by religious 
rites. Besides, religion can be a menace to progress if religious 
chiefs throw their weight on the side of a reactionary ruling class, 
for, as is well- known, control over religion in all Eastern 
(1) 
(1) C.f. Raymond Firth, Elements of Social Organisation, London, 1951. p.169. 
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communities denotes control over the minds of the people. Again, 
if religion were the principal vocation in a society, a major part 
of the community's resources would probably be devoted to religious 
purposes. This is exemplified by ancient Egypt where the temples 
played a great part in shaping the conditions of life, and by 
Tibet where religious exercise dominates the minds of the masses. 
Overmuch indulgence in religion becomes an obstacle to progress 
in the same way as overmuch indulgence in politics in a subjugated 
country diverts people's energy from the task of promoting their 
national economy to the struggle for their political independence. 
The morale of the historical evolution of Christian and 
Islamic religious thought, as described above, is that, for economic 
progress, religion as a social institution need not be thrown 
overboard. Religion may be a temporary handicap, but when this 
is recognised by theologians, all they have to do is to set out to 
work a new theology in such wise that it can easily fit in with 
changing economic conditions. 
In point of fact, almost all religions seem to follow social 
changes. In the Christian West this sociological sequence was 
eventually realised seventeen centuries after the beginning of the 
Christian era. There is no reason why this should not be true 
of the Islamic East. There is no reason why the religious code 
of human behaviour should not be so adapted to social changes as 
to allow complete economic freedom in Eastern societies where 
religious ideas have always been in firm control. 
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CHAPTER 13. 
THE ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FAD.IILY. 
1. THE FAMILY AS A SOCIAL UNIT. 
It is now time to consider those social units through which 
organised activities are being carried out. By far the most 
important social unit is the family. 
Our starting point may be the individual man or woman, making 
choices as to how much of his or her labour shall be devoted to one 
occupation or another, or shall be reserved for enjoyment in 
leisure, or as to how much of his resources shall be devoted to 
immediate consumption of goods and services, or to saving for the 
sake of enjoyment in the future. No matter how definite the 
social setting of that individual may be, he or she may be skilful 
or clumsy in managing this economic problem. But these individual 
differences tend to cancel out. Society as a functioning whole 
requires its members to work within its frame. Hence we arrive 
next at the family as the most intimate and pervading unit. At 
once great differences become visible between the Oriental family 
and that with which we are familiar in the Western world. 
The first major difference is that in the West we usually 
think of the family as a unit within which the housewife usually 
decides as to the disposal of her available resources, brings her 
children to adult status, teaches them the traditions of life and 
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its disciplines, inculcates into their minds the social values 
which were-handed over to her as a valuable heritage of the past, 
and finally launches them into the world where they may found other 
families. 
The Oriental family, too, has its primary function of 
raising children to adulthood, but it does much more. It is also 
the unit within which economic resources are brought into existence. 
It is the unit within which men and women find their life's 
employment. Within its circle the most fundamental economic 
choices are made, while when it co- operates with other families it 
remains very much the key organisation. It is within the circle 
of the family that grain is grown, that flocks are tended, that the 
proceeds are allocated to various members and to various uses. It 
is in co- operation between families that such great manipulations 
of resources as the bride -price takes place, that the family of a. 
chief is maintained by others, that families connected by marriage 
maintain economic intercourse with each other. So all -pervading 
is the activity of the family in Oriental society. It is in 
dealing with property, land tenure, agricultural systems, 
inheritance and similar topics that many of the economic aspects 
of family life in such a society can be readily seen. 
Another major difference is that, whereas a Western family 
usually provides a stimulus to work and saving, this is not 
necessarily the case with an Eastern family. It is doubtful, indeed, 
that a family system will provide incentives to work outside a 
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Western community. The Eastern family is related to the problem 
of economic progress by what the anthropologist calls the 'extended 
family system'. By this term is meant that people recognise not 
only their parents but the whole pedigree of the family. When an 
Englishman talks or writes about the family, what he has in mind 
is the unit composed of father, mother and children. It is in 
these terms that sociologists in England think when they discuss the 
size of the English family. In an Eastern community, however, the 
family normally consists of these members together with a score of 
uncles and aunts, nephews, nieces and distant relatives. 
In this way, there exists what may be called 'family 
communism', the important function of which is to carry out some 
sort of social security scheme. Any member of the family can 
call upon his near or distant relatives for financial help, if the 
need arises. But these family obligations put a heavy 
conventional tax on those more prosperous members of the family who 
are committed, by virtue of family ties, to support the less 
fortunate members, e.g. kinship in India and Africa. It is likely 
that, if family ties are strong, a man will feel a greater 
responsibility to get on in the world for the sake of his 'extended' 
family. It is more likely, however, that the more prosperous 
member will be reluctant to work harder so long as a significant 
part of the fruits of increased work is earmarked for the 
maintenance of other needy members. This conventional family -tax 
is indeed a serious handicap to economic development. In Rhodesia, 
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for instance, the family as a social unit is intimately connected 
with the development of Rhodesian economy. People who possess 
many resources are often reluctant to work harder, since the 
family obligations sweep away a great part of the fruits of 
increased work, whereas people with inadequate resources are also 
reluctant to work harder so long as they can be supported by 
their kinsfolk. 
2. THE PROPERTY INSTITUTION. 
The next step in this study is to show in what ways social 
groups in any society exercise that power to use economic goods, 
which is known as ownership. Like all peoples, the people of a 
primitive society have effective distinction between various types 
of economic goods. It is as true of the primitive people as of 
any other people that Nature supplies them with extremely few 
goods ready for immediate use. They proceed to apply their 
personal powers to certain materials provided by Nature in order 
to fashion them into commodities capable of technical manipulation 
under the guidance of economic management. It is thus that the 
material of the primary environment comes to be changed into that 
secondary environment essential to human culture, and of which the 
main characteristics are that, instead of being an undifferentiated 
mass of resources, it is a collection of goods susceptible to 
ownership and to consequent economic management. Further, these 
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goods are limited in relation to effective human wants so that, 
at any level of culture, they are certain to be the subject of 
defined ownership, since without this their economic management 
would be impossible. 
The extent to which the primitive people or any other people 
convert the primary environment into a secondary environment of 
manageable goods is conditioned by such a non -economic factor as 
the state of the people's knowledge, and by another factor, more 
relevant to economics, i.e. the felt pressure of their aggregate 
wants. These two factors determine the extent to which the 
natural resources remain latent or are turned into manageable 
commodities. The felt wants, however, are the ultimate 
determinant for, should they increase, it is highly probably that 
the people would succeed in increasing their knowledge and their 
technical capacity to exploit the resources of Nature. 
The felt wants may be taken as determining the economic 
choice involved in the expenditure of a greater or a smaller 
amount of labour. Should these wants remain fixed at a certain 
level, they may be satisfied by the devotion of a certain 
proportion of the peoplets time and energy to the manipulation of 
the raw natural resources. In any given community there appears 
to be a tendency for the aggregate of human wants to change only 
within limits, for it is clear that violent fluctuations would 
tend to disrupt the society. It further appears that this 
aggregate of felt wants, while it can vary as between individuals, 
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yet has a certain uniformity within any effective social group 
with economic foundations, for should one individual expand his 
desires and make a consequent readjustment as between his leisure 
and his working time, he is seldom able to express this change 
entirely on his own initiative. It is in such a matter as this 
that the effectiveness of groups as economic subjects can be seen in 
a primitive society. Should, for instance, a younger member of 
the household be much more willing to work than the rest of the 
household within which he must operate, he will be held back by 
the rest so that his preference will become only one of the pulls 
within the economic subject. Thus the conversion of part of the 
primary environment into disposable goods is carried out by the 
people, operating through their social organisation. But this 
organisation is not only a kind of technical instrument for the 
exploitation of resources, but also the group of effective economic 
subjects which carry out complete economic management. 
The resources of the primary environment having been converted 
into economic goods, they take on the character of property. It 
is from the various ways in which the property relation functions 
among the members of a primitive peasant community that the true 
nature of the economic subject can be readily seen. The 
sociological fact of property, enforced by custom or law, is 
invariably at the root of economic disposal of resources, and 
indeed had its necessity in this economic disposal. Nothing is 
more important to the integration of a culture than the economic 
utilisation of its scarce resources, and it will be found everywhere 
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that this is reflected in very clear formulation of the principle 
of ownership. In an agrarian society, however, the most 
important item of property is of course land, and the conditions 
of land ownership are a factor of primary importance. 
3. LAND OWN. t t SHI P . 
In the Middle East, and especially in the Moslem 'Iorld, 
conditions of land ownership have been shaped by the heritage of 
history. If the sociologist wishes to understand the complicated 
land questions to be met with in the countries of to -day, he must 
pay attention to the historical background going back to the Middle 
Ages,if not to late Antiquity. All historians seem to agree that 
conditions of land ownership are a factor of central importance 
for the whole course of ancient history. Further, the distribution 
of land forms not only the foundation of every state system, but 
also of every pre -state community and social group. Real or 
alleged injustice in the distribution of land was always the 
primitive motive for serious social warfare in ancient times. 
Division of landed estates was the ancient battle -cry which excited 
revolutions and wars in the Greek cities. 
In the matter of land ownership, the Oriental countries, ruled 
as they were to a great extent by hierarchical constitutions, 
differed quite appreciably in ancient times from the countries of 
Southern Europe. Whereas in the latter private ownership and the 
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amassing of individual landed estates predominated, in the ancient 
State systems of the East there was a trend towards authoritarian 
controls and even authoritarian appropriation of landed possessions 
by a central body, by the head of the State, or symbolically by the 
Deity itself. In ancient history of the East, light is thrown 
on the predominance of tribal ownership as one of the most 
important forms of collective ownership, and evidence can be found 
for the existence both of collective and private landownership. 
Reports from Babylon show that, in 2000 B.C. and again later in 
1500 -1200 B.C., cases of clan ownership of land were not infrequent. 
The prevalence of collective ownership in Babylonia was remarkable 
inasmuch as from the earliest times private ownership was also 
known there. In Egypt, too, although we can find evidence of 
private ownership as early as the Middle Kingdom, all such 
ownership was actually an exceptional transfer of royal rights which 
after the triumph of the Theban Dynasty became invalid. The Pharaoh 
became the owner of all land in Egypt. Incidentally, the temples 
also played an important part in shaping the conditions of 
Egyptian land tenure; under Ramses III they already owned 15 per 
cent of the cultivable land. It is true that the temples had 
State lands in their possession at an earlier period, which they 
forfeited, but it is only at the end of the Middle Kingdom that they 
gradually became the determining economic factor in the country. 
Apart from the amassing of big estates in few hands, it was 
characteristic of conditions in the Byzantine Empire that the 
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tendency of the ruling class was towards the grouping of the small 
peasants liable to pay rent and interest in tax -debt collectives 
as an alternative to relinquishing their property or selling the 
fertile parts of their holdings to the large landowners whose 
domains enjoyed substantial tax privileges and exemption. The 
collective tax -debt at that period, i.e., the obligation on the 
part of the landlord to pay the taxes on the adjoining properties 
abandoned as a result of arrears of taxes and poverty, represented 
a kind of collective ownership on the part of the community in 
respect of taxable property. The object of this institution was 
to make all members of the community liable for the debts of every 
individual member, a procedure resorted to up to quite recent times, 
forming a determining factor in some Oriental countries in the 
recreation of collective ownership. 
With the conquest of the Orient by the Moslem armies a trans- 
formation in the conditions of land tenure set in which has made 
its effects felt on the land laws of Eastern countries up to the 
present day. It is true that the Arabs often refrained from 
interfering in the prevailing conditions of farm management. The 
existing peasantry was allowed to remain on its land and even 
encouraged to continue its normal activities. It is true, however, 
that the landlords, mostly of Byzantine origin, were expelled or 
killed; the conquerors thereby obtained free disposal of the 
ownership of their estates. The major part of the land thus 
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confiscated became the property of the Moslem community, later to 
be bestowed on favourites and deserving generals. 
In accordance with the fundamental traditionalism of 1,'oslem 
doctrine the tax categories instituted in the initial stages of the 
Arab conquest, Osher and Kharaj, remained in force over a long 
period, in spite of the political and social changes which have 
since continually swept over those countries. Originally, any 
land which paid the Osher, the tithe (single or double, i.e., 5 to 
10 per cent of gross yield of land) was classed as Osher land. 
This applied to all property whose owners had embraced the Moslem 
faith at the time of the conquest or which had been distributed 
among the conquerors. All other land was termed Kharaj land and 
was liable to the payment of the tribute known as Kharaj, i.e., a 
tributary tax of 20 to 50 per cent, on the gross yield. Both 
categories of land comprised cultivated and uncultivated areas, 
private and public. In the course of time the original fiscal 
criterion of classification came to denote also a difference in 
conditions of tenure. Whereas originally all land apportioned to 
individuals, whether Osher or Kharaj land, was regarded as the 
private property of the owner, the right of private ownership was 
subsequently denied to owners of Kharaj land. The Osher estates 
retained the status of private property (Milk) whereas the peasants 
occupying Kharaj land were given only the status of hereditary 
tenants of the Crown on State land (Miri) . 
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The expansion of ownership rights on the part of the Crown 
was much facilitated in the countries under Moslem rule by the 
fact that the old pre -Islamic conception of the State as supreme 
owner found points of contact in the Moslem world of ideas, and 
with the Moslem conquests was transferred into the legal notions 
of the Arab and Turkish countries. In practice, as a result of 
these legal notions, the ruler or the State, as the case might be, 
acquired immediate possession of estates whose owners were killed. 
Moreover, there was the further chance on the death of the owners, 
who had only the status of Crown tenants, of recovering such lands 
for free disposal. Thus in time the extent of these State lands 
steadily increased, and at that time there could be distinguished 
various degrees of ownership. On the one hand, there was the 
unrestricted right of land ownership known as "Milk" which allowed 
the owner to dispose of his property without qualification. There 
was again the conception of ownership which covered "Miri" land. 
The owner of such property had outwardly all the status of a quasi - 
owner. He might sell, let, mortgage, give away or otherwise 
dispose of his land. Restriction, however, arose in connection 
with the right of inheritance. "Miri" land could not be freely 
bequeathed by will, but failing the recognised heirs the succession 
reverted to the State, although the original restriction of the 
right of inheritance to the sons of the testator had in time been 
extended. Moreover, the head of the State reserved certain rights 
of supervision which could not be applied to land in private 
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ownership, i.e. "Milk ". The theory of "Miri" land was based on 
the assumption that the State conferred the land for cultivation 
and production; the recipient of land had to cultivate it, and 
thus was under the compulsion to remit a share to the State as tax. 
Besides, the validity of any transfer of "Miri" land was dependent 
on the nominal consent of the State. 
The Ottoman land law of April 1$58 which represents the first 
of land regulations under Ottoman rule, enumerates the following 
categories of land tenure, incorporating at the same time many of 
the existing legal traditions: 
1. Milk, i.e., full right of ownership, property which like 
movables is in the possession of private individuals. 
2. Miri, i.e., property of which the nuda proprietas belongs to 
the sovereign, whereas possession and extensive rights of 
usufruct are vested in the private owner. 
3. Wagf -land belonging to endowment and pious institutions for 
which rights regarding ownership and usufruct are subject to 
important restrictions. 
4. Metruka land intended for public use. 
5. 4ïevat land for which no owner exists and which is not under 
cultivation. 
The list however does not include one of the most remarkable 
forms of property in Oriental countries, namely,ti_e Mushaa,i.e., 
communal land. This institution peculiar to the Orient, deserves 
of special treatment. Consider the case of Egypt as a typical 
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example of an Eastern country in which this peculiar form of 
communal property was predominant right up to the end of the 
nineteenth century. In Egypt the general Arab concepts regarding 
the character of land ownership up to the middle of the nineteenth 
century had favoured the retention of that form of land tenure in 
which the cultivator had but slight claims on the land, whereas the 
community or its symbolic representative, the head of the State, 
claimed the actual right of ownership. The peasant, by paying the 
land tax, acquired only the right to cultivate the land. Thus in 
Egypt, as well as in other Eastern countries, the institution of 
tax- farming, originally granted as a feudal privilege, was 
widespread; and the leading Mameluk families bequeathed it from 
father to son. The tax -farmers had, in addition, a claim on 
certain tax -free land and the right to conscript the inhabitants 
of their districts for gratuitous work on such land (corvee). The 
tax -free land itself, called Wasiyya, became the private property 
of the family when tax -farming was made an hereditary privilege. 
A further group of landowners was made up of higher officials and 
officers to whom land had been promised in the name of the Sultan, 
which was likewise exempt from taxation. 
Mohamed Ali rightly directed his efforts for agrarian reform 
at the root of the evil, i.e., the privileged position of the large 
landowners. He first of all abolished those privileges which 
were exploited by their possessors as the most serious abuses. 
Only part of the taxes paid by the farmers had found its way into 
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the coffers of the State. After an examination of the validity 
of all title deeds, which served as a basis for the claims on the 
land entrusted to the tax -farmers for the purpose of tax 
collection, all such claims were declared invalid during the years 
1808 -1814. Those tax -farmers with a loyal past were indemnified 
by the grant of a life pension, the taxes from then on being 
collected direct by Government officials. The success of these 
measures lay first in the liberation of the country from the 
oppressive claims and privileges of the tax -farmers, so that the 
way was clear for further reforms. The farmers, owing to the 
merciless exploitation by the Mameluk families, had abandoned the 
cultivation of large stretches of land. In the ten years 1789- 
1$0$ alone the cultivated areas is said to have declined by two - 
thirds. In 1813, Mohamed Ali, who by abolishing the title deeds 
of the tax -farmers and by the confiscation of their private 
possessions (Wasiyyas), had become the owner of practically all the 
land, had a general land survey carried out and arranged at the 
same time for the distribution of the cultivated areas. The 
farmers received on an average between three and five acres, which 
were entered in the register of lands in their name. This 
registration did not represent any grant of ownership inasmuch as 
it had been expressly stated that the ownership of all the lands 
was reserved for the State. The peasants received only the right 
of usufruct, and the State reserved even the right of expropriation 
without compensation. Mohamed Ali did not content himself, 
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however, with this rearrangement of title deeds, but intervened . 
also in the cultivation of land. He compelled the peasants under 
threat of punishment to bring the untilled land once more under 
cultivation, and established a monopoly of the trade in agrarian 
products. 
The effects of these reforms were twofold. On the one hand, 
the development of individual ownership was encouraged in spite of 
the remaining restrictions on the transfer of land. On the other 
hand, alongside the tendency towards the individualisation of 
landed property belonging to the head of the State, the abuses 
common to this process were also rife, especially the accumulation 
of property in the hands of a few as a result of serious 
irregularities in the way of carrying out the general survey of 
the land. Inspectors were accessible to the bribes of the wealthy 
landowners many of whom remained in de facto possession of their 
influential position and were able to use it for the accumulation 
of landed property. Another factor worsening the unequal 
distribution of landed property was that, in order to encourage the 
working of uncultivated land, Mohamed Ali had earlier invested 
wealthy notables with land as their personal property. Such land, 
which was declared exempt from taxation for ten years, was 
distributed on condition that it was brought under the plough. 
In spite of these modest reforms the farmers could not improve 
their lot, for the burden of taxation was not appreciably lightened 
in the years that followed and the frequent calling -up of the 
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farmers for military service and gratuitous forced labour absorbed, 
a considerable amount of their energy. Thus the effects of these 
reforms were largely frittered away. In order to stimulate the 
interests of the farmers in the preservation of their holdings, 
a further law was passed in 1$54 to the effect that the tenant's 
land which had hitherto been granted for life only, could be 
inherited by the next of kin. In 185$, the principle of descent 
was confirmed and at the same time both sexes were given equal 
rights in this respect. But it took a number of years before the 
right to acquire full ownership of their estates was guaranteed to 
landowners. The 1871 law, the Mugabala which granted this right, 
owes its existence to the financial difficulties of the Khedive 
Ismail. Every tenant who paid the taxes on his land for six years 
in advance received full right of ownership therein and in addition 
a permanent reduction of the, land tax by 50 per cent. A consider- 
able part of the privately owned land in Egypt passed into the 
hands of its present owners on the strength of this law. 
This brief historical account of the development of land 
tenure in Egypt readily shows how detrimental is communal property 
to agricultural development. In most Oriental countries the 
Government has, therefore, in the interests of agricultural 
development, exercised pressure to expedite the abolition of the 
institution of collective ownership and the establishment of 
individual ownership of land. However, the tempo of this process 
is still slow. In some Eastern communities even to -day collective 
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landownership is widespread. In the Orient,therefore,the problem 
of collective land ownership and its adjustment to the new 
conditions still occupies an important, if not a central,position. 
Needless to say, the application of additional efforts and labour 
for the improvement of his holding appears to the peasant only 
justifiable if the fruits of such expenditure, no matter whether 
in the form of labour or capital, remain in his possession, and he 
runs no danger of forfeiting the advantages thereby attained by a 
change of the plots when occupied on a collective basis. Thus in 
societies where production is left to private enterprise, initiative 
will be weak unless the property institution creates incentives. 
Livestock cannot be improved if all pasture land must be used in 
common, neither can improved rotations be practised in agriculture 
if the enterprising farmer is not allowed to enclose his land. 
Private enterprise and communal property can hardly be consistent 
with each other and with economic progress. 
4. INCIDENCE OF LAND OWNERShIP. 
From the point of view of economic progress the establishment 
of the institution of private property is not enough. Even if 
wealth is privately owned, but meanwhile concentrated in the hands 
of a small number of people in the society, this concentration of 
wealth would present handicaps to economic development. This is so 
because, so long as the masses of people are unable to share 
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sufficiently the fruits of economic progress,there is apt to be 
little incentive for them to exert the maximum effort. Moreover, 
in any society inequalities of wealth will entail inequality of 
opportunity to the greater part of the population; and this in 
turn will keep ignorant many people who would play an active part 
in economic development, were they given the opportunity. The 
great inequalities of wealth and income therefore provide one of 
the major economic problems of Eastern communities. 
In many such communities, a major cause of income inequalities 
is the unequal distribution of wealth. As the greater part of the 
population is employed on the land and the bulk of the national 
income is derived from agricultural enterprise, any attempt to 
bring about a more equitable distribution of wealth would naturally 
start with agrarian structure and land tenure. 
No more conclusive evidence could be found to illustrate the 
gravity of the distributive problem than the available data 
collected in respect of the distribution of land in the Middle 
East. Consider, for instance, the case of Egypt in 1950. Of a 
total number of some 2.5 million landowners, not less than 1.7 
million or 70.8 per cent belong to the category of the smallest 
farmers who own up to one feddan (1 feddan - 1.03$ acres) while 
their total holding is only 12.5 per cent of the cultivated area, 
and the average holding is less than half of a feddan. On the 
other hand, there are about 12,000 landowners with holdings of 
50 feddans and over; these comprise one half of 1 per cent of the 
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total number of landowners, but they own about 37 per cent of the 
cultivated area. Between these extremes are the small farmers 
who own 1 to 5 feddans (22.8 per cent of owners, 20.2 per cent of 
area), and landowners with holdings ranging from 5 to 50 feddans 
(5.9 per cent of owners, 30.4 per cent of area) . No prospects of 
social stability, improvement in agriculture, or of raising the 
standard of living of the masses can be visualised unless drastic 
measures, fiscal'or otherwise, are taken to cope with the problem 
in an effective way. 
"In many under- developed countries, the cultivators of the 
soil are exploited mercilessly by the landlord class which performs 
no useful social function. This class contrives to secure to 
itself the major part of any increase in agricultural yield, and 
is thus a millstone around the necks of the tenants, discouraging 
them from making improvements in agriculture and, in any case, 
leaving them too little income from which they might save to 
invest in the land. In such countries land reform, abolishing 
this landlord class, is an urgent pre- requisite of agricultural 
progress. Land reform is not, of course, the only pre -requisite; 
capital must be made available to the farmers, extension work must 
be organised; the size of the unit of cultivation must be 
reconsidered; and so on. But the land reform in these countries 
would be the first step necessary for releasing the productive 
energies of the people. "(1) 
1) United Nations Report on Measures For The Economic Development of 
Under,Developed Countries, May 1951, p.21. 
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Land reform can thus be said to serve a twofold purpose: a 
social púrpose in the sense of bridging the gap between the two 
extremes of income and an economic purpose in the sense of 
promoting agricultural development. 
5. THE SIZE OF THE AGRICULTURAL UNIT. 
Having discússed the importance of radical land reform to 
agricultural development in under -developed societies, it is then 
proposed to consider the choice between large and small scale 
enterprise in agriculture. 
In some under- developed countries the farms are too large, 
either in the sense that to increase the number of farms would 
increase the national income, or in the sense that it would 
distribute the national income more equitably. Many such countries 
are engaged in breaking up large estates. In most under -developed 
countries, however, the problem is exactly the reverse of this: 
there are too many agricultural holdings. Sometimes the amount of 
land worked by the average farmer is adequate, but each farmer is 
working several plots widely separated from each other. Where 
this is the case, the remedy may be to pass legislation providing 
compulsorily for the consolidation of holdings. 
More usually, the trouble is that there are too many farmers. 
There is no fundamental remedy for this, except either to bring new 
land under cultivation, or to create new industries more rapidly 
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than the population is growing, so that the pressure on the land 
may be reduced. This is a very urgent problem in many areas. 
Meanwhile, co- operative farming can be encouraged; and legislation 
to prevent the further splitting up of holdings may also be 
required.(1) 
The family farm is the ideal of most democratic peoples, and 
in the long run it can develop a high level of efficiency as a 
result of the incentives of working on one's own account. Iffnere 
economies of scale are significant the efficiency of the family 
farm may be supported by organising some functions co- operatively 
or through government agencies, e.g. credit, marketing or 
machinery pools. Nevertheless, where economies of scale are 
significant the small farm has to face the challenge of alternative 
systems of potentially high efficiency. 
6. AGRICULTURAL SYSTEMS . 
In the organisation of agriculture,the simplest arrangement 
is for the farmer to own the land which he cultivates in 
co- operation with his family. This plan has its recommendations: 
give a man secure tenure of a rock and he will turn it into a 
garden, give him a nine years' lease of a garden and he will turn 
it into a desert. But the scheme has its drawbacks relative to 
time, place and circumstances. While it ensures that assiduous 
attention shall be paid to the tilling; of the land, it cannot 
00) Ibid., Sec. 69, p. 25. 
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ensure that the land shall be treated in an enlightened fashion 
and with adequate capital. And when it is not supplemented with 
some form of co- operation, a deplorable lack of economy in 
marketing results. Moreover, under peasant proprietorship, there 
may be a danger of excessive division of holdings. Besides, the 
abler peasants will not find it possible to acquire all the land 
that they could manage because of its cost to purchase outright. 
Many who are best 'qualified to cultivate the land may have no 
chance of getting any at all. Some of these disadvantages of 
peasant proprietorship may be minimised by associating with it a 
leasehold system as well as by adopting some form of co- operation. 
Peasants may unite for the attainment of limited ends by co- 
operation, since small producers are placed at a disadvantage in 
competing with large producers in certain fields of production. 
For this reason, they may combine in order to enjoy co- operatively 
the economies of large scale. For instance, they may possess 
specialised agricultural machinery on a collective basis; they 
may buy seeds and manure jointly, and jointly arrange with the 
railway companies for the carriage of their produce. The 
co- operative dairy also seems to have removed a disadvantage at 
which the small dairy farmer is evidently placed. 
In the organisation of agriculture there is also the metayage 
system. It is a system which in fact is intermediate between 
peasant proprietorship and the leasehold system. Under it farms 
are united in estates over which rights are exercised by persons 
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who are called landowners, though the land may not by custom be 
theirs to do with just as they like. Broadly understood, 
metayage exists in a variety of forms in many parts of the world, 
and in some of these farms it shades off into the leasehold system. 
The landowner furnishes a portion, if not the whole, of the 
capital; and the character and the extent of the cultivation is 
generally made a matter of arrangement between him and the 
cultivator. Thóugh the liberty of the cultivator is restricted 
and there may be a fear lest the methods of farming should become 
stereotyped, the enterprise of the cultivator may actually be 
stimulated, and given opportunities, by a good landowner whose 
intelligence will probably be more highly trained than that of the 
average peasant. As the landowner is a partner, he appropriates 
some of the produce as his remuneration; his share is some agreed 
proportion of the whole. It has been objected to metayage that, as 
the landowner takes a certain proportion of the produce, the 
inducement to the cultivator to do his best is partially 
obliterated and he will therefore work the land less intensively. 
This objection might be fatal, were details as regards the working 
of the holding not settled by arrangement between the landowner and 
the farmer. It would not seem, however, to be serious in practice, 
especially in view of the tendency to excessively intense 
cultivation as regards the application of labour to the land on 
small holdings. But metayage has the merit of providing that the 
burden of the payment made to the landlords by the cultivators 
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shall be automatically reduced in bad years, as it is not when 
farms are leased at a fixed annual charge. Theoretically, under 
metayage, the size of the farm is readily adapted to the capacity 
of the cultivator, though actually tenacity of custom has curtailed 
adaptability in this respect. 
In the leasehold system, however, the leaseholder is left 
with a freer hand than the metayer, but he is seldom permitted to 
alter the character of his farm without the consent of his landlord, 
and is naturally required to keep the state of the property up to 
a certain level. Whether the greater liberty which the lease- 
holder enjoys is a gain or a loss from the public point of view, or 
his own, depends in chief upon the initiative, resourcefulness and 
knowledge of the cultivator. Freedom to make endless mistakes 
and muddle into embarrassment is a doubtful boon. 
For the attainment of the most fruitful results from the 
leasehold system, however, it is essential that the land should be 
leased for a period which will be lengthy enough to make it worth 
the farmer's while to spend himself and his resources liberally 
upon the land. It may be added that arrangements for compensation 
for unexhausted improvements, which are equitable both to tenants 
and landowners, have the good effect of preventing the waste of 
time, land and capital, which otherwise is unavoidable when a 
lease is drawing to a close and the farmer is chary about investing 
fresh capital in the land, and is anxious to squeeze out of it 
every atom of value. With all its good points, the leasehold 
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system is unsuited to the remote districts of new countries, where 
farms have to be made out of rough land, unless the lease is an 
exceedingly long one. A ,large reward must be offered to persuade 
the cultivator to endure the toils and discomforts and face the 
dangers and solitude of pioneering. 
7. THE SYSTEM OF INHERITANCE. 
Finally, reference has to be made of the system of inheritance 
which is closely related to the concept of the family. Whenever in 
a society the legal framework lays down the rights of private 
property, the rights of inheritance will stem therefrom, and the 
law will stipulate the way in which the private property of one 
member of a family on the occasion of his death, i.e. his legacy, 
will be distributed amongst other members of the family, and its 
rights will be legally transferred to them. This principle of 
inheritance is held by many to constitute another weakness of the 
family system in so far as economic progress is concerned. The 
testator bequeathes to his heir or heirs his own property after his 
death. These rights of property and inheritance are recognised 
in all capitalist societies, and to some extent in such societies 
with mixed economy and socialist elements as that of the United 
Kingdom where these rights are still maintained but meanwhile much 
curbed through heavy taxation on legacies. Controversy over such 
rights is linked with the serious allegation that the transmission 
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of property by inheritance has established an institution which 
may discourage all the incentives to progress. 
Supporters of private property stand on the ground that 
nothing promotes efficiency so much as private property. Rightly 
or wrongly, man is by nature an acquisitive animal, and his passion 
for wealth and power has been the main driving force of progress 
through the ages. Deprive him of the outlet for this instinct, 
as would be the ease if private property were abolished, and the 
strongest of all the incentives to progress would disappear. Men 
vary greatly in intellectual and in other abilities, and these 
natural differences find expression in the corresponding in- 
equalities arising from the institution of private property, and 
this is, on the whole, to the benefit of society. 
Many of the worst defects in private property have been 
corrected by the actions of the State. Great inequalities of 
wealth, arising from private property, have been diminished by 
income and sur -tax, and by death and inheritance duties. even 
the right of inheritance, although not free from defects, is 
not wholly an evil. It gives expression to a fundamental family 
instinct; a man's will to work and to save is greatly stimulated 
by the ambition to leave an inheritance to his children, and it 
is probable that the balance between spending and saving would 
be seriously disturbed if inheritance were abolished by the State. 
Specific fiscal measures may be so designed as to redress 
the defects of inheritance. The Rignano type of death duties, 
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for instance, is based on the principle that the tax on an 
inherited fortune should be graduated according to its age, 
i.e., the number of times it has already changed hands by 
inheritance. The greater the age of the fortune, the higher 
would be the tax rate. Death Duties of such a type would 
amount to a differentiation between "earned wealth" and 
"unearned wealth ". They induce individuals accumulating 
wealth to work and save, and by reducing the expectations of 
prospective inheritors they create in the meantime strong 
incentives to working and saving. 
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CHAPTER 14 
-SOiv'iE OTHER ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS 
1. BIOLOGICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL ASPECTS 
It is sometimes maintained that different races have inherently 
different elements of progress owing to differences in biological 
structure. This.is,indeed, the residual factor that cannot be 
explained in terms of sociological science. 
Geography, on the other hand, offers another explanation. 
Much obviously depends on the character of the physical environ- 
ment, or of the natural resources considered as factors of 
production. Here are involved such things as the character of the 
soil, the forest resources, topography as favouring or hindering 
cheap transportation, mineral resources, the availability of 
water- power, and rainfall and temperatures. At any given time, 
countries that possess such natural resources as are adequate to 
technology will most probably take the lead in economic progress. 
This proposition, however, can hardly be true all the time. On 
the one hand, we know of some under -developed countries which 
would potentially be progressive had they made use of available 
resources. But the state of technology in these countries Might 
have been so poor that any significant use of their economic 
potential would scarcely be feasible. On the other hand, even 
if the state of technology would initially make possible the 
economic disposal of the natural resources, this does not mean 
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that the technological advancement would go on incessantly. The 
time may come, sooner or later, when technology changes no more, 
and stagnation would set in despite the sufficiency of the scarce 
resources of Nature. 
Again.,geography suggests that countries situated on the sea 
routes are accessible to foreign trade. It is not surprising 
that countries in such a favourable geographical situation will 
start trade relations with others, make money and become richer, 
and hence have ample opportunity to bring economic progress to a 
head. On this issue, empirical evidence is available. China's 
stagnation is explained primarily on the grounds that the Chinese 
were very suspicious of the foreigners to such an extent that they 
were in favour of an isolationist policy, and thus they handled 
an insignificant volume of foreign trade confined only to one port. 
When they deliberately excluded foreign trade, the Chinese ex- 
cluded meanwhile the very elements of economic progress. Although 
this argument, in theory and in practice, seems to be true in 
large measure, it is by no means true in each and every case. 
Some countries, it will be observed, have been open to foreign 
trade for many decades, and still they were, and always are, 
economically backward. 
Geography also suggests that climate, too, is one of the 
most important pre -requisites of economic progress. This can only 
be achieved in temperate climates, but in hot as well as cold 
climates, human life becomes so intolerable that people living under 
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these unfavourable climatic conditions tend to be apathetic and 
inactive. Again one might question the validity of this argument. 
Historically,it is well -known that almost all ancient civilisations 
began in hot countries, and these were indeed ahead of other 
countries simply because the technology of their time enabled them 
to take the lead in economic progress. 
As Viner; has pointed out, an unfavourable physical environment 
can be a major obstacle to economic development. That it needs 
not be a fatal obstacle, however, that it can be overcome by high 
quality in its human resources, is demonstrated by the case of 
Switzerland. Except for the one advantage of its strategic 
location across some major trade routes, Switzerland has scarcely 
a single physical advantage for economic development. Nevertheless, 
in wealth per capita it ranks near the top, and it ranks high also 
in per capita income.(1) 
2. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
That the psychological factors are no less relevant and 
important in the study of the causes of progress and stagnation 
is a commonplace. Economic progress will not be desired in a 
community where the people do not realise that progress is 
possible. Progress occurs only where people believe that man 
can, by conscious effort, master nature. This is a lesson which 
the human mind has been a long time learning. Where it has been 
e1) Jacob Viner, International Trade And Economic Development, Oxford, 1953, 
1.103. 
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learnt, human beings are experimental in their attitude to 
material techniques, to social institutions, and so on. This 
experimental or scientific attitude is one of the pre -conditions 
of progress. The greatest progress will occur in those countries 
where education is widespread and where it encourages an 
experimental outlook. 
Even where people know that a greater abundance of goods 
and services is possible, they may not consider it to be worth 
the effort. Lack of interest in material things may be due to 
the prevalence of another - worldly philosophy which discourages 
material wants. It may also be due to a relative preference 
for leisure. In the latter case, the amount of work people wish 
to perform will be small, but they will not necessarily be averse 
to measures which increase the productivity of such work as they 
do. A high preference for leisure is not consistent with great 
material possessions, but it is not necessarily inconsistent with 
economic progress. 
Alternatively, people may be unwilling to make the effort 
to produce wealth if the social prestige which they desire is 
more easily acquired in other ways. Thus, in feudal or aristocratic 
societies where power is inherited rather than earned, and where 
little respect is accorded to wealth which has been created in the 
first or second generation, the energies of ambitious men are not 
attracted so much to the production of wealth as to the 
acquisition of skills which may secure entry into the strongholds 
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of power - to the acquisition of military skill, or the skill 
of the hunt, or the skill of the lawyer or priest. In such 
societies, the production of wealth is frequently held in 
contempt as a profession for well -bred young men. By contrast, 
economic progress is rapid in countries where the successful 
organisers of economic activity are among the more highly prized 
members of the community. 
(1) 
3. ENGINES OF ECONaJC PROGRESS 
Throughout it is contended that social institutions, e.g., 
the ruling class, religion, and the family, are sometimes 
inimical to economic progress. It now remains to see how the 
existing social institutions can be thrown overboard by the 
creative minority. clars, plagues, famines, volcanoes, earth- 
quakes and the rest of the list of crises of human life are the 
very conditions in which the social framework can be easily 
loosened up and the society becomes well adapted to the desirable 
social transformation. These conditions can then be metaphorically 
called the engines of economic progress. 
In Toynbee's exposition of his twenty -six civilisations, his 
main thesis is that, time and again, societies are liable to some 
shock of one kind or another. ':`[henever these historical events 
take place, societies begin to move and undergo fundamental changes 
in their structure. Consider, for example, the historical event 
(i) C.f. United Nations Report on Measures For The Economic Development 
of Under- Developed Countries, May 1951, p.13. 
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of war and its repercussions on a society. It is true, to some 
extent, that victory in war may carry with it the very symptoms of 
social breakdown and disintegration. We know that ancient 
empires, built up as they were on conquest and warlike achievements, 
did not last long before they eventually gave way to collapse and 
decay. The Arab State which expanded far and wide by successive 
invasions ultimately disintegrated when its rulers presumably 
took to luxury and settled down to a life of wealth, splendour 
and indulgence in pleasure. But this does not necessarily mean 
that a society should be defeated, for complete defeat would lead 
to degeneration or even annihilation. 
As a pre- condition of economic progress, war is also 
significant for it provides the new men in the society with their 
real opportunity. Lenin, for example, was an opportunist, and 
the occasion of war as a social shock was a fundamental element 
in his opportunist doctrine. In this sense it can be explained 
why he strived to convert an imperial war into a communist one. 
Let us again consider the impact on the social structure of 
another social shock such as the event of a major earthquake. 
Society loosens up; destruction is everywhere; the link with the 
past is lost; and traditional ties fade away. After this misery 
is over, new men start to build up a new society in which the 
newly established institutions would be conducive to economic 
progress. 
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SU Yli,iARY AND PROSPECTS 
To sum up, economic progress begins with a social shock 
which will inevitably loosen up the society and create the very 
conditions in which new men emerge. If the society is accessible 
to foreign trade, this enables these new men, impresséd by 
foreign experience, to disintegrate the existing social structure 
which is inimical to progress. Ancient philosophies have to be 
scrapped; old institutions have to disintegrate; and bonds of 
caste, creed and race have to be removed. But the fact that the 
people of a country must desire progress is no less important than 
the creation of a new social framework which is favourable to 
progress. 
But if one looks at the world of reality and explores the 
possibilities of progress among the different countries of the 
East, one will be much disappointed at the fact that most of the 
Eastern countries have economically been backward for so many 
decades. Social shocks of one kind or another are not infrequent. 
Again and again, wars break out in different parts of the world 
at short intervals, and within thirty years the world has witnessed 
two major wars. Other miseries of life are not lacking in 
intensity or frequency. Famines may be disguised by way of 
relief action on basis of international co- operation in welfare, 
but they are there in varying degrees and intensities. The neo- 
Malthusians are once more freezing our blood with tales of what 
will happen if output does not keep up with population. What, 
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then, is the stumbling block in the way of rapid economic 
progress? ghat social institutions do not easily disintegrate 
in practice? 
In the writer's judgment, it is the institution of the 
ruling class that is the key to the solution of the problem of 
economic development in under -developed Eastern societies. 
So long as the ruling class succeeds in preserving its power and 
privileges, so long will the way be barred to economic progress. 
The conservative ruling class must be overthrown and denied all 
privileges, and another progressive class established in its 
place. The new leadership would then inspire the masses and win 
their confidence; it would demolish the old and build up the new. 
PART IV 




THE DERIOGRAPHIC ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. 
Having discussed the circumstances in which economic progress 
emerges, it is now proposed to discuss the second set of questions 
in the new treatment of the theory of economic development, namely 
the policies -which promote progress. As has been pointed out 
already, a new society is created and inspired by new men and 
assisted by foreign experience. If now a new leadership is 
launched by new men who emerge out of the ruins of the traditional, 
chaotic past, overthrowing the reactionary ruling class that was 
inimical to progress, it might then be asked: What should they do 
to promote economic progress? 
The starting -point in this discussion is an obvious proposition: 
If the national dividend is to be increased, then both the quantity 
and the quality of factors of production have also to be increased, 
except for labour. An increase or decrease in labour power can 
only be desirable if account is taken of the the size of the 
existing population in relation to the community's available 
resources. Let us turn, therefore, to the problem of population 
in under -developed countries from both the static and dynamic 
points of view. 
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1. THE 'STATIC? PROBLEM. 
OF POPULATION IN UNDER- DEVELOPED SOCIETIES. 
The problem of rural overpopulation is a characteristic 
feature of peasant economies that stretch all the way from south- 
eastern Europe to south -eastern Asia. Chronic and large -scale 
underemployment in agriculture is what countries of this type have 
in common. There is .a tremendous waste of labour; and labour, we 
are told, is the source of all wealth. What this implies in 
regard to capital formation is the so- called concept of 'disguised 
unemployment'. 
Densely populated communities suffer from large -scale 
disguised unemployment in the sense that, even with unchanged 
techniques of agriculture, a large part of the population engaged 
in agriculture could be removed without reducing agricultural output. 
The same farm output could be got with a smaller labour force. The 
proviso that this is possible without any improvement in technical 
methods is important. With better techniques, one could always 
take some people off the land without reducing output. But here 
apparently we have a state of affairs where this can be done 
without any change in methods. 
Thus the departure of the excess population would be a big 
change in itself and would inevitably involve some other changes. 
But the changes that we exclude here are technological advance, 
more equipment, mechanisation, better seeds, improvements in 
drainage, irrigation, and other such conditions. We exclude these 
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changes here only in order to isolate the possibilities that stem 
from the presence of large -scale disguised unemployment. There is, 
of course, no question of excluding them from any development 
programme in practice. 
One thing, however, we need not exclude and that is better 
organisation. If the surplus labour is withdrawn from the land, 
the remaining people will not go on working in quite the same way. 
We may have to allow for changes in the manner and organisation of 
work, including possibly a consolidation of scattered strips and 
plots of land. 
But the term'disguised unemployment', as defined here, is not 
to be applied to wage labour. It denotes a condition of family 
employment in peasant communities. A number of people are working 
on farms' or small peasant plots, contributing virtually nothing to 
output, but subsisting on a share of their family's real income. 
There is no possibility of personal identification, here, as there 
is in open industrial unemployment. In industrial countries 
unemployment is a glaring waste of resources which is visible to 
all, and has perhaps for this reason attracted more attention. In 
an overpopulated peasant economy, we cannot point to any person and 
say he is unemployed in disguise. The people may all be occupied, 
and no one may consider himself idle. Yet the fact remains that a 
certain number of the labour force on the land could be dis,ensed 
with, without making any difference to the volume of output. 
In technical terms, the marginal productivity of labour is zero. 
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Some observers suggest that it may even be negative, which would 
imply that, by removing some people, farm output could actually be 
increased. The reason for this might be that under existing 
conditions people actually get into each other's way, so that if 
some goaway those who remain are able to work more effectively. 
But this seems to be a doubtful and unnecessary assumption. 
Changes in technical methods are excluded from the above 
definition of disguised unemployment. Improvements in methods 
are extremely important. Experts seem to be agreed, however, that 
it is rather hopeless to try to introduce better farming methods 
unless the excess population is drained off first. There is little 
chance of any substantial advance in agricultural technique until 
some of the factors of production now engaged in that activity have 
been removed. This may sound paradoxical, but there is some 
basis for this view. And in this broad dynamic sense the marginal 
productivity of labour can perhaps be said to be negative. 
This concept of disguised unemployment is typical of many 
economically backward areas. In these overcrowded areas it is 
truly a mass phenomenon, due to social, economic and demographic 
causes. There are no alternative employment opportunities; two 
thirds to four -fifths of the aggregate labour force work on the 
land. And of this agricultural population, according to various 
estimates in the different countries, 15 per cent, 20 per cent, or 
as much as 30 per cent constitutes disguised unemployment in the 
sense in which the term has been defined. 
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In certain south -eastern European countries in the 1930's 
estimates of the extent of disguised unemployment tended to show 
that it represented about 25 to 30 per cent of the agricultural 
labour force. The highest estimates of the degree of disguised 
unemployment, i.e. 40 to 50 per cent, are for Egypt. The data 
presented by Cleland in 'The Population Problem in Egypt' 
(1936 ) make 40 per cent seem a reasonable estimate. .In a later 
study by the same author, quoted in Doreen T:'arriner's work, 
(l) 
half 
the Egyptian farm population is regarded as surplus. Naturally, 
estimates of this kind are highly tentative, but the importance of 
this phenomenon seems to be quite significant from the quantitative 
point of view. 
Some economists, however, maintain that disguised unemployment 
on the land is only a seasonal phenomenon, and that at the peak of 
the harvest season all the available labour is needed and is 
actively at work. This is certainly true in some countries, 
though in others even the peak harvest load might be managed by a 
smaller labour force if organisat_onal changes, e.g. consolidation 
of plots, could be carried out. Seasonal under -employment is 
likely to be significant where an annual crop cycle dominates farm 
activity,and where this activity has not developed more advanced 
farming. Even where disguised unemployment is mainly a seasonal 
matter, the question of making productive use of it still arises 
and still has important implications in regard to capital formation. 
11) Doreen Warriner: 'Land and Poverty in the Middle East', London 1948,p.33. 
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Nevertheless, there are countries where the problem is more than 
seasonal, where a great deal of concealed unemployment exists 
throughout the year. In Egypt, for instance, the various crops, 
some of which are harvested more than once a year, tend to overlap 
so that there is hardly any time of the year when some crop is 
not being harvested. In such circumstances any underemployment 
that may exist must be more or less continuous. 
Disguised rural unemployment differs in several ways from 
open industrial unemployment. It differs notably in that it 
cannot be absorbed by means of an expansion of monetary demand. 
The inelasticity of agricultural production makes this remedy quite 
ineffective. The supply of necessities, which are mostly food, is 
rigid in the short run so that, when monetary expansion takes place, 
the outcome is merely an inflation of prices. There is the 
possibility, however, of taking the surplus people away from the 
land; and anything they could produce elsewhere would be a clear 
addition to the real national income. 
It should be noticed, however, that this is a static picture 
of the population resources in a society. We look at the 
population at a point of time and find that a certain proportion of 
it could be dispensed with in agriculture and shifted to other 
activities without reducing food output. This is a static view in 
contrast to the dynamic view which must take account of population 
growth. 
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2. THE ' DYNAliIC' PROBLEIT. 
OF POPULATION IN UNDER -DEVELOPED SOCIETIES. 
In recent discussions of disguised unemployment in relation 
to economic development, it has been customary to meat population 
growth, like excess population, as a factor determining the need 
for capital. A fashionable type of calculation has been to 
estimate the amount of capital 'required' for the productive 
employment both of the annual increase in the labour force and of 
the existing surplus labour. The population increment has also 
to be provided with capital. Socially speaking, population 
increase means an increase in the demand for capital for extensive 
investment, as distinguished from intensive investment, in the 
familiar terminology used sometimes by demographers as well as by 
economists like Alvin Hansen. While intensive investment means 
an increase in capital per head and hence in productivity and 
average living standards, extensive investment in the course of 
population growth serves merely to maintain the supply of capital 
per head of the labour force.(l) The investments contemplated 
under the Colombo Plan may prove to be of the extnsive kind, since 
it seems that they can be expected to do little or nothing, beyond 
holding the existing per capita position in the face of the 
continued rapid growth of population in south -eastern Asia. 
(1) C.f. Part II, Chapter 8, Sec.2., 'Stagnation Thesis From The Viewpoint 
Of The Under -Developed Economy, p. 227 
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Thus if people in an overcrowded underdeveloped area look 
forward -to raising their level of living, they have to have an 
increased production of foodstuffs and industrial products. But 
unless the rate of economic development is more rapid than the 
rate of population growth, the living standard will fall rather 
than rise. If such an area is really to make progress, it must 
develop non -farm activities rapidly enough to provide employment 
for all the increase in its national labour force, and must also 
create employment opportunities for still more workers so as 
gradually to reduce the existing surplus population on the land. 
This is the real task of economic development. 
Economic expansion requires capital formation. Effective 
expansion of industrial employment requires railways, streets, 
water supplies, buildings, electric power, and other facilities 
as well as factories and machinery. Extensive, detailed plans 
for economic development and large amounts of capital resources 
are required to produce this rate of growth in urban industry and 
employment. Meanwhile, agricultural, fisheries and forestry 
production must be increased to provide food and raw material for 
the expanding industrial population. Corresponding efforts and 
investments are thus required in farms, forests and fisheries to 
raise the rural output. Unless a satisfactory minimum rate of 
economic development in this sense is reached, a continued increase 
in real income per head can hardly be achieved. 
Attention has lately been focused on the possibility of taking 
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active measures to check the expansion of population in the 
overcrowded areas. A better balance between production and 
population, it is urged, can only be achieved if the rate of 
population growth is effectively slowed down. In the short run, 
it may be possible to take such active measures as raising the 
legal minimum marriage age, or spreading the use of contraceptive 
methods, as is now being done apparently even in India under a 
national 'fertility -control Policy', or imposing some legal 
restrictions on polygamy which is sanctioned by Islamic religion. 
In the longer run, it may be hoped that the dynamic population 
problem will solve itself through the widespread change in the 
scale of values which education and urbanisation tend to bring 
about. Historically, as Western countries industrialised, 
standards of living per worker rose and an increasing proportion 
of the population shifted to urban living. This was followed by 
a gradual reduction in birth rates and in net rates of population 
increase. Much the same sequence took place in Japan. Whether 
this sequence will also take place as backward areas industrialise 
remains to be seen. If any such result is to take place, the 
rate of economic development in each Linder- developed country must 
be fast enough for the real income per head to increase. In order 
to achieve this highly desirable target, the production of farms 
and factories must be high enough to ensure that the net amounts 
available for consumption increase at a faster rate than population, 
even after the deduction of the amounts to be put aside for domestic 
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saving and payment of service charges on foreign investment. 
Hence economic development is not merely an optional process 
that can be cut back or deferred at will. On the contrary, it 
is governed by certain economic principles of its own. The process 
of development in any country must attain a given speed before it 
can exceed population growth. Only then can it begin to improve 
standards of living, reduce excessive farm population and slow down 
population growth. Unless both the technical methods and assistance 
and the funds available for development are sufficient to attain 
that minimum speed, average standards of living will fall and large 
portions of the world will be governed by the old Malthusian checks. 
There is, however, another aspect of the population problem. 
It is well -known that the world's population increased by slightly 
less than 1 per cent per annum between 1900 and 1950 (1 per cent 
corresponding to 24 million additional persons every year). The 
rate of growth is accelerating, and over the next ten years it is 
expected to be 11;. per cent per annum. Thus the present prospect 
is that the world's population may double itself within the next 
fifty years. These prospects have produced great horror in some 
quarters, and it is held that the Malthusian bogey is rearing its 
ugly head again, threatening gigantic world famines unless 
population growth is quickly checked. Dut a Brazilian scientist, 
(1) 
(0) C.P. United Nations Report, Methods of Financing Economic Development, 
Section on Investment Needed For Minimum Speed of Development By F.A.O. 
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J. de Castro, in 'The Geography of Hunger' ridicules this attitude 
and maintains that if the world's population were to double in 
fifty years, this would in no way put uncomfortable pressure upon 
the world's resources. De Castro's argument is based on accepting 
an estimate that half the earth is cultivable, and on concentrating 
upon food, since not enough is known about mineral needs and 
resources. -He believes that the earth could carry four times as 
many people as it does at present, at a high standard of nutrition. 
Professor W.A. Lewis in an article on the subject comments that 
that claim is fantastic, for it apparently implies the cutting down 
of all forests to get the 50 per cent cultivable land. And, even 
if De Castro were right, there would still be cause for apprehension 
since the population could multiply itself four times within the 
next century and would then have reached its limits.. But he is 
only right in refuting the suggestion that we may already have 
passed the limits of cultivation.(l) 
True, there may still be room for some expansion of the 
agricultural acreage, for there exists some virgin land in Latin 
America, in Africa, in the interior of China, and in the islands 
of south -eastern Asia. Thus some part of the increase in world 
food supplies over the next two or three decades will come from 
bringing new land under the plough. In present circumstances, 
there can be no certainty as to the extent of the expansion of the 
1i) W.A. Lewis, Food, Famine and Fertility, The Observer, February 3, 1952, 
P.4. 
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agricultural acreage, for emigration of non -Europeans is to -day 
held up by political restrictions rather than by the lack of empty 
spaces, and the future of such restriction is a matter of 
speculation. What is certain is that reliance must be placed in 
larger measure on increasing the yield of the lands already under 
cultivation. The question then arises as to whether the backward 
countries could increase their production by say 3 per cent per 
annum over the next thirty years. On the side of industrial 
production this is beyond argument; increases of '5 per cent per 
annum are a commonplace in the early stages of industrialisation. 
But with food it is not so simple. In advanced countries the 
yield of agriculture per acre seems to increase by between 1 and 2 
per cent per annum. Technical possibilities in backward countries 
are much greater, for there is an immense gap between what is 
known and what is applied. Experts are of the opinion that the 
yield per acre in these areas could be doubled by using more 
fertilisers, by seed control, by pest control and by irrigation. 
In this respect, Lewis argues that, even if only what is already 
known were applied generally throughout world agriculture, 
elminating the primitive techniques of Asia and Africa and of much 
of Europe and America, the increase in agricultural output would 
be phenomenal. Even if there is no increase in area and no 
scientific revolution in agriculture, he maintains, the annual 
increase in world production of primary commodities can easily 
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attain a rate of 2 per cent. If science is widely applied, the 
(1) 
increase "may be much greater. 
3. DEVELOPMENT OR NO DEVELOPMENT. 
But the pessimists go a long way with Malthus and maintain that 
there is not much point in trying to increase the food supply. If 
the world grows more food and hence the living standards of the 
masses are improved, all that happens is that people will tend to 
reproduce themselves at a much faster rate. Famine is necessary 
in some parts, the pessimists believe, to keep the numbers down. 
The only way out of this dilemma is birth- control. Hence what is 
desirable is not agricultural development as such, but simply that 
moneys be willingly voted for birth - control programmes. If a 
population therefore is being held down only by famine, it would be 
ridiculous to grow more food since this will cause numbers to 
increase. To this point of view there can be raised two serious 
objections. First, there are limits to the rate at which numbers 
can increase. The natural increase in population is by no means 
infinite and is not only conditioned by economic forces. 
Statistical evidence shows that 32 per cent per annum seems to be 
almost the absolute maximum at present; but very few countries manage 
to attain even 2 per cent. Secondly, it is very doubtful 
(1) W.A. Lewis, Economic Survey 1919 -1939, London, 1949, p.192. 
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that raising the living standard will bring about an increase in 
birth rate in the Malthusian sense. It is almost uncertain that 
any positive correlation does exist between the standard of living 
and the birth rate. On the contrary, it is historically revealed, 
as has been pointed out, that the correlation tends to be negative, 
at least at the later stages of economic development.(l) What does 
really lie behind this misconceived fear? It is that the rate of 
population is increasing simply because mortality rates are falling 
while fertility rates remain almost unchanged; and the fall in 
mortality rates is due to the spread of medical knowledge and 
facilities. The rate of growth of population is now first and 
foremost a function of the extent to which medical services are 
made available to the people. It is true that the spread of these 
services is itself to some extent a function of the rate of economic 
development. But it is widely believed that these factors will 
remain largely independent. Medical knowledge will spread, and the 
population will increase, whether economic development takes place 
or not. Moreover, medical knowledge and facilities and the 
consequent reduction in disease and death rates will imply an 
increase in quality as well as size of the population. With 
greater physical health and vigour, there is likely to be an 
increase also in productive capacity. Surely this cannot be an 
entirely unfavourable factor economically so long as the increased 
(1) C.f. Part I, Chapter 3, 'Population Theories in Classical Political 
Economy0, pp. 92 -94. 
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production potential of the population is fully utilised. 
Thé belief that economic development must inevitably be 
dissipated in population growth, or that the rate of increase in 
population can be substantially diminished by refraining from 
economic development is therefore entirely unfounded. "If you can 
increase production faster than population can increase," says 
Lewis, "then the average standard of living will rise and this 
itself will reduce the rate of population growth. The fundamental 
proposition of Malthus was that production could not be increased 
faster than population. This may have been true in his day; but 
it is certainly not true in our day. We can, if we try hard, 
increase production faster than population; and, so far as we know, 
this is the only way to reduce population growth. Admittedly, we 
know very little about the factors which bring down fertility rates. 
It is possible that well- organised birth -control propaganda could 
do the trick, even among the poverty- stricken peoples of India, 
but this seems to be most unlikely. If we want to check population 
growth, the safest way seems to be rapid economic development, with 
all the cultural changes which this implies.tt(1) 





ADVERT' ISING AND DEiVIAND. 
It has been pointed out that the theory of capital formation 
under conditions of disguised unemployment in overcrowded areas 
rests on both a static and a dynamic view of population resources. 
It is widely recognised that emigration is not only an academic 
but actually an unreal solution to the population problem, for it 
does nothing to stop the population growth at the source. 
Exclusive . reliance on foreign grants, loans or investments is 
like emigration in that it does not provide a check to population 
growth. If a backward country really desires to check population 
growth, the only way is rapid economic development with all the 
cultural changes which education and urbanisation tend to bring 
about. The effective mobilisation of domestic saving potential 
is for this reason a basic initial prerequisite to capital for- 
mation and increasing real income per head. But capital formation 
is not entirely a matter of capital supply, although this is no 
doubt the more important part of the problem. It is therefore 
proposed to deal with a number of points on both the demand as well 
as the supply side. The dichotomy between demand and supply is 
fully applicable to the forces that govern the accumulation of 
capital. On the demand side of the problem, however, reference 
should first be made to investment incentives as they present 
themselves to the individual investor or entrepreneur. But 
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investment incentives, as we shall see later, are directly 
related to the issue of poverty. 
1. THE 'INCOME, CONCEPT IN RELATION TO 
THE UNDER- DEVELOPED ECONOMY. 
In dealing with the issue of poverty and prosperity, it is 
well to recall here the formal definition of the under- developed 
country as previously referred to.(1) A country of such a type 
is that which has good potential prospects of raising incomes per 
head, or of maintaining an existing fairly high level of income per 
head for an increased population. But while the supplementing of 
data as to economic aggregates by per capita averages provides 
essential information about the economy as a whole, this does not 
suffice to prove that.the mass of poverty in the country concerned 
has been lessened or increased. An under -developed country may 
embark on a programme of economic development, and later find not 
only that aggregate wealth, aggregate income, total population, total 
production, are all increasing, but that per capita wealth, income, 
production, are all increasing. As Viner has pointed out, all of 
these are favourable indications of development; but even in 
combination they do not suffice to show that there has been 'economic 
progress' in the sense of an increase in economic 'welfare'.(2) 
If it is sometimes argued that the one great economic evil is 
(I) C.f. Part II, Chap.8. Sec.1, 'The Meaning of Stagnation in Mature and 
Immature Economies', pp.224 -225. 
(2) Jacob Viner: 'International Trade and Economic Development', Oxford, 1953, 
P.99. 
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the prevalence of a great mass of crushing poverty, it is then 
a paradox to claim that a country is achieving economic progress 
as long as the absolute extent of such poverty as is prevailing 
in it has not lessened or has been increased. Such a country, 
however, might be able to meet all the tests of economic develop- 
ment. If its population has undergone substantial increase, but 
the distribution of its increased wealth and income is largely 
uneven, the numbers of those living at the margin of subsistence or 
below may have grown steadily consistently with a rise in the 
average income of the population as a whole.(1) 
Not only this, but there are certain conceptual problems 
concerning the meaning of income, which have confronted investigators 
in their attempt to compare national income aggregates of advanced 
societies with similar calculations for under -developed societies. 
The difficulty arises, not only as a result of different technical 
methods of organising production, e.g., market economy as opposed 
to family or subsistence economies, but has its origin rather in 
the different objectives and ideals which consciously or un- 
consciously dominate the communities whose individual and social 
economic activities are being compared. It is these historical and 
traditional factors, and not merely the state of technique and 
organisation, which are the basic cause of differences in the 
nature and form of the 'income' concept as between different 
societies at different stages of development. 
(i) Ibid., pp. 99-100 
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In the economically less advanced communities, the attempt 
by the individual to obtain what is called 'income' is an attempt 
to achieve a social purpose and is not an isolated activity. It 
is not merely an attempt to create a set of individual values or 
an abstract entity such as 'an individual income stream'. In 
such communities the creation of 'income' may best be understood 
from the angle of social communication, even if the accounting or 
economic symbolism which is employed in more advanced economies 
is such as to disguise this fact. What 'income' is, and how it is 
valued, is determined by the society in which the individual finds 
himself. "Our actions," says Frankel, "are not solely determined 
in isolation: they depend also on the influence we wish to exert 
upon others, and which their activities in turn exert upon us. 
Just as 'economic production depends on social co- operation, so the 
(l; 
symbolism according to which it is regulated is socially determined." 
In his view, the, problem arises precisely because we are dealing 
with different value systems and conventions, and thus the concept 
of abstract welfare has been and is being used as an inadequate 
bridge between different incomparable welfare systems. 
But Colin Clark, in criticising the view of some modern 
theoretical economists that it is impossible to compare the level 
of income between two communities,(2) argues that exponents of 
this view "do not realise what an intellectual anarchy they will 
(i) S.H. Frankel: 'The Economic Impact On Under Developed Societies', 
Oxford, 1953, pp.31 -32. 
(2) C.f. Colin Clark: 'The Conditions cá' Economic Progress', 2hd Edition, 
London, 1951, pp.16 -17. 
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let loose if their theories are adopted." 
of the concept of welfare," he -;rites, ''and 
Nothing: except possibly the theory of the 
"Deprive economics 
what have you left? 
trade cycle, where 
all values may be capable of expression in money terms without 
the introduction of the concept of welfare." He does not 
hesitate to make comparisons of economic welfare of different 
times, places, and groups of people; and in an attempt to make 
these comparisons he discusses Fisher's and Pigou's well -known 
for-nula. 
(1) 
In fact Colin Clark provides some data as to the national 
income per head in some under- developed countries in terms of 
U.S. dollars, 1939 purchasing power. 
(2) 
 In spite of the 
' above 
criticisms which both Viner and Frankel have levelled against the 
statistical concepts of aggregate incomes and incomes per head as 
(1) The so- called Pigou -Fisher ideal formula gives us the result that the 
comparative real income per head can be obtained from the geometrical 
mean of the following two ratios: cost of country A's goods at country 
B's prices and cost of country B's goods at country A's prices. 
(2) e.g., the national income per head in Peru was $39 in 1942, Salvador 025 
in 1940, Honduras $34 in 1942, Mexico $30 in 1940, Panama $127 in 1940, 
Columbia 069 in 1940, Paraguay $27 in 1940, Puerto Rico $122 in 1940, 
Jamaica $89 in 1942, British Guina $99 in 1942, Egypt $42 in 1944, 
Syria $63 in 1936, Iraq $49 in 1936, Cyprus $39 in 1936, Philippines 
$43 in 1938, Bulgaria $47 in 1945; see Colin Clark, op. cit, Table, p.161. 
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being criteria for the degree of poverty or prosperity, Colin 
Clark's tentative estimates should convey to us a rough picture of 
the very low level of living and of the state of pervasive poverty 
in under -developed societies, at least from the point of view of 
Western standards. Besides, one should bear in mind that in all 
the literature on economic development, there is no one single 
instance where statistical data in terms of aggregates and of 
averages have not been treated as providing adequate tests of 
the degree of achievement of economic development. 
Even other experts in this field have followed in the steps 
of Colin Clark, and in a report recently published by United 
Nations' Department of economic Affairs they have attempted to 
compile aggregate income and population statistics as related to 
five groups of under -developed areas, 
(1) 
exposing throughout the 
hidden assumption on which they are working: that all over these 
areas poverty is, rife and living standards are at comparatively 
low levels. On the basis of these economic aggreg;ates,the 
following table shows the income per head which the population 
of each under- developed area received in 1949. 
(i) See Statistical Appendix., p.527. 
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Table Showing per Capita Income Which the Population 
of.each Under Developed Area Received in 1949. 










Latin America 15$ 24,000 152 
Africa, excluding 
Egypt 17$ 13,200 74 
Middle East, including 
Japan 94 9,000 96 
South Central Asia 436 24,000 55 
Far East, excluding 
Japan 661 26,400 40 
Total 1,527 96,600 
On the basis of the above figures, the weighted average income, 
which the population of the five groups of under -developed areas, 
as a whole, received in 1949, is calculated to be little more than 
X60. Compare this figure with /54 as representing income per 
head in low -income countries in 1949, the latter having been 
compiled by United Nations Statistical Office. (1) 
If statistical data in terms of average national incomes 
are to be treated as providing adequate tests of the degree of 
achievement of economic progress, then these weighted averages 
should point again to the world's greatest, most serious, economic 
problem: the problem of much over half the world's :population 
(1) See table showing world income in 1949, p. 472 
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living under conditions of hunger, sickness, premature 
mortality and acute poverty. 
2. THE VICIOUS CIRCLE OF POVERTY. 
Under- developed areas, we are told, have remained, and will 
remain, under -developed. The 'vicious circle of poverty' is a 
phrase that crops up frequently in discussion of the problem of 
economic development. It implies a circular constellation of 
forces which tend to act and react upon one another in auch a way 
as to keep a poor country in a state of poverty. We can imagine, 
for instance, a poor man who may not have enough to eat. Being 
under -fed, his health may be weak; being physically weak, his 
working capacity is low, which means that he is poor, which in 
turn means that he will not have enough to eat; and so on. A 
situation of this sort, relating to a country as a whole, can be 
summed up in the following propòsition: 'a country is poor because 
it is poor'. 
This proposition has been made quite clear by Ragnar urkse.(1) 
He states that perhaps the most important circular relationships of 
this kind are those that afflict the accumulation of capital in 
economically backward countries. The supply of capital is 
governed by the ability and willingness to save; the demand for 
capital is governed by the incentives to invest. A circular 
relationship exists on both sides of the problem of capital 
formation in the poverty -ridden areas of the world. 
0) Ragnar Nurkse; 'Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries', 
Oxford, 1953, p.5. 
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On the supply side, he states, there is the small capacity 
to save, resulting from the low level of real income. The low 
real income is a reflection of low productivity, which in its 
turn is due largely to the lack of capital. The lack of capital 
is a result of the small capacity to save; and so the circle is 
complete. 
On the demand side, the inducement to invest may be low because 
of the small buÿing power of the people, which is due to their 
small real income, which again is due to low productivity. The 
low level of productivity, however, is a result of the small 
amount of capital used in production, which in its turn may be 
caused at least partly by the small inducement to invest; and so 
the circle is complete. 
Thus the low level of real income, reflecting low productivity, 
is a point that is common to both circles. Usually the trouble 
on the supply side receives all the emphasis. The trouble there 
is certainly obvious and serious; but the possible block on the 
demand side, once one becomes aware of it, is also fairly obvious, 
though it. may not be so serious, or so difficult to remove, as the 
supply deficiency. 
Nurkse, however, admits that capital is not everything. "In 
addition to the circular relationships that plague the capital 
problem ", he says, "there are, of course, matters of unilateral 
causation that can keep a country poor, e.g., lack of mineral 
resources or insufficient water or barren soil. Some of the 
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poorer countries in the world to -day are poor partly for such 
reasons. But in all of them their poverty is also attributable 
to some extent to the lack of adequate capital equipment, which 
can be due to the small inducement to invest as well as to the 
small capacity to save. 
3. THE LACK OF PURCHASING POWER 
IIv REAL TERNS. 
Adam Smith, as well as the Ricardiar_s, seems. to take it for 
granted that men have unlimited demand. Indeed they show no 
concern over the likelihood of deficiency of effective demand. 
J.B. Say, for his part, shares the view of the English classical 
economists, and comes along to expound his famous law that supply 
creates its own demand. It is that the general demand for 
produce is brisk in proportion to the activity of production, and 
that the products created give rise to various degrees of demand, 
according to the wants, the manners, the comparative capital, 
industry and natural resources of each country. Owing to the 
competition of buyers, the articles most in request yield the best 
interest of money to the capitalist, the largest profits to the 
adventurer, and the best wages to the labourers; and the agency 
of their respective services is naturally attracted by these 1 
advantages towards these particular channels. 
(l) 
In his famous work, J.B. Say has indeed gone so far as to 
(1) C. f. Part I, Chapter 3, Sec.1, 'Thomas Robert Malthus', pp. 101 - 104 
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contend that the consumption of a commodity by taking it out of 
the market diminishes demand, and the production of a commodity 
proportionately increases it. Malthus, in some respects 
anticipating Keynes, dissents from this traditional concept on 
the grounds that no permanent and continued increase of wealth 
can take place without a continued increase of capital, and that 
the problem which should worry us is not therefore the want of 
capital but deficiency in effective demand. In this sense, while 
J.B. Say as well as other classical economists were inclined to 
attribute the occasional breakdowns of trade to errors of judgment 
and disproportionate developments of production, Malthus insisted 
that they were due to an inappropriate relation between saving and 
consumption and a sluggishness in the response of the disposition 
to invest.(1) At the time Malthusian arguments fell into neglect; 
but since then the problem of demand has increasingly been 
recognised by the neo- classical economists, and the frequent 
recurrence of severe crises in the industrial world within the 
last hundred years bears out empirical evidence as to the real 
existence and significance of the problem. 
In under developed countries, it may at first be surprising 
to hear that there can be anything wrong on the demand side of the 
problem of capital formation. Backward areas, almost by 
definition, are greatly in need of capital for the efficient use 
of their labour and for the exploitation of their natural resources. 
In these circumstances, the demand for capital in such areas is 
(1) Ibid. , pp. 96-101. 
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tremendous, but there is here a serious handicap. In terms of 
private incentives to adopt capitalist methods in the productive 
process there is the difficulty that stems from the limited size 
of the domestic market in the early stages of a countryts economic 
development. 
It is a matter of common observation that in the poorer 
countries the use of capital equipment in the production of goods 
and services for the domestic market is inhibited by the small 
size of that market, by the lack of domestic purchasing power, not 
in monetary but in real terms. If it were only a deficiency of 
monetary demand, it could easily be remedied through monetary 
expansion; but the trouble lies deeper. Monetary expansion alone 
does not remove it, but produces only an inflationary spiral of 
prices. 
In the exchange economy of the real world, it is not difficult 
to find illustrations of the way in which the small size of a 
country's market can discourage, or even prohibit, the profitable 
application of modern capital equipment by any individual entre- 
preneur in any particular industry. In a country, for instance, 
where the great majority of people are too poor, many articles 
which are in common use in a Western rich country can be sold in 
a low- income country in quantities so limited that a machine 
working only a few days or weeks can produce enough for a whole 
year's consumption, and would have to stand idle the rest of the 
time. G. Wythe has given us several striking examples. In Chile, 
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for instance, it has been found that a modern rolling mill, which 
is standard equipment in any industfial country, can produce in 
three hours a sufficient supply of a certain type of iron shapes to 
last the country for a year. In these circumstances the inducement 
to instal such equipment is lacking. In some cases foreign branch 
plants which had been established in certain Latin American 
countries were subsequently withdrawn because it was found that the 
local market was too small to make their operation profitable. 
(1) 
Naturally the individual entrepreneur must take into consider- 
ation the size of the market for his commodity or service. He may 
hope to be able to deflect some of the present volume of consumers' 
demand in his own favour; but where real income is close to the 
subsistence level, there is little or no scope for such deflection. 
The limited size of the domestic market in a low- income country 
can thus constitute an obstacle to the application of capital by 
any individual firm or industry working for that market. In this 
sense the small domestic market is a deterrent to economic develop- 
ment in general. 
How can this obstacle be removed? What is it that determines 
the size of the market? Some may think of the size of a country's 
population as determining the size of the market. Others may 
have in mind the physical extent of the country's territory; others, 
again, may think, in this connection, of monetary expansion as a 
remedy. All these factors appear to be of secondary importance, 
(1) C.f. G. Wythe, Industry in Latin America, New York, 1951. 
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if not irrelevant. Again a popular prescription is that small 
adjacent countries should abolish restrictions on trade with each 
other, and set up what is commonly called a customs union. But 
the smallness of a country is not the basic difficulty; the 
market difficulty can even exist in very large countries such as 
India or China. 
Still others place much emphasis on high- powered methods of 
salesmanship and advertising as a stimulation to effective demand. 
It is therefore worth while to examine the pros and cons of 
advertising policies as an investment incentive. 
4. ADV'îRTISING PÜLICIFS. 
For investment incentives to come into play in the develop- 
ment of any economy two conditions must be satisfied: first, 
people should work and make money; secondly, people should want 
the things that money can buy. Are these two conditions fulfilled 
in backward areas? 
Let us first of all consider the condition that people should 
work and make money. Reference has already been made to the 
causes of lack of interest in matefial things. This may be 
attributed to the prevalence of a moral philosophy which tends to 
discourage material wants. More important, people may be 
reluctant to make the effort to produce wealth if the social 
prestige which they desire is more easily acquired in other ways. 
360. 
In a society of such a kind, people are not attracted so much to 
the production of wealth as to the acquisition of skill, military 
religious or otherwise, and the production of wealth is frequently 
held in contempt as a profession. The road to power and prestige 
is by moving in the circles of the ruling class; and thus people 
who are gifted may be precluded from ascending the social ladder. 
We are told that in Brazil, for example, much in affairs is done 
on a friendly basis, and doling out favours to friends and relatives 
is perhaps the rule rather than the exception. The same is true 
of many under -developed countries. If this is the road to power 
and prestige, it is no doubt a serious handicap to development, for 
if people in general refrain from producing wealth, how can an 
under developed country be economically developed? We should 
expect the least economic development where social prestige is 
mainly to be achieved by way of corruption, friendship and hypocrisy. 
It has also been noticed that most of the people in under 
developed countries do not want the things that money can buy. 
This is obviously another serious handicap. One may explain this 
attitude towards work and consumption demand in many ways. It may 
be psychological in the sense that people do not realise that 
progress is possible or even if it is possible that they will share 
in it with the rich minority on an egaliterian basis. It may be 
biological and that is a residual factor involving differences 
between races or cultures. Or it may be institutional in the 
sense that the consumption habits of the people are too rigid 
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either through their ignorance of better consumption standards 
or through their reluctance to change their cherished modes of 
life. If, then, it is the ignorance of better consumption 
standards that is largely responsible for the negative attitude 
of the masses towards work and consumption demand, there is a way 
out of the market difficulty. There is a popular prescription 
in the form of advertising policies designed to foster consumption 
demand. In this field of study, Bishop's work(1) may be con- 
sidered as a premise on which to explore the potentialities of 
salesmanship and advertising in so far as backward areas are 
concerned. 
Bishop's starting -point is to make a distinction between 
informative and persuasive advertising. In general, he says, 
all the vast daily mass of advertising, which may be regarded as 
strictly informative, may be considered useful and necessary. 
A large portion of modern advertising, however, is not informative 
and its primary object is to persuade the public. But not much 
value can be attached to the distinction between the two types, 
for they are often mixed and difficult to disentangle. Moreover, 
all modern advertising is persuasive in character, information 
being incidental to its main purpose. Private enterpriser, 
acting under the stimulus of profit motive, appeal directly to 
the ultimate consumers through advertising so as to stimulate and 
regulate demand besides protecting themselves agaihst the 
competition of others by building up a goodwill or a reputation 
(1) E.P. Bishop: 'The Economics of Advertising' 
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monopoly for their products usually differentiated and branded. 
Thus they assure themselves a steady and profitable market. In 
a free competitive economy, therefore, production as well as the 
means of stimulating demand are in private hands. Certain results 
would inevitably follow: the individual producer is concerned, 
not to adjust general demand to general supply, but to secure an 
adequate demand for his own product. Hence most modern advertising 
is competitive in character and has the effect of splitting up the 
supply of each kind of a familiar product into a number of 
differentiated brands. 
In the appraisal of advertising, however, the fundamental 
question is: does advertising serve a useful social purpose? 
Advertising is, of course, productive in the business sense. A 
business man judges it by its success or failure in increasing 
profits. But the real test is whether advertising creates utility 
in the economic sense. It is not easy to assess utilities created 
by advertising, nevertheless. Wants are usually in theory treated 
as data, as something fixed and known; and in theory, too, the 
manufacturer and the trader are presumed to be rearranging and 
moving matter in relation to these fixed wants. By contrast, 
advertising contributes to moving and rearranging matter the other 
way round, i.e. it creates utilities by moving and rearranging 
minds, that is by altering wants. And, there is no theoretical 
means to distinguish between utilities created by making available 
to the consumer something that he wants and utilities created by 
363. 
making him want something available to him. Hence the difficulty 
in discussing the effects of advertising upon the consumers' 
satisfactions. 
Braithwaite (E.J. 192$) distinguishes between informative 
advertising whose expenses can be legitimately included in 
selling cost and other advertising designed to create or stimulate 
demand which is, in his view, non - essential and unproductive. 
Samuel Courtauld (E.J. 1942), however, argues that advertising has 
a legitimate function if it is designed to let people know where 
they can get what they want or if it is an advertising campaign 
designed to introduce a really valuable commodity, hitherto unknown 
to the public. Most competitive advertising, other than these 
two types, is to be considered by Courtauld as a costly national 
extravagance. In the light of his analysis, there follows a 
complete denial of the claim of advertising to perform any 
necessary or useful function in stimulating demand for goods and 
services. But here Bishop contends that this sort of analysis 
seems to spring from the failure of classical economists to 
recognise the need for any stimulation of demand at all. He 
holds that nearly all advertising gives some information which 
otherwise would have to be provided in other ways, and to this 
extent advertising is productive of utility. The essential fact, 
however, is teat all commercial advertising is primarily designed 
to persuade, stimulate, arouse, increase and change wants; and 
the real issue, in the economic sense, is whether this aggressive 
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type of advertising is productive or wasteful. 
Although advertising is usually associated with well - 
developed economies, it is quite clear that it can play a not 
insignificant part in under -developed economies as well. The 
case for and against advertising, in so far as the welfare of the 
consumer is concerned,is presumably well -known in economic 
literature. Besides, advertising is likely to have favourable 
effects on the national economy as a whole in both developed and 
under -developed countries. But advertising has indeed special 
significance to the latter type of countries. Efficiency is to 
some extent a function of the scale on which economic activities 
are carried out. In its widest context, it relates to the size 
of the market itself. As Adam Smith has pointed out, division of 
(1) 
labour is limited by the extent of the market. But the internal 
markets of most under -developed countries are so small that they 
cannot support large -scale industries. Anything that promotes 
the expansion of these markets will do well to increase industrial 
efficiency in those countries. Advertising will do the trick 
by ensuring a ready market for new products. Nation -wide 
advertising campaigns will create national markets which were 
formerly only local. It is in this sense that advertising is very 
likely to raise the living standard directly by turning what would 
have been luxuries for the few into ordinary comforts within the 
reach of the masses. It assists the productive process in two 
(1) C.f. Part I, Chapter II, 'The Theory of Economic Policy in Classical 
Political Economy,' Section 1, p. 64 
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ways: by educating the public to the possibilities and uses of 
the newly advertised articles, and by so stimulating demand that 
the producer is encouraged to incur the risks of investment in mass - 
production plant and mass -selling organisation. 
Furthermore, advertising not only raises the living standard 
directly by bringing new products more quickly into the field of 
mass production, but raises it indirectly by encouraging further 
inventions and widening the field for investment and employment. 
The price of economic expansion and development must be paid by 
someone, and it is material to consider whethetT, without the 
protection which the patent laws on the one hand, and advertising 
on the other, give to the innovator, the product would ever have 
reached the stage of being marketed at all. 
Advertising is also claimed to stimulate the propensity to 
consume. It makes people in under - developed economies want 
things which without a stimulus they would not want. It induces 
them to work harder in order to obtain the means of satisfying 
their new wants while the money they earn and spend help to 
provide others with employment and means of satisfying their wants. 
Advertising is thus claimed to be useful in keeping the whole 
economy in order, and particularly in constantly raising the level 
of the consumption- income schedule in under -developed economies. 
Nevertheless, we must not throw ourselves unreservedly on 
the side of those advocates of advertising who believe that its 
magic is a cure -all for the problem of demand. A moment's 
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reflection will lead us to distinguish clearly between the 
deficiency of demand in economically developed and under - 
developed countries. The deficiency of market demand that tends 
to keep down private investment incentives in the domestic economies 
of under -developed countries is a deficiency of real purchasing 
power in terms of classical economics. It is not a deficiency 
of 'effective demand' in terms of Keynesian economics. There is, 
as a rule, no "deficiency of monetary demand;" there is no 
"deflationary gap ". On the contrary, many of these countries 
suffer from a chronic inflationary pressure. Money demand, 
though low in absolute amount, is excessive in relation to the 
capacity to produce. Supply creates its own demand, but supply 
is very small. It is small because of low productivity, which 
in turn is largely due to the lack of real capital. Supply being 
inelastic as well as small, monetary expansion leads merely to 
price inflation. Advertising likewise may lead merely to an 
increase in the willingness, but not necessarily the ability, to 
work harder and raise the real spending power. The ability to 
buy depends, after all, on the extent of employment opportunities 
and the volume of production in under- developed countries. In 
those countries, therefore, it seems most unlikely that advertising 





THE SIZE OF THE:T T RKET AND T HE THEORY OF BALANCED GROWTH. 
In the economy as a whole, the circular flow of goods and 
services produced and consumed is not a fixed magnitude. With a 
given population, it is a variable depending on people's productive 
efficiency. e are here in the classical world of Say's law. In 
under -developed countries there is, as a rule, no "deflationary 
gap" through excessive savings. Production creates its own demand, 
and the size of the market depends on the volume of production. 
In the last analysis, the market can be enlarged only through an 
all -round increase in productivity. Capacity to buy means 
capacity to produce. Productivity depends largely on the degree 
to which capital is employed in production. It is a function, in 
technical terms, of the capital -intensity of production. But, 
for any individual entrepreneur, the use of capital is inhibited, to 
start with, by the small size of the market. 
Where is the way out? In economically backward areas Say's 
law may be valid in the sense that there is no "deflationary ga. 
It never is valid in the sense that the output of any single 
industry, newly set up with capital equipment, can create its own 
demand. Human wants being diverse, the people engaged in the new 
industry will not wish to spend all their income on their own 
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products. And the people outside the new industry will not give 
up other things in order to buy the product of the industry if 
they do not have enough food, clothing and shelter. 
Thus the trouble is due above all to the inevitable 
inelasticity of demands at low real -income levels. It is in this 
way that poverty cramps the inducement to invest and discourages 
the application of capital to any single line of production. 
The enlargement of the market through the rise in productivity 
that would result from increased capital- intensity of production 
is inhibited by the initial smallness of the market. "l';e perceive 
a constellation of circumstances ", says Nurkse, "tending to preserve 
any backward economy in a stationary condition, in a state of 
'underdevelopment equilibrium', the possibility of which, in 
advanced industrial countries, was impressed on us by Keynes. 
Economic progress is not a spontaneous or automatic affair. On 
the contrary, it is evident that there are automatic forces within 
the system tending to keep it moored to a given level . t' ( 1) 
1. THE THEORY OF BALANCED GROWTH. 
All this, however, is only part of the story. The circular 
constellation of the stationary system is real enough, but 
fortunately the circle is not unbreakable. And once it is broken 
at any point, the fact that the relation is circular tends to make 
(1) Ragnar Nurkse, op. , ci t. p. 10. 
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for cumulative advance. What is it that breaks the circle? 
The difficulty caused by the small size of the market relates 
to individual investment incentives in any single line of 
production taken by itself. At least in principle, the difficulty 
vanishes in the case of a more or less synchronised application 
of capital to a wide range of different industries. Here is an 
escape from the deadlock; here the result is an over -all 
enlargement of the market. People working with more and better 
tools in a number of complementary projects become each others' 
customers. Most industries catering for mass consumption are 
complementary in the sense that they provide a market for, and 
thus support, each other. This basic complementarity stems, in 
the last analysis, from the diversity of human wants. The case 
for 'balanced growth' rests on the need for a 'balanced diet'.(1) 
This notion of balance is indeed inherent in the classical 
Law of Markets which generally passes under the name of Say's Law. 
J.S. Mill's formulation of this Law is that 'every increase of 
production, if distributed without miscalculation among all kinds 
of produce in the proportion which private in-erest would dictate, 
creates or rather constitutes its own demand'. "Here, in a nutshell, 
is the case for balanced growth. An increase in the production of 
shoes alone does not create its own demand. An increase in 
production over a wide range of consumables, so proportioned as to 
correspond with the pattern of consumers' preferences, does create 
?i) Ibid. , p. 11. 
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its own demand. It goes without saying that, with a given labour 
force and with given techniques and natural resources, it is only 
through the use of more capital that such an increase in production 
can be obtained . tt ( l ) 
Balanced growth may be a good thing for its own sake, but here 
it interests us mainly for the sake of its effects on the cbmand for 
capital. For it appears here as an essential means of enlarging 
the size of the market and of creating inducements to invest. But 
the question now arises, how can balanced growth be achieved? 
Ordinary price incentives may bring it about by small degrees. 
But slow growth is just not good enough where population pressure 
exists. Economic development must reach a minimum speed before it 
bears its fruits. In the evolution of Western capitalism, according 
to Schumpeter's theory, rapid growth was achieved through the action 
of individual entrepreneurs, producing recurrent waves of 
industrial progress. Many economists in the advanced industrial 
countries have commonly treated it as a theory of business cycles. 
In the advanced countries there has been a tendency to take economic 
development for granted, as something like a natural process that 
takes care of itself, and to concentrate on the short -run 
oscillations of the economy. To Nurkse, however, Schumpeter's 
work, if it is properly understood, is just what its title says it 
is: a theory of economic development. Business cycles appear in 
Z1) Ibid., p. 12. 
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it only as the form in which economic progress takes place. 
This theory, as we know it, assigns a crucial role to the 
innovator, the creative entrepreneur, or rather to the action of a 
great number of such entrepreneurs and their imitators, carrying 
out innovations, putting out new commodities, and devising new 
combinations of productive factors. Even if an innovation tends 
each time to.originate in one particular industry, the monetary 
effects of the initial investment are such as to promote a wave of 
new applications of capital over a range of different industries; 
and these waves in turn result each time in an increased production 
of consumable goods that constantly deepens and widens the stream 
of real income. While the money- income effect of investment 
accounts in art for the bunching of investment activities in the 
course of the cycle it is the effect of the investments on the 
general level of productivity that increases the flow of 
consumable goo's and services. This real income effect, even 
though it may have depressive monetary repercussions in the short 
run, is indeed the sum and substance of long -run economic progress, 
provided the composition of the increased output of consumable 
goods corresponds to the pattern of consumers' demands. 
Thus a wave of capital investments in a number of different 
industries can economically succeed while any substantial 
application of capital by an individual entrepreneur in any 
particular industry may be blocked or discouraged by the limitations 
of the pre- existing market. While any single enterprise might 
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appear impracticable, a wide range of enterprises in different 
industries might succeed. This is so because they will all support 
each other. The people engaged in each enterprise, now working 
with more real capital per head and with greater efficiency in 
terms of output per man -hour, will provide an expanded market for 
the products of the new enterprises in the other industries. And, 
the dynamic expansion of the market through investment to be 
carried out in a number of different industries, will remove or at 
least mitigate the drag it imposes on individual incentives to 
invest. It is through the application of capital over a wide 
range of activities that the general level of economic efficiency 
is raised and the size of the market expanded. 
The technical contribution which capital can bring about in 
backward' countries may be great, and the possible increase in 
physical output with modern machinery, plus efficient management, 
may be tremendous. But this, Nurkse contends, is merely the 
engineering side of the matter. The economic side is concerned, 
not simply with physical productivity, but with value productivity, 
and this is limited for any individual business by the poverty of 
potential consumers. "'hen we think of the primitive methods of 
production that prevail in most countries," he writes, "and 
contrast them mentally with the physical productivity of a modern 
mechanised plant, we readily jump to the conclusion that the 
marginal productivity of capital in the economically backward areas 
must be enormous. The case is not so simple. The technical 
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opportunities may be great, the physical increase in output may be 
spectacular comp ̂.red with existing output, but value productivity 
is limited by the low purchasing power of the people. The technical 
physical productivity of capital can be realised in economic terms 
only through balanced growth, enlarging the awgregate size of the 
market and increasing individual investment incentives all round, 
while on any single investment project, if it were considered in 
isolation, the prospective return might be quite discouraging or at 
all events not sufficiently attractive to make the installation of 
more and better equipment worth while." (1) 
In this connection, too, Nurkse distinguishes between the 
notion of 'external economies' in the Marshallian sense and this 
notion in the market sense. Each of a wide range of projects, by 
contributing to an enlargement of the total size of the market, can 
be said to create economies external to the individual firm. Indeed 
it may be that the most important external economies leading to the 
phenomenon of increasing returns in the course of economic progress 
are those that take the form of increases in the size of the market, 
rather than those which economists, following Marshall, have usually 
had in mind, i.e. improvements in productive facilities such as 
transport, communications, trade ;ournals, labour skills and 
techniques available to a certain industry and dependent on the 
size of that industry. 
But Schumpeter's theory of economic development was intended to 
(I) Ibid., P. 14. 
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apply primarily to the rise and growth of Western capitalism. It 
is not necessarily applicable in the same way to other types of 
society where it may be that the forces that are to defeat the grip 
of economic stagnation have to be deliberately organised to some 
extent, at any rate initially. In the early industrial 
development of Japan, as has already been intimated, the state was 
indeed the great innovator and the industrial pioneer on a wide 
front.(l) Japan's early industrial development seems to have been 
planned and implemented to a great extent by the state. Later 
when the main obstacles, among which was the initial market 
difficulty, had been overcome, the state was able in many cases 
to turn over to private enterprise the undertakings it had 
started. Incidentally, it appears that Japan's early industrial 
development, before 1914, was based predominantly on an over -all 
expansion of the domestic market; and it was not until later that 
export markets became important for Japanese industry. 
2. STATE PLANNING. 
nether balanced growth is to be enforced by state planning 
or achieved spontaneously by creative entrepreneurs is a much 
controversial issue and essentially a question of method. In other 
words, it is the administrative form of the economic nature of the 
(1) C.f. Part III, Chapter 10, 'The Agents of Econanic Progress', Sec. 1. pp,, 
262 - 264, Sec. 2p pp. 267 - 269 
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solution to the market difficulty. The nature of the solution is 
balanced growth, but the question of method must be decided on the 
basis of broad considerations: the human qualities and the motive 
forces existing in any particular society. Broadly state 
interference must be dependent, after all, on the extent of the 
power, intelligence, and the spontaneous initiative, possessed by 
the public. This of course will vary as between countries. The 
American economy, for instance, has been largely supplied with the 
human qualities of enterprise and initiative which it may be said 
to cover the bulk of the people; but we must not take it for 
granted that these human qualities are present in the same degree 
elsewhere. In the industrial development of ?Sestern Europe the 
main source of these qualities was the middle class. 
But if the middle class is almost non -existent, and hence the 
human qualities of enterprise and initiative are lacking in a 
society, we may expect that much reliance is to be placed on the 
state in so far as the development of the national economy is 
concerned. Most under -developed countries are well- known examples 
of this. Indeed some authors have attached great importance to 
state planning as an essential mechanism for development in those 
countries. They emphasise that "economic progress depends to a 
large extent upon the adoption by governments of appropriate 
administrative and legislative action, both in the public and 
private sectors." 
(1) 
United. Nations Report on Measures For The Economic Development 0 U er- 
Developed Countries, New York, May 1951, Sec. 39. p. 17. 
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If then development is largely a matter of 'public will' in 
backward countries, would it seem doubtful, following Professor 
Frankel, whether a history of economic change, of innovation, or 
of economic growth in different societies supports this optimistic 
view of the role and capacities of governments ?(1) The authors of 
the United Nations Report, however, have this serious criticism in 
mind when they remark that "the first thing that is demanded of 
governments is that they should be efficient and honest. This is 
hard to achieve in any country, and is particularly hard in some 
under- developed countries where skilled technicians and 
administrators are scarce, and where traditions of honest 
administration are lacking. "(2) 
The authors indeed have stressed that governments must 
discharge efficiently the functions which are everywhere expected 
of them, and devote tb these functions a sufficient proportion of 
their budgets. They must ensure that an adequate proportion of 
the national income is devoted to roads and communications, to 
education, to public health, and to: other public and social services 
which will improve the social condition of the people, their 
Physical_ strength and intellectual powers. In addition to the 
functions which all governments usually perform, there is a large 
(1) C.f. S. Herbert Frankel, The Economic Impact On Under-Developed. 
Societies, ssay V., United. Nations Premier For Develolment, p. 85. 
(2) United Nations Report, op. cit., Sec. 41. p. 17. 
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borderland of functions which they have to perform, not only 
because they are essential to the process of development; but they 
are not carried cut, or carried out insufficiently, by private 
enterprise, e.g. market research, prospecting and geographical 
surveying, agricultural experimentation and extension services, 
and the assessment of the prospects of new industries. 
A second borderland function goes a stage beyond prospecting, 
and actually establishes and operates new industries which are 
neglected by the private sector, either through lack of knowledge, 
or through fear of risk. Japan is often cited as an illustrious 
example. This type of operation played an important part in 
initiating industrialisation in that country during the nineteenth 
century, when the Japanese government established new industries 
and subsequently sold or leased them to private entrepreneurs. 
A third borderland function is the creation of financial 
institutions to mobilise savings and to channel them into desirable 
private enterprise. The provision of capital to the small private 
farmer and artisan, for instance, is an urgent way of increasing 
productivity, but is often neglected by commercial institutions. 
Similarly, in countries where there is little experience of 
manufacturing, it is difficult to mobilise capital for new 
industries without the help of publicly supported industrial 
development banks. 
Besides, there is another borderland of functions which the 
private sector is anxious to perform, but which it performs at 
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excessive cost to the public. It covers those industries where the 
wastes of competition would be so great, relative to the wastes of 
monopoly, that these industries are best conducted as monopolies, 
e.g. certain kinds of public utilities, of agencies for marketing 
agricultural produce, and of factories for processing the output of 
small farmers. In some cases, the appropriate remedy is to 
organise co- operative marketing or production; in other cases, the 
appropriate remedy is to impose legal controls on the private 
monopoly; and in still other cases the appropriate remedy is 
public operation. 
Beyond this borderland lies the economic sector in which 
private enterprise operates as efficiently as public enterprise, if 
efficiency is to be measured in terms of the ratio between the 
input of resources and the output of product. Although in most 
co ntries this economic sector is left to private enterprise, there 
is much controversy over its size. In the first place, there are 
some economic activities which some governments wish to reserve to 
themselves either because of defence purposes and public safety, 
e.g. the oil industry or the manufacture of armaments; or because 
some industries are considered to be basic, e.g. public utilities. 
In the second place, some people believe that the rewards demanded 
by private entrepreneurs are always too high, and that this is 
particularly so in under- developed countries. Economic development 
by private enterprise requires the government to co- operate with, 
and sometimes even to woo private capitalists. If it tries to 
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regulate them too closely, enterprise may be discouraged; and, 
indeed,- in any case the power of private capitalists may well be 
so large that they inevitably dominate the government instead of 
the government being able to control them. This is suggested as 
the reason why economic development by private enterprise is often 
associated with the creation of large private fortunes. 
(1) 
When this is the case, no half -way house is possible between 
development by the enrichment of private entrepreneurs, and the 
altern-;tive of confining new industries to public enterprise. In 
this case, the under -developed countries have a difficult choice 
to make. When new development is confined to public enterprise, 
its speed will be determined by the rate at which governments can 
mobilise capital, skill and enterprise, and its efficiency will be 
determined by what governments (often rather weak) can manage to 
attain. We do not have to commit ourselves on this issue, or on 
the other very controversial question whether public operation is 
not also preferable for non -economic reasons, even where it is not 
more efficient than private enterprise. Every country must 
decide for itself where it wishes to draw the limits of the public 
sector. (2 ) 
(1) United Nations Report, op. cit., Sec. 51. p. 20. 




LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES. 
1. THE LEGAL FRAKEWJRK AND ENTERPRISE. 
So far we have been discussing the concept of balanced growth 
as a main pre- requisite for enlarging the size of the domestic 
market in low- income countries. We have also been discussing the 
serious problem of technical discontinuities which are partly due 
to the fact that real capital equipment, which is produced in 
industrially advanced countries and adapted to their domestic mass 
markets, is not suited to conditions in low- income countries where 
domestic markets are comparatively very small. 
All this, however, is superimposed on the fact that in 
communities afflicted with mass poverty the qualities of enterprise 
and initiative are usually in short supply, and the demand for 
capital tends to be sluggish for this reason alone. Thus for any 
detailed study of investment incentives on the demand side of 
capital, there must be taken into consideration the possible ways 
in which the three factors, namely, inelastic consumer demand, 
technical discontinuities and lack of enterprise, can keep down the 
demand for capital in low- income countries. Thus it remains to 
be seen why the qualities of enterprise are often in short supply in 
almost all under -developed societies. 
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First of all, in societies where people are left to private 
enterprise, initiative will be weak unless the property institution 
creates incentives. Private enterprise and communal property are 
not always consistent with each other and economic progress. 
Private property as an institution increases the incentive to save 
and invest, and the magic of property, we are told, turns sand into 
gold. We may recall David Hume's argument in favour of the theory 
of property: one can conceive circumstances in which the property 
institution would be unnecessary or in which it would have to be 
superseded, e.g. in a state of abundance, or a state of siege, or 
a state of universal benevolence. But in normal circumstances, 
where the means of satisfaction are scarce, and where self -love and 
family affection are so much stronger than general altruism, it 
seems the most workable basis for order in social lif e.(l} 
Besides men are in general unlikely to make efforts if they are 
unable to secure the fruits of their own labour. Very little 
progress therefore is to take place in countries I,h ere governments 
are too weak to protect property, or where they arbitrarily 
requisition property, or where civil disorder is endemic. 
Defects of the law are also frequently a reason why a man 
cannot secure the fruits of his efforts for himself. For example, 
the law governing the relations between landlord and tenant may not 
adequately protect the right of the tenant to unexhausted investment 
(1) David Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, Book III, Part II, Sections I -V. 
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which he has made in the land. Moreover, the stealing of crops is 
sometimes a chronic problem, for people in low -income countries are 
sometimes tempted to steal crops, especially where overpopulation 
and sheer poverty dominate the agrarian life. This phenomenon has 
made it imperative in some regions to have the lay -out of the 
village in such a strategic way as to keep constant watch over the 
safety of crops. It is alleged that peasants in Jamaica grow less 
than they can grow simply because they cannot secure the safety of 
a greater amount of crops. Had there been no vile practice of this 
kind, no frequent action of robbery, more crops would have been 
planted and more material welfare procured. 
No less important in respect of the insecurity of the fruits of 
efforts is the arbitrary exactions by the government. Whatever 
may be the tax structure, it must be known in advance and must give 
the opportunity for the people to adjust their economic activities 
accordingly. With arbitrary levies, people are very likely to 
diminish their commitments in any way. Furthermore, the rates of 
taxes should not be so high as to be a deterrent to the enterprising 
spirit. It is feared that any intolerable increase in the scope 
and rate of taxation, fo' lowing the modern fiscal systems in Western 
economies, would be a serious obstacle placed in the way of developing 
a young economy, since it would necessarily act as a brake on 
individual efforts and initiative. But if the tax structure must 
not be so high as to act as deterrent to progress, what test is to 
be applied in this respect? If it is the 'taxable capacity', as 
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it might be suggested, this is a dubious term which cannot be 
easily -defined in strict accuracy. In theory, there seems to be 
no accurate test, and it should be left to the discretion of the 
public authorities to draw the line beyond which any increase in 
taxation would, in their sound judgment, be injurious to the 
development of the national economy. 
Another common factor making for the lack of enterprise in many 
agrarian societies is the indebtedness of the great majority of 
peasants to money -lenders. The peasant, who has been plunged into 
debt, will soon find out that the produce of his land can scarcely 
service the debt charges; any surplus will not increase his 
earnings but will only be pocketed by the money - lender. It is 
unlikely that the peasant will feel moved to work harder and 
increase output when self -interest is lacking. In some countries 
legislation has been introduced to cope with this problem; it has 
laid down that debts have to be scaled down by limiting the amount 
which a peasant can borrow. Within that limit it is conceived by 
legislation that the peasant will be in a position to overcome the 
shortage of cash to buy the requisite materials and implements of 
agriculture. In some other countries, legislation has been 
passed, forbidding peasants to borrow and courts to entertain any 
action brought by money- lenders or traders for repayment of debt. 
The ultimate end of these different legal measures is evidently to 
prevent farmers from getting into debt, and hence to remove a 
serious obstacle in the creation of the incentive to work and 
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enterprise. For the finance of real capital requirements of 
agriculture and industry, most governments have established public 
financial institutions for lending to private enterprise, i.e. farm 
credit institutions and industrial development banks. 
In the second place, producers may not only be denied the 
fruits of their efforts as a result of the serious drawbacks in the 
legal framework, but may also be prevented from innovating or 
applying new productive methods by custom or by law. In some 
societies, for instance, the techniques and rituals of agriculture 
are prescribed by priests, and the innovator will be committing a 
grave affront. Or, the technique may be prescribed by law, as was 
stipulated in the edicts of Colbert, the seventeenth century French 
statesman. It is well observed in Fisher's and in Hilton's works 
that, even in the more advanced societies, pressures are frequently 
organised, on the part of some producers and workers alike, to 
prevent or retard the adoption of technological improvements. 
(1) 
The only difference between the two cases seems to be thet, in the 
more advanced societies organised pressures to prevent technical 
progress are sometimes, but not always, exerted from below, whereas 
in the less advanced societies pressures are often exerted from 
above, either in the form of firmly- rooted customs, or legislation 
passed by a reactionary ruling class, or else in the form of a 
religious code of economic activity. 
(1) C.P. Part It, Chap. 6, 'The Clash Between Security And Material Progress,' 
PP157 -196 
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In the third place, it may also be that the social system is 
such that potential enterprisers may be denied opportunity as a 
result of the great inequalities of income and wealth. 
The masses of people, who are kept ignorant, would have 
contributed to the process of economic development if they were 
given the opportunity. But potential enterprisers may also be 
precluded, by monopolistic organisation of production, from entering 
into trade or ihdustry. Sometimes, this results from the 
concentration of wealth in a few hands; or it may be the organised 
pressure of a number of small producers, banding together to 
protect themselves against competition. In either case, the 
monopoly may be backed also by legal restriction on free entry. 
Rapid economic progress is bound to damage some persons whose 
fortunes are tied up with old techniques. 
Furthermore, the social system may also deny to potential 
enterprisers the resources they need for organising new units of 
production. Thus it may not be possible to recruit labour, 
because it is tied to the soil by law, or because caste restrictions 
prevent ]ìabour from moving to new occupations. Or, land may be 
concentrated in the hands of a small number of individuals who are 
unwilling to sell it to individuals outside their group. Or the 
banking system may discriminate against borrowers of a particular 
race or creed. Horizontal mobility of resources is, like vertical 
social mobility, a pre -requisite of economic progress. 
Besides the need for redressing the aforementioned defects 
in the legal framework, which may account in larger measure for the 
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lack of enterprise in under- developed societies, much importance 
should_ also be attached to the Company Law. It should be so 
framed as to cater for protecting the interests of all parties 
concerned, each party being ensured the procurement of his fair 
share of the produce in return for his efforts in the productive 
process. 
Moreover, cases may arise in which social costs in the 
Pigovian sense may not be adequately compensated for and taken into 
account by private entrepreneurs; so also are the social benefits. 
This is an important issue and the state has to pass such an 
appropriate legislation as to cope with problems arising from the 
emergence of social costs and benefits, as distinct from private 
costs and benefits. Many instances of this kind are cited in 
economic literature. In his well -known work, 'Economics of 
Welfare', Pigou discusses the problem in great detail. Take the 
instance of smoke or deforestation. Individual action, bringing 
about smoke or cutting down forests will have a wider effect over 
a whole area. Hence legislation should aim at the protection of 
forests and the wiping out of the cost of smoke to the inhabitants, 
either by specifying the appropriate location of factories, or by 
levying a tax on the producers of smoke in favour of the society. 
Similarly, adequate legislation should be passed in respect of 
systems of drainage affecting public health, or epidemic diseases, 
or plant diseases which may annihilate flourishing plantations and 
scale down any prospects of good harvests. 
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Finally, the relationships between tenant and landlord should 
also bé the subject- matter of legislation. This is, indeed, of 
utmost importance in backward countries where the farming element is 
predominant. The legislation should countenance the gravity of 
the problem and look at it from the angle of equity, making it 
difficult to.;displace tenants from their holdings by landlords 
unless it is. proved beyond dispute that the tenants pursued bad 
husbandry detriínental to the interests of farming in general. 
Adequate land tenure legislation should assure the cultivator 
enough continuity and a sufficient share of the increased fruits 
of his labour to induce him to invest all the capital needed in the 
venture, to adopt the most improved techniques suitable to his 
circumstances, and to put forth intensive effort for increased 
production. The typical productive unit in most under -developed 
countries is the family farm, and its present efficiency can also 
be increased by appropriate legal measures. 
Thus the legal framework in under -developed countries needs to 
be overhauled. Laws relating to property, inheritance, land tenure, 
companies and risk -bearing should fundamentally aim at the principle 
that each person should reap the fruits of his labour, and, 
moreover, should not be denied the opportunity or the resources 
to innovate, initiate and enterprise. Joseph J. Spengler sums 
up these matters in the following statement: 
"Industrial progress is markedly dependent upon (a) the 
relative number of 'imaginative and energetic innovators and 
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entrepreneurs present in the population, (b) the extent to which 
these qualified persons are empowered to make and execute relevant 
decisions, and (c) the degree to which these individuals are free 
of hampering legal and institutional arrangements. In the past 
this distribution has been most favourable in countries possessing 
a comparatively strong 'middle class' that enjoyed sufficient 
support at the hands of the state; while countries lacking a 
sufficiently strong middle class have had to depend upon the state 
to provide entrepreneurial leadership in so far as possible.tT(1) 
But how can this public entrepreneurial leadership be 
supplemented by private entrepreneurship at the early stages of 
development in countries where the middle class is almost non- 
existent or at best insignificant? How can this private 
entrepreneurship be promoted, not only in the sense of removing 
such legal and institutional arrangements as may hamper the course 
of industrial progress, but in the sense of training would -be 
business executives? 
It is a commonplace that the entrepreneur, in all various 
aspects of entrepreneurship, should have some capital, the ability 
and willingness to bear the risks of enterprise, access to secrets 
of processes in the industry concerned as well as a fair knowledge 
of the technical know -how, and finally the organising ability. 
(1) Joseph J. Spengler, Economic Factors in the Development of Densely 
Populated Areas, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 
Feb., 1951. p. 4+. 
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At the first stages of capitalism, the same person assumed these 
four functions simultaneously; but following the development of 
capitalism into big corporations where the functions of risk - 
bearing and provision of capital are divorced from the organising 
ability , there has emerged a class of managers and business 
executives whom Schumpeter has called the innovators, the real 
entrepreneurs in modern capitalism. It is not our intention here 
to digress into' a theoretical discussion of the theory of 
entrepreneurship and its functions, or of the related theory of 
profit whether in its traditional form as a return for risk -bearing 
or in the Schumpeterian sense as a return for innovation. But it 
is well to bear in mind that, if a new industry is established or a 
new product or idea has passed the experimental stage, the promoters 
of new firms are usually the entrepreneurs from both the traditional 
and modern viewpoints. 
2. FOREIGN ENTREPRENEURSHIP. 
In under- developed countries, most of the local entrepreneurs 
specialise in agriculture or in well -established lines of commerce. 
Very few of them venture to enter into the sphere of industry. In 
fact they have always shown a tendency to refrain from starting 
business in other fields of economic activity in which they have no 
previous experience, and in which the risks of pioneering are 
enormous. In those countries therefore it is not uncommon that 
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several other fields of business have been taken up by foreigners, 
that the bulk of industry, commerce and finance is usually found 
to be in foreign hands. This is indeed a main feature of business 
life in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. But here we 
cannot overlook the fact that foreign entrepreneurship is often 
subject to two serious criticisms. 
In the first place, there are foreign companies which make and 
export exorbitant profits in some under -developed areas. Mostly 
profits are exorbitant because such companies might have secured a 
monopolistic position and the government concerned has signed away 
some natural resource or.a public utility without demanding an 
adequate royalty or rental in return. This state of affairs might 
have taken place through ignorance, or corruption or external 
political pressure. Put it often creates political tension and 
discontent amongthe nationals; and, in consequence, foreign 
entrepreneurs are necessarily open to the charge that they are 
profiteering at the expense of the welfare of the country concerned. 
For, not only are profits exorbitant, but they are not even kept 
within the country. In most cases these exorbitant profits leak 
out of the domestic income stream and are exported abroad. Eut 
this is one side to the problem of high business profits. On the 
other side, these may reflect the high marginal productivity of 
capital that can be realised through an over -all expansion of the 
domestic market, for some countries, though still backward, are in 
process of expanding their domestic economy. Even in the absence of 
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development, however, profits may be high, partly because they may 
represënt rewards of entrepreneurial and managerial services, which 
are very scarce factors in those countries and command a high price; 
and partly because they may include illusory inventory profits due 
to failure to provide for fixed capital replacement, which are so 
common under .inflationary conditions. 
In the second place, foreign entrepreneurs most frequently 
confine themselves to developing primary production, to entering 
into public utilities or to such agricultural industries as ginning, 
sugar- refining etc., but not to industry proper. Dr. H.W. Singer 
of the United Nations Secretariat takes it as the basis for his 
criticism of the 'traditional' type of foreign investment. He 
holds that foreign investment was foreign only in a geographical 
sense. It formed essentially a pert of the creditor country's 
economy, and did little or nothing to promote, and may even have 
occasionally impeded, the economic development of the debtor 
countries. This attitúde on the part of foreign entrepreneurship 
has diverted under -developed countries into "types of activity 
offering less scope for technical progress, internal and external 
economies taken by themslves, and withheld from the course of their 
economic history a central factor of dynamic radiation which has 
revolutionised societies in the industrialised countries."(1) 
(1) H.W. Singer, The Distribution of Gains Between Investing and Borrowing 
Coun':ries, American Econanic Review, Papers and Proceedings, May, 1950. 
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Nurkse, however, is disposed tb look upon these generalisations 
as little too sweeping. In his view, they seem to apply only to a 
minor part of international investment in the century before 1914. 
.ie may agree with Nurkse that in the past decades most of the 
foreign money has gone to developing public utilities, either by 
loans to governments or by direct investment in railways and 
electricity business, and that these undertakings are just as 
necessary to any country whether it is developing primary or 
secondary industry. These undertakings unquestionably provided a 
useful foundation for the general development of the borrowing 
countries. We may agree, too, that even in the case of the so- 
called 'colonial' type of foreign investment, i.e., foreign -owned 
extractive industries working for export to the industrial countries, 
various'direct and indirect benefits were likely to develop, 
contributing gradually,to the growth of the local economy. Still, 
the fact remains that, on the whole, 'direct' foreign entrepreneurial 
investment, as distinct from 'portfolio' investment in under- 
developed countries has shown a preference for activities connected 
with exports of primary products to advanced countries and an 
aversion from activities catering for the domestic markets of the 
debtor countries. Is there an explanation for this fact? 
True, the general reluctance of private business capital to 
go to work for the domestic markets in the less developed countries, 
in contrast with its eagerness in the past to work there for 
export to the industrial creditor countries, does not reflect any 
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sinister conspiracy or deliberate policy; still less any concerted 
attempt of the rich countries to exploit the poor. Exploitation 
there may have been, but this pattern of foreign investment by 
itself does not constitute any proof of it. This pattern, Nurkse 
points out, can be readily accounted for on obvious economic grounds. 
The explanation lies, on the one hand, in the poverty of the local 
consumers in the under -developed countries, and on the other, in 
the large and vigorously expanding markets for primary products in 
the world's industrial centres during the nineteenth century.(l) 
In these circumstances it was natural for foreign business 
investment to serve merely as projections of the industrial creditor 
countries for the purpose of meeting the needs of these countries 
through cheap foodstuff and raw materials. In other words, the 
incentive to invest was created by the investing countries' own 
demand for the primary commodities which they required. There 
never was much inducement for foreign business capital to go to 
economically backward areas to work for the local markets there. 
These markets were too small to provide an incentive. Private 
investment generally is governed by the pull of market demand, and 
international investment on private business account is no 
exception to this. The weakness of the market incentive for 
private investment in the domestic economy of low- income countries 
can affect domestic as well as foreign capital. Even if we 
abstract from political and other risk factors inherent in 
(1 ) Ragnar Nurlse, op. cit. , p. 25. 
394. 
international investment, there is no guarantee that the motives 
that animate the individual business man will automatically set 
in motion a flow of funds from the rich to the poor countries. 
The doctrine of balanced growth reveals limits to the role of 
direct business investment. A private investor may not have the 
power, even if he had the will, to break the deadlock caused by 
low productivity, lack of real buying power and deficient 
investment incentives in the domestic economy of a backward area. 
It is the size of the local market that explains why American 
direct investments in manufacturing industries abroad have gone 
mostly to Western Europe and Canada where industry has already 
been highly developed, and why they have tended to keep away from 
the industrially backward countries. (l) 
All this of course applies to direct foreign entrepreneurial 
investment which must be classed predominantly as a form of 
'induced/ investment, since it generally has to be induced by 
tangible market demand already existing or visibly coming into 
existence. By contrast, capital outlay by public authorities 
financed ,From private, or public, foreign funds can be called 
'autonomous' investment, since it does not depend closely, if at 
all, on the state of market demand. Thus the general distinction 
between autonomous and induced investment, which has become 
familiar in business cycle literature, seems to be applicable in 
a certain sense to the case of international investment as well, 
(i) Ibid. pp. 25-28. 
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though here as in business cycle theory the distinction is not 
absolute, but is essentially a matter of degree.(l) 
Of course, no problem of high profitability or economic 
exploitation of borrowing countries arises if foreign 
entrepreneurship can be done away with, if domestic capital 
rather than capital imported from abroad, in one form or another, 
will set in motion a process of development on all fronts, i.e., 
a balanced growth of the national economy. In other words, no 
problem arises if domestic entrepreneurship is not in short supply. 
However, the important service which foreign entrepreneurs render 
the capital -importing countries is not so much the immediate 
increases in their national incomes. It is rather the fact that 
these foreign entrepreneurs prime the pump of industry, create 
industrial momentum, so to speak, from a humble beginning to great 
achievements in the end. They get the whole thing started, and 
nationals learn the technical as well as the managerial know -how; 
and perhaps they dispense with foreign assistance at later stages 
of development. Foreigners are usually expected to give the 
local people the opportunity to acquire the experience needed in 
industry. But where the activities are largely in the hands of 
foreigners of different race, it is not uncommon for the local 
people to be denied employment in the higher ranks. 
Needless to say, the business of training potential domestic 
entrepreneurs is most important in economic development, and for 
(1) Ibid. , p. 29. 
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the sake of increasing their numbers, governments of under- 
developed countries can do a great deal by appropriate legislation 
in order to facilitate the employment of local people in the 
higher ranks of foreign corporations,(1) and by sending young 
people abroad to work in foreign businesses for the purpose of 
acquiring managerial techniques. Germany and Japan are well- 
known examples of this. But special difficulties, it will be 
observed, stand In the way of coloured people finding such 
employment in white countries, and special assistance might be 
given for this purpose by the technical assistance agencies. The 
training of business managers is indeed of the highest importance. 
In many industries, in many countries, output could be increased 
very substantially with the same equipment and the same labour 
force, if only more efficient managers were available.(2) 
(1) In Egypt, for instance, the three year period of grace by the end of which 
foreign firms were required to have complied with the provisions of the 
Company Law No. 138 of 19)+7 came to an end on 4th November, 1950. On the 
whole, firms have succeeded either in complying with these provisions (of 
which article 5 dealing with the percentage of Egyptians to be employed proved 
to be the most difficult), or at least in satisfying the Egyptian authorities 
that they had made a reasonable attempt to do so. In these latter cases the 
authorities have generally taken a sympathetic view and have been prepared, 
in many instances, to extend the period of grace provided that firms could 
show that Egyptians were receiving training to enable them eventually to take 
positions now held by foreigners and that the required percentages could be 
reached within a reasonable further period. A certain degree of lenience 
has also been shown in giving exemption from the terms of this law in a 
number of experts who cold almost certainly not be replaced for some time 
by Egyptians. 
(2) United Nations Report, op. cit. Sec. 93, p.33. 
397. 
3. THE ELEMENT OF RISK. 
But even if the governments concerned have embarked on large - 
scale schemes for training prospective entrepreneurs at home and 
abroad, it is most likely that entrepreneurship in under -developed 
countries will remain a scarce factor of production, at least at 
the early stages of economic development. That is so because three 
difficult obstacles normally stand in the way of entrepreneurial 
initiative: the element of risk, the time factor in respect of 
economies of scale, and the inconsistency of money wages of labour 
with its real costs. 
The element of risk is not confined to economically backward 
countries. It is inherent in business enterprise everywhere at all 
stages of development. In this respect the difference between 
more advanced and less advanced countries is that in the one case 
business risks are those ordinary risks of enterprise as the result 
of uncertainties in the free competitive system, whereas in the 
other both risks of enterprise and transfer risks usually obtain 
as long as the foreign element plays an important part in the 
development of the local national economy. 
In more advanced countries devices have been made with a view 
to keeping down the ordinary risks of enterprise. In those 
countries patent laws have been promulgated for this purpose. 
(l ) 
This is the reason why Schumpeter seems to favour a patent system 
11) For detailed study of the patent system in relation to economic 
development see Chapter 19, Sec. 2, below. 
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as a potent stimulant to the innovating spirit and 
entrepreneurial initiative. By implication he tacitly assumes 
that monopoly enhanced by the protective device of patents is 
better than free competition without a patent system. 
But apart from this aspect of risk -bearing which is obviously 
common to both developed and under- developed countries, what is 
relevant here is to consider the specific ways which the 
governments of the latter countries may devise with a view to 
warding off the impact of the element of risk on prospective 
entrepreneurs. First,there may be created local monopoly by 
setting up tariff barriers, or by adopting a policy of long -term 
contracts. For most people are reluctant to enter into a new 
business or venture unless they can see a future in it. Tariffs 
would mean to them a guaranteed price which is not subject to 
severe deterioration as a result of foreign competition. It is 
when attempts are being made to produce, or increase the production 
of, commodities with which the country concerned is by no means 
familiar, that the guaranteed price makes a tremendous difference 
in business. To illustrate: 
"An important exception to the laissez -faire philosophy 
recognises the fact that an industry is not at its strongest until 
it has attained a certain size and experience. Hence, if protection 
were ruled out, often the country that started an industry would be 
able, by competing abroad, to prevent other countries from following 
in its footsteps, and might succeed in making substantial profits 
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at their expense although, if once their industries were able to 
get past their teething troubles, they would be quite as efficient 
as that of the country first in the field. This infant industry 
argument is now seen to have very wide implications. For what is 
true of one industry is even more true of industrialisation as a 
whole. Countries predominantly agricultural are at a disadvantage 
when they start to industrialise, in competition with the older 
industrial countries. But, given a stage of protection, they may 
in due course be perfectly capable of holding their own. "(l) 
The same is true of bulk contracts which have been common in 
the last few years as between countries or as between the United 
Kingdom and its colonies. It is not only the question of 
favourable prices that matters in such bulk purchases, but even if 
prices únder bulk contracts are such that over the average of 
years they are more or less equal to free prices, the main 
advantage to the entrepreneur is increased stability, a guaranteed 
market and the mitigation of the uncertainties of future demand. 
"There are, for example, many colonies," says Lewis, "which will 
start to grow tobacco, or groundnuts, or sugar, if they are 
guaranteed a market, but not otherwise. This does not apply to 
all commodities. If the local merchants know the crop, are 
willing to handle it, and know that they can always dispose of 
their purchases on an organised market, supplies may flow easily in 
response to favourable prices. But there are many cases where a 
(i) W.A. Lewis, The trinciples of Economic Planning, pp. 62 -63. 
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firm contract will make just the difference to the undertaking 
of a new venture. Accordingly, whatever may be the fate of bulk 
buying in general, it is important that government agents should 
be free to make such contracts in particular places where they are 
trying to expand supplies." 
(1) 
Another way of frustrating risks o7 entrepreneurship is the 
popular method of tax reliefs or exemptions. During the first 
five or ten years of their life, the newly established firms in a 
new industry are to be granted certain tax concessions. This 
fiscal measure, however, may not prove in practice to be very 
great if the tax concession ranges, say, between 3 to 4 per cent 
of the cost price of the product. Prospective entrepreneurs may 
not consider this insignificant reduction in the cost of production 
as a great thing. Besides, if foreign capitalists do enjoy, from 
the outset, double taxation exemption, as is sometimes the case, 
such an exemption will be of no real value as a stimulant to foreign 
entrepreneurial initiative. It is only when no previous measures 
for double taxation exemption have been taken that foreign entre- 
preneurs may profit by such a fiscal device. 
(2) 
(1) P.A. Lewis and others, Attitude to Africa, A Penguin Special, 1951, p.103 
(2) Foreigners, considered to be permanently resident in Egypt, are subject to 
the same taxation as Egyptians, while Egyptian fiscal laws, although 
territorial in principle, also apply to income derived from Egypt by persans 
residing abroad: Egyptian income tax is payable on dividends paid by a 
foreign enterprise not operating in Egypt, if the shareholders are 
Egyptians ar foreigners usually residing in Egypt and the dividends are 
brought into Egypt. Profits made or dividend paid by a foreign enterprise 
whose main object is the exploitation of a business in Egypt are like 
profits made by an Egyptian Company, subject to Egyptian income tax, even if 
the shareholders are foreigners residing outside the country. 
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Finally, the government concerned may guarantee a certain 
rate of-profit in some business undertakings whose services or 
products are of vital importance to the national economy. This 
is historically observed in the development of transport and the 
era of the introduction of the railways. During the last century, 
for instance, the French Government used to guarantee a certain 
rate of profit to some railway companies. 
4. THE TIME FACTOR. 
The second stumbling block in the way of entrepreneurial 
initiative is that new industries take time to become economical. 
The cost of producing a commodity at home may be a function either 
of the quantity produced, or of the length of time for which the 
productive process has been undertaken. 
Let us consider the first proposition. Some authors hold the 
view that many under- developed countries are so small that their 
internal market is not large enough to support large -scale 
industries; and they propose as a remedy the creation of 
preferential tariff systems, customs unions or even political 
federations among such count ries. ( 1) 
But the main trouble, however, is not that countries are too 
small either in terms of the number of the country t s inhabitants 
or in terms of physical area. A country with a large population 
will have only a small total capacity to produce, if its people 
(i) United Nations Report, op.cit., Sec.62, p.23. 
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have a low productivity per head. Size of population can affect 
the average level of productivity only in so far as the concept of 
an "optimum population" is valid. But even if a country with a 
large population does produce a sizable aggregate output, this 
still does not mean that it constitutes a coherent market. There 
is also the cost of transport to be considered; but this factor, 
too, should not be considered alone. It is true that with given 
population density and productivity per head, improvements in 
transport will increase the physical extent as well as the economic 
size of the market. But physical extent and economic size are not 
identical, for the latter depends on the efficiency, not only of 
transportation, but of production in general. True, improvements 
in transport are important, and transport facilities do play quite 
an important part in economic development. It is also true that 
tariff barriers may be regarded as artificial transport costs, and 
that reductions in transport costs, whether natural or artificial, 
do produce an increase in the size, as well as in the geographical 
extent of the market. But reductions in any cost of production, 
not only in that of transport, have that effect. Any increase in 
economic efficiency, whether in the efficiency of transportation 
or of any other items of production costs, increases the size of 
the market. But to single out transport costs and to speak of 
the territorial extent of the market as the main or the sole 
determinant of its size seems to be a case of misplaced emphasis. 
China is a well known example of this. This country, one of the 
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poorest in the world, used to have a system of internal customs 
duties which acted as interregional tariff barriers. In 192$ 
this system was abolished, and China became, from the point of 
view of commercial policy, one of the world's largest national 
markets in area as well as in numbers of people. Yet China 
remained one of the poorest countries in the world. For the main 
trouble is not that countries are too small. It is rather that 
they are too poor to provide markets for local industries. As 
has been poimnted out already, the market difficulty in poor 
countries can best be understood only in relation to the concept 
of balanced growth. 
Let us now turn to the second proposition that the cost of 
production is also a function of the length of time for which the 
productive process has been undertaken, i.e., the time factor in 
respect of economies of scale. In discussion of this problem, 
the 'infant industry' is a phrase that crops up frequently in 
economic literature. The infant industry or young economy 
argument has been recognised for well over a century. The idea is 
associated with the name of the nineteenth century German economist, 
Friedrich List, 
(1) 
and it has received the cautious blessing of 
John Stuart Mill, Alfred Marshall, Frank W. Taussig, and other 
orthodox economists. According to this doctrine, there are many 
lines of activity in which a country would really have a comparative 
advantage, if only it could get them started. If faced with 
(1) C.P. Part I, Chapter 2, 'The Theory of Economic Policy in Classical 
Political Economy', Sec.1, pp.70 .. 73 
404. 
foreign competition, infant industries are not able to weather 
the initial period of experimentation and financial stress. But 
given a breathing space, they can be expected to develop economies 
of mass production and the technological efficiency typical of many 
modern processes. Although protection will at first raise prices 
to the consumer; once the industry grows up, it will be so 
efficient that costs and ,rites will actually have fallen. 
In developed countries, the only thing to do about a new 
industry is to integrate it into the industrial framework. In 
backward countries, however, labour should learn the mechanical 
work in general, beginning from scratch for the whole range of 
this type of work. The culture is quite different, and it would 
be extremely inefficient if a start is taken in factories with 
operatives who have no mechanical outlook. Moreover, the factory 
life necessitates a different social norm of behaviour. Social 
relationships and values have to be changed, and mentalities 
diverted from agricultural to industrial atmosphere. This new 
tempo of life will take time, perhaps a long time indeed. That 
is the very reason why the Industrial Revolution started to be 
based on juvenile employment, for juveniles are more easily 
adaptable to the new environment. On the contrary, it would take 
adults one or two generations to get their cultures changed as a 
result of changes in productive methods. For these and other 
reasons, the cost of a new infant industry will be high at the outset. 
Internal economies will arise only as time goes on. 
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Economies, however, are not only internal; external economies, 
not in the market sense as defined above, but in the well -known 
Marshallian sense, are no less significant to the problem of 
efficiency. In addition to the internal economies which may 
arise within a certain firm as a result of the expansion of the 
size of plant, or the intensity of the use of capital, or the 
greater efficiency of labour, there may also be economies external 
to each firm in an andustry. On the case of 'external economies' 
is based the concept of the industrial centre, or, as it is sometimes 
called, the trading estate. Again this concept has special 
significance to backward areas. Some manufacturing industries 
flourish with difficulty in isolation. Because of their mutual 
dependence, they use common services and productive facilities 
such as'power, transport, communications, labour skills and 
techniques; and they also buy each other's products and by- 
products. The industrial system is indeed a complicated network, 
and it has to be created anyway. Hence if an industrial centre 
is to be started from scratch, it may be desirable to arrange for 
as many complementary industries as possible to be started at 
about the same time in the same place. ''The initiative in 
making and executing a plan which has the effect of bringing many 
private entrepreneurs together in this way must usually rest upon 
the government, and is an important function of an industrial 
development corporation. " 
(1) 
(i) United Nations Report, op.cit., Sec.59, p.22. 
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This technique of development is known to be of common use 
in many countries. In the United Kingdom, the trading estates came 
into being after the building up of the Manchester Canal. Factories 
were built in the planned estates, and facilities of all kinds were 
provided on a large scale from the first beginning.(1) So also 
was the case with Russian economic development. Industrial areas 
were planned once and for all, and external economies for the 
whole industry could be achieved with no regard to the element of 
time. In Japan the lead was taken a century ago after the Sino- 
Japanese war. Even in Latin America, development coporations 
were created for industrial development. The governments con- 
cerned were on the look -out for industrialists to settle down in 
the trading estates, providing them with all facilities: money, 
factory space, recruited labour and such. There is no reason why 
this useful technique should not be adopted in under developed . 
countries, following the same pattern of industrial development 
in many more advanced countries. 
5. INCONSISTENCY OF MONEY WAGES 
WITH REAL COSTS OF LABOUR. 
The third obstacle in the way of entrepreneurial initiative is 
the problem that money wages are not usually the true measure of the 
real costs of labour in under = developed countries. At first sight 
it might be expected that, once more modern productive techniques 
have been adopted in the field of industry, the physical productivity 
of labour must immediately rise by leaps and bounds. This is a 
(1) For detailed study see D.G. Wolton, 'Trading Estates'. 
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mistaken view. At the initial stages of industrial development, 
it will be observed, labour in under -developed countries is usually 
unfamiliar with modern techniques of production. Wastage of 
materials, friction, accidents, frequent absenteeism, lack of 
discipline, lack of training, lack of interest in one's job, 
indolence, carelessness and dullness of mind as a heritage from 
the agrarian mode of life, all combine to render the physical 
productivity of-labour relatively very low. Meanwhile, money 
wages which manufacturers are required to pay are often above the 
marginal productivity of labour; for the determination of wages 
in backward countries seems to be an arbitrary matter, perhaps in 
consonance with the conventional levels of subsistence. 
Unless something were to be done to establish consistency 
between 'money wages and productivity of labour, very little would 
be achieved in creating entrepreneurial initiative. There may be 
a way out to cope with this anomaly: it is to grant subsidies to 
industrial production, or to depreciate the national currency, or 
else to cut off local prices from world prices by way of tariff 
barriers. 
It is noteworthy, in this connection, that all the literature 
written by economists on the subject has laid much emphasis on 
protection as the most potent weapon to promote industrialisation. 
In fact no country in the world has ever become industrialised 
without certain protective measures. It was only as late as the 
nineteenth century that England reversed her commercial policy 
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from protection to free trade, but prior to that period, protection 
was indeed an effective technique of industrial development in this 
country. 
But protection will not in itself solve the problem of 
industrialisation. To solve it, an under developed country must 
spare no efforts to get hold of entrepreneurial skill, capital 
resources and a new generation of skilled labour, and must see to 
it that a network of complementary industries is well established, 
ensuring a balanced growth of the national economy and creating 
efficiency over the whole field of economic activity. Industrial- 
isation is a costly business. It is achieved not so much by 
keeping the level of domestic prices above the level of world 
prices by way of tariff barriers as by bringing the level of domestic 
prices down by way of increased economic efficiency and expanding 
markets. 
Consider, for instance, the case of industrial development in 
Egypt as an example of this. The great activity which reigned 
during the immediate post -war years in the establishment of new 
industries and the consolidation and extension of existing ones has 
now to a considerable extent subsided and it may well be that, 
with the possible exception of iron and steel production, most of 
the main industries capable in present circumstances of development 
in the country are now well covered. Very few new manufacturing 
companies have been constituted in the past few years and whilst 
this may be due to some extent to the shyness of capital from 
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outside Egypt to invest in new enterprises in view of the Company 
(1) - 
Law regulations, the difficulties which many local industries 
have to face in meeting foreign competition may well also have 
played a part. Although labour in Egypt is still comparatively 
cheap by European standards, the overall cost of production, owing 
to a variety of factors such as small output, higher cost of raw 
materials (since most must be imported), less skilled operatives, 
etc., is in many cases much greater. Consequently prices of local 
industrial products often tend to be higher than those of similar 
imported goods, in spite of the relatively high customs duties 
levied on the latter. 
6. ENTREPRENEURIAL EFFICIENCY. 
It'is now time to consider the problem of entrepreneurship, 
not from the quantitative, but from the qualitative, point of view. 
Needless to say, the quality of entrepreneurs, in addition to their 
number, is equally essential to any programme of economic develop- 
ment. This should bring us to an important question: how can 
improvements in the quality of entrepreneurs be achieved in an 
under -developed country? 
(1) Article 6 of the Company Law No.138 of 1947 stipulates that 51 per cent 
of the shares of all new limited companies must be made available to 
Egyptians. This article has come under severe attack throughout its 
life, not least from Egyptian leaders of finance and industry. It has 
been well recognised that Egypt must have capital and knowledge from 
abroad if its industries are to be developed and that the effect of 
the Law has been to drive both away. For all practical purposes since 
the passage of the law no foreign capital from sources outside Egypt 
has been invested in the country. 
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Let us first consider the traditional assumption of the 
classical economists who believe that competition alone is the 
key to increased efficiency. Inefficient business men are 
driven out of industry by the ruthlessness of the competitive 
market. This is but the application of the principle of the 
survival of the fittest in the sphere of business. But this 
classical assumption has been attacked from different quarters. 
The first attack comes from the itiarxist quarter. The Marxians 
contend that if competition is maintained all the time, well and 
good. But the historical evolution of capitalism points to the 
fact that competition fades away into monopolistic organisations 
of one form or another. It exists only in the minds of the 
classical economists, but not in the world of reality. By im- 
plication reliance should not be placed on the competitive drive 
as an incentive to economic efficiency simply because it is only 
an imaginary state of business conduct. The second attack comes 
from the Schumpeterian quarter. For the essence of Schumpeter's 
theory of economic development, as referred to above, is that the 
entrepreneur in the modern sense is, not the routine manager, but 
the innovator or initiator of new ideas and new ways of doing 
things. Innovations, however, should be monopolised at least for 
a certain period of time. In this sense monopoly thus becomes the 
sum and substance of the modern concept of entrepreneurship. 
This sort of controversy will be dealt with later on in its 
proper context. Here it is only proposed to proceed with the analyst: 
of the so- called gospel of high wages as a means of enhancing 
industrial efficiency in under -developed countries. One line 
of argument is to squeeze profit margins by raising wages and 
freezing prices. It is contended that this pricing policy would 
compel entrepreneurs to try to squeeze costs of production in 
order to get back their pre- existing levels of profit. This 
gospel of high wages, it is urged, is indeed the secret of progress. 
But the case is not so simple as this. If profits were 
squeezed for the purpose of increasing efficiency, profit incentives 
would of course diminish; and foreign capital, which is so 
urgently needed in any under -developed country, would be withdrawn 
in whole or at least in part. If, on the other hand, foreign 
capital were not withdrawn and entrepreneurs had to search for 
more efficient methods of production and techniques of organisation, 
this would naturally involve the achievement of a higher level of 
capital investment and the introduction of more elaborate machinery. 
Surely this would in no way assist most of the under -developed 
countries, since they have a surplus of labour to begin with. In 
those countries the gospel of high wages is thus no remedy to the 
problem of entrepreneurial efficiency. If high wages are to have 
any effect on economic development, this must come through in- 
creased productivity of labour. This is a highly desirable goal 
in the development process. 
The gospel of high wages, however, implies another line of 
argument. It is that wages have to be pushed up whilst prices 
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have to be pushed down. This line of argument is apparently 
based on the theory of prices: a reduction in prices of wage 
goods tends to bring about an expansion of prospective demand which 
is then translated into effective demand, if the price reduction is 
coupled with an increase in money wages. In turn an expansion of 
demand for wage goods then gives rise to a corresponding expansion 
of capital goods' industries through the effect of our old friend, 
the acceleration Principle that establishes the relation between 
investment incentives and market demand. Profit per unit of 
output may flag; yes, but not necessarily the total profits. 
And, even if total profits were levelled down to some extent, this 
would be a potent stimulant to entrepreneurial efficiency. 
Evidently this line of argument tacitly implies that any 
increase in money incomes of the wage- earners would be spent on 
wage goods, and would therefore increase market demand. We 
know, however, that so many budgetary investigations have been made 
of the ways_ in which people at different levels of income spend 
their money; and there is remarkable agreement as to the general, 
qualitative patterns of behaviour which have sometimes been called 
Engel's Laws, after the nineteenth -century Prussian statistician 
who first enunciated them. What concerns us here in these 
behaviour patterns is, of course, the poorest income class which 
covers the majority of wage -earners. These patterns reveal that 
poor families must, of course, spend their incomes largely on the 
necessities of life: food, shelter, and in lesser degree, clothing. 
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As income increases, expenditure on many food items goes up. 
People eat more and better, shifting their consumption from the 
cheap and bulky to the more expensive foodstuffs. However, there 
are limits to the amount of extra money that people will spend on 
food when their incomes rise. Consequently, the percentage 
importance of food expenditure declines as income increases; and 
there are even some few cheap items, the so-called 'inferior goods?, 
whose consumption decreases absolutely with income. After the 
individual gets out of the very poorest income class, the pro- 
portion of income he spends on shelter is pretty constant for a 
wide range; while expenditure on clothing and other amenities of 
life increases more than in proportion to income, until the very 
high incomes are reached. Hence it sounds reasonable to suggest 
that, by and large, income elasticity of demand for wage goods is 
relatively low. 
But all this analysis is only part of the story. In under- 
developed countries, there seems to be another relevant factor 
which must be given its due weight. In those countries it is not 
only that the level of wages is too low to be comparable to the 
level of wages in industrial countries, but the workers there 
seem to be content with their consumption standards either through 
lack of education, or through ignorance of better living standards, 
or through lack of interest in material welfare, so much so that it 
is rather difficult to change their consumption habits. Income 
elasticity of demand for wage goods in those countries is indeed 
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very much lower than it is in advanced countries, not only because 
of the relatively very low incomes of the wage- earners, but because 
of the conspicuous rigidity of consumption habits. 
It then follows that both price elasticities and income 
elasticities of demand for wage goods would most probably be too 
low to bring about an expansion of market demand adequate enough 
to compensate for the fall in profit per unit of output. Such a 
situation is more or less identical with what has been revealed by 
the previous analysis of the policy of high wages along the former 
line of argument. In other words, profits would then be squeezed 
and profit incentives diminished to such an extent that foreign 
capital would be withdrawn, or else all entrepreneurs, local and 
foreign alike, would seek to reduce costs of production in order to 
get back their pre- existing levels of profit by means of more 
efficient methods of production which would render the labour 
problem more acute. Both courses of action are socially un- 
desirable from the point of view of the under -developed country at 
the early stages of planned development,when the supply of labour 
is overabundant. 
Shall we then take a dim view of the prospects of economic 
efficiency in the under -developed economy? Can we envisage some 
other ways of solving the problem? Certainly there are a number 
of cases which are covered by the principle that the government of 
the under -developed country must sometimes compel all the firms in 
a particular industry to adopt some measure which the majority 
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desire , in pursuit of higher efficiency in production, but which 
cannot be brought into effect unless they all participate. In 
soil conservation, for instance, some measures are useless unless 
all farmers in the appropriate area are compelled to participate. 
The same is true of measures for the control of the spread of 
diseases of plant or livestock, and measures for comparative 
grading and marking of some agricultural products. 
Compulsory standardisation is also required in manufacturing 
industries. Needless to say, all aspects of standardisation, 
whether functional or dimensional, have a bearing on industrial 
efficiency. (1) Functional standardisation includes all standards 
dealing with fitness for purpose. Standards under this heading are 
based on composition or performance, and they may mean methods of . 
test or fnethods of use (codes of practice). Dimensional standard- 
isation seeks to achieve simplification, unification, and inter- 
changeability. The simplified practice means the reduction of 
variety in sizes, dimensions, and immaterial differences in everyday 
commodities. It is a well - established fact that advantages of 
mechanical production in general and of mass production in 
particular cannot be realised without bulk production of 'standardises 
products by the long run of machinery. In many ways, of course, 
standardisation within the firm is relevant, but this cannot be 
separated entirely from standardisation within the industry. 
(0) L. Rostas: 'Comparative Productivity in British and American Industry', 
National Institute of Economic and Social Research, Occasional Papers XIII, 
pp. 61 -63. 
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To many minds, moreover, the idea of Development Councils 
for industry seems to be well suited for improving industrial 
efficiency. This is not a new idea. In the United Kingdom, 
for instance, its history goes back as far as the First World War. 
The Joint Industrial Councils were intended to ensure joint action 
between employers and workers for the development of industry as 
part Of the national life. During the 1930's many industries 
suffered from excess capacity and became attracted to the idea of 
protective devices among which was a scheme for cutting down 
production. This involved limitation of capacity by "rationalis- 
ation" implying reduction to be carried out by a controlled process 
rather than by relying on bankruptcy and penalising the inefficient 
by the competitive drive. During the second World War the idea 
of self= government for industry, though in the background, was 
never dropped. Some earlier Reports by a series of Working Parties 
provided inspiration for the Industrial Organisation and Development 
Act which became law in 1947. The main functions of the proposed 
Development Councils are laid down in the Law thus: research into 
processes and materials and design, marketing and standardisation, 
training, recruiting and working conditions.(1) 
It is early to judge the outcome of the application of such 
novel technique of development. Employers, however, seem to 
dislike the whole idea, for it carries with it an undesirable taste 
of government interference and restriction of liberty. Moreover, 
(1) For de tailed s tudy see P.E.P. publication on Development Councils. 
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some critics argue against the general principle on the grounds 
that the idea may bring in its train the emergence of monopoly; 
or, if its elements are pre- existing, may strengthen monopolistic 
combination. These critics seem to be impressed by J.S. Mill's 
statement that "wherever competition is not, monopoly is; and 
that monopoly, in all its forms, is the taxation of the industrious 
for the support of indolence, if not of plunder. "(l) 
Broadly the whole discussion of the efficiency problem reveals 
one fact: it is that we have before us two opposing views on the 
solution of the problem. On the one side, some critics seem to 
go along with the traditional school of thought and still believe 
that competition, if maintained, will drive out the weak and 
penalise the inefficient. On the other side, some economists 
seem to 'favour monopoly and protection as a potent stimulant to 
the innovating spirit and entrepreneurial initiative. What is 
then the right policy to adopt? In what follows the problem of 
efficiency within the framework of economic organisation will be 
considered in some detail. 





THE EFFICIENCY PROBLEM 
"Instead of looking upon competition as the baneful and 
anti -social principle which it is held to be by the generality 
of Socialists, I conceive that, even in the present state of 
society and industry, every restriction of it is an evil and 
every extension of it, even if for a time injuriously 
affecting some class of labourers, is always an ultimate good." 
.J.S. Mill, 
1. THE iiEANING OF A COMPETITIVE POLICY 
The competitive system which the state must attempt to 
maintain is not that type of perfect competition that exists 
in the minds of economic theorists, but rather the competitive 
element of a mixed economy which is characterised by a great deal 
of state control with differences in power of business units, 
substantial obstacles hindering access to markets, monopolised 
activities under public sanction and various types of agreed 
practices. 
Competition necessarily takes the form of certain rules of 
the game established by law and custom. They establish a code 
of commercial intercourse and business relations, and are 
designed, in general,to direct competitive behaviour into 
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desirable channels without reducing intensity of competition. 
There are, however, other existing rules where their effect is not 
merely to prescribe forms of behaviour but also to thwart 
competition that remains permissible, e.g. trade marks, patents, 
collective bargaining, and natural or technical monopolies. 
The existence of such exceptions are inevitable, not only 
in the case of the so called "natural" monopolies in which 
perculiar technological conditions make competition inadequate, 
but also in fields where competition is inevitably one -sided 
and hence unduly severe in its effects on one side of the 
market. But C.D. 7dwards maintains that even exceptions that 
are improvidently made need not seriously injure the effectiveness 
of the competitive policy so long as they are not numerous. 
Thus we'can only envisage such a competitive policy as resistsex- 
ceptions to competitive behaviour as far as possible, demands 
that the need for each exception is essential,and keepsthe 
total number of these exceptions small. 
Perfect competition, in the eyes of classical theorists, 
is but an' autonomous device for the reconciliation of private 
with public interest on the tacit assumption that all persons 
concerned are perfectly rational and well informed and that 
(1) 
(1) c.f. C.D. Edwards: 'Maintaining Competition'. 
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they can transfer their purchases and productive energies from 
one commodity or one market to another without any difficulty. 
Obstacles in the way of the competitive process are assumed 
only to delay the smooth working out of the process; but in 
the longer run perfect competition supposedly results in the 
best allocation of resources, the maximum aggregate output, and 
the reward of all productive services is based only upon their 
productivity. In short, perfect competition is assumed by 
the classical theorists to be the necessary condition for the 
achievement of an toptimumt situation in respect of production, 
exchange and distribution. 
In real life, however, numerous deterrents to perfect 
competition crop up in such a way that even in the long run this 
nice and neat picture would not obtain. Information is 
incomplete and decisions are unwise and confused. Success is 
derived from competitive selling efforts which may be wasteful, 
and from differentiation of products which disablesthe buyer 
from comparing quality and price. Profit is sought in variety 
of financial manipulations which have little connection with the 
productive or distributive process. Firms cease to compete 
impersonally as their number becomes fewer and their size 
larger relative to the size of the market. They coerce each 
other by unfair devices of competition and perhaps they end this 
personal competition by collusive combinations with an incentive 
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to limit production and maintain prices above the level 
reached by the interplay of supply and demand in the open market. 
Such obstacles prevent competition from achieving its good 
results. Some critics even go so far as to recognise that 
competition alone is not sufficient to keep production and 
employment at high level, to secure the best allocation of 
resources, or to establish productivity as basis for the 
incomes of productive services. 
The competitive policy assumes, however, that although the 
maintenance of competition will not guarantee that the 
economy will work well, impairing competition by monopolistic 
restrictions, public or private, will increase the chance that 
it works badly. The competitive policy presupposes that 
unchecked private power will ordinarily be used to bring about 
exploitation and restriction of output. It strikes at extreme 
departures from.competition and does not necessarily aim at an 
atomistic competition envisaged in economic text -books. Thus 
the direct purpose of any competitive policy is to curb business 
agreements and accretions of monopoly power which directly limit 
the productivity of industry or make industrial bargains one - 
sided. Thus conceived, competition is not a complete basis for 
public policy. It does not ensure the best allocation of 
resources, distributive justice, or economic stability in contrast 
to swings of the business cycle. With reference to all such 
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problems, it is to prevent defects of economic organisation from 
being made worse by deliberate adoption of restrictive policies 
designed to serve private interests. It eliminates extremes 
of inefficiency and minimises planned restrictions of output, 
deliberate exploitation of the weak and deliberate refusal to 
adapt new methods and techniques. These are the limits of its 
usefulness and to accomplish these purposes, competitive policy 
is an appropriate part of any public policy. 
To what extent,then,is such a competitive policy approp- 
riate for an under- developed country? That is to say, apart 
from permitting such rules of the game as trade marks, patents, 
collective bargaining and technical monopolies, is it always 
desirable to strike at all other forms of business agreements and 
accretións of monopoly power? 
To begin with, the problem of efficiency in the use of labour 
by private enterprise is one that faces all governments of under- 
developed countries. However, in countries where labour is 
abundant and underemployment rife, this problem is of secondary 
importance as compared with creating new employment opportunities. 
But, as labour becomes scarce, economic progress depends upon 
more effieient use of manpower, 7fficiency is a function of the 
use of more capital, the use of better techniques, the pressure 
put upon entrepreneurs by competitive forces or trade unions 
or government action, the size of the market, and finally the 
number and size of business units whether in industry or 
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agriculture. 
Given the scope of the market, the number of firms may be 
too large or too small for efficiency. In lar7e markets of well - 
developed countries, it is often possible to leave the solution 
of such a problem to the ordinary operation of competitive 
forces. But in the less efficiently working markets of under- 
developed countries, reliance should not altogether be placed 
upon the price mechanism. It is therefore necessary to adopt 
measures either to promote more competition, or to reduce 
competition, as the case may be, with a view to either increasing 
or reducing the number of operating units. The success of such 
a policy seems to depend upon the ability of the government 
concerned to persuade industrialists to get together and co- 
ordinate their activities; and also to control their activities 
if they show a tendency to exercise a monopoly or quasi - 
monopoly power at the cost of the public. 
However, where the structure of industry or agriculture 
is characterised by many small units of operation, the govern - 
ment can assist in increasing their efficiency by providing 
services which the small units of operation can use in common. 
In agriculture, the government can organise educational services, 
credit facilities, processing and marketing facilities etc. 
In manufacturing industry, it can similarly organise training 
facilities, market research, or managerial advice. In the 
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mining industry, it can assist small units by organising 
finance, assaying, the crushing of ores, marketing or other 
facilities. 
In under -developed societies therefore monopoly presents 
a problem. Monopoly is a necessary instrument of economic 
development in situations where risks can only be taken on the 
basis of a franchise. Monopoly is also an instrument of 
efficiency if the scale of operations needs to be larger or 
if the firms in the industry concerned need to have their 
activities co- ordinated directly by agreement rather than 
indirectly by competition. On the other hand, monopoly con- 
centrates economic power, and some communities may prefer 
greater decentralisation of power even at the cost of lower 
economic' efficiency. 
2. THE PATENT SYSTEM and ECONOMIC DEVELOPrNT 
Closely related to the major problem of monopoly is the patent 
system whereby the government excludes potential competitors 
from the use of technological facilities through the operations 
of the patent laws. A patent is but a monopoly right to make 
some product or use some process or design, which has been 
granted by the patent laws for a limited period of time as a 
reward for inventive ability. The nature and reward of the grant 
differ from one country to another. In U.S.A., for instance, 
the patent holder has exclusive rights to the invention for 
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17 years from the date of the patent. During this period 
of time, the patent holder may prevent others from using it 
or may grant rights of use subject to various restrictions and 
limitations, regardless of whether he uses the invention himself 
or not. 
Two arguments may be put forward in support of patent 
rights. First, the theory upon which a patent law is based is 
that the prospects of monopoly rights will stimulate an active 
process of invention and will induce inventors to disclose, in 
application for patents, the substance of their invention. 
Monopoly rights granted under patents, it is argued, are no 
disadvantage to the public, for in the absence of a patent 
system, the monopolised inventions would not have been made or 
disclosed. In fostering inventions and releasing them for 
competitive use after a certain period of time, the patent system 
converts the attractiveness of monopoly into a stimulus for tech- 
nical improvement and effective competition. 
Another argument for the patent system is that the process 
of perfecting an invention and learning how to put it into 
commercial use is almost always a slow and expensive one. 
It is therefore contended that unless an invention is patented, 
no entrepreneur will be desirous of undertaking such development 
simply because his rivals in the industry concerned can adopt 
the perfected technique without incurring equivalent expenses and 
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can then force down prices in competition so far as to prevent - 
the pioneering entrepreneur from recovering costs of development. 
According to this argument, therefore, technical progress would 
be retarded by the absence of patent monopolies,even if there 
(1) 
were no diminution in the amount of invention and disclosure. 
However, arguments against the patent system are so strong 
that it is quite relevant to discuss them in some detail before 
any attempt can be made to formulate a concrete policy towards 
patent rights. 
Legal Power: enterprises which are often engaged in 
acquiring and exploiting patents can afford the services of 
highly skilled patent lawyers who would exercise their skill in 
inventing formulae of words that plausibly extend the scope 
of claims made in the application. In this way the patent 
system may become a device through which the skill of lawyers 
can be rewarded,by grants of monopolies running appreciably 
further than would be necessary to recognise contributions of 
inventors.. Wherever such a patent claim is granted, the effect 
is either to transfer into private ownership some part of the 
public technical domain, or else to anticipate invention by 
giving someone a monopoly right to inventions that have been 
verbally described but not yet actually made. 
(1) For detailed study see the important article by Professor Sir Arnold 
Plant on The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions 
(Economica, Feb., 1934, p. 30 seq.) 
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Economic Power: Legal power which may be attached to a patent 
is sometimes supplemented by economic power derived from the 
possession of technical trade secrets with reference to the 
subject matter of the patent. Theoretically a patent is 
granted as an inducement for the inventor to disclose his 
invention. When a patented product is sold, its nature is 
necessarily disclosed in the sale; but this is not true of a 
patented productive process. It is possible to obtain a 
process patent without revealing all that must be known in 
order to make an effective use of the patented invention. 
Where this is done, the public will not receive the information 
that is supposed to justify the grant of monopoly rights to the 
inventor. Instead, the patentee obtains the bargaining power 
attached to a legal monopoly and continues to enjoy bargaining 
strength derived from the possession of a trade secret. This 
trade secret is,generally regarded as a property distinct from 
the patent to which it is applied. 
Risk of Stagnation: Although a patent grants a monopoly, 
monopoly power conveyed by a patent may not be large. The 
so- called 'basic patents', which are indispensable for those who 
would engage in some type of production, may convey a monopoly 
of an industry. In most cases, however, a single patent 
covers only an improvement in industrial technique, or one of 
several alternative devices by which a technical objective can be 
reached. So long as other enterprises can develop alternative 
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patents, the holder of such a patent has little power to 
translate it into control of an industry; thus the danger is 
less one of monopoly than economic stagnation. From the point 
of view of public interest, the chief risk is that complementary 
industrial techniques will be patented by different interests 
and will not be used because the various patentees are 
unable to agree upon the joint use of their various inventions. 
Suppression of Patents: When a large number of patents are 
held by the same concern, the situation is different. Having 
acquired one patent that covers one way of achieving a given 
result, the enterprise would attempt to acquire all other 
patents that cover the other ways whereby the same result may 
be achieved. But once these patents are assembled, only the 
best is used; the rest being retained in order to exclude 
competitors from the industry concerned by preventing them 
from using alternative processes. Besides, as large numbers 
of patents are assembled, the holder thus exercises control over 
many complementary improvements in the industry's products 
and processes. Though the patents may be individually of 
minor importance, in the aggregate they give control of the 
industry so much that competitors are denied access. Patent 
control therefore ceases to be the monopolising of a particular 
,advantage in a product or in an industrial prócess; instead it 
becomes to be a substantial monopolising of the industry itself. 
Ineffectiveness of Time Limitation: A business enterprise 
that bases its strategy upon patents is always concerned to buy 
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up new patent rights as its old patent is due to expire. It 
endeavours to avoid a situation in which it no longer enjoys 
patent protection. If the enterprise is fortunate enough 
to control basic patents without which competitors cannot 
operate, it may control the industry for 17 years. And, since 
technology is dynamic, the patentee is likely to acquire 
important new patents within the 17 years period and to use 
them in order to perpetuate its exclusive position or limitation 
upon its competitors. True, there are cases in which basic 
patents of an industry expired and the patent control was 
broken. It is also true that there are cases in which 
important new patents have been developed by enterprises other 
than those that held the old ones, so that patent control has 
passed from one enterprise to another. But equally true, however, 
there are cases in which one enterprise has held control 
through patents.for several decades. 
Domination of Industry During the Patent Period: Besides 
the expiration of patent control has not always meant the 
expiration of the monopoly which was originally based upon 
patents. During the period of patent control an enterprise 
that dominates an industry may establish its trade marks, 
develop its marketing channels, purchase most of the available 
reserves of raw materials, make long -term contracts with 
important customers and distributors, and in various other ways 
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consolidate its dominant position. 
Thus where the strength of a patent position is great enough 
to give one enterprise monopoly control over an industry, 
exploitation of the monopoly is similar to that of monopolies 
which have other origins: limitation of output, high prices 
and high profits. The only difference is that in the patent 
monopoly there is usually an active inventive process designed 
to perpetuate patent control and also an active process in 
buying up patents developed by others. Thus technological 
progress and efficiency is likely to be more rapid than under 
other forms of monopoly; but the rate at which the new 
technology is put into commercial use may be less rapid than 
the rate of invention. 
Thus conceived, a competitive policy calls for measures to 
prevent the use of patents as devices whereby industries may 
be controlled through patent rights. This would require 
modification of the structure of existing patent laws and 
procedures. This is to be determined not only by considerations 
of competitive policy, but also by decisions as to incentives 
that are appropriate to conduct, disclosure and use of research. 
If patent monopolies are not needed as incentives, the 
abolition of the patent system is the easiest way to solve the 
problem. If, however, patent rights are to be considered as 
desirable aids to technical progress, then changes in the patent 
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system will be necessary so long as that system is to be kept 
consistent with competitive policy. 
A major part of technical progress today is the result of 
systematic co- operative research in which a research worker 
builds upon the activities of his fellows. Thus the result 
of this type of research cannot conveniently be attributed to 
particular individuals or even to particular research 
institutes. If a flash of genius still continues, it is 
argued, there is no need to be rewarded by monopoly. 
Systematic research is expensive; there is thus the need to 
maintain patent rights in results of research as incentive to 
incur research expenditure. If such a standard were adopted, 
grant of control over new technical devices would not be based 
upon thé novelty of invention but upon the proof that systematic 
and expensive research activity has taken place. 
Another patent reform should be to prevent patentees from 
unreasonably keeping their inventions out of use. A further 
reform is the prevention of a licensing policy that blocks the 
development and use of patents held by others. Patent laws 
of some countries attack the problem by authorising any 
patentee to obtain a licence under a patent held by another if 
he can show that his own patent cannot be made use of without 
this licence and if he is willing to grant reciprocal licence. 
There is also the need to prevent the development and per- 
petuation of great concentrations of patents which give 
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enduring monopoly power over a whole industry, e.g. by reducing 
rights cOnvered by patents. Under a system of compulsory licen- 
sing, the enterprise with many patents would obtain a large revenue 
from royalties but they no longer have the power to exclude others 
from an industry by withholding its technology. 
There is again the need to prevent impairment of competition 
within an industry through monopolistic restrictions incorporated 
in patent licences. The most direct and effective way is to 
prevent the patentee from including restrictive provisions in the 
licence. Under such a system, licences would become only a means 
to collect revenue from the sale of rights to use an invention and 
cease to be a means to control the marketing of a product. 
If, however, this is the case for and against the patent 
system, -then in what sense is the whole argument relevant to the 
problem of economic development in under -developed countries? 
In those countries the patent system is part and parcel of the 
major problem of monopoly. If once the encouragement of inventive 
ability has become a part of public policy, monopoly rights have to 
granted under patents. 
1 
But in laying down new patent laws 
(1) Law No.132 of 191+9 is Egypt's first statute law relating to patents and 
designs. In past years it was the practice, in the absence of a proper Patent 
Law, for the specifications of inventions arû the representations of new designs, 
to be registered in the Mixed Court of Appeal and during more recent times, in the 
National Courts. According to the new law, patents for inventions and registra.- 
tions in respect of designs not coming within the ambit of Article 55 will be 
granted for terms of 15 years (subject to the payment of renewal fees annually). 
This term is reduced to 10 years in the case of an invention relating to a chemi- 
cal process for the production of foodstuffs or medicines. In the case of an 
invention or design coming within the provisions of Article 55 of the law, i.e. 
that which has been used or published in Egypt on or before 25th November, 1949, 
the patent or design registrations will be granted for the unexpired portions of 
the terms of years indicated, calculated from the dates of filing of the first 
application lodged in any country for the protection of the inventions or designs 
concerned. 
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and formulating a concrete policy towards patent rights, the 
governments concerned may well take into serious consideration the 
many abuses of the system in the light of American and Western 
experience. Besides, entrepreneurs in under- developed countries 
may take advantage, not only of probable technical progress at 
home, but also of actual advance of technology overseas, if by 
mutual agreement they are allowed to produce under a reformed 
system of compulsory licensing. In other words, a-patent policy 
as such will have both a preventive and a constructive side: 
preventive, in the sense of avoiding the abuses of the system; 
constructive, in the sense of encouraging the transmission and 
appropriation of new foreign inventions. 
3. CO- OPrRATIVE INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH 
All firms are always looking for information which they may 
turn to account, but its scope and intensity varies considerably 
from one firm to another. At one extreme, we find firms that 
satisfy their thirst for knowledge by casual reading. At the 
other extreme, we find firms that maintain a group of scientists 
and technologists who keep in close touch with scientific 
and technical development all over the world and who carry out 
experimental work in connection with scientific principles, 
materials, processes and products in which their firms might be 
interested. This is what is commonly called industrial research. 
But between research and production, there is another stage 
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commonly called development. It is concerned more with exploiting 
knowledge than with adding to it, and it involves the solution 
of production problems and the assessment of commercial possibilities 
and limitations. The development stage requires the co- operation 
of the scientist, designer, production engineer and the financial 
expert. It is rather impossible to draw a logically satisfying 
line of demarcation between industrial research and development, 
and more often than not the expression industrial research is 
commonly, used to include both. 
The potential field for profitable research, it will be 
observed,varies greatly from industry to industry and from time 
to time. As R.S. Edwards has pointed out, we can distinguish 
five different conditions for industry in so far as industrial 
research is concerned.(1) .In an industry newly founded on a 
major scientific advance, research is likely to justify great 
expenditure because so much will depend on the race for master 
patents and for domination of the field or sections of it. 
In an industry where scientific advance is not so significant, 
research expenditure may be much less, although great attention 
may be diverted to scientific research designed to reduce costs, 
improve products or initiate product differentiation. In an 
industry which is so suddenly faced with a change in the supply 
conditions of an important factor of production,a large increase 
(1) c.f. R.S. Edwards,'Co- operative Industrial Research.' 
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in research expenditure may be of great importance. In an 
industry where the pace of research has been slow, a change 
in outside conditions may render an increase in research 
expenditure immensely profitable and of great necessity for its 
survival. Thus a firmts research and development are in some 
measure determined by factors outside its own control and by 
its industrial environment. But in most industries, in 
advanced countries, there is a great scope for variations as 
between firms. Some firms may pursue a policy of keeping 
abreast with development in the hope of recovering costs of 
research plus a profit through the partial monopoly that 
technical leadership would ensure them. Other firms may be 
content to make a standard product and depend on a low price 
achieved through good administration to secure them a good 
business. 
But how far is it possible to forecast the yield from 
research? With respect to a project at the development stage, 
it is normally possible to make rough estimates of cost and 
future revenue if the development proves to be successful and goes 
into production, and on such a basis it seems possible to con- 
sider whether the expected cost of development is worth incurring. 
But in so far as research in the narrower sense of exploration 
is concerned, it is so much the more difficult to see how there 
could be a forecast of the yield. In practice, however, some 
firms in advanced countries allocate a percentage of their 
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turnover; others a percentage of profits or a lump sum depending 
on the -profit. In some other firms it is actually left to the 
decision of the head of the research department. 
But no government of an under -developed country can ensure 
that its nationals will make discoveries and inventions, or 
will transmit the large store of Western technical and scientific 
knowledge in a way that would lead to improvements in economic 
efficiency. Gbvernments of under- developed countries can do 
much to ensure that conditions are conducive to scientific 
research. They can contribute funds to firms or associations 
set up by groups of firms. They can finance independent 
research institutions, if any, as well as universities. They 
can also set up agricultural and industrial research institutes, 
staffed'by a scientific civil service. 
But if the gap in technology between the developed and 
under -developed, countries has grown wider and wider, is there 
indeed any scope for scientific research in the latter countries? 
Would it not be that the automatic transmission of Western 
technology is a ready solution to the technical problem? 
The answer is that the economic emphasis of experimental work 
is different in some under- developed countries from what it is 
in the developed. Large sums of money must be spent on 
research into the special needs of the former countries. Some 
of this experimental work can very successfully be done inside 
the research institutes of developed countries where, indeed, 
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much of it has been done in the past. But there is needed also 
a vast multiplication of research institutes inside the under- 
developed countries themselves. 
4. THE TECHNOLOGICAL PROBLEM 
IN P"RSPECTIVE 
What is commonly known as 'technological progress' can mean 
two things. First, and quite frequently, it refers to the 
construction of more and better instruments of production and to the 
utilisation, for this purpose, of a greater share of the existing 
store of technical knowledge. The store of knowledge may remain 
unchanged, and yet we may have 'technical progress' in the sense 
of a greater application and embodiment of it in material objects. 
The other sense of the term is that in which technical knowledge 
increases without any change in the form or quantity of capital 
goods. An advance in technical knowledge in the abstract may 
be of no economic relevance if there is no capital in which to 
incorporate it and with which to take advantage of it in the 
process of production. 
We shall here proceed on the assumption that there is a 
great fund of technical knowledge in the advanced countries 
which could be applied advantageously to the productive processes 
in the less developed countries if only the economic resources 
were available to make use of it. True, the cumulative 
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charact3r of technical progress, and the traditions and 
cultural patterns which it brings about, make it easier for the 
developed countries to achieve a more rapid and continuous 
advance in technology. But if the obstacles to the absorption 
of new technology are overcome, the existence of highly 
productive methods and processes, which do not have to be 
discovered anew, but are available for transmission and 
appropriation, lays open wide opportunities for the under- 
developed countries to profit from experience already gained and 
results already well- established. A group of experts even hold 
the view that these countries may, under favourable conditions 
and with the necessary efforts and organisation, be able to 
achieve a more rapid advance, which would make it possible for them 
gradually to narrow the gap that separates them from developed 
countries. But these experts, recognise the existence of some 
serious obstacles to any general technical progress in under- 
developed countries. First and foremost is the lack of 
capital. The adoption of technological improvements requires 
the use of capital goods which are in a true sense the carriers 
and embodiments of improved technology. In most of the under- 
developed countries, however, the producers are generally too 
poor to buy even relatively inexpensive producerst goods, 
e.g. imprcved seeds, fertilisers and insecticides. But in most 
(1) United Nations Report, op. cit. Sec. 80, pp. 28 -29 
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cases, whether in agriculture or in manufacturing industry, the 
cost of such capital goods as agricultural and industrial 
machinery is far beyond the purchasing power of the producers. 
Moreover, before technological improvements in the major fields of 
production can be achieved, large investments of capital will 
have to be made in basic industries and facilities, e.g., 
power, irrigation, transport and communications. "We cannot 
over -emphasise the fact that capital and technology are joint 
inputs in one process, the use of either of which involves 
necessarily the use of the other. Technological progress 
involves necessarily the investment of capital in human beings 
and in training and instructing them in the new technology, 
in administrative processes for its transmission, in capital 
goods embodying it, and in capital works and facilities supporting 
and developing the whole process ". 
(I) 
But here reference should be made to a serious qualification. 
To some minds, these experts have failed to grasp that the 
basic problem of development in under- developed countries 
consists precisely in the fact that it is essential to utilise 
more adequately and fully the labour resources as they now are 
in those countries, so as gradually to build up new forms of 
capital suited to the specific environment, resources, and 
aptitudes of the people themselves. Frankel, for instance, 
(1) Ibid. , Sec. 84, p.30 
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states emphatically that tithe way to accumulate capital in those 
countries is in general to make the best use of that factor 
which is most abundant, i.e., labour - not to displace it by 
capital, which is relatively scarce, and has to be imported 
at considerable costtt.(1) It is wrong to imply, as the authors 
do, that there has to be a sudden, rapid, and almost 
revolutionary -shift to an entirely new structure of production 
in under -developed countries; to postulate a capital intensity 
in them akin to that which is found in the more advanced 
countries is unwarranted. Moreover, such revolutionary economic 
chan-e may be economically and socially dangerous. It is apt 
to lead to an unnec6ssary degree of both economic and social 
disintegration. It may dissociate people from their established 
social pattern of living too rapidly, and so reduce them to the 
status of uprooted wage earners without the security previously 
provided by their social system. And it may establish a 
capital structure and types of activity, which the economy cannot 
continue to support when the flow of investment or aid from 
abroad ceases. 
This sort of critism should draw our attention to the special 
problems that may arise in the transmission of Western technology 
to under -developed countries. Whereas in well- developed countries 
(1) S. Herbert Frankel, The Economic Impact on Under - Developed Societies, 
Essay V on United Nations Premier For Development, Section V, pp. 98 -99 
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much technical research is designed to save labour as being the 
relatively scarce factor of production, in some under -developed 
countries where labour is over - abundant the problem is rather 
to find new techniques which are capital -saving. 
I4oreover, the technology of advanced countries needs 
frequently to be adapted to the special requirements of under- 
developed countries. It is sometimes suggested that all that 
is required to assist the development of backward societies 
is to give or to lend to them part of the worldts accumulated 
technical knowledge and capital. But no two situations, no 
two regions, no two societies, in time or place, are alike. 
Many instances can be cited: fertiliser experimentation is needed . 
to discover what is suitable to local environment; new strains 
of plants and livestock must be bred, new crop rotations must 
be found; manufacturing processes and equipment may have to be 
adjusted to local climatic and other conditions. It then follows 
that the technology of developed countries cannot simply be 
transferred. Large sums of money must be expended on research 
into the special needs of under -developed countries. 
Another major obstacle to the general advance in technology 
is the lack of an educational and administrative structure 
through which the producers can learn the new technology. In 
under -developed countries there is the need for a well- developed 
administration in government departments of agriculture, well - 
staffed with experts and technicians. There is also the need 
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for training the higher personnel, the public administrators, 
who are - required to formulate and carry out plans of economic 
development. It is, moreover, necessary to provide for a 
basic minimum level of education and literacy among the actual 
producers to achieve great advance in technology. It is also 
necessary to build up the educational institutions, without 
which this whole process cannot be developed and maintained at 
the proper level of effectiveness. 
But in most of the under -developed countries it seems that 
the first goal in the sphere of education is solely to get rid 
of illiteracy. If, however, schemes were put into operation 
on such a grand scale that all children had to enter the 
elementary schools in order to learn the three R's, a major part, 
if not the whole, of the state budget of many countries would be 
spent on education. Still, education of children will be all the 
more costly as the standard of schooling is constantly rising; 
and this means that, with an ever- increasing cost of education, 
a government with a modest budget cannot afford it on a national 
scale. But apart from the high cost of the education of 
children, is a high standard of literacy genuinely so essential 
to economic development? The authors of the United Nations 
Report are well conscious of the fact that campaigns against 
illiteracy are no doubt useful in themselves, and a general 
high standard of education is certainly desirable. But from 
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the viewpoint of economic development they lay more emphasis on 
adult education rather than on the education of children. 
In their view, the adult must be educated in the job he is doing 
either on the farm or in the factory. 
In agriculture it is the difficulty of reaching and teaching 
millions of farmers and of persuading them to change their 
primitive methods of agriculture that development planners should 
first endeavour to overcome. To reach them with new technology 
is an educational task which requires a great number of teachers 
in the field and a whole new body of techniques of adult 
education. This system is what has come to be technically known 
as 'mass education'. It is impossible to reach the masses, 
if only men of the highest qualifications are to be employed as 
teachers, physicians or agricultural extension workers. There 
should also be a vast number of men who have received no more than 
one or two years' training, to work in spheres where a five or 
six years' training is usually demanded in developed countries. 
"Some of the peoples of under -developed countries, "the authors 
write," resent attempts to expand this type of training, because 
they consider that the dignity of their country requires that only 
the best should be used. There is also some danger that 
international institutions may set too high standards of competence 
for the local technicians whose employment they have to approve. 
We consider these attitudes to be mistaken. There is much to 
be done that can be done after a short training, and much that 
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can be done better after a short training than it is done by 
persons - further removed from the people. Economic development will 
be held up if under- developed countries are compelled to adopt the 
expensive standards of the more advanced countries" (1) 
In industry plans for economic development need to begin with 
the expansion of domestic institutions for training the personnel 
required at all levels. Even apart from the cost and scarcity 
of foreign technicians, domestic training in the environment 
where people have to work has obvious advantages. Moreover, 
no development is lasting or self -generated which is merely 
imposed from above, or imported from abroad. The new education 
and techniques will show large results only when they are 
completely assimilated and begin to develop on lines of a native 
tradition. But it is to be noted here that, if a new 
industry based on a new technique is to be established, it is by 
no means necessary to start side by side a technical institute 
with a view to teaching that technique. If the required 
workers have the technical background, they have then to be 
trained on the job, and an educational programme is to be 
started by the employers concerned for this on- the -job training. 
But it must be pointed out here that the process of 
development is not merely a process of mass education on which 
the authors of the United rations Report lean heavily for rapid 
economic development. Indeed, they tend to make this one of the 
(1) United Nation Report, op. cit., Sec. 95, p.31+ 
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main considerations in the choice of the type of education that 
should be most appropriate for under- developed societies. 
One may agree with the general principle that ?investment in 
people' should not suffer at the expense of a too high priority 
for investment in material resources. But it is doubtful 
that these generalisations get us very far unless we are prepared 
to be far more critical of the fundamental meaning to be 
attributed to such terms than appears to be the case at present. 
In Frankel's view, a whole people can no more be given rapid 
economic development by investment in mass education, than it 
can be given ?democracy? by ?investment? in mass political 
training. For quite apart from the time all this takes, what 
is involved is neither just another ready -to -hand goal of 
action, nor the transfer of a new set of techniques, but the 
necessarily slow growth of new aptitudes, and of new ways of 
doing, living, and thinking. "The problem", he writes, 
"is not to wipe the slate clean in the under- developed 
countries, and to write our economic and technical equations 
on it, but to reco;nise that different peoples have a different 
language of social action, and possess, and, indeed, have long 
exercised, peculiar aptitudes for solving the problems of their 
own time and place, aptitudes which must be further developed 
in the historic setting of their own past to meet the 
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exigencies of the present and the future ". 
5. THE HUiIAN FACTOR 
(1) 
IN INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY 
So far we have been dealing with the general and special 
problems that may arise in the transmission and appropriation 
of Western technology. But even if all the obstacles to the 
absorption of new production methods and techniques were 
removed, there would still remain another problem. It is now 
a commonplace that the human and psychological factors in 
industry are no less important than the technical aspects, and 
that the full utilisation of the valuable asset of Western 
technology and industrial resources must come from a whole 
hearted co- operation between managements and workers, and 
willingness to adapt themselves to new conditions. 
As has been mentioned earlier, this whole- hearted co- operation 
would not be forthcoming in any under- developed country unless 
the managements took the responsibility not only of ensuring the 
use of the more up -to -date techniques of applied science, but 
of providing the leadership vital to any healthy organisation. 
In addition, the trade unions must become free, independent and 
well enough organised to safeguard and improve the working 
(1) S. Herbert Frankel, op. cit., p. 96. 
For further study see J.B. Conclliffe, Technological Progress and Economic 
Development, Delhi School of Economics, Occasional Papers No. 2, Delhi, 1951. 
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and living standards of the working people as well as to make the 
positive contribution they alone can do in promoting industrial 
efficiency.(1) 
At the risk of oversimplification, the problems of capital 
labour relations may be categorically divided into three groups: 
(1) economic problems, including those relating to the workers' 
earnings; (2.) social problems, including the workers' demand 
for improved social status; (3) psychological problems, including 
the workers' unconciliatory attitude towards the management. 
As regards the first two groups of problems, it cannot be 
denied that trade unions today are quite defective in most 
under- developed countries; and in many instances labour 
legislation has been the principal substance of the protection 
enjoyed by labour,(2) But many have high aspirations as to 
the directions in which trade unions should develop in the 
future in such measure that they will increase their power of 
collective bargaining and on the workers' behalf bargain with 
employers for better conditions of work, for better terms of 
employment, and for extended welfare measures. 
In improving the lot of the working classes, trade unions 
in under -developed countries, should achieve their main aim and 
purpose; but in pursuing a policy for increasing industrial 
efficiency in co- operation with manaF,emerits, trade unions should 
1 c. f. Part II, Chapter 6, Sec. 2 pp. 190 - 196 
(2) c. f. Part II, Chapter 8, Sec. 3,pp. 228 - 229 
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embark or a scheme of full -time training and education for 
their mémbers in co- operation with technical institutions. 
For it is being realised more and more that, if workers are 
fully to co- operate in the vitally important matter of efficiency 
in industry, they must be competent to negotiate with managements 
with confidence on the technical aspects. It would be foolish, 
however, to deny that there are difficulties in the practice 
of consultation between workers and managements. Managerial 
pride often leads managerial elements into resistance against 
the advice and suggestions which emerge from the non -technical 
elements within an industry. They may regard the acceptance 
of such ideas as a reflection on their own ability, and in 
consequence a reduction in the measure of their authority. On 
the othér hand, managements must realise that the practical ex- 
perience of workers, which after all is the basis of technical 
knowledge, is of the utmost value to industry. The common 
aim of the managerial elements and the workers in a given 
industry -can benefit both, while also creating possibilities 
of advantage to the whole community. 
But even if the workers are to be technically trained and 
practically experienced, this is not enough to stimuls?te their 
interest in industrial efficiency. There is no better method 
of engaging; the worker's interest in the efficiency of the plant 
and the need for keeping costs low than by the general application 
of incentive schemes. New equipment and plants are not 
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sufficient in themsleves; they are only the means, the tools 
of abundance. If industry must bring average production to the 
highest possible level, this would involve the adoption of 
incentive schemes which vary accordin- to local conditions and 
products. They are usually based on payments by time and 
motion study, piece work and payment by results, and on a 
combination of -all three. But incentive schemes as the 
key to increased-productivity will never be readily and fully 
accepted unless the trade unions have agreements with managements 
which give union officials the right to participate and to 
check on the methods and time standard as they are developed 
and applied. Such new managerial techniques must become a 
general practice throughout industry, if the under -developed 
economy is to achieve any industrial development. 
It is well to bear in mind the experience of British 
industry. In the past decades, trade unions feared the 
introduction of these incentive schemes not without good reasons 
in view of experience between the two wars. But during the post- 
war years there has been an entirely new approach and a new 
appreciation of their purpose and consequence. The workers 
generally, and particularly shop stewards, have themselves 
accepted the new responsibility and understood the principles 
and methods of the incentive schemes. Consequently the 
demand for these new methods of industrial management have come 
from the rank-and-file workers themselves. In every factory 
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where these schemes have been introduced on the basis of 
co- operation' rather than arbitrary management decisions, 
higher producitivity and greater output at lower costs have 
resulted, and workers' earnings have increased. 
The American industry is another case in point. So 
great has been the momentum of American production that the 
American people are able to enjoy the highest living standards 
in history. It is true that there are many natural factors making 
for American prosperity, but even taking these into consideration 
the major reason for this great productivity is the much higher 
industrial efficiency of American industry, as compared with 
Britain and Western rurope. In turn this is largely due to the 
fact that the American workers, through their trade unions, 
have accepted as a first principle the truth that their standard 
of living is dependent on a constantly increasing rate of output 
and have not been afraid to embrace new ideas on incentive 
schemes and industrial management. 
As regards the psychological aspects of the problem of 
capital labour relations, in the under -developed economy there 
can be distinguished several types of labour administration. 
In the old-fashioned factories the manager directly controls 
labour. From the point of view of labour administration, this 
is generally unsatisfactory, for the manager usually has many 
other duties to perform in the running of his business and is 
thus not able to devote sufficient time to the care of the 
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workers. In some other factories the engineer directs the 
workers; this is more natural, as he must employ workers to 
operate the machines. Though a number of engineers are 
broad -minded and humanitarian, they are by training and 
experience experts in machinery, but are frequently awkward in 
dealing with human beings. In many factories, however, the 
control of labour is in the hands of the traditional foreman. 
The defects of this practice lie in the fact that the foreman 
is usually ignorant, conservative and biassed. He will not 
be able to introduce scientific improvements and will not be 
fair to all the workers under his control. As regards the 
all important question of vocational training, psychological 
testing and of sympathetic understanding, rarely has any worth 
while attempt been made in any under -developed country. 
There are no arguments, of course, for ignoring the vital 
need for accepting the most up -to -date methods of industrial 
organisation and techniques. Not to do so would make certain 
the industrial decline, and not the development, of under - 
developed.areas. Such obstacles as do exist must be resolutely 
tackled and overcome, but there is no short cut or easy road 
to a solution. It is an essential pre -requisite of economic 
development in those areas that leaders of management and labour 
should accept the basic truth that raising productivity and 
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eliminating friction and inefficiency is a joint task, to be 
pursued In the spirit of common endeavour and common interest. 
It is one of the duties having the highest priority for the 
governments concerned to take up this cause and to bring the 
leaders of industry together. Once they have been brought 
together, the first step is to arrive at agreement as to what 
really are the specific obstacles that are preventing the co- 
operation between management and workers on the actual job 
on the workshop floor. When both parties have come to a 
-common agreement as to the nature of these obstacles, attention 
can be directed towards removing or circumventing them. 
Some of the obstacles may be inadequate management, or ineffective 
leadership on the shop floor due to inadequate training of 
officials or unclear organisational structure. Some of the 
obstacles may be the lack of direct interest in improved 
efficiency of industry; or inadequate channels of negotiation and 
discussion perhaps due to the apathy of the rank and file; or 
suspicion and the assumption that management is and always was 
"the enemy". 
This list is far from complete, but it is sufficient to show 
that the onus of removing the obstacles that stand in the way of 
co- operation falls in the main, and certainly in detail, on 
managements. The trade unions, on their side, can modify the 
climate of thought of the rank- and -file workers and prepare the 




So far we have been dealing only with one particular facet 
of the problem of capital formation in under- developed countries. 
The more fundamental difficulties that lie on the supply side 
have been deliberately kept off -stage for two reasons: for the 
sake of orderly discussion as well as for removing a deep- rooted 
misconception in the minds of so many people in those countries. 
It is that, once an under -developed country lays its hands on 
capital funds from whatever source, domestic or foreign, the 
problem of economic development will automatically look after 
itself. 
But 'capital formation requires an act of investment as well 
as a capacity to save. The two things can and should be 
distinguished, at least for purposes of analysis. Having 
considered the various ways in which investment incentives have 
to be created in any under -developed economy, it is then proposed 
to discuss the more serious problem of the supply of capital. 
However, as we turn to consider the potential domestic sources of 
capital formation in such an economy we find that it is impossible 
to go on without knowing what is meant by the term 'capital 
formation' in an economic sense. It is that society does not 
apply the whole of its current productive activity to the needs 
and desires of immediate consumption, but directs a part of it to 
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the making of capital goods in the form of tools and instruments, 
machinery, transport facilities, plant and equipment, and all the 
various forms of real capital that can so greatly increase 
productive efficiency. The term is sometimes used to cover 
human as well as material capital: it can be made to include 
investment in skills, education and health. But the discussion 
here will be limited to the accumulation of material capital. 
1. CONCEALED SAVING POTENTIAL. 
In connection with the problem of disguised rural employment, 
it has been pointed out already that there is the possibility of 
taking the surplus people away from the land, and anything they 
could produce elsewhere would be a net addition to the real 
national income. Then why not set them to work on such capital 
projects, as,for instance, irrigation, drainage, roads, railways, 
housing, factories and so on? But how are these various forms of 
capital formation to be financed? In real terms, how are people 
to be fed when they are set to work on projects of this sort? The 
answer seems to lie, at least in part, in the concept of concealed 
saving potential. 
It is possible to feed the surplus people through the normal 
voluntary saving that may take place to some extent even in a poor, 
over -populated peasant society. But this sort of saving is very 
likely to be quite inadequate relative to the labour resources to be 
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mobilised; and is likely, moreover, to be used for purposes other 
than the implementation of capital projects. This voluntary 
domestic saving may be supplemented through compulsory saving by 
means of taxation; but even this, as we shall see later on, may 
turn out to be very little in comparison with what is really 
required. There is, nevertheless, the second possibility of an 
inflow of capital from abroad; but this again, besides being 
uncertain, is likely to be inadequate for several reasons. 
However, there is a third possibility of feeding the people trans- 
ferred from the land to the new investment projects; and some 
authors like Ragnar Nurkse place much emphasis on this source of 
capital supply. 
On close examination, says Nurkse, we find that the state of 
disguised unemployment implies at least to some extent a disguised 
saving potential as well. The concept can easily be illustrated 
in physical terms. As things are, those surplus labourers who 
are unnecessary on the land are sustained by the other labourers, 
even though personal identification of the two groups is, in the 
nature of things, impossible. The latter group are performing 
'virtual' saving in the sense that they produce more than they 
consume. But the saving runs to waste, for it is offset by the 
consumption of the former group who could be dispensed with, who 
contribute nothing to output. If the latter group of peasants 
were to send their useless dependants to work on capital projects 
and if they continued to feed them there, then their 'virtual' 
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saving would become 'effective' saving. 
Thus the use of disguised unemployment for the accumulation 
of capital could be financed from within the system itself. There 
is no question of asking the peasants who remain on the land to eat 
less than before, only of preventing them from eating more. What 
is wanted is that they go on feeding their dependants who leave the 
farms to go to work on capital projects and who, in effect, continue 
to be dependent for their subsistence on the peasants remaining 
on the farms. All that happens is thus a mere re- allocation of 
labour in favour of capital formation; and there is in principle 
no necessity for either group to tighten their belts, always 
provided that the initial assumption is valid. It is that 
surplus labour does exist which can be withdrawn without a fall 
(1) 
in total farm output. 
"Here we have a relationship between consumption and invest- 
ment," says Nurkse, "which stands midway between the classical and 
the Keynesian approach. In the usual classical model, an increase 
in the rate of capital formation requires a reduction in consumptions 
In the Keynesian world of industrial unemployment, consumption as 
well as investment can be expanded at the same time. In the case 
now before us, the situation differs from the Keynesian model in 
that it is impossible to expand both consumption and investment. 
On the other hand, it is possible to increase capital formation 
without having to cut down the level of consumption.tr(2) 
(1) C.f. Ragnar Nurkse, op.cit. p.38. 
( 2) Ibid. 
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This is probably enough to make clear the sense in which 
disguiséd iunemployment in under- developed peasant societies may 
be said to contain a hidden source of saving available for economic 
development. Nurkse, however, seems to be well aware of all sorts 
of difficulties as soon as one begins to consider its practical 
application. True, everything depends on the mobilisation of 
the concealed saving potential in the shape of the food surplus 
that becomes available to the peasants remaining on the farms 
when their dependants go away. But this mobilisation will not 
be complete if the remaining peasants cannot be stopped from 
eating more than before. Neither will this mobilisation be 
complete if the investment workers who were formerly unemployed 
in disguise have to eat a little more than before because they are 
now more actively at work, or because they need to be given an 
inducement to leave the farms in the first place. But how much 
inducement will be necessary is likely to depend on circumstances. 
In this sense,Nurkse recognises a leakage which may develop in the 
subsistence fund available for capital formation through increased 
consumption by the remaining peasants or by the new investment 
workers, or both. There is, moreover, a leakage which may arise 
through the cost of transporting the food from the farms to the 
places where the capital projects are established. This particular 
leakage can be reduced by scattering the projects in rural areas, 
but in practice it can probably never be entirely suppressed. 
In these circumstances the formation of capital through the 
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use of surplus labour is self- financed only if the mobilisation of 
the concealed saving potential is completely successful. Otherwise 
the scheme is very likely to break down when the amount of saving, 
or in real terms the subsistence fund available to support the 
workers engaged on real capital accumulation, proves insufficient. 
For if the investment workers will not get enough to eat on their 
new jobs, they will run back to the farms to resume their previous 
existence and absorb on the spot the food produced there. At 
first sight it seems to be a question of all or nothing. On 
reflection, however, it will be observed that the surplus labour 
can still be employed for capital formation if some complementary 
saving can be secured from outside the system to close the 
deficiency of saving that may arise within it. Some complementary 
saving might become available from domestic sources, and there is 
also the possibility of capital imports. So it may not have to 
be all or nothing, and by means of resources obtained from outside 
the system, it will be possible to mobilise the whole or part of 
the disguised unemployment for the purpose of capital formation. 
And the degree of mobilisation possible will depend on the amount 
of complementary saving available and on the relative size of the 
leakage. It is then our task to discuss the possibility of 
obtaining complementary saving from outside the system. 
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2. SAVING INCENTIVES 
INSTITUTIONS, INFLATION and TAXATION 
In all under- developed countries, paucity of capital 
resources necessary for financing development is one of the 
major bottlenecks. In such countries, the rate of saving 
is normally negligible so that only a very inconsiderable 
part of savings is mobilised to increase productivity and 
raise the average living standard. This is largely due to 
the very low incomes of the masses of the people in those 
countries, which could hardly leave any margin of savings 
after provision for the basic needs of life. This is also 
due to the lavishness of the wealthier classes of these 
communities in their expenditure on articles of luxury simply 
for conspicuous consumption. 
The new capital resources necessary for financing development 
may be imported from abroad whether by grant or by loan. 
To what extent under- developed countries can rely on foreign 
resources is a matter of speculation, particularly when account 
is taken of the several obstacles standing in the way of all types . 
of private foreign investment, the political misgivings attendant 
on government lending, and the administrative and financial 
limitations on the powers of international lending agencies. 
Under -developed countries therefore will have to count first 
on their domestic capital resources. 
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In so far as domestic saving is concerned, the first 
difficulty is, of course, that its volume is small because of the 
low level of income, But, then, there is the further trouble 
that such saving as does take place tends to be used unproductively: 
it tends to be put into real estate, gold, jewellery, commodity 
hoards, and hoards of foreign or domestic currency. This 
unfortunate tendency is usually explained by reference to in- 
adequate financial organisation or lack of education. While 
such institutional explanations seem to have some validity, 
this tendency may also reflect a more deep- seated economic 
condition. It is the deficient inducement to investment which 
is due to the poverty of the domestic market. 
Thus a source of domestic resources may be tapped in the 
form of- private hoardings of gold and foreign exchanges, con- 
stituting in some countries as much as 10 per cent of their 
national incomes. No doubt, it would be socially. desirable to 
get these not insignificant hoards used for domestic capital 
formation; but as information about these hoards is very 
scanty, it would be immensely difficult to get hold of them. 
Nor, of course, would these hoards constitute a permanent source 
of finance. Consequently more reliance should be placed on 
increasing current savings rather than on the mobilisation 
of already existing hoards of gold and foreign or domestic 
currency. 
To increase voluntary savings necessitates the establishment 
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of savings institutions, the effect of which on the level of 
savings partly depends on their number and their accessibility, 
and partly on the interest rate they pay. People with low 
incomes might save more if these institutions were widespread 
and the government urged people by propaganda to save. People 
with medium sized incomes save through such institutions as 
well as insurance companies, investment in their own business 
or in shares and industrial securities, so that the organisation 
of a stock market might induce a little more middle class saving. 
As far as the higher income class is concerned, the willingness 
to save is not hindered by the lack of savings institiztion_s. 
The problem presented by this class is rather how to divert and 
mobolise their savings into more useful purposes. Mal-investment 
of savings may be partly tackled by means of a discriminatory 
tax system implying the grant of tax exemptions and subsidies. 
Thus higher, lower, zero and 'negative' rates of tax might be 
imposed on different types of investments, and thereby ensure the 
flow of savings from the less to the more useful purposes consistent 
with the development plan. In other words, the yield of land 
and real estate ought to be subject to relatively high rates of 
tax,whilst the yield of industrial ventures and agricultural 
enterprises, as distinct from the passive ownership of land, 
ought to be subject to relatively low rates of tax or should 
even be subsidised in some cases. 
462 . 
It is partly because the capacity, and partly because the 
willingness,.to save is low in under -developed countries that 
much reliance should not be placed on stimulating voluntary 
savings as a source of financing more rapid development. Given 
the small propensity to save in those countries, if more 
ambitious development plans were set in motion, this would 
inevitably lead to inflationary tendencies. Although a certain 
measure of inflation is unavoidable in the way of carrying out 
intensive development, financing development by inflation is by 
no means desirable. Under -developed countries have much to lose 
from inflation. It distorts the profitability of various types 
of enterprises and induces people to put much capital into 
speculative enterprises and into hoards of gold and foreign 
exchange. It also discourages the inflow of foreign investment, 
and by reducing the real value of small savings, it discourages 
the lower and middle income groups from continuing to save. 
Once it starts, inflation may generate forces which reinforce it 
and make it cumulatively more difficult to end. Hence it 
would be better to try to finance more rapid development by 
means of collective savin,.s by the state, i.e., creating a budget 
surplus on current account by way of taxation. 
It is theoretically possible to increase domestic capital 
formation by compulsorily reducing consumption below its present 
level. But one may envisage three obstacles in financing 
development in this way: political pressures to protect the 
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living standard of the masses; the unfavourable reaction to 
taxation-by thé middle and higher income groups who have an 
important part to play in the process of development; and the 
reaction of the wealthiest classes to taxation by reducing their 
savings rather than their consumption. These obstacles can be 
removed by political action. The government should urge all classes 
to sacrifice and contribute to the process of development, and 
should start to tax heavily the luxury articles consumed by the 
wealthiest classes in order to win the confidence of other 
classes. 
But when taxation is employed as the primary means of 
providing the requisite finances for development, it is not 
necessary that the development programme should be undertaken 
by public- enterprise. Heavy taxation may be used merely to set 
free productive resources, and the government may merely accumulate 
a budget surplus or tax credits. In practice, however, taxation 
is often associated with promoting development of a public 
enterprise type. The danger of over- investment in public 
enterprise might be met by devoting a part of the proceeds of 
taxation to increasing the funds of public financial institutions 
catering for agricultural and industrial development, or to set 
up industrial centres in which factory space and all basic 
facilities are given to private entrepreneurs on easy terms. 
It is evident that taxation hitting consumption to release 
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resources for capital formation contributes to combat inflationary 
tendencies, if any, for it reduces effective demand for certain 
resources which are thus set free and may be transferred by 
appropriate policies to economic development. Since taxation 
is designed primarily to reduce consumption in order to increase 
collective savings by the state, such indirect taxes as import 
and export duties, excise duties and purchase taxes are the most 
appropriate category of the fiscal structure. Among the 
various types of indirect taxation, however, three taxes deserve 
special mention: royalties, export duties and import duties. 
In some under developed countries, there are foreign 
companies which make and export exorbitant profits simply 
because the local governments have signed away some natural 
resources without demanding an adequate royalty or rental in 
return. Foreign companies should not make and export exorbitant 
profits and the government concerned should ensure receiving 
adequate royalties in return for the concessions. iqoreover , 
these royalties should be exclusively devoted to the financing 
of development. Otherwise, ultimate impoverishment of the country 
must follow as a result of the depletion of its natural resources, 
which is not matched by a corresponding increase in its productive 
capital. 
In regard to export duties, some countries have found a 
source of savings by taking advantage of a temporary, or a 
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permanent, improvement in their terms of trade. The method is 
designed to prevent exporters or producers from getting the full 
benefit of the increased price of their goods in foreign countries. 
This can be done by imposing an export tax which varies directly 
with the foreign price, or by establishing a government marketing 
agency which buys produce at a low price and sells it at a higher 
price. Sizable sums have been taken away by governments in this 
way. But the difficulty is to know what part of the proceeds 
can safely be used to finance capital formatibn, end what part 
must be held in reserve against cyclical deterioration of the 
terms of trade. 
Import duties, on the other hand, can be employed as a 
fiscal measure for promoting development in four different ways. 
They may, be imposed for revenue purposes which would make possible 
the operation of development projects without resort to 
inflationary methods of finance. They may also be employed 
as a restrictive measure on consumption of imported goods; 
but, in this case, they have to be coupled with direct controls 
or other types of indirect taxation in order to rule out the 
possibility of the substitution of home-produced for similar 
imported goods. Moreover, selectivity in imports is recognised 
as a legitimate measure in many under -developed countries where 
a high proportion of the national income tends to be spent on 
luxury imports. Higher import duties are therefore to be levied 
on such luxuries to the benefit of other essential capital 
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equipment or consumption goods which may be liable to lower 
rates of duty. In this way import duties are made equivalent 
to a progressive income tax which primarily hits the higher 
income brackets. Furthermore, they may be levied with a view 
to protecting 'infant' domestic industries, producing similar 
products or substitutes. Import duties may cover therefore 
a wide range of objectives, and if carefully selected may be 
expected to play, their part in the promotion of economic 
development. 
This discussion of the savings problem in under -developed 
countries leads us to the conclusion that what needs to be done 
first is to induce the lower classes to save more by developing 
a taste for saving, the middle classes by creating saving 
institutions and setting up building societies, insurance 
companies and organised stock exchanges. Nevertheless, it is 
unlikely that development would significantly be financed by 
voluntary savings owing to the very low incomes of the masses of 
people in those countries. If, however, these voluntary savings 
were coupled by compulsory savings, i.e., by way of increased 
taxation, still the prospects would seem rather poor, for this 
fiscal measure of financing development would most probably 
meet with obstacles and political resistance by the masses. 
If, however, both voluntary and compulsory domestic savings 
proved to be inadequate for rapid economic development, it may be 
suggested that foreign savings from abroad may be invoked to fill 
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the gap. But this source of finance, as we shall see later, 
is not only uncertain but also inadequate. This is indeed 
a rather pessimistic view of the supply side of the problem of 
capital formation. Is there any other way of finance, apart 
from borrowing from abroad or increasing voluntary or compulsory 
savings? 
The authors of the United Nations Report have proceeded 
along more optimistic lines of argument, when they pointed out 
that economic progress has actually been achieved alongside 
increasing inequality of incomes. In the past, economic progress 
was only possible when the rich became richer and the poor 
poorer. It is only the increasing inequality of incomes which 
gave the impetus to progress. Hence an easier and more acceptable 
policy is to increase savings by holding consumption constant or, 
at least, by allowing it to rise only in lesser proportion. This 
is less difficult to achieve, and it is the normal way that 
countries have developed in the past. Starting from a position 
where savins were a small, portion of the national income, these 
countries have climbed to a position where savings are a much 
larger portion of the national income, by increasing production 
faster than consumption. The mechanism has been growing 
inequality of income, development giving rise to large profits 
which were plouvhed back in the creation of large private fortunes. 
But the authors do not overlook the cardinal fact that in our 
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days the creation of large private fortunes is less likely to be 
permissible. In view of this practical difficulty, the 
authors recommend a policy to be based on siphoning off the 
increase of production into the hands of the government, 
rather than into profits, and creating financial institutions which 
enable the government to use the proceeds for capital formation. 
In their opinion, this is an easier policy than one which is 
purported to involve an absolute fall in consumption. 
(l) 
3 SAVINGS AND T_ 7 D 7LCNSTRATI ON 7FFIWT 
We may now go further afield to investigate a hypothesis 
based on the unequal income distribution in the world, which both 
theory and international economic policy have too often tended 
to ignore in the past. This hypothesis may throw some light on 
the problems of economic development in their international setting. 
Our starting -point is the view taken by James S. Duesenberry 
in respect of consumer's behaviour. This view places great 
emphasis on the fact that individual consumption functions are 
interrelated and not independent. They are interrelated, first, 
through the desire for social emulation by means of conspicuous 
consumption. The point was made familiar especially by Thorstein 
Veblen; and it may be important in inter- personal relations and 
perhaps of some use in the explanation of consumption and saving 
habits that prevail in economically backward countries. There is 
(1) c. f. United Nations Report, op. cit. Sec. 113, p.39. 
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another way in which individual consumption functions are inter - 
related-and this will be our main concern. Duesenberry calls 
it the 'demonstration effect'. When people come into contact 
with superior goods or superior patterns of consumption, with 
new articles or new ways of meeting old wants, they are apt to 
feel after a while a certain restlessness and dissatisfaction. 
Their knowledge is extended, their imagination stimulated, 
new desires are aroused, the propensity to consume is shifted 
upwards 
,Thus the interdependence of consumers' preferences, stressed by 
this theory, may significantly affect the choice between con- 
sumption and saving. The amount of saving performed by an 
individual depends not only on the absolute level of his real 
income, but also on the ratio of his income to the superior 
income level of other people with whom he may come in contact. 
Thus when the interdependence of consumers' preferences is to be 
teken into consideration, we realise that a more unequal dis- 
tribution, of income may reduce the average saving ratio, instead 
of increasing it as is commonly assumed. The reason why 75 per 
cent of American familiés save nothing is not so much that they 
are too poor to save. It is rather that the example of the 
consumption patterns kept up by people in the top 25 per cent 
(1) c.f. James S. Duesenberry, Income, Saving and the Theory of Consumer 
Behav1out (Cambridge, Mass. 1949). 
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income groups stimulates their wants to such an extent that 
virtually' nothing is left over for saving.- 
l) 
All this is a 
mere hypothesis, but it seems to be consistent with the facts. 
The question then arises as to whether a hypothesis of this sort 
might not usefully be applied to international economic relations. 
Could it not be that the consumption functions of different 
countries are interrelated in a similar gay? In this respect, 
Nurkse believes that on the international plane the effect of 
unequal living standards is not dependent on Veblen's point 
that the propensity to spend is partly based on the desire for 
conspicuous consumption, but on demonstration leading to 
imitation. Knowledge of, or contact with, new consumption 
patterns opens one's eyes to previously unrecognised possibilities. 
It widens the horizon of imagination and desires. It is not 
just a matter of social snobbishness. 
(2) 
"New products constantly emerge from the course of technical 
progress," Nurkse writes, "which modify existing ways of life 
and frequently become necessities. In the poorer countries such 
goods are `often imported `goods, not produced at home; but that 
is not the only trouble. The basic trouble is that the presence 
or the mere knowledge of new goods and new methods of consumption 
tends to raise the general propensity to consume. New goods, 
whether home made or imported, become part of the standard of 
living, become indispensable or at least desirable, and are 
1 Ibid. , p.39 
(2) Ragnar Nurks e, op. cit. , p.61 
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actively desired as the standard of living rises. should 
distinguish here between two senses of the term 'standard of 
livings: first, standard simply in the sense of aspiration 
the norm to which one aspires, or the measuring rod; secondly, 
standard in the sense of what a country or a community can afford 
on the basis of its own productive efforts. Some articles of 
luxury consumption may well be a part of a country's standard 
of living in the -first but not in the second sense ". 
Nurkse then proceeds to point out that the American standard 
of living, enjoys considerable prestige, for it has come to be 
noticed that American consumption patterns include many 
unnecessary luxuries, and this presents a serious problem for 
the less advanced countries in the world today. He illustrates 
his hypothesis in its international setting by reference to the 
following table based on national income estimates for 70 
countries, compiled by the United Nations Secretariat and 
expressed on the common basis of United States dollars of 1949 
purchasing power.(2) 
(1) 
(1) Ibid., p.62 
(2) Ibid., p.63 
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TABLE SHOWING WORLD 
INCOME DISTRIBUTION, 1949 










High -income countries 67% IV 915 
Middle- income "countries 18;' 15% 310 
Low -income countries 15 67% 54 
Source: A calculation based on National and Per Capita 
Income in 70 countries, 1949, Statistical Office of the United 
Nations, 1950. 
It follows from this statistical evidence that two- thirds 
of the world's income goes to the top 1$ per cent of the world's 
population. This group consists of the United States, Western 
Europe, Australia and New Zealand. Then there is a small 
middle class, including Argentina, Uruguay, South Africa, Israel 
and some countries in Eastern Europe. The lowest income group, 
represented in the table comprises two -thirds of the world's 
population and receives less than ones -sixth of the world's 
income. Thus the so- called backward countries of the world . 
make up two- thirds of the human race, and they cover most of 
Asia, Africa, South -eastern Europe and Latin America. The last 
column of the table gives some idea of the average income levels in 
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the three groups of countries. The income per head of the first 
group, it will be observed, is about seventeen times as high as 
that of the third group. Even though the estimates on which they 
are based are extremely crude and subject to all kinds of doubts 
and reservations, yet the picture they give is not largely 
misleading. 
Howeve?, it is not only that international discrepancies in 
the standards of living are very great, but the fact that 
communication in the modern world is so much closer than ever 
before entails the result that knowledge of these discrepancies 
has greatly increased. True, the strength of the demonstration 
effect varies a great deal as between countries and as between 
different income groups in under- developed countries. It may 
be concentrated among the upper income groups in the towns, but 
it may also be diffused, though li,htly, even among the lower 
income groups, thanks to education and closer communication, 
The demonstration effect may be an important factor in most parts 
of Latin America, but it may be weak and relatively insignificant 
in India and most parts of South-eastern Asia. But practically 
all low-income countries today are to some extent affected by the 
attraction of the consumption patterns of economically advanced 
countries. This attraction is a handicap for the late comers 
in economic development. It affects not only voluntary personal 
saving but also renders it politically more difficult to use 
taxation as a means of compulsory saving and to resist demands for 
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government spending on current account. The use of potential 
domestic -sources of capital can be seriously hampered by the 
impatience and dissatisfaction which the demonstration effect tends 
to produce. 
Thus it may be said that is is not only the absolute but 
also the relative level of real income that determines the 
capacity to save. If that is so, foreign investment may not 
be capable of remóving this handicap. An increase in relative 
income in the less advanced countries is not simply a matter 
of increasing productivity; it is a matter of diminishing the gap 
between their income levels and that of the more advanced countries. 
But foreign investment does not guarantee a reduction in this 
gap. And there is the disturbing possibility that, even if the 
gap should remain unchanged, a rise in the living standards of the 
poorer countries, accompanied by an equal rise in those of the 
richer, may tend to increase the intensity of contact and 
communication between them and hence the strength of the demonstra- 
tion effect. 
In this sense there is a different view of international 
economic relations. The traditional view generally implies that 
a high level of productivity and real income in one country 
cannot possibly hurt other countries and that, on the contrary, 
prosperity tends to spread. There are, of course, many ',rays 
in which one country's prosperity will favourably affect economic 
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conditions in its neighbouring countries as, for instance, in 
the sphere of scientific knowledge. But the demonstration effect 
now discussed is unfavourable. A high income and consumption 
level in an advanced country can do harm in that it tends to 
reduce the domestic means of capital formation in the under- 
developed countries, for it puts extra pressure on countries with 
a relatively low income to spend a high proportion of it. 
Raul Prebisc . in his stimulating essay places much emphasis 
on the fact that the level of productivity in Latin America is 
low because of lack of capital, and that capital is scarce because 
of the small margin of saving, which is due, in turn, to low 
income and law productivity. But he also recognises the 
importance of the attraction exercised in the poorer countries 
by the consumption patterns of the more advanced countries.(1) 
The small rate of saving in the former countries is due not only 
to the low absolute level of real income but also to the higher 
propensity to consume which is the outcome of the attraction of 
superior forms of consumption. The vicious circle that keeps down 
the domestic supply of capital in low-income countries is bad enough 
by itself. Besides, Duesenberry's hypothesis in its international 
setting reveals the fact that the vicious circle tends to be made 
even worse by the stresses that arise from relative as distinct 
from absolute poverty, stresses that are based on demonstration 
leading to imitation. 
(1) c.f. Raul Prebisch, 'The Economic Development of Latin America and its 
Principal Problems,' p.5 
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CHAPTER 21. 
THE SUPPLY OF CAPITAL. 
It is a commonplace that economic progress is a function, 
among other things, of the rate of new capital formation. In 
progressive countries, net capital formation at home is at least 
10 per cent of the national income and in some of them it is 
substantially higher. By contrast, we find that in most under- 
developed countries net capital formation is not as high as 5 per 
cent of the national income, even when foreign investment is 
taken into consideration. In many of these countries, the savings 
have been sufficient only to keep up with population growth, so 
that only a negligible part of the new capital, if any, has 
actually become available for increasing the average standard of 
living. 
How to increase the rate of capital formation is then an 
urgent problem. So far it has been dealt with in terms of saving 
incentives. As has been pointed out, domestic capital formation 
is a matter of institutions, a matter of inflation and a matter 
of taxation. Here it is proposed to consider the question of 
capital formation in its broader context, taking into account the 
contribution that might be made by transfers of capital from 
abroad. 
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1. DOMESTIC SOURCES CF CAPITAL. 
If large -scale industrial and other investment is to be 
carried out, savings must be generated to offset this increment of 
investment. Foreign savings, private voluntary savings out of 
private incomes, and collective or compulsory saving, which is 
achieved if the state collects more in revenue than it disburses 
in current expenditure, are the principal sources of capital 
formation. 
Statistical information about private voluntary savings in 
many underdeveloped countries is very scanty indeed. But on the 
basis of other information regarding saving propensities in some 
ot.ier countries, it may be reckoned that . the rate of saving varies 
between 1 and 2 per cent of the national income. Domestic capital 
formation beyond this limit might therefore bring about 
inflationary tendencies. Since it is hard to increase voluntary 
savings very much in a country where the standard of living is very 
low, it may be said with confidence that voluntary savings are 
likely to be far too small to satisfy the capital targets. Hence 
it might be suggested that for some time to come the main source 
of domestic capital resources will have to come through public 
finance. 
One of the policies of budgeting for development is the 
achievement of an overall deficit, which may be brought about by 
various methods: a reduction in revenues by means of tax 
concessions, or a reduction in the trading profits of public 
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undertakings, or by increased expenditure without tax remissions. 
In this way the government may resort to borrowing for investment, 
or even to the printing press if unemployed resources characterise 
the economic situation. By implication this reasoning makes the 
distinction between a current budget and a capital budget of prime 
importance. Although such búdgeting policy may be appropriate 
under specific conditions, as a broad rule it would lead to 
inflationary tendencies. For, in most of these countries output 
responds less easily to an increase in effective demand even when 
there is unemployed labour, simply because of the lack in factory 
equipment. Owing to the fact that supply elasticities are very 
low, an increase in the effective demand as a result of increased 
public spending does not increase output, or increases it only 
very little. Its main effect is to cause prices to rise and 
start an inflationary spiral. For this reason, we have to rule 
out the possibility of financing capital formation by deficit 
budgeting, and to rely more on creating surpluses of the state 
budget on current account; the overall budget being balanced 
except for foreign loans. Collective savings by the state can 
only be obtained by checking consumption and thus freeing resources 
for the investment programme. The government will therefore have 
to check overall consumption by fiscal measures, and the budget 
surplus thus effected can be used to finance capital formation. 
Unless foreign loans are obtained, the problem now arises of 
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how the additional collective savings necessary for the investment 
target are to be provided. The choice is between reduction in 
current expenditure and increasing revenue from taxation. 
Cuts in: public expenditure are a very popular demand in many 
under -developed countries. However, they are usually slow in 
maturing, and sometimes harmful to the efficiency of the service. 
Strict economy in government expenditure is certainly desirable, 
and overstaffing of government departments or of state enterprises 
should be eliminated. But such staff reductions can only be 
possible if reorganisation of the administration is carried out, 
leading to a better division of labour and an improvement in 
administrative efficiency. Thus not too much reliance ought to 
be placed on these potential economies in government expenditure, 
and it ,is almost certain that increased surplus must mainly come 
from higher revenues. 
It may be assumed that with existing rates of taxes, total 
yields will rise either when prices rise, or when activity is 
pushed to higher levels, or when productivity rises. Methods of 
assessment and collection can also be improved in most under- 
developed countries. Income tax and general revenue tax and 
death duties are the most promising fields in this respect. 
Prevention of tax evasion by strict measures and the immediate 
collection of tax arrears, if any, will bring forth not 
inconsiderable yields. Moreover, land tax is capable of 
producing fairly large amounts of revenue if it is adjusted to 
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present inflated price levels. No system of financing a higher 
rate of development can be evolved which does not place some of 
the burden on the agricultural population. 
From the point of view of economic development, however, a 
faster rate of development may require, among other things, a 
greater revenue surplus which must largely be obtained through 
higher taxation. In other words, both direct and indirect tax 
rates have to be raised in order to contribute to the budget 
surplus. But in respect of indirect taxes, significant increases 
in their rates could only be made in the absence of political 
resistance by the poorer and middle classes. From the revenue 
point of view, however, the high yielding low-cost taxes are 
those on luxury goods. Thus a new purchase tax on these articles 
of luxury may be deemed necessary for development purposes; but 
this measure of course requires a more intimate knowledge of 
consumption habits and a detailed study of family budgets. As 
far as rural and provincial towns are concerned, one feels that 
a local income tax on the famous Swedish model may be an appropriate 
fiscal measure to increase the tempo of rural development. 
Taxation, however, may not only be employed as a main method 
of financing development by releasing a part of the community's 
resources for this purpose, but it can also indirectly contribute 
to development in other ways. For it may be necessary to use 
controls to ration luxury consumption which necessarily competes 
with the development programme. Thus taxation can be employed not 
to effect an over -all reduction of consumption expenditure, but 
to effect a reduction in certain types of consumption expenditure. 
Duties can then be levied heavily on articles of luxury, but 
lightly on capital goods, e.g., machinery, motors, raw materials 
and similar real resources which are of prime importance to 
under- developed countries. However, this fiscal measure would have 
to be supplemented by levying a purchase tax at the same rate on 
similar home -produced articles of luxury. Otherwise, the 
reaction of the rich class would be to substitute home -produced 
for imported luxuries. 
It may also be necessary to use controls to ration 
unessential investment which may compete with the development 
programme. Differential rates of income tax would be one method, 
among others, to perform this task not by an overall reduction in 
investment expenditure, but by a reduction in certain types of 
investment expenditure inconsistent with the development plan. 
Such fiscal discrimination might discourage the flow of saving 
into less useful investment outlets, e.g., investment in land, 
real estate and certain well -established lines of commerce, and 
encourage the flow of savings into more useful investment outlets, 
e.g., industries scheduled in the development plan. On the former 
types of savings, higher rates of income tax may be imposed, while 
on the latter types lower rates or no rates of tax may be imposed, 
or in some cases subsidies may be granted. 
It may also be deemed necessary to restrict imports of goods 
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which compete with similar home -produced goods in domestic markets. 
Thus indirect taxes, principally customs duties, may not only be 
employed to discriminate against unessential consumer goods in 
favour of essential capital goods, but also to afford protection 
to infant industries. 
2. PUBLIC LENDING AGENCIES. 
But it seems quite probable that a large portion of the new 
capital which becomes available in under- developed countries will 
be in the hands of their governments. Domestic savings will have 
largely been created by governmental policies lowering consumption 
relatively to production, or will have been diverted into the 
treasury by taxing profits and rents. It seems also probable that 
much of the foreign capital will be in the form of inter- 
governmental loans. This creates the danger that the greater part 
of the available capital resources will be diverted towards 
financing public undertakings, whilst private business will be 
relatively starved of capital. True, under -developed areas have 
a great need for investment in the public sector; but they have an 
equally great need for investment in the private sector, extra 
capital in the hands of small farmers and manufacturers. The 
danger may indeed be averted if the government uses some of the 
capital to finance institutions lending to private enterprise. 
Indeed most governments have already started farm credit 
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institutions and industrial development banks. 
(A) Farm Credit Institutions: 
Small farmers as well as handicraftsmen are usually financed 
in their peasant production through traders, and a vast amount of 
their capital is raised in this way. But traders lend on onerous 
terms; it was therefore a primary task of some governments to set 
up public financial institutions to lend capital to small farmers 
and handicraftsmen in replacement of this onerous way of money- 
lending. The government investigates their financial needs and 
lends them the required money. But the cost of borrowing in any 
case is rather expensive, whether it is effected through public 
lending agencies or money -lenders. IIowever, this cost can be 
minimised if every village in the rural community establishes a 
co- operative credit society of its own, a society where everyone 
knows everyone else. In this way there will be no cost of 
investigation as . to the credit status of the peasant borrowers, 
and there will be very small costs of lending proper. where a 
co- operative marketing board has already been established, the 
function of money- lending can be coupled with the function of 
distribution. Such a wider scope of co- operation in marketing 
and finance would indirectly encourage thrift among the rural 
population. Furthermore, some of these co- operative societies 
will probably be amalgamated into district organisations and 
central federations. In this way they can easily get hold of 
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enormous sums of money and play a prominent part in the promotion 
of primary production. 
But it is not sufficient guarantee of the security of loans 
granted by the co- operative societies to confine them to selected 
borrowers. Loans should not be given unconditionally to the 
farmers. This would be unwise. Each loan must be linked to a 
specific productive use, and there must be some sort of verification 
that the funds are used only for the purpose for which they have been 
contracted. In under- developed countries, however, the application 
of this idea of conditional lending is not an easy matter. If, for 
instance, a farmer needs to borrow a sum of money, which is 
apparently not linked to any specific productive use, he may find a 
way to get round this difficulty. For instance, he may secretly 
sell some, of his livestock, and then apply for a loan on the false 
pretence of having to buy livestock. Failing this, his financial 
crisis may drive him to borrow from the money- lender on onerous terms. 
Governments of under -developed countries, fully conscious of 
the abuses of money -lending, should refuse to recognise in the 
courts all mortgages and debts of money -lenders. But this being 
done, the governments concerned are under an obligation to create 
a lending organisation to take over the function of private money- 
lending for productive purposes. imioreover, the governments 
concerned should recognise the crises of life in the countryside, 
e.g., famines, droughts, deaths and weddings, which evidently 
require the acquisition of some financial resources. There should 
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be a device whereby farmers are to be ensured against such 
unforeseeable accidents of life. A system of social insurance 
on a national and compulsory basis would ideally serve this purpose. 
The development of agricultural credit in Egypt is indeed 
an interesting case study. In view of the great importance of 
agriculture in the Egyptian economy and the predominance of small- 
scale farming., cheap short -term agricultural credit is more 
necessary than any other form. Yet until 1930 there was 
practically no institution specialising in agricultural credit. 
Farmers obtained their requirements from different sources. 
Growers of sugar -cane, for instance, received advances from the 
Sugar Company. Growers of cotton were sometimes financed by 
local merchants or branches of exporting firms, in return for a 
lien on ,the crop. These merchants in turn often borrowed from 
the banks, so that the rate of interest charged to growers was 
relatively high. Small mortgage loans were also rendered 
inaccessible or expensive by the fact that the, Credit Foncier 
confined itself to large loans. The bulk of credit requirements 
was supplied by village usurers, who charged rates of 30 or even 
40 per cent. 
In 1931 the Credit Agricole d'Egypte was founded with a 
capital of £E., 1,000,000, of which the Government supplied one 
half and the principal banks the other. The Government has, 
moreover, advanced £E.,3,000,000 at 21 per cent, reduced to 11 per 
cent in 1938, and guaranteed shareholders a minimum dividend of 
5 per cent, in return for which it has control over the bank's 
activities. The bank has been utilising the services of 
government tax- collectors for the collection of instalments. This 
and its rather bureaucratic methods have tended to keep away many 
of the smaller growers for whom the bank is principally designed, 
but have not prevented a remarkable development. At the outbreak 
of war it had nearly 5000 'shoonahs'distributed all over the 
country. 
In 1938 the Bank sold on credit 173,000 ardebs (1) of 
cotton seed and 136,000 tons of fertilisers (about 25 per cent of 
the total consumption of seed and fertilisers in that year). The 
total value of such sales amounted to £E.,538,000. The bank's 
advances to growers and co- operatives for purposes of cultivation 
totalled £E.,919,000; and in addition £E.,695,000 was advanced 
against cotton deposited in 'shoonahs'and £E.,$$7,000 against crops. 
In addition to these short -terms the bank has also granted medium - 
term loans (up to ten years) for the purchase of livestock or 
machinery and for land improvement, etc. The total outstanding in 
1937 was £E.,3$5,000. 
The Original object of the bank was the financing of small 
growers; but in view of the very reasonable rates charged - 6 per 
cent for individuals and 5 per cent (later reduced to 4 per cent) 
for co- operatives - big landowners sought increasingly to make use 
of its services by inducing it to advance loans to owners of up 
(1) 1 ardeb = 5.414 bushels. 
to 2C0 feddans 
(1) 
instead of only up to 4q, thus covering over 
99.9 per cent of the landowners. 
The effects of these measures on the development of co- 
operatives were so far -reaching that there has been a project for 
transforming the Credit Agricole into a co- operative bank. Tith 
the eagerness of peasants to obtain cheap credit and the zeal of 
officials to obtain results the number of co- operatives had by 
1931 reached 539, with a membership of 53,000. But the foundation 
of the bank in that year, which advanced loans to individuals and 
co- operatives alike, removed the main attraction of the latter, 
and. their rate of expansion slowed down considerably. In 1939 the 
number of co- operatives was only 793, membership 78,000, advances 
and sales £E1,125,00C, and paid -up capital and reserves wE.,33 4,000. 
Nor did the matter end here. The fact that the Credit Agricole 
advanced to co- operatives at a lower rate than to individuals was 
best appreciated by large land -owners, who began to join the co- 
operatives and secure control over them. 
The co- operatives have attempted to perform many services for 
their members: advances of short, medium and long -term loans, for 
seasonal finance or long -term improvements; sale of produce; 
purchase of household goods; encouragement of village industries, 
etc. 
Nevertheless, there had existed so widespread a dissatisfaction 
with the results so far obtained that in 1940 a Commission was 
(TT- 1 feddan = 1.038 acres. 
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formed to study the defects and prospects of improvement of the 
co- operatives. Its main recommendation was the gradual 
transformation of the Credit Agricole into a Central Bank for 
co- operatives, which should restrict its activities to financing 
the societies. There can be no doubt that such a measure would 
give a great stimulus to co- operation. But there remain several 
important obstacles: first, the peasants' ignorance and imperfect 
appreciation of ,the benefits of co- operatives; secondly, the 
baleful interference of government officials in the affairs of 
the co- operatives; and thirdly, the influence of large landowners 
who secure control over the societies and prevent the emergence of 
a democratic co- operative spirit. 
Under Law No. 139 of 1948, the Statutes of the Credit Agricole 
d'Egypte were amended to enable it to assume the functions of a 
co- operative as well as an agricultural credit bank. The project 
for the creation of a separate co- operative bank was thereupon 
dropped. The capital of thel nk was increased from £E.1 to £E.1l 
millions in 19L9. The functions of the bank include the grant of 
advances for costs of cultivation, harvesting and purchase of 
agricultural machinery, livestock, etc., and the financing of land 
reclamation, advances on crops, sale of fertilizers, seed, etc. 
The Government is authorised to guarantee a minimum dividend and 
to advance to the bank loans of not more than rE, 6 million at 
rates of interest to be determined by agreement between the bank 
and the Government, which cannot claim repayment before the 
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liquidation of the bank. All the bank's advances and loans have 
the first lien on the proceeds of the sale of the produce of the 
year for which the loans are contracted. Advances by the bank 
to cultivators and co- operative societies totalled £E.,13,563,000 
in 1956, compared with £E.,9,076,000 in 1919. 
(B) Industrial Development Banks: 
The facilities afforded by banks in most of the under- 
developed countries fall short of present needs of industrial 
development and a priori will fail to cope with any future 
expansion. Credit institutions in those countries may have 
competent staffs for dealing with staple trades in primary 
products both at home and abroad, but they do lack experience and 
expert knowledge for studying the needs and investigating the 
financial standing; of the industri aT concerns. 
In those countries, no specialised institutions exist for 
granting intermediate or long -term credit to industry. The need 
for a special institution for granting intermediate credit is most 
acutely felt in such countries where the majority of industrial 
firms are'of a relatively small size and cannot afford the large 
cost of a capital issue. It is for this reason that the 
establishment of industrial development banks has been advocated 
to provide long term and intermediate credit for industry, 
catering for the needs of small and medium size firms. 
The Industrial Bank of Japan, for instance, was established 
by the turn of the century with a view to providing finance for 
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state enterprises and some other key industries. It actually was 
instrumental -in developing shipbuilding, transport and other home 
industries, and in carrying out the policy of compulsory 
cartellisation and financial assistance to depressed industries. 
The Industrial Bank of Egypt was formed in 1949 with a capital of 
TE.1,500,000 with the object of developing Egyptian industries by 
participating in the establishment and consolid; tion of industrial 
companies, assisting in the supplying of raw materials and 
machinery, furnishing short, medium and long -term loans, etc. The 
Egyptian Government holds 51 per cent of the shares and the balance 
was subscribed by Egyptian Chambers of Commerce, and by some of 
Egypt's principal industrial concerns. 
Even in an industrially advanced country like Great Britain 
the idea of industrial development banks is not unfamiliar. In 
this country banks have traditionally refrained from having close 
connections with industry, and except for some medium term credit 
to a select group of customers, their role has consisted in 
providifg short term loans and in financing international movement 
of goods. But the prolonged depression in basic industries and 
chronic unemployment in "Special" areas called for the adoption 
of some radical methods of financing industry, since the existing 
channels, i.e., banks and the investing public, were reluctant to 
throw good money after bad. Hence a break_ with tradition was 
initiated when the Bank of England set up two subsidiary companies: 
Bankers Industrial Development Co. and Securities Management Trust 
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to preside over the re- organisation of basic industries and provide 
them with funds for the construction of new works and modernisation 
of equipment. Financial help to depressed industries was normally 
contingent on their acceptance of measures of compulsory 
cartellisation and sometimes entailed formation of mergers and 
closing down of "redundant capacity". Both companies were in fact 
engaged in salvage work and were not concerned with financing of 
new industry proper. In February 1940, the B.I.D.C. ceased to 
function as a credit institution. In January 1945, however, the 
Treasury announced its plans for postwar financial assistance to 
industry, and two finance companies have since been established: 
The Finance Corporation for Industry and the Industrial and 
Commercial Finance Corporation. Their object was to be an 
addition to existing channels of finance, especially where a 
market issue cannot be made or the amount required puts the 
operation outside the scope of normal capitalissue channels. 
It is worthy of note, in this connection, thet most 
governments of under -developed countries have already entered the 
sphere of agricultural and industrial finance by establishing farm 
credit institutions and industrial development banks. But neither 
of these has anywhere received a fraction of the amount of money 
which is really needed to increase agricultural productivity and 
to foster manufacturing industry in the economy. Thus any 
expansion of the funds at the disposal of these credit institutions 
lending to private enterprise should be a main feature of economic 
development. 
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3. EXTERNAL SOURCES OF CAPITAL. 
The ability to have large exports and obtain favourable terms 
for them is of tremendous importance for all under = developed 
countries. It is of particular importance to countries in those 
economies international trade plays a large part. 
If the proceeds of exports are substantial and stable, such 
countries may; be able to satisfy their needs of imports of capital 
goods for development largely out of these proceeds, and thus to 
keep down the volume of borrowing. This may also make it easier 
for them to make replacements in later years. Besides, a 
favourable balance of payments position may have its effect in 
easing the terms and conditions on which external capital may be 
obtained. Favourable and stable terms of trade are thus of prime 
importance to those countries. In this respect,, however, their 
position is traditionally precarious and vulnerable. Primary 
commodities are the main items of these countries, exports; and 
for reasons well explored in economic analysis, such primary 
commodities, particularly industrial raw materials, are open to 
violent price fluctuations. Mor can the fall of primary commodity 
prices be compensated for by an increase in the volume of exports. 
Often the effects of changes in quantities are added to those of 
changes in prices, with the result that the values of total exports 
may vary from year to year as much as 30 per cent. Changes in the 
same direction may also go on for successive years, resulting in a 
total fall in value of more than 50 per cent within a few years. 
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With respect to the terms of trade, the authors of a United 
Nations Report- have drawn attention to the unfair policies of some 
developed countries, which depress the terms of trade of under- 
developed countries and hold up their economic development. First, 
some developed countries undertake to subsidise domestic production 
of some commodities which might be produced mainly by under- 
developed countries. Beet sugar production in U.S.A. and Europe is 
a case in point; other affected commodities are meat and wool. 
Moreover, some industrial countries even export primary commodities 
which they produce in competition with under- developed countries. 
Such a commercial policy reduces the opportunities of the latter 
countries to expand in such fields of production, moves the terms 
of trade against them, and contributes to the disequilibrium of 
world trade. There is also the risk that capital goods may not 
be available in time at the crucial stages of the operation of 
development plans. Such a risk, the authors stress, has to be 
eliminated, and countries economically under -developed have to be 
given an equitable share of the capital goods and other materials 
that are needed for the execution of their planned development.(l) 
The authors have estimated the total capital, which is required 
by under -developed areas in order to raise their average national 
incomes by 2 per cent per annum, to be around $19 billion, i.e., 
20 per cent of their national incomes in l949.( 
2) 
(1) United Nations Report, op.cit., Sections 230, 231, 234, pp.73-74. 
(2) C.P. Statistical Appendix, p.527. 
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This annual investment, they hold, might raise their national 
incomes.. by ab =out 2.5 per cent per annum. But this is not the 
amount by which their standard of living will increase, for their 
populations are growing rapidly and the population growth will 
absorb some of the increased income. In the same year, domestic 
savings fell short of what the estimate requires by nearly S 14 
billion. But under -developed countries need not import as much 
as ,$ 14 billion,annually because their domestic savings might be 
increased by adopting measures requiring domestic action; and 
because, if this investment took place and raised national incomes 
to as much as 2.5 per cent per annum as estimated, some part of the 
increase in national income could be mopped up to increase domestic 
savings. When allowance is made for these two possibilities, it 
remains that a 2 per cent increase in national incomes per head 
cannot be achieved unless capital resources in excess of S 10 
billion are brought annually into under -developed countries. 
It is to be noted here that the investment target of ,$ 19 
billion per annum shows the capital required by the under -developed 
countries. of the world for two purposes: to increase the national 
income by transferring population out of agriculture into non- 
farm occupations, and to increase agricultural yields. The 
capital needed for industry is estimated by the authors to be a 
little over ,$ 15 billion whereas the capital needed for agriculture 
is estimated to be a little less than $ 4 billion in order to 
raise national income per head by 2 per cent per annum. The 
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comparison between these two figures may show the importance of the 
provision of new employment outside agriculture, which is commonly 
called for short "industrialisation ". although this process of 
industrialisation may vary from country to country in accordance 
with the pressure of population and the prospects for improving 
agricultural yields, it is everywhere of the highest priority, 
whether because of the superior productivity of industry, or 
because the improvement of agricultural techniques will reduce the 
need for labour, or because the land is already overcrowded. 
It is to be noted, too, that the authors' estimate of the 
investment target in under -developed countries as being yß'1:9 billion 
per annum is in fact based on two important assumptions. First, 
it is assumed that the annual transfer out of agriculture into 
employment other than in agriculture is 1 per cent of the total 
working population. Secondly, it is assumed that g2,500 represent 
the amount of capital required for each person absorbed into 
non -agricultural employment. This is an average, the authors 
say, which takes into account the low amounts required by those who 
go into light industries, and the very high amounts required in 
heavy industries and in public utilities. It also includes 
expenditure on industrial research and on training. This gives 
the figure of X15 billion a year for the under- developed world as 
a whole, of which 70 per cent is shown by the authors to be 
required for Asia. 
It should also be noted that the authors' estimates include 
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only what is directly required for industry and for agriculture. 
The total capital requirement, including the capital required for 
social overheads, greatly exceeds $ 19 billion. Compare this 
figure with net investment in the United States of America, which 
now runs at between $ 25 and $ 30 billion a year for a population 
one -tenth the size of that of the under -developed areas, and for 
an economy that is already highly developed. Another point which 
is worthy of mention is that the cost of industrialisation, as a 
ratio of the national income, varies inversely with national 
income per head. Industrialisation requires a larger part of the 
national income in poor countries than it does in rich countries, 
because as between countries the cost of industrial capital per 
worker does not vary very much.(1) 
In view of these large investment requirements which, according 
to the authors of the Report, are not beyond the capacity of the 
developed countries to provide, it is of great importance to 
consider how the inflow of capital might be increased. 
(A) Private Investment: 
In respect of private foreign investment, the authors seem to 
hold a rather pessimistic view. In the past decades, private 
purchases of foreign government securities, i.e. 'portfolio' 
investment, as distinct from 'direct' foreign entrepreneurial 
investment, constituted the largest type of foreign capital. It 
has now virtually ceased for European in estors are sometimes 
(1) United Nations Report, op. cit., pp. 75 -79. 
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prohibited by their respective governments from undertaking foreign 
lending: The New York market, moreover, has still not recovered 
from its shock in the 1930's, when some governments defaulted 
payment on their borrowings in the previous decade. At present it 
is but a matter of speculation to estimate the demand and supply 
of this type of foreign investment. On the demand side, it is 
very likely that the demand for this type of capital may not be 
large simply because the borrowers with the best credit alone 
could look forward to borrow more cheaply in the open market than 
they can borrow from the Export- Import Bank, or from the 
International Bank. On the supply side, individual investors are 
no longer likely to be interested in such a type of foreign 
investment. True, institutional lenders, e.g. banks and 
insurance companies have superseded individual lenders in 
importance in the capital market; but even as far as institutional 
lending is concerned,the United States Government forbids investment 
in foreign securities.(1) 
Practically all the private foreign investment now taking place 
is direct investment in branches or subsidiaries effectively 
controlled by the capital -exporting countries. In recent years, 
the experts have estimated that about 70 per cent of direct 
investment has been going to petroleum, and very little foreign 
investment is taking place outside the oil -bearing countries. 
Many obstacles indeed stand in the way of the further 
(1) Ibid. p. 80. 
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expansion of yri vate foreign investment. Some under -developed 
countries, for instance, do not favour this type of investment 
for they fear foreign control of the important sectors of their 
economy, and they resent the high cost of foreign private capital. 
This is the reason why at present opportunities are denied to 
foreigners. Public utilities which used to be the most 
attractive private foreign investment in many backward areas are 
now being reserved to domestic private enterprise, or else are 
being operated under public control. Besides, foreign companies 
are often denied the opportunity of leasing land for agricultural 
production; and even mining is sometimes reserved to domestic 
entrepreneurs or the state. 
The second obstacle in the way of foreign private investment 
is the f ,act that some governments of capital- importing countries 
impose arbitrary acts which might frustrate the security of 
foreign investment. A third and more serious obstacle is that 
capital- importing countries cannot guarantee that foreign investors 
will be allowed to remit their profits home in foreign currency or 
to retire their investments, simply because it is beyond the 
power of those countries to ensure that necessary foreign exchange 
will always be available. 
Finally, some foreign investment is held back by the existence 
of double taxation. It is therefore to be hoped that the 
governments of capital -exporting countries will provide legal 
exemptions from double taxation of profits earned abroad, and that 
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the governments of capital -importing countries will enter into 
agreement with other governments concerned in order to provide for 
the protection of foreign investments. (1) 
(B) Governmental Lending: 
At present there are two main sources of foreign lending, 
namely the United States Export- Import Bank and the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The loans of the Exort- 
Import Bank wére °at one time confined to Latin America; but they 
are now being made available to all countries. 
The International Bank, it is reported, has been lending to 
under -developed areas at a rate well below 0 300 million annually 
and expects not to exceed that figure in the next few years. At 
the beginning it was feared the Bank would not be able to borrow 
enough money to lend on the required scale; but it has lately 
succeeded in making its issues acceptable in the capital markets. 
Then the Bank was bound by a narrow interpretation of its articles 
of agreement, which seemed to confine it to lending sums of foreign 
exchange needed to purchase equipment and materials for specific 
projects. In the opinion of the authors, although the articles 
seem to be more liberally interpreted, there is still the 
impression that the Bank attaches great importance to the foreign 
currency aspects of development. `~That is really important, they 
say, is to build up the capacity of under -developed countries to 
(1) For detailed study see Royal Institute of International Affairs, The 
Problem of International Investment, London, 1937. 
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produce goods and services, and the Bank should start from this 
point rather' than from a measurement of currency needs. If 
development succeeds, the transfer problem of meeting the debt 
charges should take care of itself.(1 
Even apart from these technical difficulties in the way of 
economic development, a further obstacle to greater lending by the 
Bank is the unpreparedness of the governments of most under- 
developed countries. Some of them may not show the desire to 
develop their economies or understand adequately what is involved. 
And, even if there is the desire to make rapid progress, lending 
may be slow, for some borrowers lack the facility to absorb 
imported capital rapidly. They may lack the technical staff to 
make surveys and prepare concrete plans, to construct capital works 
and to operate large new undertakings. The Bank has started to 
meet this difficulty by sending out its own survey missions and by 
giving technical assistance in the preparation of plans. 
A further obstacle is the fact that the amount that can 
profitably be invested at a 4 per cent rate of interest depends on 
the amount which is being spent at the same time on providing social 
capital, e.g., public health, education, roads and communications. 
There is much to be done in this way before under -developed 
countries will be in a position to absorb large amounts of loan 
capital. 
This discussion of governmental lending, however, should raise 
(1} United Nations Report, op. cit., Sec. 266, p. 83. 
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the basic need for a more objective approach to international 
co- operation: Frankel, in this connection, has emphasised that 
not only is the revival of private investment desirable, as is 
generally agreed, but that decisions by such international agencies 
as the International Bank must themselves increasingly be freed 
from political pressures which make economic criteria of investment 
impossible to apply, either before, or after, the investment 
decision is made. "Investment involves a continuing process of 
decision -making," he says, "it involves enterprise per se, and it 
involves therefore the recognition of the need for a large variety 
of institutions able to conduct it according to evolving 
international law or custom, and free from interference as long as 
such law or custom is adhered to. Without the human agencies 
able to,conduct continuous economic operations, unhampered by 
fiscal or other exactions foreign to their purpose, the growth of 
capital in any form is impossible; and foreign investment becomes 
a farce however much this may be camouflaged. This is especially 
true of investment in under -developed areas where the experience 
and aptitútde for modern enterprise and the fashioning of 
administrative devices for its social control are so recent.' 
(l ) 
In Frankel's opinion, therefore, it might prove very valuable if 
institutions like the International Bank were given the opportunity 
to develop agreed comparative criteria of world investment, criteria 
(1) S. Herbert Frankel, op. cit., pp. 80 -81. 
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which would be applied continously as a code of international 
conduct relating to the investment itself, and recognised by 
national governments as such. 
Apart from the need for a more objective approach to 
international co- operation, the authors even feel that the 
International Bank has not adequately realised that it is an agency 
charged by the United Nations with the duty of promoting economic 
development. In their judgment, the bank "should do everything 
that lies in its power to break down the obstacles to sound 
investment in the under -developed countries. The Bank should set 
itself to reach, within five years, some such target as an annual 
rate of lending of not less than $ 1 billion a year to the under- 
developed countries. If it shows no sign of approaching this 
target, the whole question of the proper international organisation 
for the provision of adequate amounts of loan capital to the under- 
developed countries should be reviewed by the United Nations. "(l) 
It has also been proposed that, since the International Bank 
cannot make equity investments and some companies cannot raise all 
the equity capital they need for making direct foreign investments, 
an International Finance Corporation should be established "Ii:ith 
authority to make loans in local and foreign currencies to private 
enterprise without the requirement of government guarantees, and 
also to make non -voting equity investments in local currencies in 
participation with private investors. 
(2) 
1 United Nations Report, op. cit. Section 268, p. 84.. 
2 Partners in Progress, A Report to the President by the International 
Development Advisory Board, U.S. Government Printing Office, March, 1951,p.84. 
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(C) Inter -Governmental Grants: 
As has been pointed out, governments of under -developed 
countries will have to spend large sums in improving the human 
factor in development before rapid economic progress can begin 
to be made. So they will have to spend large sums on education, 
on public health, on agricultural extension services and on basic 
social capital. Most of these countries lack the money required 
for these purposes and they cannot borrow it. without this money, 
however, development can only proceed at a slow rate. It is for 
this reason that experts recommend the creation of some mechanism 
for transferring sums of money from the developed to the under- 
developed countries by way of grants -in -aid. The principle 
underlying a mechanism of this sort is based upon the idea that 
the rich should help the poor on an international scale. The 
desirability of such transfers need not be questioned, at least 
so long as they are compatible with the maintenance or, better 
still, expansion of world income. Besides, we need not entertain 
any exaggerated notions about the size of such income transfers. 
Let us only remember that 2 per cent of the United States/ 
national income would be equal to about 7 per cent of the combined 
national income of all low- income countries outside the Soviet orbit. 
The post -war years have witnessed the beginnings of a 
system of international income transfers. As a result of closer 
contact and communications, people in the United States 
have become increasingly conscious of the discrepancies 
in living standards, of the hunger, poverty, disease 
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and illiteracy that prevail in two- thirds of the world. The 
humanitarian aspects of Point Four have been associated with an 
emotional tone in the reports and official publications concerning 
these problems. Both the Gray Report of November 1950(1) and the 
Rockefeller Report of March 1951(2) came out in favour of a 
sizable flow of governmental grants from the United States to the 
low- income areas of the world as part of the foreign aid 
programmes of the United States. 
In the past, international unilateral transfers may have 
occurred to some extent under the guise of foreign investment. It 
has been argued that foreign investments have, in part, turned out 
to be haphazardly distributed gifts, because of subsequent default. 
But this is a very awkward solution since default interferes with 
the continuity of the flow. Default is therefore considered 
(3) 
unwise and immoral. 
Again we encounter the basic pressures that make for income 
transfers from rich to poor when relatively advanced countries are 
associated with economically backward areas in the form of colonies. 
In Western European countries in the last two or three decades it 
has been a fashionable question to ask: do colonies pay? The 
answer of the experts has usually been in the negative. Recent 
Ti--) A Report to the President on Foreign Economic Policies, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, November, 1950. 
(2) Partners in Progress, A Report to the President by the International 
Development Advisory Board, U.S. Government Printing Office, March, 1951. 
(3) Ragnar Nurkse, op. cit., p. 79. 
colonial history seems, on the whole, to support this view. For 
instance, M.X. Knight, the American economic historian, finds that 
in Algeria the local government's budget deficits were covered 
directly by the French Treasury and that the framework of a system 
of railways, roads and ports was laid down as an outright gift 
from the French taxpayer.(l) 
Quite apart, however, from the humanitarian, or the incon- 
venient but inevitable, aspects of international gifts and grants, 
do such transfers provide a sufficient and satisfactory solution 
to the problem of capital accumulation in under- developed areas? 
International grants can of course be used for capital formation 
in the same way as loans. In the case of loans, however, there 
is generally some pressure to use them Et least for specific 
productive purposes so that interest and amortization requirements 
can be met later on. But in the case of grants, even this 
pressure does not exist. Grants can be used directly or 
indirectly for consumption without any subsequent inconvenience. 
But while a country's capacity to absorb foreign aid for current 
consumption is presumably unlimited, there exist fairly definite 
bounds to absorptive capacity if the aid is to be applied to 
capital formation. They arise from a country's backwardness 
itself and from the lack of various overhead facilities in the 
early stages of development. Capital development schemes usually 
require large movements of people as well as of material goods; 
(1) Ibid. pp. 79-80. 
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but in under -developed areas, mobility is impeded by lack of 
transport, housing and public facilities of all kinds. 
Such local bottlenecks that limit a country's absorptive 
capacity for investment purposes tend to accentuate the general 
difficulty of ensuring the productive use of external resources. 
The earmarking of particular foreign loans or grants to specific 
investment projects may do something to ensure the productive use 
of funds, but it is not by any means a basic remedy. As Nurkse has 
pointed out, only' where there is no domestic saving at all to start 
with can such earmarking be fully effective. It is not otherwise 
an infallible method of increasing the räte of investment., for it 
cannot prevent a substitution of external for domestic sources of 
capital. Under the European Recovery Programme the specific 
project approach was followed to some extent in the release of 
counterpart funds for reconstruction and new investment projects. 
But as an illustration of the futility of the specific project 
method of control the following story has been told by the same 
author. "The Austrian government;' so the story goes, "asked for 
the release of counterpart funds to reconstruct the Vienna opera. 
The E.C.A. is said to have replied that this would not be a 
productive investment and that the release could not be granted for 
this purpose. Then the Austrian government remembered that it was 
itself financing the construction of an electric power plant in 
the mountains. It v, ent back to the E.C.A. and asked for a relase 
of counterpart funds to pay for this piece of construction, to 
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which the E.C.I. agreed. So. all that happened was a switch: 
the wily Austrians, having got the E.C.A. to take over the 
financing of the power plant, now financed the reconstruction of 
the opera from their own resources.:r(1) 
The desire of the lending or giving country to tie its aid to 
specific investment projects is understandable, but this procedure 
by itself cannot assure the desired effect. The European Recovery 
Programme was first and foremost an investment compaign. " :uch can 
be learned from it," says Nurkse, 'lin regard to the international 
financing of capital formation, but its main lesson is the vital 
need for plans and policies designed to make sure that top priority 
is given for capital formation in the over -all allocation of 
available resources, domestic as well as external. The American 
E.C.A. was insistent from the start that American aid should be 
matched by the greatest possible mobilisation of domestic resources 
in the receiving countries. In fact, under this programme the 
domestic resources used for capital formation in Western Europe as 
a whole were several times greater than the amount of American 
aid."(2) 
The authors of the United Nations Report, in this connection, 
have formulated a comprehensive plan for the establishment by the 
United Nations of an International Development Authority with power 
to make grants to the governments of under -developed countries. 
Its main functions are the following: 
(1) Ibid. pp. 95--19b 
(1) Ibid. 
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(a) Decision upon and administration of the distribution of 
grants -in-aid for certain specific purposes listed below and 
to verify their utilisation. 
(b) Co- operation with under -developed countries in preparation 
and co- ordination of plans of economic development by 
affording general assistance and, where necessary, by providing 
the services of technical experts and by giving grants for 
the preparation of plans. 
(c) Assistance in implementing development plans, especially in 
the procurement of scarce resources, e.g., capital goods and 
technical personnel. 
(d) Making periodic reports regarding the preparation and progress 
of plans of economic development. 
The following purposes are considered by the authors as 
eligible for grants; other purposes, which are capable of 
being self -supporting, should be financed by borrowing: 
(a) Research and education. This includes grants for agricultural 
extension services, technical schools, farm schools, local 
universities and for training technicians abroad, grants to 
departments of governments, research institutes or universities, 
wherever located, working on problems of under -developed 
countries; 
(b) Public health programmes, emphasising preventive medicine 
and nutrition rather than curative medicine; 
(c) Subsidisation of medium and short -term farm credit; 
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(d) Improvement of rural public works. This includes grants for 
roads, rural water supplies, land reclamation, drainage, soil - 
conservation, and afforestation. 
The authors considered whether there should not also be created 
an institution to make loans at very low rates of interest for 
investment in social capital in general, e.g., roads. They have 
concluded that this is not necessary, since exactly the same 
rurpose can be met by combining a loan from the International Bank 
with a grant -in -aid from the International Development Authority, 
in cases where an undertaking desirable on social grounds, could 
not meet the full burden of loan finance. 
Besides, the authors have drawn attention to the great 
of the time factor in the process of economic development. 
Even if the authors/ recommendations in respect of external, 
technical and financial assistance were all put into operation, 
they are still conscious of the fact that it would be some years 
before the rate of the flow of capital into the under- developed 
countries reaches a satisfactory level. The rate of expenditure 
of grants may be slow at first, because it takes much time to 
prepare plans for spending money and to assemble the persons who 
are required for carrying out the plans. Besides, the growth of 
private investment and loan capital will lag behind the 
expenditure of grants. The authors, moreover, lay much emphasis 
on the need for social and legal changes and for education and 
intensive training of industrial workers and technicians, which 
require minimum outlay on social overheads before rapid economic 
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development can begin. Time and money are also needed to obtain 
statistical data and to prepare development plans. Planning takes 
time. It is therefore essential that this period of initial 
preparation be cut down as far as possible, and the authors 
recommend that the proposed international development authority 
take steps to shorten this period. 
In framing their recommendations regarding international 
measures which are, in their opinion, necessary and practicable 
in the sense that they represent the minimum required in view of 
the magnitude and the urgency of the problem, and in the sense that 
they are well within the capacity of the advanced countries, the 
authors are, however, well aware of the political difficulties 
standing in the way of their implementation. Meanwhile, they 
realise that from the viewpoint of under- developed countries the 
following question is of utmost importance: What is the extent of 
external aid on which these countries can count in drawing up their 
development plans? In their opinion, however, international action 
may be held up for different reasons and no definite answer can be 
offered in the existing international situation. Tven so, under- 
developed countries cannot afford to delay action. The authors 
well recognise the urgency of the problem, and call upon those 
countries to proceed immediately with formulation of plans and 
their implementation. In fact many of them would find it 
best not to count on any substantial external aid. "It cannot 
be denied," the authors say, "that most of the under- 
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developed countries will find it extremely difficult to make 
progress in the initial stages without effective international aid. 
Even with such aid, their task would be difficult enough. As we 
visualise it, economic development of these countries will require 
fundamental changes in their social and economic structure, a large 
effort at mass education, and very intelligent husbanding of 
resources. This arduous task would be rendered more manageable 
if some external aid in terms of personnel and finance were 
available. In its absence, the task would indeed be formidable. 
Its essential nature would not, however, be changed; it would only 
call for a greater intensity of effort in all directions. The 
need for social cohesion and solidarity would be greater than ever, 
for the sacrifices imposed on the people by the initiation of the 
process of development would be larger and the period for which 
they have to wait for its fruits longer. It would call for great 
ingenuity in adaptation, in seizing all opportunities, making all 
economies, however small, and in quickening the pace of the whole 
process. The situation will make enormous demands on intelligence 
in planning, honesty, and ability in execution, and on discipline 
within the communit--. TT 
1) 
(1 ) United Nations Report, op. cit. pp. 88-89. 
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CHAPTER 22. 
ARE SOME TYPES OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
MORE IMPORTANT THAN OTHERS? 
1. THE FOUR PROPOSITIONS. 
Bottlenecks in economic development are not only confined to 
social, legal, administrative and financial problems, but problems 
no less difficult and exhaustive are involved in choosing the 
targets for the development programme, in formulating and putting 
it into operation. 
As far as the proper disposal of the community's resources 
between various types of economic activity, i.e., the objectives 
of the development programme, are concerned, the marginal principle 
of the ''little more' and the 'little less' well- known in economic 
analysis can hardly apply in planning economic development in 
under -developed countries. Major structural readjustments are 
inevitably essential even though they do involve difficulties in 
the assessment of cost and productivity. It is for this reason 
that planers in under -developed countries have to fall back upon 
their qualitative judgments to choose between consumption and 
investment, or human investment or investment in material goods, 
or free trade and autarchy, or public works and other types of 
investment, or industry and agriculture. 
It would be wrong, however, to give the impression that the 
problem in each case is that of choosing between one type of 
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activity and another. Progress must be made on all fronts 
simultaneously and in a balanced way. The problem in each case 
is only that of relative emphasis. Nevertheless, one might put 
forward the following four propositionsin respect of priorities 
in general: (a) In the case of a stagnant economy, its revival 
should be the top priority, and this can be achieved by treating 
the economy to foreign trade; (b) In under-populated countries, 
concentration on increasing food supplies should be the guiding 
policy; (c) In over -populated countries, more emphasis should 
be laid on industry rather than on agriculture, exporting 
manufactured goods in return for food imports; (d) Whatever the 
condition of the area may be, expansion of those industries which 
earn or save foreign exchange should be the top priority, for the 
shortage of foreign exchange is one of the major difficulties in 
the way of economic development. The second and third 
propositions in the above list of priorities, however, have 
seemed to arouse much interest and. controversy in many under- 
developed countries. It is therefore worth while to refer to 
such misconceptions as may arise in the minds of planners in those 
countries in so far as the relative emphasis of industry and 
agriculture in the formulation of development plans is concerned. 
2. INDUSTRIALISATION OR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT? 
So far the whole discussion has been general in character, 
not related to any particular country or countries. However, as 
we turn to consider the question of priority as between industry 
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and agriculture, it is impossible to go on without making at least 
a broad- distinction between two types of countries, roughly 
described as 'overpopulated' and 'under- populated'. 
With reference to the two possible views on the relationship 
between population and capital formation, it has been pointed out 
that domestic resources can be mobilised in a country where there 
is much surplus labour on the farms. Population is viewed as a 
possible source of supply of capital. The other view stresses 
population size, as well as population growth, as a factor 
governing the total amount of capital required. A large 
population needs a large amount of capital and an increase in 
population calls for an increase in capital. The second view, is 
apt to emphasise the need for investment, domestic and foreign, 
in order to offset the adverse effect of population growth on 
consumption per head and also to provide a possibility for 
increasing income per head, i.e., both extensive and intensive 
investment. 
These two approaches however, do not exclude each other, and 
neither áf them is likely to be universally valid. If the first 
approach applies to the densely populated peasant economies, it 
may be that the second is more applicable to sparsely populated 
areas including, for instance, South America. It might seem 
paradoxical,Nurkse remarks, to suggest that such regions as those of 
South America, which, on the whole, have a higher level of income 
per head, are more dependent on foreign assistance than the 
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overcrowded peasant countries. It is not a conclusion worth 
emphasising for practical purposes. It is based only on the 
rapid rate of population growth coupled with the absence of 
disguised unemployment on any mass scale.(1) 
In discussing the question of priorities in under- developed 
countries, however, it might be suggested that a transfer of 
people from the 'unproductive' to the 'productive' occupations 
seems to be the solution, but it completely begs the question of 
capital supply. The main reason for this difference in 
productivity as between different occupations may be that in the 
one little capital is used, while in the other, production is 
relatively capital-intensive. In particular, this may be one 
reason for the difference stressed so much in under -developed 
countries between the level of productivity in agriculture and 
in industry. It is not so much that agriculture is inherently 
less productive than industry, as is sometimes thought, although 
demand conditions, and other circumstances as well, do create 
important differences between the two types of productive activity. 
There exists apparently a statistical correlation between the 
degree of industrialisation and the level of average income in 
different countries, but from this it is not legitimate that the 
former causes the latter. The two things may both be due to 
a third factor: namely, the supply of capital. Modern industry 
is highly productive because it uses a lot of capital. In 
(1) C.f. Ragnar Nurkse, op. cit. p. 50. 
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advanced industrial countries labour has the immense advantage 
of being supported by a great deal of capital, in agriculture as 
well as in manufacturing industry. For an under -developed 
country a transfer of labour from agriculture to industry is, by 
itself, no solution, for it does not by itself provide the 
capital necessary for industry. The problem of capital formation 
must be solved first.(- 
The productive use of the rural excess labour in the densely 
populated countries seemsto provide at least a partial solution 
of the problem of capital formation, for it is possible to get 
more capital from domestic sources by drawing labour away from 
agriculture without a cut in consumption. The same solution may 
be conceivable for the sparsely populated countries, but not 
without a radical improvement in the techniques and methods of 
agricultural production. This is indeed a pre- condition of 
industrialisation in sparsely populated countries where conditions 
for an advance in farming techniques are favourable at least 
inasmuch as land, by definition, is relatively plentiful. In 
those countries an increase in agricultural productivity must 
have top priority over everything else. The reason for this is 
that the great majority of the population, even in the sparsely 
populated areas, is in agriculture. If labour is wanted for 
capital formation, agriculture is the place to look for it. 
Moreover, in agriculture some increases in productivity are 
(1 ) Ibid., p. 51 
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possible that do not require much, if any, capital. There is 
the possibility of applying improved knowlede in seed selection, 
soil conservation, crop rotation, the use of fertilisers, 
livestock feeding, fighting insect pests etc. In a great many 
ways, a great deal could be done, and is now being done, that 
does not require heavy capital investment. 
But in densely populated countries, a substantial improvement 
of agricultural technique can come perhaps only as a result of 
industrial development. In sparsely populated countries, by 
contrast, an improvement in agriculture is the pre -requisite for 
capital formation and industrial development. This conclusion 
is well stated in the United Nations Report thus: "In a country 
where there is no surplus labour, industrialisation waits upon 
agricultural improvement. The way to industrialisation lies 
through the improvement in agriculture The reverse is the 
case in a country where population is so large in relation to 
cultivable land, that the land is carrying more people than can 
be fully employed in agriculture substantial technical 
progress in agriculture is not possible without reducing the 
numbers engaged in agriculture." lì 
In the two cases of overpopulation and under population there 
is one thing in common, there is an increase in total output: in 
the one case it occurs through the use of previously unemployed 
labour, in the other through technical improvements in 
(1) United Nations Report, op. cit., p. 59. 
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agriculture. Common to both is also an increase in farm 
productivity-in the sense of output per worker engaged in 
agriculture, even though in the first it comes about through a 
withdrawal of excess labour rather than an advance in agricultural 
techniques. In both cases, too, the problem of saving is the 
problem of channelling as much as possible of the increment in 
total output into capital formation. It is not a matter of 
cutting down consumption. To keep a firm check on the rise in 
living standards should be easier than actually to reduce the 
level of living. Yet it is hard enough, in view of the forces 
pressing for higher immediate consumption. 
A possible difference that appears from the consideration of 
the two cases is that, as far as the prospects and potentialities 
of domestic capital formation are concerned, overpopulated 
countries might be better off, because they have a large surplus 
of unused labour that could be set to work on capital formation. 
The thinly populated countries do not have the surplus population 
that could be used for capital construction; they are faced with 
the prior problem of having to create the surplus labour through 
improvements in agriculture. In other respects, however, the 
latter countries are better off. Many of them have a higher 
average income to start with. The very fact that they have much 
land in relation to population should tend to provide more scope 
for increased productivity in agriculture. And in any case, the 
mere possession of a surplus labour force in the over- populated 
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countries js no guarantee of progress. It is an advantage only 
if, and in so far as, the surplus labour force can be effectively 
used for real capital accumulation. (1) 
3. SELECTION OF INDUSTRIES. 
Development planning, as far as priorities are concerned, 
should not only be viewed from the angle of the relative emphasis 
in respect of agriculture and industry in under -developed countries, 
but also from the angle of the relative adequacy of different 
manufacturing industries in any development programme. In other words 
we are not here primarily concerned with the choice :between 
primary and secondary production as being of top priority, but 
rather with the choice as between different lines of economic activity 
in secondary production. Manufacturing industries indeed vary 
widely in their requirements of power, skill, capital, heavy raw 
materials, and so on, and each country must be careful to make the 
most appropriate choice. Nevertheless, an attempt can only be made 
to indicate some broad criteria for the selection of industries in 
the formulation of any development programme. The problem of 
selection should of course involve considerations of demand and cost 
factors in the process of industrialisation. 
Let us first assume that the provision of capital in some way or 
another brings about a certain rate of industrial expansion, an 
increase in real income and a consequential steady increase in market 
(1) Ragnar Nurkse, op. cit. pp. 55-56. 
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demand. Then such an increase is presumably distributed over various 
industries, and hence the new selling possibilities created by the 
expansion of the domestic market would then be taken as a provisional 
guide to the direction of industrialisation. But this demand 
criterion may or may not conflict with the traditional doctrine of 
comparative costs which lays down that each country should produce 
those commodities which it is best suited to produce and dispose, 
through the channels of foreign trade, of that part of its output 
which is surplus to home requirements. 
However, there is a wide range of industries where the demand 
criterion could be applied without question. This is the case with 
the so- called 'sheltered' industries whose products do not normally 
pass through the channels of foreign trade, e.g., road -making, 
housebuildirng, retail trade, the generation of electricity and other 
kindred industries. This is also the case with the existing export 
industries provided that costs are not pushed up through their 
expansion and that world demand conditions remain unaltered. In so 
far as these industries are concerned, it may be assumed that the 
country concerned has a comparative advantage and in the face of an 
increased home demand, it would therefore be justifiable to expand 
them. 
It is only in the remaining field of non -specific products, i.e., 
products which are imported in whole or in part, or goods which are 
so far not produced in the country owing to the lack of demand for 
them, that the demand criterion alone could not be taken to be a 
521. 
decisive guide. The comparative cost doctrine would seem to provide 
the additional criterion. But as far as the long run view is 
concerned, the state could foster the development of those industries 
which do not improve their immediate competitive position, but in 
which the actual disadvantage is smallest, or is expected to turn 
into a smaller disadvantage or into an actual advantage in the near 
future. In other words, output plans would be based on prospective 
costs on the assumption that costs will in fact be different in 
future, under the influence of deliberate policies. However, 
estimates of what costs will be in future are little more than guess 
work, and the relevant decisions are necessarily arbitrary. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to make a few generalisations in 
respect of the probable lines of industrial development in under- 
developed countries. To start with, unskilled labour is relatively 
the most abundant and hence the cheapest factor. This being given, 
it is naturally in the so- called 'light' industries, i.e., industries 
which are labour-intensive, that industrial development could be 
started; and, particularly in those industries in which 
mechanisation involves a reduction in skill requirements that capital 
equipment will be increased and improved, e.g., textile industries 
and the boat and shoe industry. As a general rule, some consumption 
goods industries, which are included among the 'light' industries, 
will develop first. Apart from mining, buildings, public utilities, 
repair and assembly, capital goods as well as certain consumption 
goods industries, e.g., drink and tobacco, which are included among 
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the 'heavy' industries will expand only at later stages. 
Although this sequence has been observed throughout the history 
of industrialisation, the high capital or skill requirements of the 
'heavy' constructional industries may not check their development 
at the initial stages, provided specific conditions do exist. They 
may enjoy cost advantages owing to their proximity to rich sources 
of raw materials, or they may from the beginning find a market 
outside manufacturing, e.g:, in an expanding agriculture or in 
mining, or if a country fears that it will not be able to obtain a 
steady and continuous supply of capital goods required for its 
development. But apart from such exceptions, it is only in the 
course of time that productive skills can be developed, and more 
capital -intensive techniques of production or industries requiring 
higher capitalisation will come into the range of profitability.l) 
(1) I. Mandelbatmi, The Industrialisation of Backyard Areas, Institute Of 
Statistics, Monograph No. 2, Oxford., 1947, pp. 11 -16. 
See also Maurice Dobb, Some Aspects of Economic Development, Delhi School 
of Economics, Delhi, 1951, p. 34, seq. 
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CHAPTER 23. 
PLANNING IN PRACTICE. 
As far as the techniques of planning are concerned, once the 
objectives of the plan have been set out, the next task of the 
planners is to formulate the development plan and put it into 
operation. In this respect, the first step is to establish technical 
survey organisations to find out what resources are available. 
Geological, biological, and engineering surveys and market surveys 
are needed, first of all, before the country is in a position to 
begin development planning. In addition to technical surveys, 
economic surveys should also be undertaken. Two further steps must 
be taken for this purpose. The first is the survey of all economic 
institutions which can stimulate and mobilise domestic savings, the 
survey of the existing commercial law which can inspire the 
confidence of people, and the survey of the scale of organisation of 
business units, whether they be in agriculture, industry, commerce 
or services of marketing and transport. The second is the 
formulation of manpower budget as well as similar budgets showing 
the magnitude and utilisation of the scarce resources as between 
different lines of production. These budgets have to be coupled with 
industry studies, the so- called input- output matrix, and national 
income analysis, showing how it is produced, distributed, and spent 
on consumption, investment, or public expenditure. They have also 
to be coupled with a national income account, showing the 
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distribution of income as between the different social groups in 
the society. 
Having made these surveys, plans for public expenditure, have 
then to be drawn up normally covering several successive years, five - 
year or ten -year plans. Some plans cover all public expenditure 
while others cover only public capital formation. In the process of 
drawing up the first of these plans, the several agencies of the 
government are compelled to look ahead, to re- examine their objectives 
and to determine their priorities. Such plans, however, have to 
include the proposals for all government agencies, including public 
undertakings. When these departmental plans are put together, the 
central planning authorities are enabled to relate them to each other, 
and further to set priorities in the light of the total amounts of 
money which are likely to be obtainable for public spending. There 
can then be formulated a well- balanced consistent plan, which enables 
the financial authorities to make their arrangements well in advance, 
and which sets the technical personnel precise tasks for a 
considerable period ahead. This is a great advantage both for the 
government which has its targets precisely formulated and for the 
people who get to know what the government is intending to do in 
the economic life of the society. 
Once the plan has been drawn up, it has then to be Lout into 
operation, but in this respect it faces three problems. The first is 
drawing the line between the public sector and the private sector in 
the national economy. The problem seems to be largely a political 
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issue, but the government anyway has to assume special responsibility 
in so far as the private sector is concerned. In the field of 
i ndustry, it can set up new industries publicly owned and administered 
for a certain period of time, and then sold or leased to private 
entrepreneurs on easy terms as a device to encourage businessmen to 
operate risky undertakings. Or, it may build up industrial centres 
so as to obtain, once and for all, the external economies and 
facilities available when many factory premises are grouped together 
in one centre. It can also finance technical training and establish 
industrial development banks in order to meet the danger that a 
large part of the new capital available for financing development 
will go to the public sector to the neglect of the private sector. 
Similarly, to the field of agriculture, it has an equally important 
part to play in providing capital for small farmers through farm 
credit institutions, in financing agricultural extension services, 
and in ensuring a sound agricultural organisation. 
The second problem is what the government has to do to ensure 
that businesses in the private sector carry out that part of the 
development plan which is left to private enterprise. Two alternatives 
are open to the government: either to offer inducements, in the 
form of taxes and subsidies, to private enterprise so that it finds 
it most profitable to do what the plan really calls for; or to 
devise a system of licences, quotas and other direct controls, so 
that private enterprise is not free to do business in the most 
profitable way, but only in a way not inconsistent with the 
development plan. 
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The third problem is how to raise the new capital resources 
that are necessary for financing the planned development. In this 
respect, it is a natural tendency in under -developed countries to 
stress the importance of the external factors of development. The 
freer international movement of capital on reasonable terms and the 
facilitation of the general diffusion of the world's stock of 
technical knowledge and skills are major contributions which the 
more advanced countries of the world can make to the less advanced. 
They are contributions of the greatest importance. But they will 
not suffice. without genuine co- operation from the countries to be 
benefited they will not be effective. Even if the utmost help from 
these external factors is given, the problem of economic development 
will not begin to have a practicable solution unless the under- 
developed countries dedicate their own resources, human, physical 
and financial, to a sound and persistent attack on those basic 
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